Recommendation: The Director of BOP should conduct an analysis, using available incident and cost data, and other information as appropriate, to determine if the current decision to not issue pepper spray to minimum security prisons should remain in effect. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Justice: Bureau of Prisons
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To ensure that DOD program managers have the necessary information to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF-funded equipment in SCIP, the Secretary of Defense should identify the root causes, such as potential interoperability and data reporting issues within SCIP and other DOD data systems, for why DOD components are not ensuring that ITEF-funded equipment transportation dates are captured in SCIP.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of October 2019, DOD was in the process of developing a plan to address this recommendation. GAO is continuing to monitor DOD's progress in addressing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To ensure that DOD program managers have the necessary information to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF-funded equipment in SCIP, the Secretary of Defense should develop an action plan with associated milestones and time frames for addressing the root causes for why DOD components are not ensuring that ITEF-funded equipment transportation dates are captured in SCIP.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of October 2019, DOD was in the process of developing a plan to address this recommendation. GAO is continuing to monitor DOD's progress in addressing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To ensure that DOD program managers have the necessary information to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF-funded equipment in SCIP, the Secretary of Defense should develop written procedures that specify under which data field ITEF-funded equipment transfer dates should be captured in the Enhanced Freight Tracking System in SCIP.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. The department commented that the relevant organizations have most, if not all, of the written procedures that are necessary for reporting these dates in the Enhanced Freight Tracking System. However, it would coordinate with all interested parties to update these procedures if needed. As of October 2019, GAO was continuing to monitor DOD's progress in addressing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To ensure that DOD program managers have the necessary information to maintain complete visibility and accountability of ITEF-funded equipment in SCIP, the Secretary of Defense should update the 1st Theater Sustainment Command's (1st TSC) written standard operating procedures to include the 1st TSC commander's verbal order requiring the inclusion of unique equipment case identifier information for ITEF-funded equipment on transfer documentation.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of October 2019, DOD officials said they had updated the 1st TSC's written standard operating procedures to include the 1st TSC's commander's verbal order, and GAO was in the process of obtaining documentation of these changes.

Recommendation: To strengthen compliance with the Leahy laws and implementation of State's human rights vetting process and to help ensure that U.S. funded assistance is not provided to Egyptian security forces that have committed gross violations of human rights, as State works to implement a revised version of the International Vetting and Security Tracking system (INVEST) system that is expected to help facilitate equipment vetting, the Secretary of State should develop time frames for establishing corresponding policies and procedures to implement a vetting process to help enable the U.S. government to provide a more reasonable level of assurance that equipment is not transferred to foreign security forces, including those in Egypt, when there is credible information that a unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.

Agency: Department of State
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: State agreed with this recommendation. State acknowledged challenges identifying recipients of equipment across the range of assistance activities, but noted that it would continue to update its systems and procedures to facilitate human rights vetting for recipients of equipment. In April 2017, State reported that it had provided finalized guidance on vetting Egyptian recipients of Foreign Military Financing-funded equipment to Embassy Cairo and that these procedures had been incorporated into a revised version of Embassy Cairo's guide for conducting human rights vetting. At the time, State noted that Embassy Cairo had begun to implement these procedures. However, State subsequently reported that implementation of these procedures lapsed in 2018 due to staff turnover at Embassy Cairo. As of January 2020, State said that it intends to have new standard operating procedures in place for equipment vetting in Egypt later in 2020. In addition, State has not adopted procedures, similar to those in development for Egypt, to be used more broadly in other countries that also receive equipment through the Foreign Military Financing account or through other U.S. assistance programs. As of June 2017, State had added new features to INVEST, its human rights vetting system, to help facilitate vetting of equipment recipients, and published new vetting guidance requiring screening of equipment transfers. However, State has not established global requirements for posts to use the new equipment vetting system features to screen equipment transfers. As of February 2020, State reported that it had developed draft standard operating procedures for conducting equipment vetting globally; however, these procedures are being reviewed internally within the Department and are expected to be finalized later in 2020. We will continue to monitor agency efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: To ensure the reliability of OEHS data, the Secretary of Defense should establish clear policies and procedures for performing quality assurance reviews of the OEHS data collected during deployment, to include verifying the completeness and the reasonableness of these data, and require that all other related military-service-specific policies be amended and implemented to ensure consistency.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. In August 2016, DOD officials told us that a new DOEHRS version was released that contained several system enhancements and defect corrections to improve overall data quality in the system. However, as of July 2020, DOD had not provided specific information on these system enhancements, which would allow us to determine whether our recommendation has been fully addressed.