Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should take steps to develop a streamlined enforcement approach to counterfeit goods in small packages. This may include assessing the feasibility and impact of such an approach, including any potential for cost savings. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Biometric Entry-Exit Program's privacy notices contain complete and current information, including all of the locations where facial recognition is used and how travelers can request to opt out as appropriate. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Biometric Entry-Exit Program's privacy signage is consistently available at all locations where CBP is using facial recognition. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should direct the Biometric Entry-Exit Program to develop and implement a plan to conduct privacy audits of its commercial partners', contractors', and vendors' use of personally identifiable information. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement a plan to ensure that the biometric air exit capability meets its established photo capture requirement. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop a process by which Biometric Entry-Exit program officials are alerted when the performance of air exit facial recognition falls below established thresholds. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement additional guidance for ensuring funds appropriated for specific purposes are obligated consistent with the purpose of the funds. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. In July 2020, CBP's Office of Finance issued new guidance on how to execute the remaining funds CBP received in the 2019 Emergency Supplemental. In September 2020, the CBP Budget Directorate's Program Analysis Division also updated its standard operating procedures to describe how it will review samples of purchase requests for supplemental funds. To fully implement our recommendation, CBP should develop and implement guidance for ensuring all funds appropriated for specific purposes, including future appropriations CBP may receive, are obligated consistent with the purpose of the funds.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should establish and document oversight roles and responsibilities to ensure funds appropriated for specific purposes are obligated consistent with the purpose of the funds. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. In September 2020, the CBP Budget Directorate's Program Analysis Division updated its standard operating procedures to describe how it will review samples of purchase requests for supplemental funds. To fully implement our recommendation, CBP should establish and document oversight roles and responsibilities to ensure all funds appropriated for specific purposes, including regular appropriations, are obligated consistent with the purpose of the funds.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement oversight mechanisms for CBP's implementation of policies and procedures relating to medical care for individuals in its custody to include documentation of expected practices, metrics and corresponding performance targets, and roles and responsibilities for taking corrective action. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should document what information it is using to assess whether to offer the influenza vaccine to individuals in custody, including how it weighs costs and benefits. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement training on recognizing medical distress in children for all CBP officers and Border Patrol agents who may come into contact with children in custody. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should provide additional guidance to field personnel to ensure they classify significant incident reports on deaths, serious injuries, and suicide attempts, in accordance with CBP policy. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should update the Significant Incident Reporting System to include categories that align with CBP's directive on the reporting of significant incidents. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should provide additional guidance to components on the procedures for reporting deaths in custody to OPR and other entities within CBP. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that timely, reliable information on deaths in custody is reported to Congress, as directed, and maintain documentation on those reports. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Acting Commissioner of CBP should better communicate to stakeholders the types of information stakeholders could collect and submit to CBP to help the agency initiate and investigate forced labor cases related to seafood and, as appropriate, other goods. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop internal controls to track and document which employees worked and what work was performed daily during a government shutdown. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security agreed with the recommendation and stated that Customs and Border Protection plans to analyze existing systems to determine which is best suited to track and document employee work during a government shutdown and will ensure that the chosen system is available should a future shutdown occur. When we confirm what actions CBP has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop internal controls to limit access to physical workspaces to appropriate employees during a government shutdown. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agreed with the recommendation but stated that because Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not have systems capable of efficiently restoring physical access for furloughed employees, it would have to reinstate employee access individually and the cost would be substantial. DHS stated that CBP plans to update procedures to ensure more comprehensive workspace access guidance for furloughed employees. We continue to believe that physical access controls are important during shutdowns in order to prevent misuse of government resources. We encourage CBP to improve their systems to be able to efficiently implement such controls and will monitor CBP's efforts going forward.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop internal controls to limit access to virtual workspaces to appropriate employees during a government shutdown. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agreed with the recommendation. DHS stated that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) believes that furloughed employees must be able to passively monitor the status of the government shutdown and access important agency communications using DHS-issued electronic devices. Additionally, disabling and reactivating thousands of employee user accounts during a shutdown posed a significant burden. DHS said that CBP plans to update shutdown procedures to clarify allowed use of DHS-issued electronic devices by furloughed employees. We agree that CBP should update procedures on workspace access as suggested, and continue to believe that virtual access controls are important during shutdowns in order to prevent misuse of government resources. We encourage CBP to improve their systems to be able to efficiently implement such controls and will monitor CBP's progress going forward.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should issue updated Border Patrol and OFO training materials that reflect the correct definition of a family unit and guidance for recording that information. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the CBP has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should provide written guidance to Border Patrol agents and OFO officers about what narrative information should be recorded on the child's and the accompanying adult's Forms I-213 to document cases in which CBP determines that a parent–child relationship may be invalid. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the CBP has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should develop and implement additional controls to ensure that Border Patrol agents accurately record family unit separations in its data system. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS reported that CBP plans to add enhancements to Border Patrol's processing system that will prompt agents to create family units within the system, when applicable. Upon completion of these enhancements, CBP plans to provide training to agents to describe the enhancements to help ensure that family units are recorded when necessary. DHS estimates these actions will be completed by September 30, 2020. To fully address our recommendations, CBP should develop and implement controls to ensure agents are accurately recording family unit separations in its data system.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should update Border Patrol's and OFO's data systems to ensure data captured on family unit separation reasons clearly align with CBP policy. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and provided documentation of guidance that OFO and Border Patrol issued about data system updates. We are reviewing the information and documents DHS provided to assess the extent to which CBP fully addressed this recommendation.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should develop and implement additional controls to ensure that Border Patrol agents include a narrative description of a family unit separation on the parent's / legal guardian's and child's Forms I-213, including the reason for the separation. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the CBP has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should provide guidance to Border Patrol agents and OFO officers on the narrative information they are to include about family unit separation events on the parent's / legal guardian's and child's Forms I-213. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the CBP has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Field Operations, in consultation with the Office of Trade, develops a plan for managing its increased workload. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. According to CBP, the new ACE drawback module provides the capability to extract data for workload management. Further enhanced reporting capabilities for drawback claims are under development. CBP's Office of Field Operations and Office of Trade continue to collaborate on a plan to employ risk management principles and automation to resolve the drawback claims backlog and lay the foundation for processing current drawback claims workload. They estimate the completion of this workload management system by October 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade assesses the feasibility of flagging excessive export submissions across multiple claims and takes cost-effective steps, based on the assessment, to prevent over claiming. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. According to CBP, the Office of Trade is exploring alternatives to track and automatically flag duplicate exports across multiple drawback claims. CBP expects to complete their assessment and plan for implementation by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade develops a plan, with time frames, to establish a reliable system of record for proof of export. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. According to CBP, the Office of Trade will work to develop a plan for the use of the Automated Export System (and possibly other systems) for electronic proof of export in the future. They expect this to be complete by September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade turns the claim selection feature in ACE back on and finalizes and implements procedures to target claims for review that were accepted into ACE during the period in which the selection feature was disabled. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with our recommendation. According to CBP, the Office of Trade, in collaboration with the Office of Information Technology, will automate updates that turn the claim selection feature on in ACE. The Office of Trade plans to retroactively identify drawback claims accepted during the lapse period, and is working to implement a solution by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade analyzes the results of its targeting of claims for review and designs responses to mitigate identified risks. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. According to CBP, on March 25, 2020, the Office of Trade initiated an analysis to improve automation and targeting on an ongoing basis. Based on the results of this analysis, the Office of Trade will make any needed adjustments to policy and procedures to assist with data quality, by September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade prioritizes developing a plan to conduct an ex post analysis of the impact on industry and government of key changes to the drawback program, including time frames and methodology. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurs with this recommendation. According to CBP, the Office of Trade is finalizing a plan to conduct an ex post analysis of the impact on industry and government of key changes to the drawback program. CBP's analytical plan will include a timeline and methodology for assessing changes to the program. They expect to complete this by November 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should review and update policies related to land port of entry inspections in accordance with Office of Field Operations guidance. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and stated that it intends to implement it by January 2021. We will continue to monitor CBP's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should analyze the results of the Self-Inspection Program over time and at a level necessary to identify and address potentially reoccurring inspection deficiencies at individual ports of entry. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and stated that it intends to implement it by November 2021. We will continue to monitor CBP's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should implement a policy to conduct periodic comprehensive analyses of covert test findings. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in March 2020, it provided information on its plans to conduct a comprehensive analysis after completing several covert tests. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should implement a policy to conduct periodic comprehensive analyses of covert test findings. We will continue to monitor CBP's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop a new target for the land border interception rate for passengers in privately-owned vehicles with major violations that sets an ambitious and realistic goal based on past performance. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and stated that it intends to implement it by January 2021. We will continue to monitor CBP's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner, in conjunction with the DHS Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer, should develop and implement a plan to ensure that CBP executes its Facility Condition Assessments (FCA) program by conducting FCAs at each CBP-owned land border crossing consistent with DHS Directive 119-02-004. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in March 2020, provided a plan for conducting FCAs at some, but not all, CBP-owned land border crossings. According to officials, CBP will update this plan to include all CBP-owned land border crossings and may coordinate with the DHS Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer to ensure the plan is consistent with DHS Directive 119-02-004. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should complete the FCA plan to include all CBP-owned land border crossings.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should share FCA reports with GSA and use facility condition information in GSA's Building Assessment Tool to inform FCAs. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in February 2020, GSA confirmed that it received FCA reports from CBP for GSA-owned land border crossings. GSA also confirmed that it provided CBP with a spreadsheet containing data from GSA Building Assessment Tools. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should demonstrate that it is using GSA Building Assessment Tool information to inform its FCAs at GSA-owned land border crossings.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should use information on maintenance and repair work conducted by GSA at GSA-owned land border crossings to update facility condition information in TRIRIGA on an ongoing basis. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in December 2019, reported that it began documenting processes for validating and correcting existing records in TRIRIGA using information on maintenance and repair work conducted by GSA. In addition, CBP reported that it is developing a standard operating procedure for TRIRIGA data entry. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should demonstrate that it is regularly receiving information on maintenance and repair work performed by GSA and that it is using this information to update data in TRIRIGA.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should establish review time frames for stakeholders involved in its Five-year Capital Investment Plan review and approval process. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in April 2020, provided a document establishing time frames for stakeholders involved in the five-year plan review and approval process. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should demonstrate that it has communicated these time frame expectations to stakeholders.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should establish and document a methodology for its annual land border crossing capital prioritization process that includes procedures and time frames for each step. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in April 2020, provided a document that formally establishes and documents a methodology for its land border crossing prioritization process, including procedures and time frames for each step. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should demonstrate that it is implementing this methodology during its annual five-year capital investment planning process.

Recommendation: The Chief of Border Patrol should develop and implement performance measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner: U.S. Border Patrol
Status: Open

Comments: Border Patrol concurred with this recommendation and in an April 2020 update and stated that it is developing new northern border security metrics. Border Patrol is in the process of evaluating them and coordinating with subject matter experts to ensure they are valid. We will continue to monitor Border Patrol's ongoing efforts.

Recommendation: The Executive Assistant Commissioner of AMO should develop and implement performance measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry in the air and maritime environments (Recommendation 2).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Air and Marine Operations
Status: Open

Comments: AMO concurred with this recommendation and in a July 2020 update, stated that it has developed preliminary performance measures and established a working group to assess their effectiveness. According to AMO, they remain on track to implement the performance measures and report on them beginning in fiscal year 2022. We will continue to monitor AMO's efforts.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should revise policy or guidance to ensure documentation of required control activities in its case management system, such as legal review of adverse actions, and data verification (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In February 2020, CBP provided documentation of a data verification checklist used by its Office of Professional Responsibility for the Joint Integrity Case Management System. However, CBP also needs to develop a similar tool or method to verify case management data contained in its Human Resource Business Engine system. And to fully implement this recommendation, CBP needs to revise policy or guidance to ensure documentation of control activities (data verification and legal review of adverse actions) in its case management systems. We are continuing to follow-up on the actions taken by CBP to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should monitor the duration of all cases beginning-to-end by stage and by case type (Recommendation 4).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2018, CBP told us that it is currently updating one of its case management systems to better monitor cases beginning-to-end by stage and by case type. Once implemented, CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility will develop an internal management report that includes information on caseload and associated timelines. The estimated completion date for this recommendation is September 30, 2019. As of September 2020, we are continuing to follow up with CBP on its actions to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should monitor the timeliness of misconduct cases according to established targets for management inquiries, administrative inquiries, and criminal and non-criminal investigations using case management system data (Recommendation 5).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2018, CBP stated that it is currently updating one of its case management systems to better monitor the timeliness of misconduct cases according to established targets. Once updated, CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility will develop an internal management report that includes information on caseload and associated timelines. The estimated completion date for this recommendation is September 30, 2019. As of September 2020, we are continuing to follow up with CBP on its actions to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should define and document the case management system data fields to be used for monitoring all established performance targets and provide related guidance to staff (Recommendation 6).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2018, CBP stated that its Office of Professional Responsibility will define the case management system data fields used to measure established performance targets, and it will provide the appropriate guidance to staff. The estimated completion date of this recommendation is September 30, 2019. As of September 2020, we are continuing to follow up with CBP on its actions to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should take steps to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP's IPR enforcement efforts, such as by improving its metrics to track the overall effectiveness of its IPR enforcement efforts, evaluating selected activities to enhance IPR enforcement, and developing a process to assess and share information on port-led initiatives to enhance IPR enforcement (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. In September 2018, CBP stated that it had established an IPR working group that meets every 4-6 weeks to implement its Fiscal Year 2018 IPR Strategic Plan and develop priorities and metrics. CBP stated that, in these meetings, headquarters and field personnel share information on the results and effectiveness of local and national port initiatives and develop policies for improving IPR enforcement. Additionally, CBP provided evidence that it has begun efforts to improve its tracking of metrics and evaluation of selected activities to enhance IPR enforcement. For example, CBP provided data for 5 of the 16 measurement indicators included in its IPR Strategic Plan. Additionally, the IPR Strategic Plan includes at least 5 action items to assess or evaluate aspects of CBP's IPR enforcement. As of February 2020, CBP officials indicated they are continuing to work on these efforts. We will continue to monitor their implementation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP, in consultation with ICE, should assess what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with the private sector and, as appropriate, take action to enhance information sharing, where possible, such as by proposing regulatory revisions or requesting additional legal authorities from Congress. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. CBP stated that, in May 2018, it briefed the Senate Finance Committee on six policy goals to improve IPR, import safety, and e-commerce enforcement that require additional legislative authority to implement. In December 2018, CBP stated that it had identified the need to establish an information sharing structure for e-commerce as a first step in implementing its E-Commerce Strategy. CBP officials stated that they would work with offices throughout CBP and with key stakeholders in the trade community and the Commercial Customs Advisory Committee (COAC) to build an information sharing structure and identify the necessary statutory and regulatory changes to implement it. CBP said that, when statutory changes have been identified, it will work through the interagency process to make any necessary Congressional recommendations. In January 2020, the Department of Homeland Security published a report that identified actions to combat trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods in conjunction with the private sector. These actions included steps to share additional information with the private sector. For example, the report said that when CBP identifies suspected counterfeit merchandise that is destined for a U.S. fulfillment center or warehouse, it will notify the e-commerce platform or other third-party intermediary operating the facility. This will allow the operator of the fulfillment center or warehouse to remove or destroy any identical items from the same seller in coordination with rights holders. The report also recommends the formation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Consortium to Identify Online Nefarious Actors and a framework for sharing information with sellers, shippers, and other third-party intermediaries. If implemented, these steps could help to enhance information sharing with the private sector. GAO continues to monitor the implementation of these actions.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop a monitoring system to help ensure that CBP officials comply with license verification policies and procedures. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: CBP agreed with our recommendation and said they would complete their corrective actions by April 30, 2020. To fully implement it, CBP should develop a monitoring system that observes agency verification of licenses for imported radiological materials to ensure CBP officials are complying with existing policies and procedures.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop a system that better identifies shipments of radiological material that pose the greatest risk and revise CBP's policies and procedures as necessary to verify licenses for these shipments. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: CBP agreed with our recommendation and said they would complete their corrective actions by April 30, 2020. To fully implement it, CBP should develop a system to better identify which shipments of radiological material pose the greatest risk and revise their policies and procedures for verification of the licenses for these shipments accordingly.

Recommendation: To improve agencies' physical security programs' alignment with the ISC Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government for information and monitoring, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, with regard to the updated Security Policy and Procedures Handbook, should include data collection and analysis requirements for monitoring the performance of CBP's physical security program.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection issued an updated Physical Security Policy and Procedures Handbook in January 2020, which includes a series of internal controls and physical security performance measures. We have reviewed the handbook and requested additional information from CBP to determine whether it meets ISC's Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should clearly document the process and criteria for making decisions on funding non-owned operational requirements and communicate this process to Border Patrol sectors. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2017, CBP concurred with our recommendation and stated that it will use the Capability Gap Analysis Process to validate its access and mobility requirements on a national level. The national priorities will be determined through requirements planning at Border Patrol stations. CBP noted that it will outline the process and criteria for making decisions on funding for non-owned operational requirements and communicate this process to Border Patrol sectors. In November 2018, CBP reported that Border Patrol developed a prioritization process related to the order of wall deployments, which will be tailored to use in determining the priority order for road investments. According to CBP, priority order is to be determined based on the analysis of quantitative and qualitative data and the operational expertise of Border Patrol station, sector and national level leadership. The process was developed by USBP's Operational Requirements Management Division, communicated to southern border sectors, and executed to establish the priority deployment order of fiscal year 2018 new road requirements. Once the prioritization process has been refined, it will be expanded to also include the maintenance and repair on existing roads. In October 2019, CBP reported that it continues to work on enhancing the existing prioritization strategy, which includes exploring implementation of a new prioritization modeling tool and methodology. Discussions on how and if the model will be effective as a prioritization tool have been delayed due to several other internal priorities and external disruptions. Therefore, and based on leadership guidance, the prioritization strategy and methodology will be delayed. CBP officials reported in June 2020 that Border Patrol's Strategic Planning and Analysis Directorate Operational Requirements Management Division personnel will conduct data calls over the upcoming weeks with Tactical Infrastructure subject matter experts from the sectors and stations to validate existing road requirements and initiate the data collection for the prioritization process. Once the process is formalized, we will determine whether CBP's efforts fully address the intent of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should identify and collect additional performance information on the impact of the ISF rule data, such as the identification of shipments containing contraband, to better evaluate the effectiveness of the ISF program.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In March 2018, the CBP liaison informed GAO that offices within CBP are collaborating on a plan to assess additional performance metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the ISF program. On June 13, 2018, the CBP liaison stated that CBP staff continue to work on additional performance metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of the ISF program and noted, in particular, are analyzing data to: (1) identify the number of unmanifested containers and determine how/if they were mitigated before arrival; (2) determine the number of times C-TPAT companies were identified and given targeting benefits, but did not receive the same treatment based on manifest information; and (3) identify the number of times potential terrorism matches were made against an ISF entities vs. the number of times not matched using the same manifest data. In March 2019, the CBP liaison stated that the new estimated completed date for this recommendation is the end of 2019. This recommendation will remain open until CBP's planned actions are completed and meet the intent of GAO's recommendation. In late February 2020, CBP liaison staff informed GAO that they are continuing to work on this recommendation, which they expect to complete by March 31, 2020.

Recommendation: To strengthen CBP's trade enforcement efforts, the Commissioner of CBP should direct the Office of Trade to include performance targets, when applicable, in addition to performance measures in its Priority Trade Issue strategic and annual plans.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2019, the seven FY 2019 Priority Trade Issue (PTI) annual plans prepared by CBP's Office of Trade all included performance measures with performance targets, but some plans did not include baselines to measure it's trade enforcement efforts against. The Office of Trade reported that it was in the process of finalizing its FY2020 annual plans, which should be available in December 2019. In addition, the Office of Trade reported that it no longer develops a single strategic plan covering all of its PTIs and only prepares the PTI annual plans.

Recommendation: To strengthen CBP's trade enforcement efforts, the Commissioner of CBP should direct the Office of Trade and the Office of Field Operations to develop a long-term hiring plan that articulates how CBP will reach its staffing targets for trade positions set in the Homeland Security Act and the agency's resource optimization model.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: As of June 2019, CBP stated that both the Office of Trade (OT) and Office of Field Operations (OFO) continue to take steps to address hiring gaps which include evaluating approaches to hiring and evaluating and selecting candidates for its various trade positions. For example, OT had developed a recruitment strategy for hiring regulatory auditors. OT reported that it has brought regulatory auditors onboard as a result of its strategy but experienced attrition and challenges in attaining its staffing target for this position. OT and OFO did not provide recruitment strategies for the other trade positions. OFO's Human Capital Division, along with assistance from OT and other CBP components, reported finalizing a long-term hiring plan to meet and maintain the congressional floor for certain trade and revenue positions, including those for import specialists, by the end of fiscal year 2020.

Recommendation: To ensure Border Patrol has the best available information to inform future investments in TI and resource allocation decisions among TI and other assets Border Patrol deploys in the furtherance of border security operations, and to ensure that key parties within Border Patrol's Requirements Management Process are aware of their roles and responsibilities within the process, the Chief of the Border Patrol should develop metrics to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border security along the southwest border using the data Border Patrol already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making investment and resource allocation decisions.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner: U.S. Border Patrol
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DHS agreed with the recommendation and stated that it planned to develop metrics for southwest border security operations. To fully implement it, the Border Patrol should complete its efforts to develop metrics for assessing the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border security operations and apply these metrics when making resource allocation decisions. As of October 2019, DHS stated that they have developed and are testing the initial metrics. DHS stated that they will continue to gather data over the next two fiscal years (FY20-FY21) which will help to identify if these metrics are accurately representing realities in the field. The estimated completion date is September 2021.

Recommendation: To better inform on the effectiveness of CDS implementation and border security efforts, the Chief of Border Patrol should strengthen the methodology for calculating recidivism such as by using an alien's apprehension history beyond one fiscal year and excluding aliens for whom there is no record of removal and who may remain in the United States.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner: U.S. Border Patrol
Status: Open

Comments: DHS did not concur with this recommendation. DHS noted that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Consequence Delivery System Program Management Office (CDS PMO) uses annual recidivism rate calculations to measure annual change, which is not intended to be, or used, as a performance measure for CDS. We continue to believe that DHS should strengthen its methodology for calculating recidivism. DHS noted in its comments on our report that the recidivism rate is used as a performance measure by U.S. Border Patrol and DHS. Additionally, strengthening the recidivism rate methodology would not preclude its use for CDS as a measure of annual change, and would provide Border Patrol a more complete assessment of the rate of change in recidivism. In January 2018, CDS-PMO officials stated that the office started reporting nationwide the recidivism rates for multiple years to U.S. Border Patrol sectors for situational awareness. However, the methodology for this reported recidivism rate does not exclude aliens for who there is no record of removal. In May 2020, CDS-PMO reported that it has not taken any further steps to implement this recommendation. To fully implement this recommendation, DHS needs to further strengthen its recidivism rate methodology by excluding aliens for whom there is no record of removal. Further, DHS needs to demonstrate that it is using this updated methodology on a recurring basis and for CDS performance measurement purposes.

Recommendation: To improve risk management in the collection of AD/CV duties and to identify new or changing risks, CBP should regularly conduct a comprehensive risk analysis that assesses both the likelihood and the significance of risk factors related to AD/CV duty collection. For example, CBP could construct statistical models that explore the associations between potential risk factors and both the probability of nonpayment and the size of nonpayment when it occurs.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: As of December 2019, CBP was taking steps to conduct the type of risk analysis GAO recommended in July 2016. In November 2019 we reported that according to CBP , the agency had developed and successfully tested two models using risk factors including, but not limited to, the type of good, country of origin of the good, and whether the importer is from a foreign country. One test demonstrated that, using data from fiscal years 2007-2015, CBP could have predicted over 95 percent of the importers with delinquent antidumping and countervailing (AD/CV) duty bills in fiscal years 2016 and 2017. CBP requested $17 million in fiscal year 2020 funds to make updates to its information systems necessary to facilitate the implementation of statistical models. CBP is also working on long-term enhancements to the models that it says will leverage additional modeling techniques, such as social network and spatial analysis. Regularly conducting a comprehensive risk analysis of factors related to AD/CV duty non-collection could enhance CBP's capacity to collect additional revenue by enabling CBP to increase bonding amounts for continuous entry and single-transaction bonds for importers with a greater risk of nonpayment. In a December 2019 Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee report, CBP said that it planned to begin rolling out a risk-based bonding framework in March 2020. The new framework relies on a bond formula that is in part based on risk factors identified by the statistical models .

Recommendation: To improve risk management in the collection of AD/CV duties, CBP should, consistent with U.S. law and international obligations, take steps to use its data and risk assessment strategically to mitigate AD/CV duty nonpayment, such as by using predictive risk analysis to identify entries that pose heightened risk and taking appropriate action to mitigate the risk.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: As of December 2019, CBP was taking steps to develop a risk-based AD/CV bonding framework to use in conjunction with the development of an AD/CV risk assessment model. CBP is developing a supplemental AD/CV duty continuous entry bond that incorporates nonpayment risk factors identified in its statistical models and has worked with Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC) to test the proposed risk based bonding formula by applying it to historical data. CBP has estimated that the collection rate under the risk-based bonding framework using the proposed formula would have been significantly higher than the collection rate under its existing bond policies during fiscal years 2007-2017, both in number and value of the bills collected; however, COAC members said the proposed bond formula would have resulted in overinsurance, which could increase cost to importers. The use of supplemental continuous entry bonds may require regulatory changes and modifications to CBP's database. CBP has also conducted an analysis of the use of single-transaction bonds using historical data, and found that this procedure would have allowed CBP to collect significantly more revenue in fiscal years 2007-2018. CBP is working with COAC members to test a risk-based application of single-transaction bonds to historical AD/CV duty entries to assess whether the bond would have reduced the amount of uncollected duties. In a December 2019 Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee report, CBP said that it plans to rolls out its risk-based bonding framework in March 2020.

Recommendation: To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies, and better inform CBP's deployment decisions, once data on asset assists are required to be recorded and tracked, the Commissioner of CBP should analyze available data on apprehensions and seizures and technological assists, in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate, to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP's border security efforts.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In 2014, CBP expanded its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan to the Southwest Border Technology Plan. In February 2015, the Border Patrol took steps to address this recommendation by developing the Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP) with the support of Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Lab to examine the effects of technology and other assets. In May 2017, Border Patrol officials demonstrated a new system, intended to allow for more comprehensive analysis of the contributions of surveillance technologies to Border Patrol's mission during the CGAP process. As of March 2019, Border Patrol is now able to generate a performance report, using data collected from multiple systems, on how surveillance technologies have assisted agents during operations, including Border Patrol apprehensions. In February 2020 Border Patrol officials stated the data gathered in the report were reliable. They also provided examples of how they use available performance data to help identify gaps in capabilities and inform future investments in surveillance technologies. Border Patrol officials are also developing a surveillance capability score intended to represent the combined contributions of individual technology assets and agents on patrol to conduct surveillance in a given area. Border Patrol plans to report this score in fiscal year 2021, according to documentation provided by Border Patrol. We view these efforts, as described, as important progress toward fulfilling our recommendation, and will review the planned surveillance capability score once it is implemented to determine whether Border Patrol has fully implemented our recommendation.

Recommendation: To better ensure that CBP's Office of Field Operations' (OFO) staffing processes are transparent and to help ensure CBP can demonstrate that these resource decisions have effectively addressed CBP's mission needs, the Commissioner of CBP should document the methodology and process OFO uses to allocate staff to land ports of entry on the southwest border, including the rationales and factors considered in making these decisions.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In May 2017, CBP's Office of Field Operations began working with a contractor to develop a comprehensive CBP position allocation methodology and tool. According to CBP officials, the purpose of this tool was to ensure a data driven, transparent process for allocating CBP resources--including staff--to land ports of entry on the southwest border. CBP officials stated that the contractor completed the tool in January 2018, CBP tested the tool in fiscal year 2018, and CBP planned to implement the tool in fiscal year 2019. However, CBP officials told us in September 2020 that a subsequent reorganization of the Office of Field Operations rendered the tool unusable without further modification. As a result, they used a manual method to allocate staff in fiscal year 2020 and plan to do the same in fiscal year 2021. As of September 2020, CBP officials planned to document the methodology and process they are now using to allocate staff to land ports of entry, including rationales and factors considered, by November 2020. This recommendation remains open.