Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should update the BASE cybersecurity template to ensure it reflects cybersecurity key practices, including the Detect and Recover functions outlined in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: TSA concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it by updating the BASE Cybersecurity Security Action Item section to ensure it reflects the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Detect and Recover functions. When we confirm what actions TSA has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should update TSA guidance for developing and approving screening technology explosives detection standards to reflect designated procedures, the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders, and changes in the agency's organizational structure. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should require and ensure that TSA officials document key decisions, including testing and analysis decisions, used to support the development and consideration of new screening technology explosives detection standards. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should require and ensure that TSA officials document their assessments of risk and the rationale—including the assumptions, methodology, and uncertainty considered—behind decisions to deploy screening technologies. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should develop a process to ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment to commercial airports. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should implement the process it develops to ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment to commercial airports. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should update Army manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 15, 2020, the Department of the Army has neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Air Force should update Air Force manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 15, 2020, the Department of the Air Force has neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should update Navy and Marine Corps manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 15, 2020, the Department of the Navy has neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with the combatant commands, incorporate into the appropriate guidance a requirement that the military services notify the Joint Staff and the affected combatant commands when the execution of VIP support missions negatively affects the preparedness of EOD units for combat-related missions. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 15, 2020, the Department of Defense has neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: NNSA's Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager and relevant NNSA officials and contractor representatives at NNSA sites should take steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data related to NNSA's infrastructure supporting explosives activities. These steps should include reviewing and updating information about associations of assets with primary and secondary explosives missions; ensuring that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to provide; and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for explosives assets that are not buildings. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 2020, we are currently reviewing agency information and plan to reach out as needed for additional information for this recommendation.

Recommendation: NNSA's Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA's Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include discussion of identified challenges related to explosives activities, such as data quality, workforce levels, and safety as well as any actions to address them, as appropriate, or document the rationale for why identified challenges were not included. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: Based on trade press reports, NNSA appears to be taking several actions that, collectively, may serve to close this recommendation as implemented. As of July 2020, we are awaiting information from agency officials and will update the status of this recommendation when the information is received.

Recommendation: NNSA's Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA's Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan, such as a clearly identified mission statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, set time frames for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities for all strategic goals. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: Based on trade press reports, NNSA appears to be making progress implementing this recommendation. As of July 2020, we have requested additional information from agency officials and will update the recommendation status when the information is received.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should direct the Army's Provost Marshal General to take actions to help ensure that physical security inspections at locations with Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) are conducted on time, as required by Army guidance. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Chief of Naval Operations' Supply, Ordnance, and Logistics Operations Division to take actions to help ensure that physical security inspections at locations with AA&E are conducted on time, as required by Navy guidance. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations to take actions to help ensure that physical security inspections at locations with AA&E are conducted on time, as required by Marine Corps guidance. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Air Force should direct the Air Force's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering and Force Protection, Directorate of Security Forces, to take actions to help ensure that inspectors at locations with AA&E are consistently documenting in inspection reports that all minimum requirements for physical security were checked. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to revise DOD guidance to require that the military services establish a process to consistently document the resolution of all identified physical security deficiencies. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: If DHS's proposed CBRNE program consolidation is approved by Congress, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy to use, where appropriate, the key mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in our previous work to help ensure that a CBRNE consolidated office benefits from lessons learned from other organizational transformations.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: We found that key mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in previous GAO work could benefit the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) during implementation of the proposed CBRNE consolidation. As a result, we recommended that should Congress approve DHS's CBRNE consolidation plan, the department use these key mergers and organizational transformation practices. In December 2018, the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 was enacted into law (Public Law 115-387) authorizing the proposed consolidation of CBRNE functions into a new Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD office). In a memo to Congress regarding the new CWMD office, DHS stated that it remained committed to evaluating GAO's identified practices when implementing the consolidation. In August 2019, DHS provided us with information outlining efforts to use the key mergers and organizational transformation practices during the CWMD implementation phase. However, we requested additional evidence that all practices were considered. For example, one of the key practices is to use the performance management system to define responsibility and assure accountability for change. DHS created position descriptions for CWMD office leadership but we did not receive evidentiary support to demonstrate that DHS has added CWMD office transition goals to relevant employee performance plans. In April 2020, DHS estimated June 2020 for completing steps responsive to this recommendation. We will update the status of this recommendation as additional information is made available.

Recommendation: To strengthen federal oversight of facilities with ammonium nitrate, the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of EPA should direct OSHA and EPA, respectively, to consider revising their related regulations to cover ammonium nitrate and jointly develop a plan to require high risk facilities with ammonium nitrate to assess the risks and implement safeguards to prevent accidents involving this chemical.

Agency: Department of Labor
Status: Open

Comments: On December 9, 2013, OSHA issued a Request for Information seeking, among other things, comments on potential revisions to its Process Safety Management standard and its Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard. The Request for Information specifically invited comments on safe work practices for storing, handling, and managing ammonium nitrate and on regulatory requirements to improve its approach to preventing the hazards associated with ammonium nitrate. As of July 2017, OSHA reports it has completed a Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Review Act panel to gather feedback from small businesses on updating its Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation. During the panel, the agency discussed the option of adding ammonium nitrate to the list of chemicals covered by PSM and collected comments. As of June 2018, the PSM rulemaking is on the regulatory agenda under Long Term Action. According to OSHA officials, the agency will continue to collect comments on the option of adding ammonium nitrate to the list of highly hazardous chemicals covered by the PSM regulations as dictated by the rulemaking process. We will close this recommendation when OSHA decides what action to take as a result of the rulemaking process.

Recommendation: To strengthen federal oversight of facilities with ammonium nitrate, the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of EPA should direct OSHA and EPA, respectively, to consider revising their related regulations to cover ammonium nitrate and jointly develop a plan to require high risk facilities with ammonium nitrate to assess the risks and implement safeguards to prevent accidents involving this chemical.

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
Status: Open

Comments: In January 2017, EPA issued a final rule to modify its Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations. The agency decided not to propose any revisions to the list of regulated substances and therefore, did not address ammonium nitrate in the revised regulations.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Labor should direct the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to consider updating regulations for the storage of ammonium nitrate taking into consideration, as appropriate, other related standards and current practices.

Agency: Department of Labor
Status: Open

Comments: OSHA previously (December 3, 2014) issued guidance to Regional Administrators to assist OSHA officials in enforcing the ammonium nitrate storage requirements in the Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard. In addition, on December 9, 2013, OSHA issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking, among other things, comments on potential revisions to the Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard, which includes ammonium nitrate storage requirements. According to OSHA officials, the agency discussed the option of adding ammonium nitrate to the list of chemicals covered by the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations and collected comments. As of June 2018, the PSM rulemaking is on the regulatory agenda under Long-Term Action. We will close this recommendation when the agency decides what action to take as a result of the rulemaking process.