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Recommendations Database

GAO’s recommendations database contains report recommendations that still need to be addressed. GAO’s priority recommendations are those that we believe warrant priority attention. We sent letters to the heads of key departments and agencies, urging them to continue focusing on these issues. Below you can search only priority recommendations, or search all recommendations.

Our recommendations help congressional and agency leaders prepare for appropriations and oversight activities, as well as help improve government operations. Moreover, when implemented, some of our priority recommendations can save large amounts of money, help Congress make decisions on major issues, and substantially improve or transform major government programs or agencies, among other benefits.

As of October 25, 2020, there are 4812 open recommendations, of which 473 are priority recommendations. Recommendations remain open until they are designated as Closed-implemented or Closed-not implemented.

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Subject Term: "Radiological dispersal device"

2 publications with a total of 7 open recommendations including 2 priority recommendations
Download these results in CSV format or XLSX format.
Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address Limitations to Its Program to Secure Key Cities
GAO-19-327, May 13, 2019
Director: David Trimble
Phone: (202) 512-3841

4 open recommendations
Display
Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) should ensure that the office regularly collects detailed information from cities on expenditures made using program funds and compares that information to approved purchase plans to ensure that these funds were spent as approved, consistent with program goals, and that the expenditures are in keeping with the objectives of the program. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open

Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should more fully assess cities' performance by collecting information from cities on achieving key performance metrics and program milestones and enforcing reporting requirements on performance during exercises. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open

Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should analyze risks related to sustaining detection capabilities, work with cities to address these risks, and enforce sustainment planning requirements for future cities. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open

Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of CWMD should clearly communicate to cities how the existing program will operate until a new program is developed and implemented. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open

Comments: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 requires that CWMD develop an implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program that, among other things, identifies the goals of the program and provides a strategy for achieving those goals. The act requires CWMD to submit this implementation plan to Congress by December 2019. As of June 2020, DHS/CWMD had not yet completed its implementation plan for the Securing the Cities program. Depending on its content, this plan may contain key provisions that could address this recommendation.
Combating Nuclear Terrorism: NRC Needs to Take Additional Actions to Ensure the Security of High-Risk Radioactive Material
GAO-19-468, Apr 4, 2019
Director: David Trimble
Phone: (202) 512-3841

3 open recommendations
including 2 priority recommendations
Display
Recommendation: The Chairman of NRC should direct NRC staff to consider socioeconomic consequences and fatalities from evacuations in the criteria for determining what security measures should be required for radioactive materials that could be used in an RDD. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NRC disagreed with this recommendation, and NRC did not provide us with documentation of any actions it plans to take to implement this recommendation. NRC maintains that the current regulatory requirements provide for the safe and secure use of all radioactive materials, regardless of category. We disagree with NRC's assessment. We continue to believe that by implementing our recommendation NRC would have better assurance that it was considering more likely and more significant consequences of an RDD when establishing its security requirements for this material. We encourage NRC to take action to implement this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Chairman of NRC should require additional security measures for high-risk quantities of certain category 3 radioactive material, and assess whether other category 3 materials should also be safeguarded with additional security measures. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NRC neither explicitly agreed nor disagreed with this recommendation, but stated that it would consider our recommendation as part of a working group the agency has established. The working group provided a staff analysis on these issues to the Commission in August 2017, but NRC has not updated this analysis taking into account the new information we provided in our April 2019 report. We continue to believe that implementing our recommendation would provide greater assurance that NRC's requirements are sufficient to help ensure all high-risk radioactive material are protected from theft and use in an RDD. We encourage NRC to take action to implement this recommendation.
Recommendation: The Chairman of NRC should require all licensees to implement additional security measures when they have multiple quantities of category 3 americium-241 at a single facility that in total reach a category 1 or 2 quantity of material. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Status: Open

Comments: NRC disagreed with this recommendation. NRC maintains that the issue of aggregation of radioactive material has already been considered and NRC has taken or is in the process of taking actions to clarify relevant guidance and procedures. We disagree with NRC's assessment. We believe that by implementing our recommendation NRC would have better assurance that licensees are not storing multiple quantities of category 3 americium-241 at a single facility that in total reach a category 1 or 2 quantity of material.