Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Naval Sea Systems Command fully analyzes the use of overtime among shipyard production shops, and updates workforce requirements to avoid the consistent use of overtime to meet planned maintenance requirements. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Naval Sea Systems Command identify a timeframe for completing the development of metrics for its Shipyard Performance to Plan initiative and complete the development of metrics to address the main factors contributing to maintenance delays and improve the timely completion of ship maintenance at Navy shipyards. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Naval Sea Systems Command develop and implements goals, action plans, milestones, and a monitoring process for its Shipyard Performance to Plan initiative to address the main factors contributing to maintenance delays and improving the timely completion of ship maintenance at Navy shipyards. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Naval Air Systems Command and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers effectively use historical data to analyze turnaround time and establish accurate turnaround time targets for fixed-wing aircraft depot maintenance packages. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the Navy has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Commander, Naval Air Forces and Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific provide depot planners regular reporting on fixed-wing aircraft maintenance performed outside the Navy aviation depots by an operational unit or at an intermediate maintenance facility to ensure they have information on the current condition and depot maintenance needs of individual aircraft. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the Navy has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Naval Air Systems Command and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers establish formal processes and related guidance for communication and coordination between depot stakeholders to inform maintenance requirements planning. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the Navy has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should direct the Assistant Secretary of Environmental Management to ensure that EM's final AOA for HLW pretreatment at the Hanford Site includes a definition of mission need and life-cycle cost estimates for the baseline or status quo alternative, as called for in the best practices for an AOA process we have identified and DOE guidance. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2020, EM officials told us that EM's final analysis of alternatives (AOA) "will include life cycle cost estimates consistent with" best practices and DOE guidance. We will continue to monitor the AOA process and evaluate the extent to which EM follows through with its commitment.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should direct the Assistant Secretary of Environmental Management to follow the steps outlined in GAO's risk-informed decision-making framework as EM makes decisions about the future of the pretreatment mission; in particular, engaging the Washington State Department of Ecology in the AOA process, communicating with them throughout the process, and providing them with transparent information about the rationale behind the final decision. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2020, EM officials told us that EM will "continue to include Ecology in the AOA process as an active participant, providing the opportunity for transparent and open communications through the process, inclusive of rationale used for the final decision." We will continue to follow the AOA process and monitor the extent to which EM follows through with its commitment.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should establish an analysis plan for the evaluation of OPN-funded pilot program availabilities, based on the leading practices for pilot programs. This analysis plan should identify opportunities to evaluate schedule outcomes of pilot program availabilities as compared to non-pilot program availabilities and document a process for evaluating lessons learned from the pilot program (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of the Navy concurred with our recommendation in May 2020, stating that it would establish an analysis plan for evaluating Other Procurement, Navy-funded pilot program availabilities. In July 2020, the Director, Maintenance & Modernization, within the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Ship Programs, stated that the Navy has drafted this analysis plan, which is now undergoing required Department of Defense (DOD) reviews. The Director stated that he expects this review process to be completed sometime in late summer 2020. Once complete, he stated that his office will provide the analysis plan to GAO for review to confirm that it satisfies our recommendation.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations directs the Advanced Exploration Systems division to define and determine a schedule for synchronization reviews, including the role of the proposed Lunar Exploration Control Board, to help ensure that requirements between mission and program levels are reconciled. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated that the Advanced Exploration Systems division will review program life-cycle review plans to ensure enterprise and program requirements are reconciled across the mission. NASA is in the process of determining the organizational structure of the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. Following this completion, NASA officials stated that the appropriate control board and division structures for review and program direction will become active.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations directs the Gateway program to conduct a joint cost and schedule confidence level at the program level for the Artemis III mission. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated it would conduct a joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis or equivalent. The Gateway program is planning to conduct a series of project- and program-level reviews and assessments aligned with key decision point reviews. This includes conducting a joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis or equivalent of the Gateway initial configuration to support a program key decision point planned for fall 2021. NASA has not yet taken action on this recommendation.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations directs the Gateway program to update its overall schedule for 2024 to add a KDP II to occur before system integration. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation, but has not yet taken action on it. NASA stated that it would provide a schedule for future reviews, including whether there will be a Key Decision Point (KDP) II, at the KDP-I review currently scheduled for fall 2021.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations creates a life-cycle cost estimate for the Artemis III mission. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with the recommendation and stated that the agency will provide a preliminary cost estimate for the Artemis III mission by the end of 2020. Further, NASA stated that it will provide an updated cost estimate for the Artemis III mission after it establishes cost and schedule commitments for some of the projects that compose the lunar mission, currently planned for the Spring of 2021. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to provide a cost estimate.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations directs the Advanced Exploration Systems division to commit to a completion date and finalize a cohesive document outlining the rationale for selecting its current lunar architecture and lunar programs. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated that it is developing a document that will summarize the trades and architectural studies, but the document is not yet complete.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the Office of the Chief Engineer determines under what conditions it is appropriate to complete an analysis of alternatives, particularly when there are multiple pathways—including architectures or programs—that NASA could pursue in the future, and document the justification for not completing an analysis. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation, but has not yet taken any action on it. NASA stated that it will provide additional clarifying guidance for conducting analyses of alternatives for new programs in the next update to NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5E, "NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements." NASA plans to complete the update of the procedural requirement in September 2021.

Recommendation: We recommend the NASA Administrator ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations direct the SLS program to calculate its development cost growth using a baseline that is appropriately adjusted for scope and costs NASA has determined are not associated with the first flight, and determine if the development cost growth has increased by 30 percent or more. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. As of February 2020, NASA stated that it is conducting a rebaseline of the cost and schedule commitments for the SLS program and will document final decisions in an Agency Baseline Commitment decision memorandum. NASA officials anticipate they will complete this effort in Spring 2020. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to measure cost growth using a baseline that reflects the scope of work currently planned for the first mission.

Recommendation: We recommend the NASA Administrator ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations direct the Orion program to update its cost estimate to reflect its committed EM-2 baseline date of April 2023. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA partially agreed with this recommendation, stating that providing the estimate to the forecasted launch date rather than to the committed baseline date of April 2023 is the most appropriate approach. In November 2019, program officials told us that they will consider this recommendation as part of updating the joint confidence level analysis for the program's Key Decision Point D review. This review occurs before the program enters the system assembly, integration and test, and launch phase, and is not scheduled to occur until December 2020. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA needs to provide an updated cost estimate through April 2023.

Recommendation: We recommend the NASA Administrator ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations direct the EGS program to demonstrate design maturity by completing 3D product modeling of the basic and functional design of the second Mobile Launcher prior to construction start. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated that the acquisition strategy for the second mobile launcher requires the use of 3D product modeling and that it will be the source for all engineering activities including integrated design reviews to demonstrate design maturity. It is too soon to assess the design maturity prior to construction start and we will provide updated information on actions NASA has taken at that time.

Recommendation: We recommend the NASA Administrator ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations direct the SLS and Orion programs to reevaluate their strategies for incentivizing contractors and determine whether they could more effectively incentivize contractors to achieve the outcomes intended as part of ongoing and planned contract negotiations. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with the intent of this recommendation and stated that the SLS and Orion program offices reevaluate their strategies for incentivizing contract performance as part of normal contracting activities including contract restructures, contract baseline adjustments, and new contract actions. The Orion program has awarded a long term contract for production of the Orion spacecraft that incorporates new strategies intended to reduce contract costs. The SLS program is in the process of negotiating long term production contracts for required hardware.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office assesses whether the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) R&M targets are still feasible and revise the ORD accordingly. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would review its Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) requirements and possibly revise them. In late 2019, the F-35 Program Executive Officer (PEO) developed an initiative to clearly identify what, if any, revisions DOD should make to the ORD. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office, as it revises its Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program (RMIP), identifies specific and measurable R&M objectives in its RMIP guidance. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would update its Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) RMIP guidance. In late 2019, DOD reported that a revised RMIP will be delivered to program leadership for approval. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office, as it revises its RMIP, identifies and documents which RMIP projects will achieve the identified objectives of the RMIP guidance. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would update its RMIP guidance. In late 2019, DOD reported that a revised RMIP will be delivered to program leadership for approval. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office prioritizes funding for the RMIP. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would plan for R&M funding going forward. In Sept. 2019, the F-35 Program Office reported that it was coordinating with the services to increase its Reliability & Maintainability investment. In Nov. 2019, the F-35 Program Office reported that it would allocate significant additional funding for RMIP for calendar year 2020. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the department's guidance that addresses software development provides specific, required direction on when and how often to involve users so that such involvement is early and continues through the development of the software and related program components. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and issued an interim Software Acquisition Pathway policy in January 2020 that addresses software development, including direction on user involvement. As of August 2020, this interim policy has not yet been finalized. According to DOD officials, a final policy is currently under development and is expected to be issued by the end of December 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the department's guidance that addresses software development provides specific, required direction on documenting and communicating user feedback to stakeholders during software system development. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2020, DOD has issued an interim Software Acquisition Pathway that addresses software development, including direction on user involvement. According to DOD officials, this interim pathway is planned to be replaced by a final policy that is currently under development and is expected to be issued by the end of December 2020.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Health should work with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA's) Office of Construction and Facilities Management to ensure that VHA incorporates the 12 steps in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide in VHA's updated construction projects' cost-estimating guidance. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs: Veterans Health Administration
Status: Open

Comments: The Office of Capital Asset Management Engineering and Support (OCAMES) is working with the Office of Construction and Facility Management (OCFM) to make necessary updates to CFM's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. GAO has reviewed VA's revisions and found that while they incorporated information on two of the 12 steps in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the guidance currently meets or substantially meets only 4 of the 12 steps. GAO met with OCFM and OCAMES staff in April 2020 to further discuss our guidance and how to apply it. The VA staff will consider how to further apply our guidance.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Health should obtain information on cost increases, schedule delays, and reasons for contract modifications in its updated Capital Asset Database through requiring medical center staff to provide the information or another appropriate method. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs: Veterans Health Administration
Status: Open

Comments: OCAMES is finalizing updates and fixing issues related to improvements to the Capital Asset Database; these updates include additional information related to change orders. Due to unexpected challenges with data connections and issues; however, these improvements have not yet been completed. The change in completion date is caused by data connection issues and progress on the overall system was stalled. GAO will continue to monitor VA's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Health should develop a comprehensive plan that includes elements such as milestones and roles and responsibilities for updating VHA's Capital Asset Database. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs: Veterans Health Administration
Status: Open

Comments: OCAMES is still finalizing updates and fixing issues related to improvements to the Capital Asset Database. Until the updates have been finalized, roles and responsibilities cannot be created. Upon completion of updates, roles and responsibilities will be developed.

Recommendation: The NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations should direct the Commercial Crew Program to include the results of its schedule risk analysis in its mandatory quarterly reports to Congress. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA did not concur with our recommendation that the Commercial Crew Program should include the results of its schedule analysis in its quarterly reports to Congress. In July 2019, NASA reaffirmed that it will be working to ensure that the contractors' schedules and the program's internal assessments sync up as the program gets closer to launch, which is the process it used in March 2019 leading up to SpaceX's uncrewed test flight. GAO continues to believe that the recommendation is valid because the program's schedule risk analysis would provide Congress with valuable insight into potential delays, which are likely.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should develop and maintain a contingency plan for ensuring a presence on the ISS until a Commercial Crew Program contractor is certified. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. NASA stated that it is in discussions with Russia to obtain additional seats on its Soyuz spacecraft for NASA crew as a contingency plan. NASA is also providing Extra-Vehicular Activity and robotics training for a subset of cosmonauts to support U.S. Operating Segment operations, and looking at a possible extension of the duration of the Space X Demonstration 2 crewed test flight. In November 2019, NASA reported that it completed its actions for this recommendation. However, while NASA is working on potential solutions, there is no contingency plan in place. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA needs to provide documentation of its contingency plan.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should direct the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations, the Commercial Crew Program Manager, and the Commercial Crew Program Contracting Officer to collectively determine and document before the agency certification review how the agency will determine its risk tolerance level with respect to loss of crew. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA partially concurred with our recommendation, stating it documented the agency's risk tolerance level with respect to loss of crew for the program in its May 2011 safety memo. NASA stated that ultimately the Commercial Crew Program is accountable for ensuring that the contractors' systems meet the loss of crew value of 1 in 270. In July 2019, the Commercial Crew Program noted that it will continue to determine its risk tolerance with respect to loss of crew and formally document its decisions at program management meetings. We continue to believe that, before agency certification, the key parties must collectively determine how the agency will determine its risk tolerance with response to loss of crew, as the risk tolerance for the loss of crew requirement depends on which entity is presenting the results of its analysis. We believe this approach will reduce confusion and increase transparency. In late September 2020, GAO received additional information from NASA on actions taken to implement this recommendation. We are currently assessing this information.

Recommendation: After completing the agency certification review, NASA's Chief Engineer and Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, with support from the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations and the Commercial Crew Program Manager, should document lessons learned related to loss of crew as a safety threshold for future crewed spaceflight missions, given the complexity of the metric. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA concurred with our recommendation to document lessons learned related to the loss of crew requirement. In June 2020, NASA told us that they expect to take action to close this recommendation by the end of May 2021.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 program office to resolve all critical deficiencies before making a full-rate production decision. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that critical deficiencies would be resolved before full-rate production, due in December 2019. In May 2020, we reported that DOD delayed its full-rate production decision from December 2019 to between September 2020 and March 2021.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 program office to identify what steps are needed to ensure the F-35 meets reliability and maintainability requirements before each variant reaches maturity and update the Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program with these steps. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. According to a DOD official, as of July 2020, the F-35 program office is in the process of revising its plan for improving the F-35's reliability and maintainability.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Defense Laboratories Office routinely obtain and monitor defense laboratory hiring data to improve the oversight of the defense laboratories' use of hiring authorities. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and cited steps the department was and would be taking to improve oversight and coordination of the defense laboratories' hiring efforts. In June 2018, DOD acknowledged receipt of our final report and stated that the department's overall position on the report had not changed. We will provide further updates once additional information is received.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Defense Laboratories Office develop performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the defense laboratories' use of hiring authorities as part of the labs' overall hiring to better inform future decision making about hiring efforts and policies. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and cited steps the department was and would be taking to improve oversight and coordination of the defense laboratories' hiring efforts. In June 2018, DOD acknowledged receipt of our final report and stated that the department's overall position on the report had not changed. We will provide further updates once additional information is received.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Defense Laboratories Office, in collaboration with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Laboratory Quality Enhancement Panel's Personnel Subpanel, establish and document time frames for its coordination process to direct efforts across the relevant offices and help ensure the timely approval and implementation of hiring authorities. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and cited steps the department was and would be taking to improve oversight and coordination of the defense laboratories' hiring efforts. In June 2018, DOD acknowledged receipt of our final report and stated that the department's overall position on the report had not changed. We will provide further updates once additional information is received.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the CIO of USDA establishes an agency-wide policy and process for the CIO's certification of major IT investments' adequate use of incremental development, in accordance with OMB's guidance on the implementation of FITARA, and confirm that it includes: a description of the CIO's role in the certification process; a description of how CIO certification will be documented; and a definition of incremental development and time frames for delivering functionality, consistent with OMB guidance. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2019, a Department of Agriculture official stated that the department was working to establish a policy to include the information noted in our recommendation and planned to finalize a policy by the end of December 2019. We will continue to monitor the department's progress on these efforts.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Veterans Affairs (VA) should ensure that the CIO of VA updates the agency's policy and process for the CIO's certification of major IT investments' adequate use of incremental development, in accordance with OMB's guidance on the implementation of FITARA, and confirm that it includes a description of the CIO's role in the certification process and a description of how CIO certification will be documented. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has taken action, and stated that it would draft a policy to address our recommendation. In November 2019, a VA official stated that the department is working to address our recommendation but did not identify timeframes for when all activities would be completed. We will continue to evaluate the department's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should ensure that the CIO of EPA establishes an agency-wide policy and process for the CIO's certification of major IT investments' adequate use of incremental development, in accordance with OMB's guidance on the implementation of FITARA, and confirm that it includes: a description of the CIO's role in the certification process; a description of how CIO certification will be documented; and a definition of incremental development and time frames for delivering functionality, consistent with OMB guidance. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
Status: Open

Comments: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concurred with our recommendation and stated that it planned to develop a policy to implement this recommendation and other FITARA issues. Specifically, EPA officials reported in July 2019 that the agency was continuing to work to address the recommendation but did not provided a time frame for when a policy would be finalized. We will continue to monitor EPA's progress on these efforts.

Recommendation: The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) should ensure that the CIO of NASA establishes an agency-wide policy and process for the CIO's certification of major IT investments' adequate use of incremental development, in accordance with OMB's guidance on the implementation of FITARA, and confirm that it includes: a description of the CIO's role in the certification process; a description of how CIO certification will be documented; and a definition of incremental development and time frames for delivering functionality, consistent with OMB guidance. (Recommendation 13)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) concurred with our recommendation and reported that the agency was in the process of addressing it. Specifically, NASA officials reported in June 2020 that its guidance is currently being updated to include the information noted in our recommendation and will be finalized by September 2020. We will continue to monitor NASA's progress on these efforts.

Recommendation: The Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) should ensure that the CIO of OPM updates the agency's policy and process for the CIO's certification of major IT investments' adequate use of incremental development, in accordance with OMB's guidance on the implementation of FITARA, and confirm that it includes a description of the CIO's role in the certification process and a description of how CIO certification will be documented. (Recommendation 16)

Agency: Office of Personnel Management
Status: Open

Comments: The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would update its policies and processes to include the elements we recommended. Specifically, OPM officials reported in November 2019 that guidance on CIO certification was being developed but the agency had not yet determined a time frame for finalizing the policy. We will continue to monitor OPM's progress on these efforts.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer completes efforts to identify future telecommunications needs and areas for optimization, identifies the costs and benefits of new technology, and aligns USDA's approach with its long-term plans. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) concurred with our recommendation and stated that it plans to, among other things, provide the EIS vendor community with USDA's future vision and requirements in order to enable each vendor to propose optimal solutions; and update the cost benefit analysis of new technologies while reviewing vendor proposals. However, USDA has not yet provided documentation demonstrating that it has completed these efforts. We will continue to monitor USDA's progress on these efforts.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer identifies transition-related roles and responsibilities related to the management of assets, human capital, and information security, and legal expertise; develops a transition communications plan; and uses configuration and change-management processes in USDA's transition. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: As we recommended, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified transition roles and responsibilities related to the management of assets, human capital, and information security, and legal expertise. USDA also developed a communications plan and change management plan for the transition. However, the department has not yet demonstrated that it has implemented change management, nor that it is using configuration management for the transition. We will continue to monitor USDA's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer documents the costs and benefits of transition investments, identifies staff resources needed for the remainder of the transition, and analyzes training needs for staff assisting with the transition. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) officials stated that they are in the process of completing an Independent Government Cost Estimate for the transition. The officials also stated that the department is creating an EIS support organization that will address staffing needs for the transition. However, USDA has not yet provided documentation demonstrating that it has completed these efforts. We will continue to monitor USDA's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer demonstrates that the Department's transition goals and measures align with its mission, identifies transition risks related to critical systems and continuity of operations, and identifies mission-critical priorities in USDA's transition timeline. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) concurred with our recommendation and stated that it plans to (1) incorporate mission-critical priorities into USDA's requests for quotes; (2) ensure that critical systems are inventoried and that their respective transition plans ensure continuity of operations; and (3) prioritize mission-critical functions within its transition timeline. However, USDA has not yet provided documentation demonstrating that it has completed these efforts. We will continue to monitor USDA's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Labor should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer verifies the completeness of DOL's inventory of current telecommunications assets and services and establishes a process for ongoing maintenance of the inventory. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Labor
Status: Open

Comments: Department of Labor (DOL) officials stated that the agency is in the process of developing an inventory of its telecommunications assets and services that are associated with GSA's expiring contracts (e.g., Networx). The officials noted that, as part of the department's transition to EIS, DOL plans to include only limited non-GSA/commercial telecommunications assets and services in its initial transition efforts and inventory. The officials further stated that DOL will not focus on these non-GSA/commercial assets and services until the department completes its transition of assets and services associated with GSA's expiring contracts. We will continue to monitor the department's efforts to develop a complete telecommunications inventory, including assets and services associated with both GSA and non-GSA/commercial contracts, and associated maintenance processes for this inventory.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Labor should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer identifies the agency's future telecommunications needs, completes a strategic analysis of the agency's telecommunications requirements, and incorporates the requirements into transition planning. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Labor
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Labor (DOL) provided documentation demonstrating that it has identified certain future telecommunications needs for the department, but DOL did not identify these needs using a complete inventory of its current telecommunications assets and services. In addition, the department demonstrated that it had completed a draft strategic analysis of its telecommunications requirements, but this analysis was not yet finalized and approved. Further, the department has not yet demonstrated that it has aligned its identified telecommunications needs with its long-term plans and enterprise architecture. We will continue to monitor DOT's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Labor should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer identifies transition-related roles and responsibilities related to the management of assets, human capital, and information security, and legal expertise; develops a transition communications plan; and uses project, configuration, and change-management processes in DOL's transition (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Labor
Status: Open

Comments: Department of Labor (DOL) officials stated that the department is in the process of selecting a project manager to develop the Transition Project Plan and other supporting documentation for the transition, including a communications plan. DOL expects to develop this documentation around March 2020. We will continue to monitor the department's progress on these efforts.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Labor should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer identifies the resources needed for the full transition, develops justifications for the costs of changes to hardware and software, identifies staff resources needed for the remainder of the transition, and analyzes training needs for staff assisting with the transition. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Labor
Status: Open

Comments: Department of Labor (DOL) officials stated that the department is in the process of selecting a project manager to develop the Transition Project Plan and other documentation that would address this recommendation. The officials expect to develop this documentation around March 2020. We will continue to monitor the department's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Labor should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer identifies transition risks related to information security, critical systems, and continuity of operations, and identifies mission-critical priorities in DOL's transition timeline. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Labor
Status: Open

Comments: Department of Labor (DOL) officials stated that the department is in the process of selecting a project manager to develop the Transition Project Plan and other documentation that would address this recommendation. The officials expect to develop this documentation around March 2020. We will continue to monitor the department's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission should ensure that the Commission's Chief Information Officer identifies the agency's future telecommunications needs, areas for optimization, and the costs and benefits of new technology; completes a strategic analysis of the commission's telecommunications requirements; and incorporates the identified requirements into transition planning. (Recommendation 12)

Agency: United States Securities and Exchange Commission
Status: Open

Comments: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concurred with our recommendation. SEC stated that it plans to establish an EIS planning team comprised of key IT personnel from across the agency to identify, among other things, future needs and areas for improvement, so that SEC can incorporate the results into its transition planning. However, SEC has not yet provided documentation demonstrating that it has completed these efforts. We will continue to monitor SEC's progress implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission should ensure that the Commission's Chief Information Officer identifies roles and responsibilities related to the management of assets and human capital and legal expertise for the transition; includes key local and regional officials in SEC's transition communications plan; and completes efforts to use configuration and change management processes in the transition. (Recommendation 13)

Agency: United States Securities and Exchange Commission
Status: Open

Comments: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) concurred with our recommendation and stated that it plans to document the roles and responsibilities of key EIS transition team members across the agency. The agency also plans to develop a transition communications plan that includes configuration and change management practices. However, SEC has not yet provided documentation demonstrating that it has completed these efforts. We will continue to monitor SEC's progress implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission should ensure that the Commission's Chief Information Officer identifies the resources needed for the full transition, justifies requests for transition resources, identifies staff resources needed for the full transition, and completes efforts to analyze training needs for staff assisting with the transition. (Recommendation 14)

Agency: United States Securities and Exchange Commission
Status: Open

Comments: In response to our recommendation, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) provided a high-level budget estimate for the transition. However, it was unclear what costs were included in this estimate and the agency did not provide documentation that justified the costs identified. In addition, SEC has not yet provided an analysis of the staff resources it needs for the transition, nor an analysis of the training needs for the staff assisting with the transition. We will continue to monitor SEC's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission should ensure that the Commission's Chief Information Officer completes efforts to demonstrate that the commission's transition goals and measures align with its mission, identifies transition risks related to critical systems and continuity of operations, and identifies mission-critical priorities in SEC's transition timeline. (Recommendation 15)

Agency: United States Securities and Exchange Commission
Status: Open

Comments: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has demonstrated that its transition goals and measures align with its mission. In addition, the commission has identified transition risks related to continuity of operations. However, SEC has not yet identified transition risks related to its critical systems, nor identified mission-critical priorities in its transition timeline. We will continue to monitor SEC's progress on these efforts.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should ensure that the Administration's Chief Information Officer verifies the completeness of SSA's inventory of current telecommunications assets and services and establishes a process for ongoing maintenance of the inventory regarding services other than local and long-distance telecommunications. (Recommendation 16)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: Social Security Administration (SSA) officials stated that the agency is in the process of making significant changes to its procedures and policy for its telecommunications inventory. The officials expect to have a complete inventory of their telecommunications assets and services by 2021. We will continue to monitor SSA's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should ensure that the Administration's Chief Information Officer completes identification of the agency's future telecommunications needs and aligns its approach with the agency's enterprise architecture. (Recommendation 17)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: Social Security Administration (SSA) officials stated that the agency's priority is to transition its telecommunications services on a like-for-like basis, in order to complete the transition before its existing contracts expire, as well as to receive immediate cost savings. Officials also stated that, once SSA has released its EIS solicitations, they plan to analyze the alignment of their future telecommunications needs with the agency's enterprise architecture. However, SSA has not yet provided documentation demonstrating that it has completed this analysis. We will continue to monitor SSA's progress on these efforts.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should ensure that the Administration's Chief Information Officer uses configuration and change-management processes in its transition. (Recommendation 18)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: The Social Security Administration (SSA) provided documentation demonstrating that it has implemented a change management process, including establishing a change control board that is scheduled to meet on a weekly basis and tracking change requests in its IT Service Management tool. However, SSA has not yet demonstrated that it has implemented configuration management processes for its transition. We will continue to monitor SSA's efforts to implement these processes.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should ensure that the Administration's Chief Information Officer identifies the resources needed for the full transition, documents the costs and benefits of transition investments, identifies staff resources needed for the remainder of the transition, and analyzes training needs for all staff working on the transition. (Recommendation 19)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: The Social Security Administration (SSA) provided documentation demonstrating that it has identified the staff resources and required training for staff working on the transition. However, SSA has not yet provided documentation demonstrating that it has identified the funding resources needed for the full transition, nor documented the costs and benefits of transition investments, such as for resource requests related to transition program management staff. We will continue to monitor SSA's efforts to fully implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should ensure that the Administration's Chief Information Officer completes efforts to identify measures of success for the transition, identifies transition risks related to critical systems and continuity of operations, and identifies mission-critical priorities in SSA's transition timeline. (Recommendation 20)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: The Social Security Administration (SSA) has identified transition risks related to critical systems and continuity of operations. In addition, SSA officials stated that the agency is in the process of identifying (1) agency-specific measures of success for the transition and (2) mission-critical priorities that need to be incorporated into its transition timeline. However, SSA has not yet provided documentation demonstrating that it has completed these efforts. We will continue to monitor SSA's efforts to fully implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Transportation should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer verifies the completeness of DOT's inventory of current telecommunications assets and services and establishes a process for ongoing maintenance of the inventory. (Recommendation 21)

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: Department of Transportation (DOT) officials stated that the department has developed a comprehensive inventory of its telecommunications assets and services, and maintains this inventory on a regular basis. However, as of August 2020, the department has not yet provided documentation of its inventory or the associated maintenance processes. We will continue to monitor DOT's efforts to complete this inventory and establish a maintenance process for it.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Transportation should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer identifies the agency's future telecommunications needs, areas for optimization, and costs and benefits of new technology; and completes efforts to align DOT's approach with its long-term plans and enterprise architecture. (Recommendation 22)

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: Department of Transportation (DOT) officials stated that they conducted an assessment of the department's future telecommunication requirements. According to officials, the results of this analysis were included in an EIS Statement of Work. However, DOT has not demonstrated that it used its complete inventory of existing services to identify its future needs. DOT also stated that it has conducted extensive research to identify areas for optimization and sharing, but did not provide documentation of this research. Further, DOT has not provided evidence that the department has aligned its transition approach with its long-term plans and enterprise architecture. We will continue to follow-up with DOT regarding these efforts.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Transportation should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer identifies roles and responsibilities related to the management of assets and human capital and legal expertise for the transition; develops a transition communications plan; and fully uses configuration and change-management processes in DOT's transition. (Recommendation 23)

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Transportation (DOT) developed a transition communications plan and identified roles and responsibilities related to legal expertise, the management of assets and human capital. DOT has also provided evidence that they are requiring the use of change management in the transition. However, DOT has not demonstrated that it is applying configuration management processes to DOT's transition efforts. We will continue to monitor DOT's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Transportation should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer fully identifies the resources needed for the full transition, justifies requests for transition resources, identifies staff resources needed for the full transition, and fully analyzes training needs for staff assisting with the transition. (Recommendation 24)

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: Department of Transportation (DOT) developed a transition resource plan that identifies functional roles needed for the transition, such as network engineers and staff to place new telecommunications orders. However, the transition resource plan did not identify the staffing levels needed for each of the functional roles, such as how many network engineers are necessary, and DOT did not provide other documentation that fully identifies these resources needs. In addition, DOT has not yet provided documentation that it has identified the funding needed for the full transition, justified requests for transition resources, or fully analyzed training needs for staff assisting with the transition. We will continue to follow-up on DOT's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Transportation should ensure that the Department's Chief Information Officer fully demonstrates that DOT's transition goals and measures align with its mission; completely identifies transition risks related to information security, critical systems, and continuity of operations; and fully identifies mission-critical priorities in the transition timeline. (Recommendation 25)

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: Department of Transportation (DOT) provided evidence that its transition goals and measures align with its mission and that it has identified the risks associated with the EIS transition. However, DOT has not yet provided documentation demonstrating that it has identified mission-critical priorities in its transition timeline. We will continue to monitor DOT's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should develop a comprehensive plan for shipyard capital investment that establishes (1) the desired goal for the shipyards' condition and capabilities; (2) an estimate of the full costs to implement the plan, addressing all relevant requirements, external risk factors, and associated planning costs; and (3) metrics for assessing progress toward meeting the goal that include measuring the effectiveness of capital investments. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Navy concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to develop and implement a comprehensive plan. Naval Sea Systems Command produced a Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan in February 2018 to guide the overhaul and improvement of the naval shipyards. This plan includes some of the recommended elements but not others. (1) The plan includes some goals for the desired shipyard condition and capabilities including to: recover almost 70 maintenance periods over the next 20 years, modernize capital equipment to industry standards, optimize facilities, and reduce travel time and movement for personnel and materiel during the maintenance process. Navy officials stated the program office is in the process of creating digital maps of the yards to use in modeling facility layouts to identify the optimal layout. The Navy states that the optimal layout will recover 328,000 man days per year, a 65 percent reduction of travel and movement. (2) The report includes a preliminary cost estimate, but work is underway to determine the full costs to address all relevant requirements, risk factors, and planning costs. The plan identifies risks that could increase costs, but does not identify solutions to address those risks. Program officials said they will develop plans to address the risks in subsequent phases of the planning effort. The risks Navy officials identified included historical preservation, environmental regulations, and the need for extra capacity. (3) The plan did not include metrics for assessing progress toward meeting each of the goals. Navy officials stated that they intend to develop metrics to meet this element during a second phase that will be complete in fiscal year 2020.To fully implement this recommendation, the Navy should complete its optimization plan, develop a reliable cost estimate addressing all relevant requirements, risks, and planning costs, and develop metrics to help it assess progress towards meeting its goal that include measuring the effectiveness of capital investments.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should conduct regular management reviews that include all relevant stakeholders to oversee implementation of the plan, review metrics, assess the progress made toward the goal, and make adjustments, as necessary, to ensure that the goal is attained. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Navy concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to conduct regular management reviews. To address this recommendation, the Navy issued NAVSEA Notice 5450 in June 2018. This notice established a new program management office responsible for planning, developing, scheduling, budgeting, and sustaining the replacement of shipyard facilities and equipment. By creating this office, the Navy has taken a first step toward establishing a result-oriented management approach and toward implementing our recommendation to conduct regular management reviews. In addition, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, in September 2018, required this new program office to provide regular updates to an Executive Oversight Council. These updates could serve as a foundation to address this recommendation. However, as noted in GAO-20-64, the Navy has faced challenges involving all the relevant stakeholders in the plan's implementation, namely the shipyards. In the absence of clear direction, the shipyards have worked with the program office to develop several informal collaboration mechanisms. For example, the program office and the shipyards have begun several shipyard-specific working groups and hold regular telephone calls. However, until the shipyards are formally involved in the implementation and assessment of the plan, the Navy will be unable to fully meet the direction of this recommendation to involve "all relevant stakeholders."

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should provide regular reporting to key decision makers and Congress on the progress the shipyards are making to meet the goal of the comprehensive plan, along with any challenges that hinder that progress, such as cost. This may include reporting on progress to reduce their facilities restoration and modernization backlogs, improve the condition and configuration of the shipyards, and recapitalize capital equipment. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Navy concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to provide regular reporting to key decision makers and Congress. DOD officials stated in October 2018 that the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan, along with the creation of the Readiness Reform Oversight Council, address this recommendation. While the Readiness Reform Oversight Council does appear to involve some of the key stakeholders who should be receiving the regular reporting, the Navy has already made clear that it sees the shipyard optimization process as a 20-year-long effort. Given that, regular reporting on progress cannot be achieved with a single disclosure at the beginning of the effort. Both Congress and DOD decision makers need to receive regular updates on the implementation of the shipyard optimization plan, and while it is possible that the newly created Shipyard Program Management Office will be able to provide such reporting, that organization is still being developed and, as of August 2019, no progress reporting has yet begun.

Recommendation: The Chief Executive Officer should direct the Chief Information Officer to take steps needed to ensure that system requirements are defined to align with the business needs of CNCS's future risk-based grants monitoring process (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Corporation for National and Community Service
Status: Open

Comments: In November 2018, CNCS officials stated that the agency made the decision to terminate the development of the Grants and Member Management (GMM) system. They subsequently awarded a contract to assess the state of development for the GMM system and to provide recommendations on the actions CNCS needed to take in order to implement a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) application for core grants management functions. According to CNCS officials, based on the findings from that assessment, further investments in developing customized applications (even an implementation of a COTS application) were not likely to be successful. As of September 2019, CNCS officials stated that they were pursuing the option of a federal shared service as a solution to grants management. As of November 2019, according to CNCS officials, the agency had not yet defined requirements for the grant monitoring system project because the decision to pursue the federal shared services as a solution for grants management is very recent. CNCS officials agreed to provide GAO with an update as further progress is made on this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Chief Executive Officer should direct the Chief Information Officer to ensure that the system development project schedule identifies in the baseline both planned and actual dates for completing all project-level activities, and can be used to monitor and measure progress of the grant monitoring system project (Recommendation 2).

Agency: Corporation for National and Community Service
Status: Open

Comments: In November 2018, CNCS officials stated that the agency made the decision to terminate the development of the GMM system. They subsequently awarded a contract to assess the state of development for the GMM system and to provide recommendations on the actions CNCS needed to take in order to implement a COTS application for core grants management functions. According to CNCS officials, based on the findings from that assessment, further investments in developing customized applications (even an implementation of a COTS application) were not likely to be successful. As of September 2019, CNCS officials stated that they were pursuing the option of a federal shared service as a solution to grants management. As of November 2019, according to CNCS officials, the agency had not yet established a project schedule for completing the grant monitoring system project because the decision to pursue the federal shared services as a solution for grants management is very recent. CNCS officials agreed to provide GAO with an update as further progress is made on this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Chief Executive Officer should direct the Chief Information Officer to ensure that test plans are defined and implemented to include the second version of the grant monitoring system in all stages of testing during development, and results of initial stages are approved before conducting subsequent test stages (Recommendation 3).

Agency: Corporation for National and Community Service
Status: Open

Comments: In November 2018, CNCS officials stated that the agency made the decision to terminate the development of the GMM system. They subsequently awarded a contract to assess the state of development for the GMM system and to provide recommendations on the actions CNCS needed to take in order to implement a COTS application for core grants management functions. According to CNCS officials, based on the findings from that assessment, further investments in developing customized applications (even an implementation of a COTS application) were not likely to be successful. As of September 2019, CNCS officials stated that they were pursuing the option of a federal shared service as a solution to grants management. As of November 2019, according to CNCS officials, the agency had not yet established a timeframe to define test plans for the selected solution for the grant monitoring system project because the decision to pursue the federal shared services as a solution for grants management is very recent. CNCS officials agreed to provide GAO with an update as further progress is made on this recommendation.

Recommendation: To mitigate the risk of poor acquisition outcomes and strengthen the department's investment decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Undersecretary for Management to update the acquisition policy to require that major acquisition programs' technical requirements are well defined and key technical reviews are conducted prior to approving programs to initiate product development and establishing Acquisition Program Baselines, in accordance with acquisition best practices.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments on this report, DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that it planned to initiate a study to assess how to better align its processes for technical reviews and acquisition decisions. Upon completion of the study, DHS updated its acquisition policy instruction in May 2019, which adjusted the acquisition life cycle. Specifically, the updated instruction requires programs to conduct key technical reviews--including a preliminary design review--prior to establishing the program's Acquisition Program Baseline. As of July 2020, DHS was in the process of updating the related policies and guidance for its Systems Engineering Life Cycle, which govern the department's technical reviews. GAO will review these policies and guidance once complete to confirm alignment with the changes made to the acquisition management instruction and will monitor DHS's implementation of its new acquisition life cycle to ensure the department's actions meet the intent of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in the movement of Marine Corps units by, for example, reconsidering when units should move to Guam to minimize leaving facilities vacant.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation and stated that the Marine Corps' plans for the movement of units from Okinawa to Guam has considered many factors, including, among others, the capabilities required to support Pacific Command and the logistical requirements associated with the movement of forces. In March 2020, DOD stated that the Marine Corps and Pacific Command have done extensive planning and analysis to determine how best to posture, move, and support distributed III Marine Expeditionary Force Marines. However, as of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of this analysis. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI by, for example, identifying other suitable training areas.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation and stated that it has already conducted an extensive analysis of training needs. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility by, for example, selecting other runways that would support mission requirements.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD had not identified any additional runways and stated that this is a Government of Japan responsibility. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in challenges in Australia regarding seasonal changes and biosecurity requirements that affect equipment downtime by, for example, deciding on a location for the wet season and identifying a solution for biosecurity requirements.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD stated that no new decisions have been made regarding the Australia rotation. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To provide DOD with reliable information on potential sources of delays for the design and construction of infrastructure in Guam, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to update the Marine Corps' integrated master schedule for Guam so that it meets the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. For example, the update to the schedule should include resources for nonconstruction activities.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In March 2020, DOD stated that the updated integrated master schedule for Guam conforms to the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide and accounts for the best practices of a reliable schedule. However, as of May 2020, we have not received an updated integrated master schedule that meets the criteria for a reliable schedule.

Recommendation: To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Guam, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to revise the cost estimates for Guam to address all best practices established by GAO's cost estimating guide. Specifically, the revisions to the cost estimates should include: a unifying Work Breakdown Structure, risk and sensitivity analyses, and an independent cost estimate.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD nonconcurred with this recommendation. In March 2020, DOD stated that the department does not accept the assertion that GAO's best practices for cost estimates are universally applicable to a wide range of activities that includes military construction, acquisition, or basing. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to revise the DOD cost estimates for Hawaii to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD stated that it continues to update its cost estimates for the Hawaii program in line with GAO's cost estimating guide but did not agree that detailed cost estimates are required at this early planning stage to make decisions in the 2026 timeframe and beyond. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, the Secretary of Defense should revise the DOD cost estimates for Australia to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD stated that it continues to update its cost estimates for the Australia program in line with GAO's cost estimating guide. However, DOD stated that since Australia will build or provide much of the infrastructure enhancements in support of the Marine Corps, cost estimates will not incorporate the construction costs. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To provide the Congress and NASA a reliable estimate of program cost and schedule that are useful to support management and stakeholder decisions, the NASA Administrator should direct the Orion program to perform an updated JCL analysis including updating cost and schedule estimates in adherence with cost and schedule estimating best practices.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA partially agreed with this recommendation, stating that the agency reviewed, in detail, the Orion integrated cost/schedule and risk analysis methodology and determined the rigor to be a sufficient basis for the agency commitments. In November 2019, Orion program officials told us that in response to a recent policy change, the program office will update its joint confidence level analysis when the program has its Key Decision Point D review. This review occurs before the program enters the system assembly integration and test, and launch phase and is not scheduled to occur until December 2020. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to provide evidence that it updated its joint confidence level analysis when the Orion program holds its Key Decision Point D review.

Recommendation: To ensure that risks associated with ALIS are addressed expediently and holistically, the Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 Program Executive Officer to improve the reliability of its cost estimates, conduct uncertainty and sensitivity analyses consistent with cost-estimating best practices identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. According to DOD officials, as of July 2018, this recommendation conflicts with established Office of the Under Secretary of Defense/Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation guidance for cost estimation and uncertainty analysis. Absent a change in policy at that level, the Joint Program Office will continue to follow Office of the Under Secretary of Defense/Cost Estimation and Program Evaluation policy on this issue. We continue to believe that in order for any risks associated with ALIS to be addressed expediently and holistically, uncertainty and sensitivity analysis must be used on the F-35s cost estimates to improve its overall reliability. Thus, this recommendation will remain open.

Recommendation: To ensure that risks associated with ALIS are addressed expediently and holistically, the Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 Program Executive Officer to improve the reliability of its cost estimates, ensure that future estimates of ALIS costs use historical data as available and reflect significant program changes consistent with cost-estimating best practices identified in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. According to DOD officials, since April 2016, the F-35 program has continued to update the ALIS estimate with the latest available cost data, based on recent contracts. Until more reliable actual costs become available, the program utilizes negotiated contract costs, incorporates program initiatives, and ensures the estimate reflects the latest technical baseline and requirements. Until actual costs associated with ALIS historical data are incorporated in the F-35 cost estimate, we believe that the estimate will not be as reliable as it could be. For this reason, this recommendation will remain open.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Agriculture should revise existing department policies for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories to contain specific requirements for reporting laboratory incidents to senior department officials, including the types of incidents that should be reported, to whom, and when, or direct the Administrator of the Food Safety and Inspection Service to develop agency policies that contain these requirements.

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2016, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) stated that its Joint Committee on Biorisk Management Policy (JCBMP) would oversee the revisions of existing policies to include department-wide incident reporting requirements and time frames. As of July 2020, USDA estimated that these revisions should be completed by October 2020. Officials stated that updates to component agency policies would be completed shortly after issuance of the departmental policy. We will update the status of this recommendation when we receive additional information.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Agriculture should review and update outdated department policies for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and direct the Administrators of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and Agricultural Research Service to update their policies and, in the case of APHIS, establish a regular review schedule.

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2016, USDA stated that the JCBMP would oversee the revisions of existing outdated departmental policies. In addition, officials stated that APHIS reviews and updates agency policies every 3-5 years, and that this schedule will be reflected in the updated departmental policy. In October 2019, the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) updated its agency policy for its institutional biological safety committee, the entity responsible for ensuring biosafety in its laboratories. As of July 2020, USDA estimated that revisions to the departmental, APHIS, and Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) policies should be completed by December 2020. We will update the status of this recommendation when we receive additional information.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Agriculture should routinely analyze results of the department's laboratory inspections and incident reports to identify potential trends that may highlight recurring laboratory safety or security issues and share lessons learned with laboratory personnel.

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2016, USDA stated that the JCBMP would oversee efforts to collect and analyze laboratory inspection results and incident reports and share these reports and critical analyses with USDA senior leadership on an annual basis. As of July 2020, USDA estimated that revisions to its departmental policy-which would reflect the JCBMP's role in analyzing inspection results and incident reports, identifying potential trends, and sharing lessons learned-should be completed by October 2020. We will update the status of this recommendation when we receive additional information.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Agriculture should require routine reporting of the results of department, agency, and select agent laboratory inspections to senior department officials.

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2016, USDA stated that the JCBMP would oversee the revisions of existing policies to include requirements for routine reporting of inspection results to senior USDA officials. In July 2020, USDA estimated that these revisions should be completed by October 2020. We will update the status of this recommendation when we receive additional information.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Agriculture should require routine reporting of incidents at agency laboratories to senior department officials.

Agency: Department of Agriculture
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2016, USDA stated that the JCBMP would oversee the revisions of existing policies to include requirements for routine reporting of laboratory incidents to senior USDA officials. In July 2020, USDA estimated that these revisions should be completed by October 2020. Officials stated that updates to component agency policies would be completed shortly after issuance of the departmental policy. We will update the status of this recommendation when we receive additional information.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Defense should revise existing department policies for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories to contain specific requirements for inventory control for all of DOD's high-containment laboratories, not just for its select agent-registered laboratories, or direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy to revise their existing, respective policies to contain these requirements.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. In June 2018, DOD stated that it had completed evaluation of existing DOD and service level guidance related to inventory control. DOD also stated that it will continue to analyze the adequacy of existing policy and the need to expand that policy across the DOD Lab Enterprise as the draft Department of Defense Manual (DoDM) 6055.18 is finalized for publication. As of August 2019, DoD said the draft DoDM 6055.18 was still in review and the agency estimated it would complete work to respond to this recommendation in February 2020.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force and Army to review and update their respective outdated policies for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. DOD stated that it had updated the Air Force policy (AF Instruction 10-2611-0) as of January 19, 2017; this document updates the biological safety standards used in AF labs and implements the draft update to Department of Defense Manual 6055.18M: Safety Standards for Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories. As of July 2019, DOD provided GAO with the updated Army policy AR 190-17; however DOD officials stated that as the draft Department of Defense Manual (DoDM) 6055.18 was still undergoing review, this recommendation should remain open. DOD estimated it would complete work to respond to this recommendation in February 2020.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Defense should require routine reporting of the results of Air Force, Army, and Navy inspections of non-select agent registered laboratories to senior department officials.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. In August 2019, DOD reported that the Air Force is planning to close its BSAT program by the summer of 2019 and planning was underway to move the Air Force BSAT inventory to another DOD BSAT facility. Additionally, the Army was revising its AR 385-10, which contains biosafety criteria unique to the Army, and estimated the revision would be completed by December 2019. Finally, the draft Department of Defense Manual (DoDM) 6055.18 was still undergoing review, and DOD estimated it would complete work to respond to this recommendation in February 2020.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Defense should require routine reporting of laboratory incidents at Air Force, Army, and Navy non-select agent registered laboratories to senior department officials.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. In August 2019, DOD reported that the Air Force is planning to close its BSAT program by the summer of 2019 and planning was underway to move the Air Force BSAT inventory to another DOD BSAT facility. Additionally, the Army was revising its AR 385-10, which contains biosafety criteria unique to the Army, to include a new mishap classification for biosafety mishaps to effect better reporting and analysis of these mishaps, and estimated the revision would be completed by December 2019. Finally, the draft Department of Defense Manual (DoDM) 6055.18 was still undergoing review, and DOD estimated it would complete work to respond to this recommendation in February 2020.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army and Navy to require reporting of agency and select agent laboratory inspection results to senior agency officials.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of June 2018, DOD stated that the draft directive DODD 5101.XXE, which is expected to be published in October 2018, formally designates the Executive Agent Responsible Official for Biosafety and Biosecurity and will establish roles and responsibilities including a role for reporting inspection results. Further, DOD stated that all inspection results of a joint inspection team are provided to the Executive Agent Responsible Official, and that the joint inspection team was established in September 2016. As of September 2019, DOD officials had provided updated documentation regarding this recommendation, and GAO was reviewing these updates.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should develop department policies for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories that contain specific requirements for reporting laboratory incidents to senior department officials, including the types of incidents that should be reported, to whom, and when, or direct the Director of CDC and the Commissioner of FDA to incorporate these requirements into their respective policies.

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Status: Open

Comments: In August 2016, HHS reported that both CDC and FDA were working to incorporate incident reporting requirements and time frames into formal agency policies and practices but did not provide an anticipated completion date. In summer 2017, CDC and FDA reported that they were continuing to incorporate incident reporting, which includes all laboratory incidents, accidents, injuries, infections, and near-misses, into formal agency policies. In August 2019, FDA reported that it continues to work with the Biosafety and Biosecurity Coordinating Council to establish a process for the routine reporting of these results but had not yet completed its actions. As of September 2019 we had not received an update from HHS on the status of CDC's implementation of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should develop department policies for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories that contain specific requirements for training and inspections for all high-containment component agency laboratories and not just for their select-agent-registered laboratories; or direct the Director of CDC to provide these requirements in agency policies.

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Status: Open

Comments: In August 2016, HHS reported that CDC plans to revise its policies to include training and inspection requirements for inspections for all high-containment laboratories but did not provide an anticipated completion date. In June 2017, HHS reported that CDC was in the process of revising its formal policies to ensure they included requirements for training and inspections for all of the agency's high-containment laboratories but did not provide an anticipated completion date. In December 2017, HHS reported that CDC's policies were in the initial stages of the clearance process and anticipated they would be finalized in fall 2018. As of September 2019, HHS had not provided an update on the status of these policies.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should require routine reporting of the results of agency and select agent laboratory inspections to senior department officials.

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Status: Open

Comments: In August 2016, HHS reported that CDC was working with FDA and NIH to establish a process for notifying HHS leadership of inspection results through the department's Biosafety and Biosecurity Coordinating Council. HHS did not provide us with an anticipated time frame for implementing this notification practice or when the agencies plan to begin notifying HHS of inspection results. In August 2019, FDA reported that it continues to work with the Biosafety and Biosecurity Coordinating Council to establish a process for the routine reporting of these results but had not yet completed its actions. As of September 2019, HHS had not provided an update on the status NIH's actions.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should direct the Director of NIH and the Commissioner of FDA to require routine reporting of the results of agency laboratory inspections--and in the case of FDA, require routine reporting of select agent inspection results--to senior agency officials.

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Status: Open

Comments: In August 2016, HHS reported that NIH's ongoing practice is to report the results of external inspections to senior agency officials and, in May 2016, developed a standard operating procedure that outlines this reporting process. In March 2017, NIH officials provided assurance that its Division of Occupational Safety and Health provides NIH's intramural governing body with information about NIH's safety performance at least annually; officials further assured that this information includes the overall results of annual inspections (or audits, as NIH calls them) of all NIH laboratories and discussion of the top 10 most report safety infractions for the year. GAO considers NIH to have implemented the recommended action. GAO will close the overall recommendation once FDA has taken equivalent, appropriate action. As of August 2019, FDA reported that the agency began piloting a standardized agency-wide laboratory safety inspection checklist to ensure that all laboratories are inspected rigorously and consistently. As part of the pilot, all laboratories were to be inspected during the first 3 quarters of the calendar year. The agency said it planned to aggregate the results of the inspections, and trends and significant findings would be reported to FDA senior leadership in the fourth quarter of 2019. GAO will continue to monitor FDA's actions to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: To ensure that federal departments and agencies have comprehensive and up-to-date policies and stronger oversight mechanisms in place for managing hazardous biological agents in high-containment laboratories and are fully addressing weaknesses identified after laboratory safety lapses, the Secretary of Health and Human Services should require routine reporting of incidents at CDC, FDA, and NIH laboratories to senior department officials.

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Status: Open

Comments: In August 2016, HHS reported that its Biosafety and Biosecurity Council was working to establish incident reporting requirements for CDC, FDA, and NIH but did not provide an anticipated completion date. HHS noted that NIH formally adopted a standard operating procedure that lays out the agency's requirements for reporting incidents to senior officials. In August 2019, FDA reported that it continues to work with the Biosafety and Biosecurity Coordinating Council to establish a process for the routine reporting of these results but had not yet completed its actions. As of September 2019, HHS had not provided an update on the status of NIH or CDC actions.

Recommendation: The EPA Administrator should direct OGD to develop a timetable with milestones and identify and allocate resources for adopting electronic records management for all 10 regional offices.

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
Status: Open

Comments: According to EPA officials, the Office of Grants and Debarment (OGD) established an agency-wide electronic grants record workgroup in fiscal year 2016. The workgroup identified the contents of the electronic grant file, technical options, and evaluation criteria. OGD completed its alternatives analysis for scope, general approach, and requirements in fiscal year 2017 and EPA expected this recommendation to be addressed by its new grants management system (GrantsSolutions). However, in January 2020, EPA officials told us that EPA had ceased its migration to GrantSolutions after determining the long-term costs were unsustainable and that the system lacked fundamental functionality necessary for core grant operations and to maintain appropriate internal controls. EPA is now migrating towards a modernized grants administration and management cloud solution. EPA expects this recommendation to be addressed when the new grants management system is fully implemented. EPA anticipates deployment of the new cloud solution in December 2020.

Recommendation: The EPA Administrator should direct OGD to implement plans for adopting an up-to-date and comprehensive IT system by 2017 that will provide accurate and timely data on agencywide compliance with grants management directives.

Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
Status: Open

Comments: Implementation efforts are ongoing. According to EPA officials, OGD is conducting a multi-modular project to upgrade the agency's grants management IT system. EPA expected this recommendation to be addressed by its new grants management system (GrantsSolutions), which had been targeted for deployment in March 2020. However, in January 2020, EPA officials told us that EPA had ceased its migration to GrantSolutions after determining the long-term costs were unsustainable and that the system lacked fundamental functionality necessary for core grant operations and to maintain appropriate internal controls. EPA is now migrating towards a modernized grants administration and management cloud solution. EPA expects this recommendation to be addressed when the new grants management system is fully implemented. EPA anticipates deployment of the new cloud solution in December 2020.

Recommendation: To more accurately communicate DHS's funding plans for USCG's major acquisition programs, the Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure the funding plans presented to Congress in fiscal year 2015 are comprehensive and clearly account for all operations and maintenance funding DHS plans to allocate to each of the USCG's major acquisition programs.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with this recommendation and stated in their comments that the U.S. Coast Guard and the DHS Chief Financial Officer will develop a plan to address this recommendation by September 30, 2015, then work together to fully implement the plan. DHS estimated it would complete this effort March 31, 2016. However, the USCG encountered technical challenges during this process and was unable to implement the plan by that time. The U.S. Coast Guard has revised the estimated completion date and now anticipates it will be able to address this recommendation in fiscal year 2022. GAO will continue to assess the updated APBs as a part of its annual review of select DHS major acquisition programs to determine whether the department has addressed the recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in consultation with DOD components, to establish guidelines on what constitutes a "current" ACAT II or III program for reporting purposes; the types of programs, if any, that do not require ACAT designations; and whether the rules for identifying current MDAPs would be appropriate for ACAT II and III programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that it planned to review existing policy to see if revisions were needed. Since that time, DOD has taken some steps to implement this recommendation, but has not established department-wide guidelines as we recommended. Starting in September 2018, DOD began providing the military departments with a capability to identify ACAT II and III programs using the Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE) system. The DAVE system is now considered to be a trusted source for ACAT II and III program data. DOD, in consultation with the military departments, established standard data elements for collection across ACAT II and III programs for inclusion in DAVE, but the military departments determine individually what constitutes a "current" program and the types of programs that do not require ACAT designations. As of August 2019, the Army and Navy have established guidance regarding what constitutes an active ACAT II or III program for reporting purposes. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in consultation with DOD components, to determine what metrics should be used and what data should be collected on ACAT II and III programs to measure cost and schedule performance; and whether the use of DAMIR and the MDAP selected acquisition report format may be appropriate for collecting data on ACAT II and III programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that it planned to review existing policy to see if revisions were needed. DOD has taken steps to implement this recommendation, but has yet to determine at the department level what metrics should be collected on ACAT II and III cost and schedule performance as we recommended. DOD determined that the use of the Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE) system, which is closely related to DAMIR, was appropriate to collect information on ACAT II and III programs and has made that system available to the military departments. Specifically, DOD provided the military departments with the capability to identify ACAT II and III programs in DAVE/DAMIR in September 2018 and made the DAVE/DAMIR Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) workflow tool for cost and schedule data collection available for components' use in April 2019. However, according to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the military departments are responsible for individually determining what cost and schedule metrics to collect and monitor for ACAT II and III programs. According to December 2018 Army guidance, the Army will require all ACAT II and III programs use DOD's APB tool by the end of fiscal year 2019 to capture baseline cost, schedule, and performance parameters for ACAT II and III programs. According to Navy officials, the Navy is developing an APB tool in its for a future update of its acquisition information system that will collect APB cost and schedule information for ACAT II and III programs. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy and the Commander of SOCOM to assess the reliability of data collected on ACAT II and III programs and work with PEOs to develop a strategy to improve procedures for the entry and maintenance of data.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would direct DOD components to evaluate data on ACAT II and III programs and report back on the reliability of the data and plans to improve it. In September 2015, the Assistant Secretary of Defense directed the military departments and DOD components to assess the reliability of ACAT II and III data, but in July 2018, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment confirmed that based on the results of the assessments reported by the components, it does not plan to take any additional action to implement this recommendation. Since that time, as of September 2018, DOD began providing standard data elements and definitions of those elements that it collects for ACAT II and III program identification in order to improve the consistency of data. However, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment stated that it is still up to the military departments to ensure the accuracy of data entered. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy and the Commander of SOCOM to develop implementation plans to coordinate and execute component initiatives to improve data on ACAT II and III programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would direct DOD components to evaluate data on ACAT II and III programs and report back plans to improve it. In September 2015, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition requested that DOD components provide an update on their plans to improve the availability and quality of ACAT II and III data. In July 2018, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment confirmed that based on an assessment of the information reported by the components, it does not plan to take any additional action to implement this recommendation. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment reiterated in August 2019 that while DOD now provides a department-wide system to be used for collecting basic program data for ACAT II and III programs, it remains the responsibility of the military departments to enter complete and accurate data. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure compliance with relevant provisions of DOD acquisition policy with the purpose of improving DOD's ability to provide oversight for ACAT II and III programs, including those programs that may become MDAPs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force and Commander of SOCOM to establish a mechanism to ensure compliance with APB requirements in DOD policy.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would issue guidance to DOD components related to APB requirements for ACAT II and III programs. DOD has taken some steps related to this recommendation. In September 2015, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition requested that DOD components review their mechanisms for establishing and enforcing the APB requirements for all ACAT II and III programs. In July 2018, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment confirmed that, based on the results of these reviews, it does not plans to take any action to implement this recommendation. However, in 2019, DOD made its DAVE/DAMIR APB workflow tool available for military department use, and the Air Force elected to use the tool to create and track APBs for ACAT II and III programs. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure compliance with relevant provisions of DOD acquisition policy with the purpose of improving DOD's ability to provide oversight for ACAT II and III programs, including those programs that may become MDAPs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy to improve component procedures for notifying the Defense Acquisition Executive of programs with a cost estimate within 10 percent of ACAT I cost thresholds.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would issue guidance to DOD components related to notification requirements for programs approaching ACAT I cost thresholds. The Army and Navy have reiterated existing guidance and the Air Force is evaluating additional actions it might take to improve its notification procedures. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment confirmed in July 2018 that it does not plan to take additional actions to implement this recommendation, and as of August 2019, that office has not directed DOD components to improve their processes as we recommended .We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to require MAIS programs to establish their first acquisition program baseline within 2 years of beginning work on the programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of January 2020, DOD had made limited progress addressing our recommendation for business system programs; however, it had not addressed the recommendation for non-business system programs. Specifically, the department updated its instruction on business systems requirements and acquisition to include, among other things, guidance on establishing baselines against which to measure progress for developing needed business capability. However, the instruction did not explicitly require that a program baseline be established within 2 years. Specifically, according to the instruction, baselines may be established at the program level or at the release level (i.e., for a manageable subset of functionality in support of the business capability), within 2 years after programs have validated a business capability is needed and received approval to conduct solution analysis. If at the program level, the baseline is to be set prior to the development of the first release or deployment. If at the release level, the baseline is to be set prior to the development of each release or deployment. In January 2020, the department also issued interim policy for software-intensive systems. However, while the interim policy requires program managers to develop an acquisition strategy that includes delivering software within one year from the date funds are first obligated to acquire or develop new software capability, the interim policy does not require software-intensive system programs to establish a program baseline within 2 years.

Recommendation: To ensure that DOE's long-term plans for storing waste in the existing SSTs and DSTs at Hanford consider the condition of the tanks and the WTP construction delay, the Secretary of Energy should assess the extent to which the factors that may have led to corrosion in AY-102 are present in any of the other 27 DSTs.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: As of March 2020, DOE has not yet done this study though they are currently planning to do so.

Recommendation: In order to improve transparency and allow for more informed decision making by congressional leaders and DHS and GSA decision-makers, before requesting additional funding for the DHS headquarters consolidation project, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the General Services Administration should work jointly to conduct the following assessments and use the results to inform updated DHS headquarters consolidation plans: (1) a comprehensive needs assessment and gap analysis of current and needed capabilities that take into consideration changing conditions, and (2) an alternatives analysis that identifies the costs and benefits of leasing and construction alternatives for the remainder of the project and prioritizes options to account for funding instability.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security Headquarters Consolidation Accountability Act of 2015 (Pub. L. No. 114-150) was enacted on April 29, 2016. Among other things, the act requires DHS, in coordination with GSA, to submit information to Congress about DHS headquarters consolidation efforts not later than 120 days of enactment. As of April 2020, DHS and GSA had not submitted the information to Congress required by Pub. L. No. 114-150. Required information includes a comprehensive assessment of property and facilities utilized by DHS in the National Capital Region, and an analysis that identifies the costs and benefits of leasing and construction alternatives for the remainder of the consolidation project. DHS reported that DHS and GSA prepared a comprehensive response to P.L. No. 114-150, but that the consolidation plan and response needed to be revised based on changing budget circumstances, among other things. In April 2020, DHS estimated that the final consolidation plan will be completed and approved in 2020. GAO will review the latest information on DHS headquarters consolidation efforts when it is provided to Congress, and will assess the materials in the context of this recommendation at that time. Continued DHS and GSA attention to following leading capital planning practices is critical given the project's multi-billion dollar cost and impact on future departmental operations.

Recommendation: In order to improve transparency and allow for more informed decision making by congressional leaders and DHS and GSA decision-makers, before requesting additional funding for the DHS headquarters consolidation project, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the General Services Administration should work jointly to conduct the following assessments and use the results to inform updated DHS headquarters consolidation plans: (1) a comprehensive needs assessment and gap analysis of current and needed capabilities that take into consideration changing conditions, and (2) an alternatives analysis that identifies the costs and benefits of leasing and construction alternatives for the remainder of the project and prioritizes options to account for funding instability.

Agency: General Services Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security Headquarters Consolidation Accountability Act of 2015 (Pub. L. No. 114-150), enacted on April 29, 2016, mirrors GAO recommendations in this area. Among other things, the act requires DHS, in coordination with GSA, to submit information to Congress about DHS's headquarters consolidation efforts not later than 120 days of enactment. As of April 2020, DHS and GSA had not submitted the information to Congress required by Pub. L. No. 114-150. Required information includes a comprehensive assessment of property and facilities utilized by DHS in the National Capital Region, and an analysis that identifies the costs and benefits of leasing and construction alternatives for the remainder of the consolidation project. DHS reported that DHS and GSA prepared a comprehensive response to P.L. No. 114-150, but that the consolidation plan and response needed to be revised based on changing budget circumstances, among other things. In April 2020, DHS estimated that the final consolidation plan will be completed and approved in 2020. We will review the latest information on DHS's headquarters consolidation efforts when it is provided to Congress, and will assess the materials in the context of these recommendations at that time. Continued DHS and GSA attention to following leading practices for capital planning and cost and schedule estimation is critical given the project's multi-billion dollar cost and impact on future departmental operations.

Recommendation: In order to improve transparency and allow for more informed decision making by congressional leaders and DHS and GSA decision-makers, before requesting additional funding for the DHS headquarters consolidation project, after revising the DHS headquarters consolidation plans, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the General Services Administration should work jointly to develop revised cost and schedule estimates for the remaining portions of the consolidation project that conform to GSA guidance and leading practices for cost and schedule estimation, including an independent evaluation of the estimates.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security Headquarters Consolidation Accountability Act of 2015 (Pub. L. No. 114-150) was enacted on April 29, 2016. Among other things, the act requires DHS, in coordination with GSA, to submit information to Congress about DHS headquarters consolidation efforts not later than 120 days of enactment. As of April 2020, DHS and GSA had not submitted the information to Congress required by Pub. L. No. 114-150. Required information includes updated cost and schedule estimates for the consolidation project that are consistent with GAO's recommendations in GAO-14-648. Furthermore, the act requires the Comptroller General to evaluate the cost and schedule estimates not later than 90 days after their submittal to Congress. DHS reported that DHS and GSA prepared a comprehensive response to P.L. No. 114-150, but that the consolidation plan and response needed to be revised based on changing budget circumstances, among other things. In April 2020, DHS estimated that the final consolidation plan will be completed and approved in 2020. GAO will review the latest DHS headquarters consolidation cost and schedule estimates when they are provided to Congress, and will assess the materials in the context of this recommendation at that time. Continued DHS and GSA attention to following leading cost and schedule estimation practices is critical given the project's multi-billion dollar cost and impact on future departmental operations.

Recommendation: In order to improve transparency and allow for more informed decision making by congressional leaders and DHS and GSA decision-makers, before requesting additional funding for the DHS headquarters consolidation project, after revising the DHS headquarters consolidation plans, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the General Services Administration should work jointly to develop revised cost and schedule estimates for the remaining portions of the consolidation project that conform to GSA guidance and leading practices for cost and schedule estimation, including an independent evaluation of the estimates.

Agency: General Services Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security Headquarters Consolidation Accountability Act of 2015 (Pub. L. No. 114-150) was enacted on April 29, 2016. Among other things, the act requires DHS, in coordination with GSA, to submit information to Congress about DHS headquarters consolidation efforts not later than 120 days of enactment. As of April 2020, DHS and GSA had not submitted the information to Congress required by Pub. L. No. 114-150. Required information includes updated cost and schedule estimates for the consolidation project that are consistent with GAO's recommendations in GAO-14-648. Furthermore, the act requires the Comptroller General to evaluate the cost and schedule estimates not later than 90 days after their submittal to Congress. DHS reported that DHS and GSA prepared a comprehensive response to P.L. No. 114-150, but that the consolidation plan and response needed to be revised based on changing budget circumstances, among other things. In April 2020, DHS estimated that the final consolidation plan will be completed and approved in 2020. GAO will review the latest DHS headquarters consolidation cost and schedule estimates when they are provided to Congress, and will assess the materials in the context of this recommendation at that time. Continued DHS and GSA attention to following leading cost and schedule estimation practices is critical given the project's multi-billion dollar cost and impact on future departmental operations.

Recommendation: Congress should consider making future funding for the St. Elizabeths project contingent upon DHS and GSA developing a revised headquarters consolidation plan, for the remainder of the project, that conforms with leading practices and that (1) recognizes changes in workplace standards, (2) identifies which components are to be colocated at St. Elizabeths and in leased and owned space throughout the National Capital Region, and (3) develops and provides reliable cost and schedule estimates.

Agency: Congress
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security Headquarters Consolidation Accountability Act of 2015 (Pub. L. No. 114-150) was enacted on April 29, 2016. Among other things, the act requires DHS, in coordination with GSA, to submit information to Congress about DHS headquarters consolidation efforts not later than 120 days of enactment. As of March 2019, DHS and GSA had not submitted the information to Congress required by Pub. L. No. 114-150. Required information includes: a comprehensive assessment of property and facilities utilized by DHS in the National Capital Region; an analysis that identifies the costs and benefits of leasing and construction alternatives for the remainder of the consolidation project; and updated cost and schedule estimates for the project that are consistent with GAO's recommendations in GAO-14-648. Furthermore, the act requires the Comptroller General to evaluate the cost and schedule estimates not later than 90 days after their submittal to Congress. DHS reported that DHS and GSA prepared a comprehensive response to P.L. No. 114-150, but that the consolidation plan and response needed to be revised based on changing budget circumstances, among other things. In April 2020, DHS estimated that the final consolidation plan will be completed and approved in 2020. A comprehensive report to Congress on DHS headquarters consolidation, along with reliable project cost and schedule estimates, could inform Congress's funding decisions.

Recommendation: To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program planning and affordability, and to decrease the risk of cost and schedule overruns, NASA's Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to take the following action: To allow for a continued assessment of progress and affordability, NASA should structure each future increment of SLS capability with a total cost exceeding the $250 million threshold for designation as a major project as a separate development effort within the SLS program. In doing so, NASA should require each increment to complete both the technical and programmatic reviews required of other major development projects, per the agency's acquisition and system engineering policies.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. In January 2020, NASA stated that it planned to establish an agency baseline commitment for capability upgrades (e.g., Block 1B upgrades, such as Mobile Launcher-2 and Exploration Upper Stage) above the $250 million threshold. A joint confidence level analysis will be performed at key decision points and will include the cost and schedule range estimates for each of these upgrades. To fully implement this recommendation, however, NASA needs to provide evidence that each capability upgrade is designated a major project and is required to complete the technical and programmatic reviews required of other major development projects.

Recommendation: To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program planning and affordability, and to decrease the risk of cost and schedule overruns, NASA's Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to take the following action: Provide decision makers with an informed basis for making investment decisions regarding the SLS program, NASA should identify a range of possible missions for each future SLS variant that includes cost and schedule estimates and plans for how those possible missions would fit within NASA's funding profile.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. In January 2020, NASA stated that new leadership at the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate is conducting an internal independent assessment to assess the current schedule and technical approach for achieving a lunar landing by 2024, including the utilization of SLS for Artemis missions. With the insights gained from this assessment, NASA will move forward with planning and executing these missions through the annual budgeting process. To fully address this recommendation, NASA will need to identify cost and schedule estimates for possible SLS missions beyond its first exploration mission, now known as Artemis I, and how its planned missions would fit within NASA's funding profile.

Recommendation: To reduce uncertainty about the expected cost and schedule of the U.S. ITER Project and its potential impact on the U.S. fusion program, once the ITER Organization completes its reassessment of the international project schedule, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Associate Director of the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences to use that schedule, if reliable, to propose a final, stable funding plan for the U.S. ITER Project, approve a performance baseline with finalized cost and schedule estimates, and communicate this information to Congress.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOE approved a performance baseline for the first plasma portion of the U.S. ITER Project in January 2017 and communicated that performance baseline to Congress. However, as of June 2020, DOE has not set a performance baseline for the post-first plasma portion of the project. DOE officials told us the Administration was reviewing U.S. participation in ITER. They said that if, at the end of the review, the Administration decided to continue U.S. participation in ITER, then DOE would set a performance baseline for the post-first plasma portion of the U.S. ITER Project.

Recommendation: To reduce uncertainty about the expected cost and schedule of the U.S. ITER Project and its potential impact on the U.S. fusion program, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Associate Director of the Office of Fusion Energy Sciences to direct the U.S. ITER Project Office to revise and update the project's cost estimate to meet all characteristics of high-quality, reliable cost estimates. Specifically, the U.S. ITER Project Office should revise the project's cost estimate to ensure it is credible by including a comprehensive sensitivity analysis that includes all significant cost elements and conducting an independent cost estimate.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE revised and updated the cost estimate for the first plasma portion of the U.S. ITER Project in November 2016. Officials reported that, as part of that update, the U.S. ITER Project Office completed a comprehensive sensitivity analysis and that the Office of Science's Office of Project Assessment had conducted a review of the revised cost estimate. However, as of June 2020, DOE had yet to revise and update the cost estimate for the post-first plasma portion of the U.S. ITER Project. DOE officials told us they planned to do so when they set a performance baseline for that portion of the project, which they expected to do if, at the end of an ongoing review, the Administration decided to continue U.S. participation in ITER.

Recommendation: To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies, and better inform CBP's deployment decisions, once data on asset assists are required to be recorded and tracked, the Commissioner of CBP should analyze available data on apprehensions and seizures and technological assists, in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate, to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP's border security efforts.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In 2014, CBP expanded its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan to the Southwest Border Technology Plan. In February 2015, the Border Patrol took steps to address this recommendation by developing the Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP) with the support of Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Lab to examine the effects of technology and other assets. In May 2017, Border Patrol officials demonstrated a new system, intended to allow for more comprehensive analysis of the contributions of surveillance technologies to Border Patrol's mission during the CGAP process. As of March 2019, Border Patrol is now able to generate a performance report, using data collected from multiple systems, on how surveillance technologies have assisted agents during operations, including Border Patrol apprehensions. In February 2020 Border Patrol officials stated the data gathered in the report were reliable. They also provided examples of how they use available performance data to help identify gaps in capabilities and inform future investments in surveillance technologies. Border Patrol officials are also developing a surveillance capability score intended to represent the combined contributions of individual technology assets and agents on patrol to conduct surveillance in a given area. Border Patrol plans to report this score in fiscal year 2021, according to documentation provided by Border Patrol. We view these efforts, as described, as important progress toward fulfilling our recommendation, and will review the planned surveillance capability score once it is implemented to determine whether Border Patrol has fully implemented our recommendation.

Recommendation: In order to improve NMB's planning and make the most effective use of its limited resources, the Chairman of the National Mediation Board should develop and fully implement key components of an information security program in accordance with the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.

Agency: National Mediation Board
Status: Open

Comments: In February 2020, we determined that NMB had taken some steps to further implement key information security practices, but had not fully implemented this recommendation. We reported in GAO-20-236 that NMB continued to only partially follow the eight key information security practices in accordance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). NMB must take other steps, such as providing risk assessment documentation of its enterprise network for fiscal year 2019. NMB officials stated that the agency plans to address several of these practices by the end of fiscal year 2020. They further noted that they hired a Chief Information Officer and planned to hire additional staff and employ contractors to aid in these efforts.

Recommendation: In order to improve NMB's planning and make the most effective use of its limited resources, the Chairman of the National Mediation Board should establish a privacy program that includes conducting privacy impact assessments and issuing system of record notices for systems that contain personally identifiable information.

Agency: National Mediation Board
Status: Open

Comments: In February 2020, we reported in GAO-20-236 that NMB had taken some steps to implement information privacy practices, such as designating a privacy officer. However, NMB must take additional steps, such as specifying whether a system of records notice would be developed, as required by the Office of Management and Budget.

Recommendation: To help maintain a more thorough and insightful 2020 Census development schedule in order to better manage risks to a successful 2020 Census, the Secretary of Commerce and Undersecretary of Economic Affairs should direct the U.S. Census Bureau to improve the credibility of schedules, including conducting a quantitative risk assessment.

Agency: Department of Commerce
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Bureau agreed with this recommendation and stated that it had already begun maturing project schedules to ensure that the logical relationships between discrete schedules were put into place. Schedule integration sessions across projects and programs were held in late January 2014 and into February 2014 and periodically since then, where work was deconstructed into detailed schedules. The Bureau released its operational plan and other documentation in November 2015 and announced in June 2016 that it would finalize and release its 2020 Census schedule in July 2016. In 2015, the Bureau provided us with a preliminary output from its risk analysis software as a demonstration of the type of analysis it had committed to, but since then its officials have said that they will not be able to take all the steps needed to satisfy this recommendation for the 2020 Census. The Bureau took steps toward conducting quantitative schedule risk analyses with its master activity schedule for the 2020 Census, but effectively ran out of time to do so. Assigning resources to large complex schedules in order to conduct such analyses is easier to do early in schedule development process, as we recommended the Bureau do in 2009 for its 2020 Census schedule. This recommendation will remain open pending the Bureau taking steps to carry out quantitative risk assessments of its 2030 schedule with appropriate resources linked to it.

Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to include in its resource baseline cost estimates all life cycle costs, specifically the operations and support costs, from the military services in order to provide decision makers with the full costs of ballistic missile defense systems.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our 2013 recommendation that decisionmakers should have insight into the full lifecycle costs of MDA's weapon systems outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense System Accountability Report (BAR), including the military services' operations and sustainment (O&S) costs. This is especially important, as after more than a decade MDA has yet to transfer weapon systems in production and sustainment to the military services, as originally intended. Consequently, MDA is becoming responsible for an increasing amount of the costs associated with these weapon systems. DOD and Congress have expressed concerns over this situation and are exploring a path forward; however, in the mean time, determining the O&S costs can help decisionmakers fully understand the financial responsibility for these weapon systems, be it with the military services or MDA. MDA cited beginning to report aspects of this information in the BAR and also establishing joint cost estimates (JCE) for O&S with the military services for some weapon systems, both of which could potentially serve as a means of providing decisionmakers with insight into the full lifecycle costs. We have an ongoing assessment that will evaluate both of MDA's cited efforts and the extent to which these are providing decisionmakers with a comprehensive understanding of the depth and breadth of each weapon system's full lifecycle costs.

Recommendation: In order to strengthen investment decisions, place the chosen investments on a sound acquisition footing, provide a better means of tracking investment progress, and improve the management and transparency of the U.S. missile defense approach in Europe, the Secretary of Defense should direct MDA's new Director to stabilize the acquisition baselines, so that meaningful comparisons can be made over time that support oversight of those acquisitions.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with our 2013 recommendation regarding the need for MDA to stabilize its acquisition baselines, but also noted MDA's need to adjust its baselines to remain responsive to evolving requirements and threats; both of which are beyond MDA's control. Further, DOD highlighted the MDA Director's authority to make adjustments to the agency's programmatic baselines, within departmental guidelines. Our recommendation, however, is not designed to limit the Director's authority to adjust baselines or to prevent adjusting the baselines, as appropriate. Rather, our recommendation is designed to address traceability issues we have found with MDA's baselines, which are within its control. Specifically, for MDA to be able to effectively report longer-term progress of its acquisitions and provide the necessary transparency to Congress, it is critical that the agency stabilize its baselines so that once set, any revisions can be tracked over time. We have an ongoing assessment to update MDA's progress.

Recommendation: To improve NASA management and oversight of its spaceflight projects, and to improve the reliability of project EVM data, the NASA Administrator should direct the appropriate offices to modify the NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5 to require projects to implement a formal surveillance program that: (1) Ensures anomalies in contractor-delivered and in-house monthly earned value management reports are identified and explained, and report periodically to the center and mission directorate's leadership on relevant trends in the number of unexplained anomalies. (2) Ensures consistent use of work breakdown structures (WBS) for both the EVM report and the schedule. (3) Ensures that lower level EVM data reconcile to project level EVM data using the same WBS structure. (4) Improves underlying schedules so that they are properly sequenced using predecessor and successor dependencies and are free of constraints to the extent practicable so that the EVM baseline is reliable.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA partially agreed with this recommendation, stating that the reliability and utility of the EVM data needed to be improved but that it did not plan to implement a formal surveillance plan due to resource constraints. Since initially commenting on the report, however, in December 2018, NASA included an initiative in its Corrective Action Plan-a plan put in place in response to recent programmatic performance and NASA's designation on GAO's High-Risk List-to enhance EVM implementation. In June 2019, NASA issued EVM guidance that covered several items, including enhancing in-house and contracted earned value management surveillance and requiring EVM reporting at Baseline Performance Review. NASA officials reported that its near-term plans are well-defined to address the reliability of project EVM data, but they have expressed concerns about funding challenges and cultural resistance. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to take action and provide documentary support for several of its identified planned next steps to enhance EVM surveillance. Without implementing proper surveillance, NASA may be utilizing unreliable EVM data in its analyses to inform its cost and schedule decision making.

Recommendation: To help maximize the use of available capacity at slot-controlled airports, enhance competition through greater airline access to slots, and enhance transparency of slot information, the Secretary of Transportation should direct the FAA Administrator to apply slot rules to individual slots, as opposed to pools of slots within a slot period.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: In January 2015, the FAA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the New York City area airports. The proposal included changes to how the FAA would determine compliance with minimum slot usage rules similar to GAO's recommendation and the WSG. Under that concept, a slot would only be considered for a flight or series of flights in a single slot and not potentially applied or averaged to more than one slot. The NPRM was withdrawn by DOT and FAA in April 2016 to allow further evaluation of recent changes in demand, competition, operations, and other factors in the New York City area airports. The FAA and the Office of the Secretary continue to evaluate the circumstances at the New York City area airports and DCA and, if necessary, will consider steps to ensure compliance with minimum slot usage, including future rulemaking. In March 2018, DOT indicated that it has no plans to initiate a rulemaking on this issue. As of June 2019, DOT plans no further action on this recommendation. However, GAO believes this recommendation continues to have merit.

Recommendation: With respect to possible future regulatory action, the DOT Secretary should consider requiring airlines to schedule a certain percentage, or all, of their slot allocations, similar to practices maintained elsewhere in the world.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: The Department concurs that any future rulemaking should consider changes to the minimum slot usage rules to improve slot utilization at the slot controlled airports and provide greater harmonization with industry standards applied at airports outside the U.S. The FAA and the Department of Transportation stated that they will evaluate the circumstances at the New York City area airports and DCA and, if necessary, will consider steps to improve slot utilization, including future rulemaking. As of June 2019, DOT plans no further action on this recommendation. However, GAO believes this recommendation continues to have merit.

Recommendation: To ensure that the Department of Defense is taking full advantage of the cost savings that can be achieved by implementing CPC projects, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) to update applicable guidance, such as DOD Instruction 5000.67, Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and Infrastructure or the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan to further define the responsibilities of the military departments' Corrosion Executives, to include more specific oversight and review of the project proposals before and during the project selection process.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD has not updated DOD Instruction 5000.67 - Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and Infrastructure, the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan, or other applicable guidance since the publication of our report. DOD did not concur with this recommendation at the time of our report but as of March 2019, has since decided to take action to implement it. Corrosion Office officials agree that Corrosion Executives' responsibilities in the Corrosion Prevention Project selection process have to be further defined. They plan to clearly document the selection procedures and participation of the Corrosion Executive in an update to DOD Instruction 5000.67 (Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and Infrastructure) and in the new DOD manual on corrosion. The Corrosion Office's goal is to complete this instruction update and create the new manual by the end of calendar year 2020. We will monitor the extent to which DOD implements this recommendation.

Recommendation: To strengthen NNSA's oversight practices and current and future facility modernization efforts, and to improve the transparency and usefulness of cost analyses prepared for future NNSA nuclear facilities modernization projects, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Administrator of NNSA to ensure that life cycle cost analyses include a thorough and balanced evaluation of short- and long-term construction and financing alternatives. Such analyses should consider the full useful life of the facility rather than the 20-year requirement for GSA leases or any predetermined length of time that might produce results that favor one option over another.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA provided evidence that it requires life cycle cost analyses for projects greater than $20 million. However, this is not fully responsive to GAO's recommendation. For example, the recommendation stated that each life cycle cost analysis performed includes short- and long-term construction and financing alternatives and that these analyses should consider the full life of the facility rather than the 20-year requirements for GSA leases or any predetermined length of time. NNSA's actions do not address this aspect of the life cycle cost analysis. Our work found that facility's life cycle cost analysis only covered 20 years and it failed to reflect cost savings over a longer useful life (possibly over 50 years) that could have been realized if the facility were purchased instead of leased. Nothing in the Order addresses how the life cycle cost period to be analyzed should be established (e.g., 20 years or 50 plus years). Although we requested additional information from NNSA on this recommendation in fiscal year 2019, the agency has not responded. As a result, as of June 2020, the recommendation remains open.

Recommendation: To strengthen NNSA's oversight practices and current and future facility modernization efforts, and because of the importance of mitigating the risks of outsourcing nuclear weapons components and other information that if exported, might allow potential adversaries to develop or advance their nuclear capabilities, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Administrator of NNSA to take immediate action to assess the effectiveness of NNSA's oversight of KCP's current export control and nonproliferation practices and, if appropriate, initiate corrective actions to strengthen that oversight.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2020, there has been no change in the status of this recommendation. While NNSA/contractor actions are commendable and appear to be beneficial, such as adding performance-based incentives, training 950 employees, and including new contract clauses in its supplier purchase orders, these actions do not fully satisfy the recommendation. GAO's recommendation was specifically directed at the effectiveness of NNSA's oversight of the KCP contractor's export control and nonproliferation practices and to initiate corrective actions to strengthen that NNSA oversight. While the Kansas City Site Office's addition of a performance based incentive seems to be a good improvement, NNSA has not demonstrated its own oversight effectiveness. Our review of NNSA's response provided in March 2014 was not persuasive. In addition, GAO-16-710 found that as of May 2016, the Secretary of Energy had not used the enhanced procurement authority to ensure supply chain integrity, and the Department of Energy (DOE) had not developed processes for using the authority, as it had not fully assessed the circumstances under which the authority might be useful. Although NNSA provided additional information on this recommendation in August 2019, these actions relied primarily on contractor self assessments and not on independent federal oversight. As a result, this recommendation will continue to remain open.

Recommendation: To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, the Administrator of NNSA should direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to develop a realistic schedule for the W76 warhead and future life extension programs that allows NNSA to (1) address technical challenges while meeting all military requirements and (2) build in time for unexpected technical challenges that may delay the program.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In past and ongoing work, GAO has identified areas where NNSA's modernization plans may not align with planned funding requests over the Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP) and post-FYNSP periods. Based on the FY 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), (GAO-14-45) NNSA plans to work on five life extension programs (LEP) or major alterations through 2038. The FY 2014 SSMP states that the LEP workload represents a resource and production throughput challenge that requires improvements in LEP planning and execution. GAO's analysis indicates there is limited contingency time built into the LEP schedules, all of which are technically ambitious. Any delays in schedules could lead to an increase in program costs or a reduction in the number built for any of the LEPs, both of which have occurred in prior and ongoing LEPs. While NNSA has acknowledged issues and identified some steps to improve the LEP process, this recommendation will remain open and unimplemented until NNSA demonstrates successful LEP and refurbishment execution. We reconfirmed this finding in GAO-17-341 where we found the following: In some cases, NNSA's FY 2017 nuclear security budget materials do not align with the agency's modernization plans, both within the 5-year FYNSP for fiscal years 2017 through 2021 and beyond, raising concerns about the affordability of NNSA's planned portfolio of modernization programs. As of June 2020, this situation has not been fully addressed as evidenced by cost increases and likely delays in the B61-12 and W88 ALTV programs; an aggressive schedule in the W80-4 program, and a large scope in the W87-1 warhead replacement. In addition, new programs contained in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the announcement of a new development effort, the W93, may further stress NNSA's program.

Recommendation: To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, the Administrator of NNSA should direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to ensure that the program managers responsible for overseeing the construction of new facilities directly related to future life extension programs coordinate with the program managers of such future programs to avoid the types of delays and problems faced with the construction and operation of the Fogbank manufacturing facility for the W76 program.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: A number of Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plans (SSMP) state that the life extension program (LEP) workload represents a resource and production throughput challenge that requires improvements in LEP planning and execution. The officials elaborated that the main area that will be strained is pit production. NNSA's plutonium strategy needs to be resourced fully and implemented successfully by 2030 to support the W87 warhead replacement. Additionally, the officials said that the UPF project and an arrange of associated programmatic efforts need to be operational by 2025 or there will be challenges in completing all of the planned LEPs. In addition, NNSA needs to re-establish depleted uranium operations, construct a new lithium facility and establish a domestic uranium enrichment function for tritium production by the late 2020s to meet stockpile needs. As such, this recommendation remains open and, given the aggressive warhead and bomb modernization efforts proceeding in parallel with infrastructure modernization efforts, will likely remain open for some time.

Recommendation: To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, the Administrator of NNSA should direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to ensure that program managers for the construction of new facilities for future life extensions base their schedule for the construction and start-up of a facility on the life extension program managers' needs identified in their risk mitigation strategies.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA has generally improved its management of construction projects, to include requirements setting, Analysis of Alternatives, and independent cost estimates, among other items. However, it is too soon to tell if these positive developments will help--or hinder--LEPs that are underway or are being conducted. Key uranium activities, to include construction and operating funds will not be complete until 2025; key tritium and lithium programs and facilities will not complete until the 2030s; key plutonium activities are underway as well, but will not be complete until the late 2020s. As of June 2020, there are no significant changes related to this recommendation, and it will continue to remain open.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Interior should direct the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Insular Affairs to develop a framework for OIA employees to use in conducting site visits to help ensure objectives are achieved, to assure that relevant information is shared with responsible officials, and to allow more efficient and effective monitoring of issues.

Agency: Department of the Interior
Status: Open

Comments: On May 24, 2017, the Department of Interior (DOI) sent out an email to its staff showing the dissemination of the new format required for completing trip reports by the staff of the Office of Insular Affairs (OIA). The new format requires staff to include travel justification (i.e., purpose/objective, location, and travel period) and trip report (i.e., meetings, site visits, results, and next steps, as applicable.) The intent of the recommendation is for DOI to have a framework that includes (1) status of required single audit reports; (2) the progress of actions to resolve reported internal control weaknesses; and (3) current needs for technical assistance, capacity building, and staff level expertise. Further, the intent of GAO's recommendation is that this information be integrated into a comprehensive monitoring process. We did not see these elements included in DOI's new format. At present, the agency has been unable to provide additional information that supports the development of a framework for conducting sites visits that incorporates procedures about how information will be shared and monitored. In August 2020, the agency informed us that it has taken additional corrective actions some time ago and is in the process of trying to locate the supporting documentation. We will continue to monitor the agency's actions to address this recommendation.