Recommendation: The NPO Cost Savings Program Manager should work with CNS to evaluate the remaining site reinvestment funds and develop and implement a plan for how best to aggregate and use them. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation. In comments on a draft of the report, DOE stated that NPO plans to work with CNS on a plan for the remaining reinvestment funds, with an estimated completion date of December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should gather data on and document an analysis of the Cost Savings Program, including its cost effectiveness, to determine whether it is exportable to existing or future contracts. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred, in principle, with the recommendation. In its comments on a draft of the report, NNSA stated that potential benefits of the cost savings program should be considered for future contracts, as applicable. NNSA stated that it believes this recommendation is closed with actions to address other recommendations. We disagree and continue to believe that NNSA should document an analysis of the cost savings program, including its cost effectiveness, to determine the exportability of the program to other contracts.

Recommendation: The NPO Cost Savings Program Manager should share relevant lessons learned with other NNSA sites so that those sites can determine if efficiencies CNS has achieved can be implemented at other sites. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation. In its comments on a draft of the report, NNSA stated that it plans to upload lessons learned into DOE's Corporate Lessons Learned Database so they can be considered by other sites by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should evaluate whether to require all other sites to institute an Annual Controlled Baseline. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation. In its comments on a draft of the report, NNSA stated that it plans to evaluate whether to expand use of Annual Controlled Baselines to other sites by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: To improve technical expertise and overcome fragmentation, the CDC director of the Select Agent Program should work with APHIS to develop a joint workforce plan that assesses workforce and training needs for the program as a whole. This assessment should be done in conjunction with the development of the strategic plan. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services: Public Health Service: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Status: Open

Comments: CDC agreed with this October 2017 recommendation and, as of January 2020, CDC and APHIS were in the process of finalizing a joint workforce assessment focusing primarily on inspections, according to officials from the Select Agent Program. However, this joint assessment does not account for other aspects of the program, such as training, which was part of GAO's recommendation. According to Select Agent Program officials, the program is developing a new information system and officials plan to conduct a follow-up workload assessment once this new system is fully implemented, as they anticipate that the program will gain efficiencies once this new system is in place. Officials from the Select Agent Program said they did not have a definitive timeframe as to when the new system would be in place and a new workload assessment could be completed but, as of December 2019, they said it would be several years. Once the updated workforce assessment is completed, GAO will review it to determine if it fulfills the recommendation. Developing a joint workforce plan as recommended would help the program to better manage fragmentation by improving how it leverages resources, which in turn would help to ensure that all workforce and training needs are met.

Recommendation: To improve technical expertise and overcome fragmentation, the APHIS director of the Select Agent Program should work with CDC to develop a joint workforce plan that assesses workforce and training needs for the program as a whole. This assessment should be done in conjunction with the development of the strategic plan. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Agriculture: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Status: Open

Comments: APHIS agreed with this October 2017 recommendation and, as of January 2020, CDC and APHIS were in the process of finalizing a joint workforce assessment focusing primarily on inspections, according to officials from the Select Agent Program. However, this joint assessment does not account for other aspects of the program, such as training, which was part of GAO's recommendation. According to Select Agent Program officials, the program is developing a new information system and officials plan to conduct a follow-up workload assessment once this new system is fully implemented, as they anticipate that the program will gain efficiencies once this new system is in place. Officials from the Select Agent Program said they did not have a definitive timeframe as to when the new system would be in place and a new workload assessment could be completed but, as of December 2019, they said it would be several years. Once the updated workforce assessment is completed, GAO will review it to determine if it fulfills the recommendation. Developing a joint workforce plan as recommended would help the program to better manage fragmentation by improving how it leverages resources, which in turn would help to ensure that all workforce and training needs are met.

Recommendation: To enhance the usefulness of NNSA's future reports to Congress describing the costs and benefits of its competition of M&O contracts under the requirements contained in Section 3121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013, as amended, the NNSA Administrator should take steps to ensure that future reports reflect DOE's information quality guidelines, federal cost accounting standards, and GAO's best practices guidance relevant to the clear and complete presentation of information on each of the required topics. In particular, future reports should clearly and completely describe costs and benefits, including the agency's expectations, as well as the associated analysis, assumptions, information sources, and key limitations and uncertainties about costs and benefits described. The description of uncertainties should include key excluded or unspecified costs and benefits, such as those that are anticipated but not fully known at the time of report writing.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA believes it has met the requirements of the recommendation and considers it closed. In our March 2015 report--which examined NNSA's report on the contract to manage and operate the Pantex Plant and the Y-12 National Security Complex under a single management and operating (M&O) contract with Consolidated Nuclear Services (CNS)--we recommended that NNSA enhance the clarity and completeness of its future reports on the costs and benefits of M&O contract competitions. While NNSA demonstrated progress in implementing this recommendation in its September 2017, August 2018, and April 2019 reports to Congress on the costs and benefits of the contract competitions for the Sandia, Nevada, and Los Alamos sites respectively, NNSA did not provide clear and complete information on all required elements of these reports. Specifically, for the Sandia National Laboratories M&O contract, in our August 2018 report we found that NNSA addressed most but not all reporting requirements. For example, NNSA's report addressed all requirements pertaining to cost savings, other benefits, and disruptions or delays, but only partially addressed the reporting requirements on the limitations or uncertainties about cost savings and on the immediate costs of competition and over the life of the contract. NNSA issued a report in August 2018 on the costs and benefits of its competition of the M&O contract for the Nevada National Security Site. In our April 2019 report on NNSA's cost-benefit analysis of that contract competition, we found that, of the five required reporting elements, NNSA's report addressed one with detail but addressed the other four without detail. In April 2019 NNSA issued its cost-benefit analysis of the competition for the Los Alamos National Laboratory contract. In our January 2020 report on NNSA's cost-benefit report for that contract competition, we found that it addressed five reporting elements on costs and disruption during contract transition with detail, partially addressed two reporting elements on uncertainties and benefits, and did not address one reporting element on activities to be covered by the M&O contractor. Since our 2015 recommendation, NNSA's cost-benefit reports on M&O contract competitions have generally provided clearer and more complete information on most of the required reporting elements, but they have not provided clear and complete information on all required reporting elements. In June 2020, NNSA announced that it would end the current CNS contract for Pantex and Y-12 management and operations instead of awarding the contractor its final option term. This will result in a new contract competition and award by the end of the current contract's term on September 30, 2021. The NNSA report on the costs and benefits of that competition may give us another opportunity to assess the quality of NNSA's reports for clarity and completeness on the required reporting elements.

Recommendation: To help improve its ability to oversee M&O contractor costs, including indirect costs, for its laboratories and make more effective use of DOE and contractor resources, the Secretary of Energy should take--or, as appropriate, direct the Administrator of NNSA to incorporate more specific benchmarking requirements into future laboratory contracts--similar to the benchmarking requirements used by DOE to assess and manage pension and post-retirement benefit costs--including which costs should be benchmarked, how frequently benchmarking should occur, and what process should be used to ensure corrective actions are taken, as needed.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: In April 2017, the Director of NNSA Office of Policy issued guidance to NNSA Laboratory Field Office Managers to update contracts to include a new clause requiring laboratory contractors to submit a strategic plan every year in accordance with guidance. Part of the annual plan requires contractors to discuss the costs of doing business and cost-increase factors at the sites, including overhead dollars. The annual strategic plan is due to the NNSA Office of Policy by August 15 each year. The annual strategic plans included information on indirect costs and cost drivers, but did not include benchmarking. We again requested information on the benchmarking requirements, if any, in July 2020.

Recommendation: To strengthen NNSA's oversight practices and current and future facility modernization efforts, and to improve the transparency and usefulness of cost analyses prepared for future NNSA nuclear facilities modernization projects, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Administrator of NNSA to ensure that life cycle cost analyses include a thorough and balanced evaluation of short- and long-term construction and financing alternatives. Such analyses should consider the full useful life of the facility rather than the 20-year requirement for GSA leases or any predetermined length of time that might produce results that favor one option over another.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA provided evidence that it requires life cycle cost analyses for projects greater than $20 million. However, this is not fully responsive to GAO's recommendation. For example, the recommendation stated that each life cycle cost analysis performed includes short- and long-term construction and financing alternatives and that these analyses should consider the full life of the facility rather than the 20-year requirements for GSA leases or any predetermined length of time. NNSA's actions do not address this aspect of the life cycle cost analysis. Our work found that facility's life cycle cost analysis only covered 20 years and it failed to reflect cost savings over a longer useful life (possibly over 50 years) that could have been realized if the facility were purchased instead of leased. Nothing in the Order addresses how the life cycle cost period to be analyzed should be established (e.g., 20 years or 50 plus years). Although we requested additional information from NNSA on this recommendation in fiscal year 2019, the agency has not responded. As a result, as of June 2020, the recommendation remains open.

Recommendation: To strengthen NNSA's oversight practices and current and future facility modernization efforts, and because of the importance of mitigating the risks of outsourcing nuclear weapons components and other information that if exported, might allow potential adversaries to develop or advance their nuclear capabilities, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Administrator of NNSA to take immediate action to assess the effectiveness of NNSA's oversight of KCP's current export control and nonproliferation practices and, if appropriate, initiate corrective actions to strengthen that oversight.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2020, there has been no change in the status of this recommendation. While NNSA/contractor actions are commendable and appear to be beneficial, such as adding performance-based incentives, training 950 employees, and including new contract clauses in its supplier purchase orders, these actions do not fully satisfy the recommendation. GAO's recommendation was specifically directed at the effectiveness of NNSA's oversight of the KCP contractor's export control and nonproliferation practices and to initiate corrective actions to strengthen that NNSA oversight. While the Kansas City Site Office's addition of a performance based incentive seems to be a good improvement, NNSA has not demonstrated its own oversight effectiveness. Our review of NNSA's response provided in March 2014 was not persuasive. In addition, GAO-16-710 found that as of May 2016, the Secretary of Energy had not used the enhanced procurement authority to ensure supply chain integrity, and the Department of Energy (DOE) had not developed processes for using the authority, as it had not fully assessed the circumstances under which the authority might be useful. Although NNSA provided additional information on this recommendation in August 2019, these actions relied primarily on contractor self assessments and not on independent federal oversight. As a result, this recommendation will continue to remain open.

Recommendation: To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, the Administrator of NNSA should direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to develop a realistic schedule for the W76 warhead and future life extension programs that allows NNSA to (1) address technical challenges while meeting all military requirements and (2) build in time for unexpected technical challenges that may delay the program.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In past and ongoing work, GAO has identified areas where NNSA's modernization plans may not align with planned funding requests over the Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP) and post-FYNSP periods. Based on the FY 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), (GAO-14-45) NNSA plans to work on five life extension programs (LEP) or major alterations through 2038. The FY 2014 SSMP states that the LEP workload represents a resource and production throughput challenge that requires improvements in LEP planning and execution. GAO's analysis indicates there is limited contingency time built into the LEP schedules, all of which are technically ambitious. Any delays in schedules could lead to an increase in program costs or a reduction in the number built for any of the LEPs, both of which have occurred in prior and ongoing LEPs. While NNSA has acknowledged issues and identified some steps to improve the LEP process, this recommendation will remain open and unimplemented until NNSA demonstrates successful LEP and refurbishment execution. We reconfirmed this finding in GAO-17-341 where we found the following: In some cases, NNSA's FY 2017 nuclear security budget materials do not align with the agency's modernization plans, both within the 5-year FYNSP for fiscal years 2017 through 2021 and beyond, raising concerns about the affordability of NNSA's planned portfolio of modernization programs. As of June 2020, this situation has not been fully addressed as evidenced by cost increases and likely delays in the B61-12 and W88 ALTV programs; an aggressive schedule in the W80-4 program, and a large scope in the W87-1 warhead replacement. In addition, new programs contained in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the announcement of a new development effort, the W93, may further stress NNSA's program.

Recommendation: To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, the Administrator of NNSA should direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to ensure that the program managers responsible for overseeing the construction of new facilities directly related to future life extension programs coordinate with the program managers of such future programs to avoid the types of delays and problems faced with the construction and operation of the Fogbank manufacturing facility for the W76 program.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: A number of Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plans (SSMP) state that the life extension program (LEP) workload represents a resource and production throughput challenge that requires improvements in LEP planning and execution. The officials elaborated that the main area that will be strained is pit production. NNSA's plutonium strategy needs to be resourced fully and implemented successfully by 2030 to support the W87 warhead replacement. Additionally, the officials said that the UPF project and an arrange of associated programmatic efforts need to be operational by 2025 or there will be challenges in completing all of the planned LEPs. In addition, NNSA needs to re-establish depleted uranium operations, construct a new lithium facility and establish a domestic uranium enrichment function for tritium production by the late 2020s to meet stockpile needs. As such, this recommendation remains open and, given the aggressive warhead and bomb modernization efforts proceeding in parallel with infrastructure modernization efforts, will likely remain open for some time.

Recommendation: To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, the Administrator of NNSA should direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to ensure that program managers for the construction of new facilities for future life extensions base their schedule for the construction and start-up of a facility on the life extension program managers' needs identified in their risk mitigation strategies.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA has generally improved its management of construction projects, to include requirements setting, Analysis of Alternatives, and independent cost estimates, among other items. However, it is too soon to tell if these positive developments will help--or hinder--LEPs that are underway or are being conducted. Key uranium activities, to include construction and operating funds will not be complete until 2025; key tritium and lithium programs and facilities will not complete until the 2030s; key plutonium activities are underway as well, but will not be complete until the late 2020s. As of June 2020, there are no significant changes related to this recommendation, and it will continue to remain open.