Recommendation: The Director of the Secret Service should identify which types of investigations and activities best prepare special agents for protective responsibilities. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: The agency has submitted a 180-day letter describing actions it is planning to take in response to this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of the Secret Service should develop a framework to help ensure special agents have an opportunity to work, to the extent possible, investigations and activities that best prepare them for protection. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: The agency has submitted a 180-day letter describing actions it is planning to take in response to this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of the Secret Service should establish a documented process to ensure that Office of Investigations resources are aligned with priority criminal threats. The process should outline key information to be included in plans for addressing priority threats. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: The agency has submitted a 180-day letter describing actions it is planning to take in response to this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of the Secret Service should identify investigations that address priority criminal threats agencywide and collect data on the resources expended to investigate the threats. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: The agency has submitted a 180-day letter describing actions it is planning to take in response to this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of the Secret Service should develop and implement a plan to ensure that special agents assigned to Presidential Protective Division and Vice Presidential Protective Division reach annual training targets given current and planned staffing levels. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: In May 2019 we reported that the Secret Service had not met the established training target (25 percent of work time) and lacked a plan for achieving it. We therefore recommended that the Director of the Secret Service develop and implement a plan to ensure that special agents assigned to the Presidential Protective Division and the Vice Presidential Protective Division reach annual training targets given current and planned staffing levels. The agency concurred with our recommendation. Towards addressing this recommendation, in October 2019, the Secret Service reported that the Office of Protective Operations is currently soliciting training requirements from each internal operational division, including the Presidential and Vice Presidential Protective Divisions, to determine the appropriate amount of training and associated training hours for each division. They further reported that once reviewed, the training requirements are to inform the agency's revised Human Capital Strategic Plan. The revised Human Capital Strategic Plan is to include an overview of Office of Protective Operations' training requirements and corresponding staffing needs. The Secret Service anticipates a revised Human Capital Strategic Plan to be available by the end of January 2020. The Secret Service's efforts to reevaluate the training requirements and targets are a positive first step. However, Secret Service's actions are not fully consistent with the recommendation. Specifically, in its updated response, the Secret Service stated that training hours for Presidential Protective Division and Vice Presidential Protective Division special agents training will only increase once the agency nears its ultimate staffing target. This is inconsistent with our recommendation to establish a plan to ensure these special agents reach annual training targets given current staffing levels. In the interim, affected special agents may continue to lack training required to prevent security breaches, such as that of September 19, 2019, when an intruder jumped the north fence and entered the White House. We will continue to monitor the Secret Service's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of the Secret Service should develop and implement a policy that documents the process for collecting complete Uniformed Division officer training data and establishes the types of information that should be collected. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: In May 2019 we reported that training data collected on the Secret Service's Uniform Division were incomplete and in certain cases unrelated to protection or lacked descriptions to clearly link the training to required skills. Further, the process used to capture the data was not consistently employed and did not include information on how or whether to capture internal on-the-job training instances, or instruction on the type of training to be captured to demonstrate that the training is protection-related training. We therefore recommended that the Director of the Secret Service develop and implement a policy that documents the process for collecting complete Uniformed Division officer training data and establishes the types of information that should be collected. The Secret Service, through DHS, concurred with our recommendation, stating that it would develop rigorous and uniform standards for collecting and reporting training data related to the Uniformed Division branch, and would work to capture additional training information. In response to our recommendation, in October 2019 the Secret Service reported that the Uniformed Division has worked with the Office of Training and Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS) team to capture Uniformed Division training requirements. The requirements are to include the 20 formalized on-the-job training programs for officers assigned to the Uniformed Division's White House, Foreign Missions, and Naval Observatory Branches, or one of the Special Operations Branch specialized units. In addition, the Secret Service stated that approximately 19 micro-training courses (also known as Roll Call Training) are currently captured within PALMS-the Department of Homeland Security's learning management system -and additional formalized on-the-job training programs are being reviewed for inclusion in PALMS. According to the Secret Service, use of PALMS should help ensure that the process for collecting and recording Uniformed Officer training is standardized and monitored. The Secret Service's efforts to capture additional training information in PALMS is a positive development. However, we have not yet observed progress towards the Secret Service's implementation of a policy that documents the process for collecting complete Uniformed Division officer training data and establishes the types of information that should be collected, as we recommended. We will continue to monitor the Secret Service's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy updates its policy and instruction on providing support to the Secret Service to define the requirements for producing semiannual reports of expenditures required by the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, as amended. These requirements should, at a minimum, include (1) the steps and time frames for completing updates to the policy and instruction, (2) time frames for reporting the expenditures, and (3) an oversight mechanism to ensure that the Department of Defense consistently submits these reports to specified congressional committees. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. As of July 31, 2019, DOD has not updated its policy or instruction.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy defines the steps, including time frames, necessary to achieve near term reporting requirements under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, as amended, and submit the reports as required. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. As of July 31, 2019, DOD has not updated its policy.

Recommendation: The Director should update the enterprise governance policy to specify (1) the CIO's current role and responsibilities on the Executive Resources Board, to include developing and reviewing the IT budget formulation and execution; and (2) the Deputy CIO's role and responsibilities on the Enterprise Governance Council. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. In March 2020, Secret Service officials stated that the component had drafted a revised enterprise governance policy that outlines the CIO's and Deputy CIO's roles and responsibilities. We will continue to monitor the component's efforts to finalize this policy.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the Secret Service develops a charter for its Executive Resources Board that specifies the roles and responsibilities of all board members, including the CIO. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. In March 2020, Secret Service officials stated that the component had drafted a charter for its Executive Resources Board that specifies the roles and responsibilities of Board members, including the CIO. We will continue to monitor the component's efforts to finalize this charter.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the CIO includes product quality and post-deployment user satisfaction metrics in the modular outcomes and target measures that the CIO sets for monitoring agile projects. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: Secret Service officials stated that Secret Service acquisition directives require the component to conduct a Post Implementation Review of IT programs after such a program achieves Initial Operating Capability. However, it is unclear whether and how this requirement applies to agile projects, and if the Secret Service has included post-deployment user satisfaction metrics in the modular outcomes and target measures that the CIO sets for monitoring such projects. DHS's draft agile guidance strongly recommends that user satisfaction be assessed at the end of each production deployment, not just one time after Initial Operating Capability. Moreover, the Secret Service has not yet demonstrated that the CIO has included product quality in the modular outcomes and target measures that the CIO sets for monitoring agile projects. We will continue to monitor the department's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the CIO identifies all of the required knowledge and skills for the IT workforce. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: In 2018 and 2019, the Secret Service participated in the Department of Homeland Security's Strategic Workforce Planning initiative, during which the department identified critical competencies and target proficiency levels for various IT workforce roles across the department (e.g., systems analysis, network management). However, it is unclear whether the Secret Service's participation in this initiative included the identification of the required knowledge and skills for all of the roles within the component's IT workforce, or just certain roles. In addition, while the Secret Service also established a standard operating procedure document in December 2019 that, among other things, identified recommended training and certifications for each OCIO division (e.g., network management, cyber security), this procedure document did not identify the required knowledge and skills for the workforce roles within each of those OCIO divisions. We will continue to monitor the component's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the CIO regularly analyzes the IT workforce to identify its competency needs and any gaps it may have. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: According to Secret Service officials, the component analyzed its IT workforce to identify its competency needs, as well as determined the projected staffing and competency gaps that it would have in fiscal year 2019. However, it has not yet provided supporting documentation of the analyses that the CIO conducted to determine these competency needs and projected competency gaps. We will continue to follow-up with the Secret Service for documentation of its efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that, after OCIO completes an analysis of the IT workforce to identify any competency and staffing gaps it may have, the Secret Service updates its recruiting and hiring strategies and plans to address those gaps, as necessary. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: According to Secret Service officials, the component determined that it had a projected staffing gap for fiscal year 2019 of 35 staff within the 2210 occupational job series (i.e., IT management staff). The officials also said that they had identified projected competency gaps related to positions such as Cyber Intelligence Analyst and Intelligence Research Specialist. While the Secret Service has not yet provided documentation of the analyses it conducted to determine these gaps, the component provided documentation to demonstrate that it targeted its fiscal year 2019 recruiting events to focus on addressing IT staffing and competency gaps. For example, among other things, in fiscal year 2019 the component conducted outreach and recruiting events focused on defense, cyber, IT, and intelligence hiring, as well as conducted a targeted cyber security hiring campaign with a large online job search service. We will continue to follow-up with the Secret Service for documentation of the analyses the OCIO conducted to determine its IT staffing and competency gaps, in order to verify whether the 2019 recruiting events conducted were focused on addressing such gaps.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources (1) develops and tracks metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service's recruitment activities for the IT workforce, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps; and (2) reports to component leadership on those metrics. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: Secret Service officials stated that the component has conducted recruitment and outreach efforts focused on IT, cyber, and engineering careers, and monitors the effectiveness of these efforts. However, the Secret Service has not yet provided supporting documentation demonstrating that it has (1) developed and tracked metrics to monitor the effectiveness of these recruitment activities, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps within the IT workforce; and (2) reported to component leadership on those metrics. We will continue to monitor the Secret Service's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources and OCIO adjust their recruitment and hiring plans and activities, as necessary, after establishing and tracking metrics for assessing the effectiveness of these activities for the IT workforce. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: The Secret Service has not yet demonstrated that it has established and tracked metrics for assessing the effectiveness of its recruitment and hiring plans and activities for the IT workforce. As such, the component is not yet able to demonstrate that its Office of Human Resources and OCIO have adjusted their recruitment and hiring plans and activities based on these metrics. We will continue to monitor the Secret Service's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the CIO (1) defines the required training for each IT workforce group, (2) determines the activities that OCIO will include in its IT workforce training and development program based on its available training budget, and (3) implements those activities. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: In December 2019, the Secret Service established a standard operating procedure document that identifies, among other things, recommended training and certifications for each OCIO division (e.g., network management, cyber security). However, this procedure document does not identify required training for each of these divisions. In March 2020, Secret Service officials stated that OCIO supervisors issued individual development plans to their team members that identified training requirements for continued professional development. However, the Secret Service has not yet provided documentation of these training requirements, nor evidence to support that the planned professional development activities are based on the required training for each IT workforce group. Moreover, the officials stated that, in response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), training is suspended. As such, the component is not implementing IT workforce training activities at this time. The officials plan to continue staff training once it is reinstated. We will continue to monitor the component's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the CIO ensures that the IT workforce completes training specific to their positions (after defining the training required for each workforce group). (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: While Secret Service officials stated that the component's Office of Training establishes the required curriculum for Secret Service personnel, the component has not yet demonstrated that the CIO has defined the training required for each IT workforce group, as we previously recommended. As such, the component is also not able to demonstrate that it is ensuring that each IT workforce group completes the training specific to their positions, as we also recommended. We will continue to monitor the Secret Service's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the CIO collects and assesses performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the IT training program contributes to improved performance and results (once the training program is implemented). (Recommendation 12)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: Secret Service officials stated that they are assessing how IT training has contributed to improved performance and results by comparing IT course completion results to the results of related training exercises that the component conducts (for example, the Secret Service may compare the completion rates for an IT security awareness training course to the results of a related IT security awareness exercise that the component conducts). However, the Secret Service has not yet provided supporting documentation of these assessments. We will continue to monitor the component's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director should ensure that the CIO updates the performance plans for each occupational series within the IT workforce to include the relevant technical competencies, once identified, against which IT staff performance should be assessed. (Recommendation 13)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Secret Service
Status: Open

Comments: According to Secret Service officials, the component has implemented a performance management system that enables OCIO supervisors to update the individual performance plans of each IT workforce staff member to include the relevant technical competencies against which each staff member's performance is to be assessed. However, the Secret Service has not yet provided supporting documentation demonstrating that OCIO has updated the performance plans for each IT workforce staff member to include the relevant technical competencies. We will continue to monitor the component's efforts to address this recommendation.