Recommendation: The Director of DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency should assess EPA data when planning outreach to public water system and wastewater treatment works facilities (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The PHMSA Administrator should analyze the factors affecting states' participation in underground natural gas storage inspections and analyze its workforce needs on an ongoing basis to guide its budget requests. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of February 2020, the Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is collaborating with an organization of state government oil and gas oversight officials to assess the factors affecting their participation in its underground natural gas storage inspections, according to DOT. PHMSA plans to use this information by December 2020 to assess whether additional measures can be undertaken to increase state participation for its use starting in Fiscal Year 2022.

Recommendation: The Director of DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate's Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) should incorporate vulnerability into the CFATS site security scoring methodology to help measure the reduction in the vulnerability of high-risk facilities to a terrorist attack, and use that data in assessing the CFATS program's performance in lowering risk and enhancing national security. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and has taken steps to implement and monitor two new performance metrics intended to better demonstrate the CFATS program's effectiveness in enhancing national security and reducing national risk. Specifically, according to DHS, these new performance metrics allow for the (1) evaluation of the progress individual facilities have made in enhancing their security while part of the CFATS program, and (2) comparison of the security measures employed by CFATS-covered chemical facilities upon first entering the program against the improved and enhanced security measures contained in their approved CFATS security plans. DHS began reporting the two measures, "Average score of approved Site Security Plans" and "Average score of initial Site Security Plans", for the first quarter of fiscal year 2019. DHS stated that these measures will be used to demonstrate the percent increase in security score of facilities' security plans, resulting in a representation of the increase in the security posture across the facility population, which will be used internally to assess progress. GAO continues to monitor the results of these two new performance metrics.

Recommendation: To achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness, Congress should consider transferring the oversight of the markings of toy and imitation firearms in 15 U.S.C. 5001 from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (within the Department of Commerce) to the Consumer Product Safety Commission.

Agency: Congress
Status: Open

Comments: This matter is an action identified in GAO's annual Duplication and Cost Savings reports. No legislative action identified. The Gun Look-Alike Case Act, H.R. 3224, which was introduced on July 27, 2015, in the 114th Congress, would transfer the authority to regulate the markings of toy, look-alike, and imitation firearms in section 5001 of title 15 of the U.S. Code from NIST to CPSC, as GAO suggested in November 2014. This bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade of the Committee on Energy and Commerce in the United States House of Representatives, and did not pass out of committee. This bill was not reintroduced in the 115th Congress and, as of March 2020, has not been reintroduced by the 116th Congress. Continued regulation of the marking of toy and imitation firearms by NIST rather than CPSC does not leverage each agency's expertise and therefore may not be the most efficient use of scarce federal resources.

Recommendation: To improve existing coordination of oversight for consumer product safety, Congress should consider establishing a formal comprehensive oversight mechanism for consumer product safety agencies to address crosscutting issues as well as inefficiencies related to fragmentation and overlap such as communication and coordination challenges and jurisdictional questions between agencies. Different types of formal mechanisms could include, for example, creating a memorandum of understanding to formalize relationships and agreements or establishing a task force or interagency work group. As a starting point, Congress may wish to obtain agency input on options for establishing more formal coordination.

Agency: Congress
Status: Open

Comments: This matter is an action identified in GAO's annual Duplication and Cost Savings reports. As of March 2020, no legislation was identified that would establish a collaborative mechanism to facilitate communication across the relevant agencies and to help enable them to collectively address crosscutting issues, as GAO suggested in November 2014. Some of the agencies with direct regulatory oversight responsibilities for consumer product safety reported that they continue to collaborate to address specific consumer product safety topics. However, without a formal comprehensive oversight mechanism, the agencies risk missing opportunities to better leverage resources and address challenges, including those related to fragmentation and overlap.

Recommendation: To strengthen federal oversight of facilities with ammonium nitrate, the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of EPA should direct OSHA and EPA, respectively, to consider revising their related regulations to cover ammonium nitrate and jointly develop a plan to require high risk facilities with ammonium nitrate to assess the risks and implement safeguards to prevent accidents involving this chemical.

Agency: Department of Labor
Status: Open

Comments: On December 9, 2013, OSHA issued a Request for Information seeking, among other things, comments on potential revisions to its Process Safety Management standard and its Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard. The Request for Information specifically invited comments on safe work practices for storing, handling, and managing ammonium nitrate and on regulatory requirements to improve its approach to preventing the hazards associated with ammonium nitrate. As of July 2017, OSHA reports it has completed a Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Review Act panel to gather feedback from small businesses on updating its Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation. During the panel, the agency discussed the option of adding ammonium nitrate to the list of chemicals covered by PSM and collected comments. As of June 2018, the PSM rulemaking is on the regulatory agenda under Long Term Action. According to OSHA officials, the agency will continue to collect comments on the option of adding ammonium nitrate to the list of highly hazardous chemicals covered by the PSM regulations as dictated by the rulemaking process. We will close this recommendation when OSHA decides what action to take as a result of the rulemaking process.

Recommendation: To strengthen federal oversight of facilities with ammonium nitrate, the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator of EPA should direct OSHA and EPA, respectively, to consider revising their related regulations to cover ammonium nitrate and jointly develop a plan to require high risk facilities with ammonium nitrate to assess the risks and implement safeguards to prevent accidents involving this chemical.

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
Status: Open

Comments: In January 2017, EPA issued a final rule to modify its Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations. The agency decided not to propose any revisions to the list of regulated substances and therefore, did not address ammonium nitrate in the revised regulations.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Labor should direct the Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health to consider updating regulations for the storage of ammonium nitrate taking into consideration, as appropriate, other related standards and current practices.

Agency: Department of Labor
Status: Open

Comments: OSHA previously (December 3, 2014) issued guidance to Regional Administrators to assist OSHA officials in enforcing the ammonium nitrate storage requirements in the Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard. In addition, on December 9, 2013, OSHA issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking, among other things, comments on potential revisions to the Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard, which includes ammonium nitrate storage requirements. According to OSHA officials, the agency discussed the option of adding ammonium nitrate to the list of chemicals covered by the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations and collected comments. As of June 2018, the PSM rulemaking is on the regulatory agenda under Long-Term Action. We will close this recommendation when the agency decides what action to take as a result of the rulemaking process.

Recommendation: To better position EPA to collect chemical toxicity and exposure-related data and ensure chemical safety under existing TSCA authority, while balancing its workload, and to better position EPA to ensure chemical safety under existing TSCA authority, the Administrator of EPA should direct the appropriate offices to develop strategies for addressing challenges that impede the agency's ability to meet its goal of ensuring chemical safety. At a minimum, the strategies should address challenges associated with: (1) obtaining toxicity and exposure data needed to conduct ongoing and future TSCA Work Plan risk assessments, (2) gaining access to toxicity and exposure data provided to the European Chemicals Agency, (3) working with processors and processor associations to obtain exposure-related data, (4) banning or limiting the use of chemicals under section 6 of TSCA and planned actions for overcoming these challenges--including a description of other actions the agency plans to pursue in lieu of banning or limiting the use of chemicals, and (5) identifying the resources needed to conduct risk assessments and implement risk management decisions in order to meet its goal of ensuring chemical safety.

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: As of March 2020, several sections of this recommendation have been superseded by the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century of 2016. However, questions remain about whether the Office of Chemical Safety and Pollution Prevention, which oversees implementation of this legislation, has identified the resources necessary to conduct risk assessments and implement risk management decisions.

Recommendation: To better ensure the credibility of IRIS assessments by enhancing their timeliness and certainty, the EPA Administrator should require the Office of Research and Development, should different time frames be necessary, to establish a written policy that clearly describes the applicability of the time frames for each type of IRIS assessment and ensures that the time frames are realistic and provide greater predictability to stakeholders.

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: As of March 2020, we have not seen a formal written memo from the IRIS program laying out this information - in detail - publicly, or how timelines for assessments are influenced by various criteria. While IRIS program staff have discussed this issue, no written guidance has been created. Such communication from the IRIS Program, as well as more frequent updates of the timelines for chemicals currently in assessment and projected starting dates for every chemical listed as "under assessment" is needed.

Recommendation: To ensure that current and accurate information on chemicals that EPA plans to assess through IRIS is available to IRIS users--including stakeholders such as EPA program and regional offices, other federal agencies, and the public--the EPA Administrator should direct the Office of Research and Development to annually publish the IRIS agenda in the Federal Register each fiscal year.

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
Status: Open

Comments: As of March 2020, EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) Program has established the priority chemicals it is working on, and has published some timelines via the IRIS Program Outlook document. However, this information has not been published as an agenda in the Federal Register.

Recommendation: To develop timely chemical risk information that EPA needs to effectively conduct its mission, the Administrator, EPA, should require the Office of Research and Development to re-evaluate its draft proposed changes to the IRIS assessment process in light of the issues raised in this report and ensure that any revised process periodically assesses the level of resources that should be dedicated to this significant program to meet user needs and maintain a viable IRIS database.

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: As of February 2020, EPA officials indicated that the IRIS Program had almost completed internal review of a "Handbook for Developing IRIS Assessments," intended to guide staff through the sequential stages of the IRIS assessment process and ensure consistency across assessments. The Handbook, when finalized and used by staff, codifies the agency's effort to reevaluate their assessment process, but doesn't address the resources that should be dedicated to the IRIS Program. A workforce plan that includes both staff and budget resources consistent with user needs is necessary. As we reported in March 2019, the program has made strides utilizing project management software and project management techniques that enable the IRIS Program to better plan assessment schedules and utilize staff. However, we also reported in March 2019 that the President's budget requests since fiscal year 2018 have repeatedly cut the budget by as much as 40 percent for the Health and Environmental Risk Assessment (HERA) area, of which IRIS is a part. While these cuts were not enacted by Congress, the President's fiscal year 2021 budget request again cuts the HERA program by 34 percent, or approximately $12.7 million dollars. These cuts could have an impact on the IRIS program's ability to meet EPA program and regional office needs, if enacted by Congress.