Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should establish an analysis plan for the evaluation of OPN-funded pilot program availabilities, based on the leading practices for pilot programs. This analysis plan should identify opportunities to evaluate schedule outcomes of pilot program availabilities as compared to non-pilot program availabilities and document a process for evaluating lessons learned from the pilot program (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of the Navy concurred with our recommendation in May 2020, stating that it would establish an analysis plan for evaluating Other Procurement, Navy-funded pilot program availabilities. In July 2020, the Director, Maintenance & Modernization, within the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Ship Programs, stated that the Navy has drafted this analysis plan, which is now undergoing required Department of Defense (DOD) reviews. The Director stated that he expects this review process to be completed sometime in late summer 2020. Once complete, he stated that his office will provide the analysis plan to GAO for review to confirm that it satisfies our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct NAVSEA to incorporate current cost and program data and an updated cost risk analysis in its planned update of the Columbia class lead submarine cost estimate. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, stating that the Columbia Class Program cost estimate will be updated in 2019 to support the lead ship authorization Decision Acquisition Board in 2020. As of September 2020, we have yet to receive an update on the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct NAVSEA to develop a realistic and well-documented estimate of savings from use of the authorities associated with the Fund and incorporate the savings associated with the lead submarine into the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation, stating that the updated Columbia Class Program cost estimate would incorporate estimated savings from use of the authorities associated with the fund and savings associated with the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate. In August 2020, Navy officials indicated that NAVSEA updated the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate to include updates to the estimate of savings from the use of the authorities associated with the Fund.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Columbia class program office to update the lead submarine cost estimate and cost risk analysis prior to requesting funds for lead submarine construction. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, stating that the lead submarine cost estimate and cost risk analysis will be updated to support the lead ship authorization Decision Acquisition Board in 2020. In August 2020, Navy officials indicated that NAVSEA updated the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate. However, this estimate was completed after funding was requested for lead submarine construction. While the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation plans to conduct an assessment of this estimate in the summer of 2020, the assessment will also be too late to inform the Navy's funding request.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's ship delivery policy to clarify what types of deficiencies need to be corrected and what mission capability (including the levels of quality and capability) must be achieved at (1) delivery and (2) when the ship is provided to the fleet (at the obligation work limiting date (OWLD)). In doing so, the Navy should clearly define what constitutes a complete ship and when that should be achieved.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD disagreed with our recommendation to clarify the Navy's ship delivery policy and stated that other existing policies help ensure the completion and capability of ships at delivery. However, as of August 2020, Navy officials stated that they are working on a new response based on ongoing discussions with GAO and they expect to develop a new proposal for responding to this recommendation by December 2020. We maintain that the Navy's ship delivery policy is a key instruction for ensuring that complete, mission-capable ships are provided to the fleet and should be revised in line with our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to reconcile policy with practice to support INSURV's role in making a recommendation for fleet introduction. Accomplishing this may require a study of the current timing of ship trials, and the costs and benefits associated with adding an INSURV assessment prior to providing ships to the fleet.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD and the Navy did not concur with this recommendation, noting that the current timing of Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) trials provides the Navy with an opportunity to ensure contractual obligations have been met and identify construction deficiencies for correction during the post-delivery period. DOD and the Navy also stated that adding another INSURV trial at the end of the post-delivery period would not be cost-effective and could delay ship deployment schedules. However, we found that most of the significant construction deficiencies identified prior to delivery were not corrected until the post-delivery period and, therefore, INSURV generally did not have an opportunity to inspect these corrections before ships were provided to the fleet. Given this, we maintain that the Navy should re-assess the timing of its post-delivery trials in support of INSURV's responsibility to make recommendations for fleet introduction. As of August 2020, DOD officials stated that they are working on a proposal to address this recommendation based on ongoing discussions with GAO and they expect to complete this proposal by December 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to reflect additional ship milestones in Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress, including OWLD and readiness to deploy.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. DOD and the Navy agreed to report obligation work limiting dates (OWLD) in its Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress, and, as of December 2018, has implemented this portion of the recommendation. The department added the OWLDs for all ships that have yet to achieve this milestone to its Selected Acquisition Reports and plans to continue reporting this information in all subsequent Selected Acquisition Reports. However, DOD did not agree to report ready-to-deploy dates in the Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress, noting that operational factors outside of acquisition concerns can affect the timing of this milestone. While we agree that readiness to deploy is a fleet determination, we continue to believe that this date is important for Congressional oversight, as it remains the best milestone for determining when a ship has achieved a sufficient level of completeness to operate, under the Navy's current framework for ship delivery. As of August 2020, DOD and Navy officials stated that they are working on a new proposal for addressing the recommendation based on ongoing discussions with GAO and they expect to complete this proposal by December 2020.

Recommendation: To improve insight into cost changes for individual ships in the Ford Class, the program office should prepare cost summary and funding summary sections for each individual ship in the class as part of the SAR for the overall Ford-Class program.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In its comments on our draft report DOD disagreed with our recommendation, stating that it currently provides progress reports to Congress on costs for CVN 78 and CVN 79. In July 2020, Navy officials stated that the department continues to disagree with this recommendation. We continue to maintain that Selected Acquisition Reports represent the primary statutorily required means for DOD to report on program status. Grouping average unit costs for all Ford-class ships obscures individual ship cost growth and does not provide Congress with an adequate level of insight to monitor this over $55 billion program. Our recommendation would ensure that Congress receives insight into the costs of each existing and planned Ford-class ship. To fully implement this recommendation, the report should include cost information on individual ships.

Recommendation: To improve the use of warranties and guarantees in Navy shipbuilding, the Secretary of the Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy, for future ship construction contracts, to determine whether or not a warranty as provided in the FAR, provides value and document the costs, benefits, and other factors used to make this decision. To inform this determination, the Navy should begin differentiating the government's and shipbuilder's responsibility for defects and track the costs to correct all defects after ship delivery.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation in February 2016 by committing to study policy changes with regard to warranties, but disagreed that additional cost data were needed to inform these decisions, and questioned whether warranties are suitable for ship acquisitions. In February 2017, a Navy-funded study found that the Navy had no policy to collect data, and that the little data available were not useful for determining when warranties are suitable. In response to the study, the Navy agreed that, by December 2017, it would make some policy and contractual changes to collect data, but it continued to maintain that warranties are likely not suitable for ship contracts. In January 2018, the Navy issued guidance to help contracting officers determine when and how to use a warranty or guarantee, but the Navy has collected only one warranty cost proposal from one shipbuilder for a contract for a single ship and, going forward, Navy officials stated that they do not have plans to systematically collect such data. In August 2019, we recommended in GAO-19-512 that the Navy collect warranty pricing on its new class of frigates, as the Navy initially did not include warranty pricing as part of its request for proposals for the ship class. However, as of August 2020, the Navy has not made meaningful efforts to gain pricing data for warranties and has stated that the department does not plan to take any further action. To fully implement this recommendation, the Navy needs to collect additional data in order to determine cases in which warranties could contribute to improvements in the cost and quality of Navy ships.