Recommendation: The NPO Cost Savings Program Manager should work with CNS to evaluate the remaining site reinvestment funds and develop and implement a plan for how best to aggregate and use them. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation. In comments on a draft of the report, DOE stated that NPO plans to work with CNS on a plan for the remaining reinvestment funds, with an estimated completion date of December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should gather data on and document an analysis of the Cost Savings Program, including its cost effectiveness, to determine whether it is exportable to existing or future contracts. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred, in principle, with the recommendation. In its comments on a draft of the report, NNSA stated that potential benefits of the cost savings program should be considered for future contracts, as applicable. NNSA stated that it believes this recommendation is closed with actions to address other recommendations. We disagree and continue to believe that NNSA should document an analysis of the cost savings program, including its cost effectiveness, to determine the exportability of the program to other contracts.

Recommendation: The NPO Cost Savings Program Manager should share relevant lessons learned with other NNSA sites so that those sites can determine if efficiencies CNS has achieved can be implemented at other sites. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation. In its comments on a draft of the report, NNSA stated that it plans to upload lessons learned into DOE's Corporate Lessons Learned Database so they can be considered by other sites by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should evaluate whether to require all other sites to institute an Annual Controlled Baseline. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation. In its comments on a draft of the report, NNSA stated that it plans to evaluate whether to expand use of Annual Controlled Baselines to other sites by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of DOE's Office of Environmental Management should direct RL to conduct a root cause analysis to identify any programmatic causes that may have led to the collapse of PUREX Tunnel 1. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management: Environmental Management Consolidated Business Center
Status: Open

Comments: DOE concurs with this recommendations and has agreed to conduct a root cause analysis examining the programmatic cause leading to the Hanford PUREX tunnel collapse. In DOE's October 2020 Audit Report regarding the implementation of recommendations in our report, DOE states that the Office of Environmental Management is taking action to implement this recommendation, but that action is still insufficient to satisfy the recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should ensure DOE headquarters offices responsible for the oversight of EM sites' field offices conduct an assessment of RL's management and oversight of the Hanford Site contractor's surveillance and maintenance activity for contaminated excess facilities. Based on the results of this assessment, DOE headquarters offices should consider whether such assessments should be conducted on a periodic basis. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open

Comments: DOE concurs with this recommendation and the Office of Environmental Management agreed to conduct an assessment, in coordination with headquarters oversight offices, of the Richland Operations Office's management and oversight of the Hanford Site contractor's surveillance and maintenance activities for contaminated excess facilities. In DOE's October 2020 Audit Report regarding the implementation of recommendations in our report, DOE states that the Office of Environmental Management is taking action to implement this recommendation, but that action is still insufficient to satisfy the recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should direct ORP to require the WTP contractor to determine the full extent to which problems exist in all WTP structures, systems, and components.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE agreed with the recommendation. As of June 15, 2020, DOE has started to take action to implement this recommendation, but actions are not sufficient to close it yet. DOE has directed the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) construction contractor to determine the full extent to which problems exist in all WTP structures, systems, and components and plans to complete full implementation of this recommendation by February 15, 2021.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy should direct ORP to use its authorities to stop work in areas where quality assurance problems are recurring until ORP's Quality Assurance Division can verify that the problems are corrected and will not recur.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE agreed with the recommendation. As of July 1, 2020, DOE has taken some action to implement this recommendation, but actions are not sufficient to close it yet. To implement this recommendation, DOE strengthened and evaluated the existing Office of River Protection (ORP) Stop Work process to ensure it is sufficiently rigorous. In June 2020, ORP activated this new process. However, ORP has not yet used its authority to stop work in areas in areas where quality assurance problems are recurring.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, should include more complete information on the assessments--that is, security plans, vulnerability assessments, independent assessments, and other assessments--used in the annual reports to support the agencies' assessments that DOE and NNSA sites are secure.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: We reported in May 2019 that DOE and NNSA continued to make progress in responding to this recommendation. The draft 2018 annual report contained, as recommended, more complete and uniform information on assessments, though in some cases different terminology was used by programs and sites. As of June 2020, we have requested final 2018, 2019, and 2020 annual reports from NNSA to ensure progress has continued. Once we have received and reviewed the reports, we will update the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: Additionally, the Secretary of Energy should develop a plan for addressing the physical security infrastructure needs at DOE sites. Similar to a report under development by NNSA, this plan could identify cost and time frames and enable DOE and the Congress to prioritize these projects.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: As of June 2020, DOE has not implemented this recommendation. While DOE program offices (Environmental Management, Science, and Nuclear Energy) are individually considering long-term needs, the program offices are not required by Congress to submit the kind of physical security plan that Congress requires of NNSA. In the absence of Congressional direction, we believe it is unlikely that DOE will fully implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: Additionally, the Secretary of Energy should, in future annual security certification reports, inform Congress of the reasons for the delayed implementation of the June 2011 DOE material control and accountability order at some sites, as well as the steps DOE and its sites are taking to implement it. DOE should also provide Congress with information on any vulnerabilities or deficiencies in the security at sites that may potentially exist while the sites complete implementation of the order as well as information on any concomitant adjustment to their security posture that is required.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: As of June 2020, we are continuing to monitor actions related to this recommendation. DOE has acknowledged in a classified memorandum the security risks associated with the slow pace of the material control and accountability order. DOE has also developed a plan to implement measures to address these risks in a phased approach with final implementation sometime in the 2020s. Some of the early phases will be complete between 2019 and 2022, but others will extend beyond 2022. As such, it will be important for DOE to continue to report to Congress on residual risk until planned actions are fully completed and their implementation has been verified by the relevant DOE program offices and DOE's Office of Enterprise Assessments. We will update the status of this recommendation once we have we have received and reviewed DOE's classified 2018-2020 annual reports to ensure this action is taken.

Recommendation: To enhance its ability to fulfill its role as the facilitator of cross-sector collaboration and best-practices sharing, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection, Office of Infrastructure Protection, to explore with key critical infrastructure partners, whether and what opportunities exist to harmonize federally-administered screening and credentialing access control efforts across critical infrastructure sectors.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: As of 2/12/2020, awaiting additional evidence/clarification from DHS.

Recommendation: To ensure that NNSA will provide clear information to stakeholders about the program needs that the revised CMRR project will satisfy, the Secretary should direct the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, in his capacity as the NNSA Administrator, to update the program requirements document for the revised CMRR project to clarify whether the project will provide plutonium analysis equipment to meet the needs of DOE and NNSA programs other than those in the Office of Defense Programs.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2020, LANL has drafted a revised PRD but NNSA's review is not yet complete. This recommendation will remain open until we can evaluate the PRD.

Recommendation: To improve DOE's ability to evaluate and monitor the effectiveness of policies that call for all organizations, including contractors, to embrace a strong safety culture and create a work environment that encourages a questioning attitude by all employees, the Secretary of Energy should develop and implement an independent evaluation process for routinely and accurately measuring contractor employees' willingness to raise safety and other concerns without fear of retaliation. This process should ensure that an independent third party develops, conducts, and consistently applies the evaluation methodology--which should include safeguards that protect anonymity. The process should also enable DOE to oversee and ensure that appropriate corrective actions are taken in response to evaluation results.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE concurred with the recommendation. DOE has developed a plan to analyze tools utilized by site contractors to determine the viability of using the data to monitor the influence of work environment on employees' willingness to raise safety concerns. As of March 2020, DOE had completed assessments of safety culture sustainment tools and drafted a report. According to officials, the draft report is undergoing final review and officials anticipate issuing the report by the end of fiscal year 2020.

Recommendation: To help ensure that the organizational placement and practices of DOE- and contractor- provided Employee Concerns Programs (ECP) do not inhibit contractor employees from raising safety and other concerns, the Secretary of Energy should revise DOE's ECP order and guidance to (1) require that the organizational placement and practices of contractor ECP's do not compromise or impair their independence, (2) clarify the circumstances under which DOE's ECP is permitted to transfer and refer concerns to contractors, and notify or require approval of the contractor employee raising the concern, and (3) provide criteria for overseeing and evaluating the effectiveness and independence of contractor-provided ECPs.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE concurred with the recommendation. DOE issued its revised order on the employee concerns program (ECP) in January 2019. However, that order did not address all three issues raised in our recommendation. Specifically, the order states that it is a best practice for contractor ECP managers to report to a designated executive in the contractor management chain, but does not include information on concerns of independence. Additionally, there is instruction that ECP managers must assess programs and how often, but there is not specific criteria for overseeing and evaluating effectiveness or independence. As of May 2020, we are continuing to discuss these issues with DOE officials.

Recommendation: To help ensure that Congress has the information it needs as it considers whether or not to make permanent the enhanced whistleblower pilot program and that DOE has assurance that contractor employees have an effective mechanism to seek remedy for unlawful retaliation, the Secretary of Energy should fully evaluate the extent to which the pilot program has been implemented and whether its provisions will mitigate challenges associated with DOE's 708 program. This evaluation should include, at a minimum, an assessment of (1) contractors that have adopted the pilot program and the date they did so; (2) contractors that have not adopted the pilot program and an explanation of why not; (3) cases filed under the pilot program, if any; and (4) the pilot program's potential for mitigating challenges associated with the 708 program.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: DOE concurred in principle with the recommendation. In response, the Office of Hearings and Appeals conducted a review of the Part 708 program that addressed three of the four items identified in the recommendation. As of May 2020, we are continuing to work with DOE on whether or how it plans to assess the contractors that have adopted the pilot program and the date they did so.

Recommendation: To help improve DOE's ability to take enforcement action against unlawful retaliation when appropriate and take action against contractors that create a chilled work environment, the Secretary of Energy should revise DOE's Integrated Safety Management policy and guidance to clarify what constitutes evidence of a chilled work environment and define the appropriate steps DOE should take to hold contractors accountable for creating a chilled work environment.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOE concurred with the recommendation. In January 2018, DOE issued a revision to DOE Policy 450.4A. The revised policy states that organizations should foster a culture that allows employees to "feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation...and supporting a questioning attitude concerning safety by all employees." However, the policy does not define the appropriate steps DOE should take to hold contractors accountable for creating a chilled work environment. As of May 2020, we are continuing to work with DOE to determine whether they plan to make additional changes to the policy to address our recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve the reliability of its cost estimates, as NRC revises its cost estimating procedures, the NRC Chairman should ensure that the agency aligns the procedures with relevant cost estimating best practices identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide and ensure that future cost estimates are prepared in accordance with relevant cost estimating best practices.

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In August 2019, NRC staff reported that the Commission had directed them to revise the guidance and resubmit it to the Commission by January 2020. In February 2020, the NRC staff submitted the revised guidance to the Commission. NRC staff said that following Commission review and approval, they will publish the guidance. We will review the cost-benefit guidance when it is released and determine if it responds to this recommendation.

Recommendation: To strengthen NNSA's oversight practices and current and future facility modernization efforts, and to improve the transparency and usefulness of cost analyses prepared for future NNSA nuclear facilities modernization projects, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Administrator of NNSA to ensure that life cycle cost analyses include a thorough and balanced evaluation of short- and long-term construction and financing alternatives. Such analyses should consider the full useful life of the facility rather than the 20-year requirement for GSA leases or any predetermined length of time that might produce results that favor one option over another.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA provided evidence that it requires life cycle cost analyses for projects greater than $20 million. However, this is not fully responsive to GAO's recommendation. For example, the recommendation stated that each life cycle cost analysis performed includes short- and long-term construction and financing alternatives and that these analyses should consider the full life of the facility rather than the 20-year requirements for GSA leases or any predetermined length of time. NNSA's actions do not address this aspect of the life cycle cost analysis. Our work found that facility's life cycle cost analysis only covered 20 years and it failed to reflect cost savings over a longer useful life (possibly over 50 years) that could have been realized if the facility were purchased instead of leased. Nothing in the Order addresses how the life cycle cost period to be analyzed should be established (e.g., 20 years or 50 plus years). Although we requested additional information from NNSA on this recommendation in fiscal year 2019, the agency has not responded. As a result, as of June 2020, the recommendation remains open.

Recommendation: To strengthen NNSA's oversight practices and current and future facility modernization efforts, and because of the importance of mitigating the risks of outsourcing nuclear weapons components and other information that if exported, might allow potential adversaries to develop or advance their nuclear capabilities, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Administrator of NNSA to take immediate action to assess the effectiveness of NNSA's oversight of KCP's current export control and nonproliferation practices and, if appropriate, initiate corrective actions to strengthen that oversight.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2020, there has been no change in the status of this recommendation. While NNSA/contractor actions are commendable and appear to be beneficial, such as adding performance-based incentives, training 950 employees, and including new contract clauses in its supplier purchase orders, these actions do not fully satisfy the recommendation. GAO's recommendation was specifically directed at the effectiveness of NNSA's oversight of the KCP contractor's export control and nonproliferation practices and to initiate corrective actions to strengthen that NNSA oversight. While the Kansas City Site Office's addition of a performance based incentive seems to be a good improvement, NNSA has not demonstrated its own oversight effectiveness. Our review of NNSA's response provided in March 2014 was not persuasive. In addition, GAO-16-710 found that as of May 2016, the Secretary of Energy had not used the enhanced procurement authority to ensure supply chain integrity, and the Department of Energy (DOE) had not developed processes for using the authority, as it had not fully assessed the circumstances under which the authority might be useful. Although NNSA provided additional information on this recommendation in August 2019, these actions relied primarily on contractor self assessments and not on independent federal oversight. As a result, this recommendation will continue to remain open.