Recommendation: Following the completion of its emerging technology study, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP should assess what additional authorities may be necessary to address risks related to foreign investment in critical and emerging technologies, and seek legislative action to address risks posed by these investments as appropriate. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it believes the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) should provide the department with the necessary authorities to address concerns related to foreign investment in emerging technologies. However, in August 2020, officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy stated that the regulation implementing FIRRMA requrements related to emerging technology is still in the process of being written by the Department of Commerce, and that until these regulations are issued the Department of Defense cannot assess their ability to address concerns related to foreign investment in critical and emerging technologies.

Recommendation: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP should update DOD Instruction 2000.25, to include additional guidance and clarification regarding DOD component responsibilities during the CFIUS process and DOD processes for identifying non-notified transactions. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it was working with other CFIUS member agencies to make the formal non-notified process DOD established in 2016 a more robust, interagency process. In August 2020, DOD stated it is still in the process of revising DOD Instruction 2000.25 to include additional information on identifying non-notified transactions, but does not anticipate that the revisions will be completed until April 2021.

Recommendation: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP should update and implement requirements identified in DOD Instruction 2000.25 regarding management and oversight of mitigation agreements, such as taking into account the resources needed to effectively monitor agreements, improving communication methods between MIBP and the DOD components, and clarifying component responsibilities in developing and monitoring mitigation agreements. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it is in the process of revising DOD Instruction 2000.25 regarding the management and oversight of mitigation agreements, and have more than doubled their resources for mitigation monitoring. As of August 2020, officials from the Office of Industrial Policy stated that that revisions to DOD Instruction 2000.25 will not be completed until April 2021.

Recommendation: As MIBP moves forward with its plans to improve data collection and analysis, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense, Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy should determine a solution to make better use of existing lower-tier supplier information from program offices. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, noting that it plans to takes steps to identify and incorporate available supplier data from across the department into its defense industrial base data system, but noted that they only planned to rely on one data system, DIBNow, instead of continuing to develop its second data system, the Defense Planning Guidance Input and Retrieval System. The Industrial Policy Office, formerly Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, has taken some steps to improve sharing of industrial base analysis information across the Department, such as establishing a web repository of industrial base assessment information and subject matter expert contacts. However, these sharing tools continue to rely primarily on summary narratives and Industrial Policy has not incorporated program office lower-tier supplier data into this web repository or DIBnow. Industrial Policy has incorporated sub-tier supplier information into DIBnow from commercial industry sources, but these sources do not have the same level of insight into the supply chain as program offices. An Industrial Policy official said there are no plans to incorporate supply chain information from program offices because this information is proprietary and therefore cannot be incorporated into DIBnow, which is built and maintained by a contractor. DOD General Counsel has determined that contractors cannot have access to this proprietary information for the purposes of DIBnow. We continue to believe that program offices have the most complete insight into sub-tier suppliers, which is essential for DOD to achieve its goal of proactive industrial base risk analysis. Industrial Policy should continue to pursue risk reductions solutions, such as non-disclosure agreements and/or data masking, to make better use of existing lower-tier supplier information from program offices.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's ability to make consistent and informed decisions in its management of the TCC program in accordance with internal control standards, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should require the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, to document the procedures for approving projects within the TCC program for civilian institutions.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD did not agree with the recommendation. In 2016, DOD's Corrosion Office consistently maintained that its existing process is adequately documented in the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan and the Technical Corrosion Collaboration (TCC) Definitions Document. However, GAO maintained that DOD could enhance its oversight of corrosion projects by documenting how it approves projects for civilian institutions. As of March 2019, DOD has since decided to take action to implement this recommendation. Specifically, the Corrosion Office plans to include information on documenting procedures for approving projects in a new DOD manual on corrosion that it has a goal of creating by the end of calendar year 2020. We will monitor the extent to which DOD implements this recommendation

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's ability to make consistent and informed decisions in its management of the TCC program in accordance with internal control standards, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should require the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, to document the procedures for selecting and approving projects within the TCC program for military academic institutions.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD did not agree with the recommendation. In 2016, DOD's Corrosion Office had consistently maintained that its existing process is adequately documented in the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan and the Technical Corrosion Collaboration (TCC) Definitions Document. However, GAO maintained that DOD could enhance its oversight of corrosion projects by documenting how it selects and approves TCC projects for military academic institutions. As of March 2019, DOD has since decided to take action to implement this recommendation. The Corrosion Office plans to include information on documenting procedures for selecting and approving projects in a new DOD manual on corrosion that it has a goal of creating by the end of calendar year 2020. We will monitor the extent to which DOD implements this recommendation.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's ability to make consistent and informed decisions in its management of the TCC program in accordance with internal control standards, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should require the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, to document the procedures for selecting and approving military research labs supporting civilian and military institutions in conducting projects within the TCC program.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, the Corrosion Policy and Oversight office is currently re-writing Appendix A of the "Technical Corrosion Collaboration (TCC)" document to include steps and grading criteria for decision makers when selecting and approving military research labs supporting civilian and military institutions conducting projects with the TCC program. The Corrosion Policy and Oversight office will complete this re-write and the post procedures to their web site by November 30, 2018. As of March 2019, the Corrosion Policy and Oversight office plans to include procedures for selecting and approving labs to support institutions in a new DOD manual on corrosion. Its goal to create this new manual is by the end of calendar year 2020. We will monitor the extent to which DOD implements this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's corrosion-prevention and control program, and to enhance DOD in its oversight of the status and potential benefits of its equipment-related corrosion projects, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should require the Director, Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office, to revise the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan or other guidance to require that the military departments include in all follow-on reports the details of measures of achievement other than ROI, such as the features, results, and potential benefits of the project.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD did not concur with this recommendation. As of March 2016, DOD had not implemented this recommendation and stated that the DoD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan currently provide sufficient guidance in this regard. As of March 2019, DOD has decided to take action to implement this recommendation. According to DOD Corrosion Office officials, they plan to list measures of achievement for the military departments to follow on the departments' corrosion project in a new DOD manual on corrosion. The Office's goal is to create this new manual by the end of calendar year 2020. We will monitor the extent to which DOD implements this recommendation.