Recommendation: The Director of the Defense Security Service should determine how it will collaborate with stakeholders as it pilots a new approach to overseeing contractors with cleared facilities (DSS in Transition), including identifying roles and responsibilities and the related resources needed. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Security Service
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and as of February 2019, stated that it continues to pilot DSS in Transition at cleared facilities and use information gathered from stakeholders, including key government and industry stakeholder organizations to refine the process. On August 12, 2020, DOD stated that DSS was in the process of drafting a Corrective Action Plan. At that time, DOD officials explained that this plan would be completed in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019. As of September 2020, this plan has not been completed.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence, in his capacity as Security Executive Agent, and in coordination with the other Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council Principals--the Deputy Director for Management of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in his capacity as Chair of the PAC, the Director of OPM, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence--should establish a milestone for the completion of government-wide performance measures for the quality of investigations. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI stated that it non-concurred with many of the report's recommendations, but did not state with which recommendations it did not concur. In August 2019, ODNI officials pointed to the Quality Assessment Reporting Tool as the mechanism to measure the quality of background investigations. However, officials also stated that they had not finalized collection of all required data to establish performance measures and, while QART contains a significant data sample size, the data call issued in January 2019 will provide additional information for comparative analysis to develop performance measures for the entire Executive Branch. Officials agreed that since DOD does not use QART, there needed to be ongoing discussions with them to ensure quality standards are met. We will continue to follow-up on the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence, in his capacity as Security Executive Agent, and in coordination with the other Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council Principals--the Deputy Director for Management of OMB in his capacity as Chair of the PAC, the Director of OPM, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence--should conduct an evidence-based review of the investigation and adjudication timeliness objectives for completing the fastest 90 percent of initial secret and initial top secret security clearances.(Recommendation 2)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI stated that it non-concurred with many of the report's recommendations, but did not state with which recommendations it did not concur. ODNI officials stated in August 2019 that Trusted Workforce 2.0 is specifically developing timeliness goals which are achievable and based on empirical evidence. We will continue to follow-up on the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence, in his capacity as Security Executive Agent, and in coordination with the other Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council Principals--the Deputy Director for Management of OMB in his capacity as Chair of the PAC, the Director of OPM, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence--should develop a government-wide plan, including goals and interim milestones, to meet those timeliness objectives for initial personnel security clearance investigations and adjudications. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI stated that it non-concurred with many of the report's recommendations, but did not state with which recommendations it did not concur. In its August 2019 response on the status of this recommendation, ODNI officials stated that the transfer of background investigations from NBIB to DOD will provide an opportunity for the Executive Agents to reassess and address investigative timeliness issues and strengthen management of sensitive information. Moreover, they stated that Trusted Workforce 2.0 will give them the ability to significantly reduce the timelines required to deliver a Secret and Top Secret clearance. We will continue to follow-up on the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure that the respective DHS and DOD data systems contain sufficiently complete and accurate information to facilitate effective oversight of the personnel security clearance revocation and appeal process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to take steps to ensure that data are recorded and updated in the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) and the department's new systems, so that the relevant fields are filled.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, DOD requested to close this recommendation per a closure memo signed by Ms. Nancy Spaulding. We are awaiting further documentation supporting the closure of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure independence and the efficient use of resources, the Secretary of Defense should direct the DOD General Counsel to first, resolve the disagreement about the legal authority to consolidate the PSABs (Personnel Security Appeals Board) and, in collaboration with the PSABs and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, address any other obstacles to consolidating DOD's PSABs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. DOD agreed with us to review legal or other impediments to consolidation, and stated that the DOD Office of General Counsel will address any unresolved disagreements about legal authority for consolidation of PSABs. DOD further commented that the DOD Office of General Counsel will work closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to address other issues concerning consolidation of PSABs. However, DOD commented that some DOD components disagreed with PSAB consolidation. Specifically, DOD stated that of the eleven components that provided responses to the draft report, eight concurred or had no issues or comments, while the remaining three components noted that the PSABs should remain at the component level and not be consolidated. As of July 2018, DOD stated that the DOD Office of General Counsel is conducting an ongoing review, with all legal opinions contingent upon a USD(I) funded PERSEREC study to determine the feasibility of PSAB consolidation. USD(I) is coordination with OGC in order to provide the results of the study upon completion. DOD estimates this study will be completed in the third or fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2019. As of November 2019, DOD stated that the PERSEREC study is still ongoing. GAO will continue to monitor the completion of the study.

Recommendation: To help ensure that all employees within DOD receive the same rights during the revocation process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise Secretary of the Navy Manual M-5510.30 to specify that any information collected by the Navy PSAB from the employee's command will be shared with the employee, who will also be given the opportunity to respond to any such information provided.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, DOD stated that Navy Instruction 5510.30C and concomitant manual M-5510.30 have been revised and are being coordinated throughout the Department of the Navy at every level--to include the Action Officer level. DOD stated the estimated completion date is the third quarter of FY 2019. We have no updates on whether this instruction and the manual are complete. This recommendation will remain open pending further updates from DOD.

Recommendation: To help ensure independence and the efficient use of resources, and, if the General Counsel determines that there are no legal impediments and that other obstacles to consolidation can be addressed, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Defense Legal Services Agency to take steps to implement the Secretary of Defense's direction to consolidate DOD's PSABs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. DOD stated that some DOD components disagreed with PSAB consolidation. Specifically, DOD stated that of the eleven components that provided responses to the draft report, eight concurred or had no issues or comments, while the remaining three components noted that the PSABs should remain at the component level and not be consolidated. One of these three components also commented that the perceived efficiencies from consolidation described in our report should be validated and that all models for consolidation should be evaluated before a decision is made that would consolidate the PSABs. DOD's comments reflect internal disagreement, which corroborates our finding that there is disagreement within DOD on the legal authority, risks, and benefits of consolidating the department's multiple appeals boards. As we also note in our report, the Secretary of Defense has already directed this consolidation. As of November 2019, DOD stated that the Office of General Counsel's determination on the legal impediments to consolidation is contingent upon the results of the PERSEREC study, which will assess the feasibility of PSAB consolidation. The study results will inform the OGC decision. DOD estimates this study will be completed in the third or fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2019. However, the study has not been released yet. This recommendation will remain open until DOD takes steps to consolidate the PSABs.

Recommendation: To help ensure that all employees within DOD receive the same rights during the revocation process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to revise Army Regulation 380-67 to specify that any information collected by the Army PSAB from the employee's command or by the Army PSAB itself will be shared with the employee, who will also be given the opportunity to respond to any such information provided.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of July 2018, DOD stated that the Army updated its PSAB guidance in 2016 to include the GAO-recommended verbiage regarding new information. Similar language will also be incorporated in Army Regulation 380-67, which is currently under revision. DOD estimates the revision will be completed in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2019. As of November 2019, no further updates were provided by DOD. GAO will monitor the status of this regulation and assess whether the revised regulation meets the intent of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure that all employees are treated fairly and receive the protections established in the executive order, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, to revise the Coast Guard instruction for military personnel to specify that military personnel may be represented by counsel or other representatives at their own expense.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, the Commandant of the Coast Guard issued a policy message stating that individuals may have counsel or other representatives present at the service member's own expense. According to a Coast Guard official, this message serves as interim guidance until the personnel security manual can be finalized. Coast Guard officials stated that the manual will be undergoing revision, and is expected to be updated at the end of March 2019 . We are awaiting documentation from the Coast Guard that this manual is complete. This recommendation will remain open until the Coast Guard finalizes the update to its manual in accordance with our recommendation.

Recommendation: To facilitate department-wide review and assessment of the quality of the personnel security clearance revocation process, the DNI should, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, develop performance measures to better enable them to identify and resolve problems, and direct the collection of related revocation and appeals information.

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, ODNI stated that review proceedings considerations have been a focus of the ongoing Trusted Workforce 2.0 discussions with a view toward whether policy changes were necessary. ODNI further stated that one key to further examination of this issue is to gather metrics which can inform any subsequent adjustment to the current Executive Branch revocation and review proceedings area. They stated that metrics collection has begun with a January 2019 data call which includes the capture of metrics on denials, revocations, and national security adjudications resulting in an adverse adjudication of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. Metrics collected is expected to be completed in 2020. When we confirm what data fields are included in the metrics collection and whether this meets the intent of our recommendation, we will provide further updates.

Recommendation: To facilitate coordination between personnel security and human capital offices regarding how a security clearance revocation should affect an employee's employment status, and to help ensure that individuals are treated in a fair and consistent manner, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, to review and revise policy regarding coordination between the personnel security and human capital offices to clarify what information can and should be communicated between human capital and personnel security officials at specified decision points in the revocation process, and when that information should be communicated.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, DOD stated that USD(I) has formed a working group to develop a new DOD manual that would respond to this recommendation. DOD further stated that this working group has completed the first half of the manual and will finish the initial review by the fourth quarter of FY 2019. Estimated completion date for the manual is the first quarter of FY 2020. This recommendation remains open pending the department's issuance of this manual.

Recommendation: To help ensure that the DNI report to Congress contains accurate data about the number of current DOD military and federal civilian employees eligible to access classified information, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to review and analyze the discrepancies in the total number of employees and the number of employees eligible to access classified information, and take immediate steps to address the problems.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD stated that this recommendation is tied to recommendation 2 regarding updating information in JPAS and DISS. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I) is facilitating Data Quality Initiatives to identify where gaps may exist and ensure all pertinent data is recorded and updated in JPAS and its successor system, DISS. Officials stated that there is an annual or quarterly service specific personnel center synchronization effort to match the data in JPAS and the personnel centers. Since publication of our report through December 2017, DMDC has conducted 413 DQIs to evaluate and correct data anomalies in JPAS. Further, on a monthly basis, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), DOD components, and industry participate in a meeting which addresses actions to improve the accuracy of information in JPAS. GAO will monitor fielding of the new system and in the process of validating DOD officials' statements that discrepancies have been substantially resolved. As of November 2019, DOD requested to close this recommendation per a closure memo signed by Ms. Nancy Spaulding. We are awaiting further documentation supporting the closure of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure that similarly situated individuals are treated consistently, and to facilitate oversight and help ensure the quality of the security clearance revocation process, the DNI should review whether the existing security clearance revocation process is the most efficient and effective approach. In this review, the DNI should consider whether there should be a single personnel security clearance revocation process used across all executive-branch agencies and workforces, with consideration of areas such as the timing of the personal appearance in the revocation process, and the ability to cross-examine witnesses. Further, to the extent that a single process or changes to the existing parallel processes are warranted, the DNI should consider whether there is a need to establish any policies and procedures to facilitate a more consistent process, and recommend as needed any revisions to existing executive orders or other executive-branch guidance.

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, ODNI stated that there is not currently an ongoing effort to review the security clearance revocation process across all executive branch agencies and workforces. Instead, the Trusted Workforce 2.0 efforts is conducting an end-to-end review of the current security clearance process for the executive branch and ODNI is currently gathering metrics on adverse security actions which can inform any subsequent determination on whether the revocation process requires policy adjustment by the DNI. When we confirm what actions DNI has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.