Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Commander, Army Materiel Command, develops procedures to help ensure that it will incorporate depot stakeholder input into the new metrics framework for the Army's organic industrial base through iterative and ongoing processes. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: The agency concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commandant of the Marine Corps should ensure that the Marine Corps Logistics Command establishes a complete baseline schedule, which includes all planned depot maintenance work for the fiscal year, against which to measure performance. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: United States Marine Corps
Status: Open

Comments: The agency concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Commander, Army Materiel Command, develops guidance that synchronizes the Army's timelines for required inputs from Army depot maintenance customers who use funds from the Procurement; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation; and Operations and Maintenance budgets with the depots' timelines for development of their finalized budget estimate submissions to AMC. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: The agency concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Commander, Army Materiel Command, provides its non-Army customers with guidance that will help ensure that the depots have all updated maintenance needs in sufficient detail from non-Army customers prior to the depots' finalized budget estimate submissions to AMC. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: The agency concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Army Organic Industrial Base Corporate Board oversees a study that includes a recurring, comprehensive, and systematic analysis of Army depot data to identify trends and causes behind changes in depot maintenance schedules; and that it uses this analysis to recommend actions to reduce unplanned maintenance work, as appropriate and necessary. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: The agency concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Naval Air Systems Command and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers effectively use historical data to analyze turnaround time and establish accurate turnaround time targets for fixed-wing aircraft depot maintenance packages. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the Navy has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Commander, Naval Air Forces and Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific provide depot planners regular reporting on fixed-wing aircraft maintenance performed outside the Navy aviation depots by an operational unit or at an intermediate maintenance facility to ensure they have information on the current condition and depot maintenance needs of individual aircraft. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the Navy has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that Naval Air Systems Command and Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers establish formal processes and related guidance for communication and coordination between depot stakeholders to inform maintenance requirements planning. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the Navy has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in consultation with the F-35 Program Executive Officer, develops a program-wide process for measuring, collecting, and tracking information on how ALIS is affecting the performance of the F-35 fleet to include, but not be limited to, its effects on mission capability rates. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in consultation with the F-35 Program Executive Officer, develops and implements a strategy for the re-design of ALIS. The strategy should be detailed enough to clearly identify and assess the goals, key risks or uncertainties, and costs of re-designing the system. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Administrator of FAA should direct the Aviation Workforce Steering Committee, as part of its ongoing efforts, to take steps to use existing FAA data and coordinate with other federal agencies to identify and gather the information it needs to measure progress and target resources toward its goal of promoting a robust, qualified, and diverse aviation maintenance workforce. For example, FAA could task a committee working group with developing and implementing ways to improve data sharing among federal agencies to inform decision-making on how to strengthen career pathways and better understand the supply and demand of certificated workers. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration: Office of the Administrator
Status: Open

Comments: DOT agreed with this recommendation. Specifically, the agency agreed that using existing data could potentially contribute to its efforts to develop the aviation maintenance workforce. DOT said it will ask the Aviation Workforce Steering Committee to consider using existing FAA data and to coordinate with other federal agencies regarding other potential data sources to support the FAA's aviation maintenance workforce goals. We will consider closing this recommendation when these and other efforts to address this recommendation are complete.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense ensures that the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment in coordination with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force take interim steps to help ensure that standardized aviation mishap data elements are collected by the safety centers. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. According to a corrective action plan that DOD updated in July 2020, the department has taken some steps to implement this recommendation. According to the plan, DOD is developing standards for mishap data through the Safety and Information Management Working Group and is making progress towards finalizing mishap data element standards. DOD's internal tracking indicates that the draft business process model has been completed, but standardizing the DOD data elements is a work in-progress. DOD's estimated completion date for this effort is June 2021. Completing these actions would allow the military services' safety centers to collect relevant training-related data as part of the update of aviation mishap data elements, as GAO recommended in August 2018.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense ensures that the Offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment in coordination with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force update department-wide and service instructions and policies to clarify the responsibility of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for conducting analysis and its access to the military services' information on human factors that contributed to aviation mishaps. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. According to a corrective action plan that DOD updated in July 2020, the department has taken some steps to implement this recommendation. According to the plan, DOD is revising DOD Instruction 6055.07, which will clarify the department's policy that it is the responsibility of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for conducting analysis and its access to the military services' information on human factors that contributed to aviation mishaps. DOD's estimated completion date for this effort is July 2021. Completing this action would clarify the Office of the Secretary of Defense's role for conducting analyses and access to the military services' safety centers' data on aviation mishaps, as GAO recommended in August 2018.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense ensures that the DOD Chief Management Officer in coordination with the offices of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force identify relevant training-related data to collect as part of any update of the aviation mishap data elements and incorporate these data into future analyses. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. According to a corrective action plan that DOD updated in July 2020, the department has taken some steps to implement this recommendation. According to the plan, DOD is developing standards for mishap data through the Safety and Information Management Working Group and is making progress towards finalizing mishap data element standards. DOD's internal tracking indicates that the draft business process model has been completed, but standardizing the DOD data elements is a work in-progress. DOD's estimated completion date for this effort is June 2021. Completing these actions would allow the military services' safety centers to collect relevant training-related data as part of the update of aviation mishap data elements, as GAO recommended in August 2018.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Commandant of the Marine Corps develops and implements mechanisms to consistently capture information on pilots' post-service employment, including the number of those going to the commercial airlines, such as through revising existing exit surveys, or working in coordination with the National Pilot Sourcing Forum specifically to monitor commercial airline hiring to supplement the information DOD collects. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of April 2020, this recommendation remains open.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Secretary of the Air Force analyzes staffing levels by officer grade for each pilot community as part of its annual business case for aviation retention bonus payments to help ensure that aviation retention bonuses are targeted to the appropriate pilot communities. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of April 2020, DOD officials stated that the Air Force plans to make changes to its upcoming business case analysis to break out control grade from field grade officers to better delineate the staffing challenges it faces as well as the targeted effect of aviation bonus offerings. Officials stated that this change is part of an ongoing study with RAND that should be completed in early summer 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure that the Director of Operations and the Air Force Manpower Analysis Agency reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements, to include updating current assumptions of fighter pilot workload, and assessing the impact of future incorporation of UAS platforms into combat aviation. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In its initial response, DOD noted that across the Air Force, many organizations and offices, in addition to the Director of Operations and Air Force Manpower Analysis Agency will play integral roles in determining the future size and mix of manpower requirements for fighter pilot squadrons. DOD also noted that the Air Force will review fighter wing manpower determinants to accurately account for fighter pilot workloads and analyze support organization manning to ensure adequate support to operational units. In December 2018, the Air Force provided a report to Congress on the efforts to implement GAO's recommendation, among other things. The report noted that an Air Force reevaluation of pilot staff requirements resulted in a reduction to requirements of 106 positions (4 percent). In addition, the report discussed how fighter pilot workload is impacted by UAS platforms, specifically that the growth of UAS platforms has allowed the Air Force to reduce the need for fighter aircraft operations in uncontested environments, and that the growth of the UAS pilot community has allowed that community to begin filling staff positions that would formerly have been filled by fighter pilots. Further, the report stated that the Air Force Manpower Analysis Agency - in coordination with other Air Force offices - was conducting a study of fighter squadron workloads, anticipated to be completed in mid-2019. We requested a copy of the Air For Manpower Analysis Agency study in March 2020, and again in August 2020 - but as of September 2020 a copy has not been provided. Once we have an opportunity to review the study we will update the status of this recommendation as appropriate.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Chief of Naval Operations reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements, to include updating current assumptions of fighter pilot workload, and assessing the impact of future incorporation of UAS platforms into combat aviation. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In its initial response, DOD noted that across the Navy, many organizations and offices including the resource sponsor (Naval Air Forces) will play integral roles in determining the future size and mix of manpower requirements for fighter pilot squadrons. As of August 2020, DOD officials told us that the Navy has updated most of the fighter pilot requirements for most squadrons, is taking action to update requirements for the remaining squadrons, and will provide us with documentation when the process is complete. When we obtain documentation of the updates to fighter pilot squadron requirements we will update the recommendation status as appropriate.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Deputy Commandant for Aviation reevaluate fighter pilot squadron requirements. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In its initial response, DOD noted that across the Marine Corps, many organizations and offices in addition to the Deputy Commandant for Aviation play integral roles in the continuous evaluation and determination regarding current and future size and mix of manpower requirements for fighter and attack squadrons. As of August 2020 DOD has not taken actions in response to this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Chief of Naval Operations should clarify workforce planning policies to identify circumstances in which federal civilian employees and private sector contractors may serve in operational roles and what the benefits and limitations are of using federal civilians and private sector contractors as alternative workforces. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. However, it has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: The Chief of Naval Operations should, after clarifying workforce planning policies, apply the revised policies to evaluate the use of alternative workforces (including federal civilian employees and private sector contractors) for future unmanned system operators. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. However, it has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: The Commandant of the Marine Corps should clarify workforce planning policies to identify circumstances in which federal civilian employees and private sector contractors may serve in operational roles and what the benefits and limitations are of using federal civilians and private sector contractors as alternative workforces. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. However, it has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: The Commandant of the Marine Corps should, after clarifying workforce planning policies, apply the revised policies to evaluate the use of alternative workforces (including federal civilian employees and private sector contractors) for future unmanned system operators. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. However, it has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: The Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, in coordination with the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Combat Development and Integration, should update the Marine Corps personnel requirements associated with the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS based on the most current and enduring concept of operations and utilize the updated requirements in planning for UAS squadron personnel requirements. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. However, it has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: The Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, should update the life cycle cost estimate for the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS to make adjustments as appropriate after updating the personnel requirements for the system. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. However, it has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (N9), in coordination with the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, should prioritize continued efforts to fully evaluate policies for operating and maintaining UAS of different sizes and capabilities, such as group 3 UAS--to include establishing completion time frames, determining whether reductions to personnel requirements could be accomplished, and identifying any associated cost savings and the benefits to the UAS squadrons' ability to complete missions--and update such policies as needed. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. However, it has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should clarify overarching goals for unmanned systems' personnel requirements, including related priority levels for resourcing purposes, and communicate them to requirements planners and budget decision makers. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. However, it has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: The Chief of Naval Personnel and the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs should assess civilian supply, demand, and wages in the commercial drone industry and use the results to inform retention approaches, including the use of special and incentive pays for UAS operators. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. DOD has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: The Deputy Commandant for Aviation and the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs should examine the use of additional human capital flexibilities that could improve the career satisfaction and retention of experienced UAS operators and maximize their availability to squadrons. Such flexibilities could include authorizing available special and incentive pays; permitting UAS operators to extend their enlistments to serve longer within squadrons; ensuring the availability of career- and promotion-enhancing opportunities for professional military education; considering the use of a potential insignia device for operators; or extending UAS operator contract lengths. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. DOD has not fully implemented it as of November 2019.

Recommendation: To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, and to help ensure that the Air Force strategies to address UAS pilot shortages are tailored to address remaining issues, such as the significant amount of pilots who are temporarily assigned to the UAS pilot career, the limited amount of cadet interest in the UAS pilot career, and the workload of UAS pilots, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to revise the Get Well Plan to address these issues.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: Although the Air Force has taken some steps to address issues such as the use of pilots temporarily assigned to the UAS pilot career and has accelerated its efforts to increase recruit interest in this particular field, high operational tempo, manning shortages and increased workload among UAS pilots still exist. As noted earlier, in July 2018, the Air Force established a new office within its headquarters a focal point for overseeing RPA personnel matters throughout the Air Force and it established a career field manager (CFM) specifically for RPA personnel, placing the career field on par with manned aircraft pilot career fields. These latest efforts show that the Air Force is taking actions to address challenges to the RPA community beyond the stated goals of the Get Well Plan that we identified and on an enterprise-wide level. Because the Air Force efforts are newly instituted and it remains to be seen how UAS aircrew workloads will be affected, we believe that as of November 2019 this recommendation should remain open until more progress is made.

Recommendation: To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, and to help the Air Force ensure that its strategies are having the intended effects, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to monitor the extent to which that achieving the human capital goals in its strategy helps the Air Force achieve its programmatic goals.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. According to headquarters Air Force officials, the Air Force has three program goals that are related to addressing UAS pilot shortfalls: to (1) meet combat demand, (2) staff enough personnel to UAS units to allow UAS pilots time to train and take part in development activities, and (3) provide surge UAS combat capabilities when needed. As of September 2019, the Air Force does not have enough personnel in UAS units to allow UAS pilots time to train and take part in developmental activities-known as being in "dwell." As of November 2019, Air Force officials state that they are able to "meet combat demand" but are not able to provide enough manpower to "surge UAS combat capabilities when needed." Therefore, we believe this recommendation should remain open.

Recommendation: To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, and to help the Air Force ensure that it is poised to meet future needs for UAS pilots, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to explore the potential use of additional flexibilities that would enable it to increase the number of UAS pilots in its workforce.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In a March 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force stated it had developed a deliberate plan to integrate enlisted pilots in the RQ-4 Global Hawk UAS as it provided the ideal environment to expand mission flexibility. Further, as another way to build capability in support of human capital strategies by using flexibilities, an Air Force selection board met in July 2017 to consider total force officer as well as civilian candidates for various test pilot positions to include test UAS pilots. Finally, the Air Force is seeking legislative changes to allow the Air Reserve Component to perform full time, 24/7, 365 operational missions such as the UAS mission, in Active Guard Reserve status. Additionally, in July 2018, Air Force is in the process of establishing a new division to be the Headquarters focal point for overseeing RPA personnel matters throughout the Air Force and they also stated the Air Force established a career field manager (CFM) specifically for RPA personnel, placing the career field on par with manned aircraft pilot career fields. Further, the Air Force is working on an initiative that would enable it to provide UAS pilots with "dwell time"-a time during which servicemembers are at their home station during which they are able to take leave, attend training, and recuperate. As of November 2019, the Air Force had not implemented this initiative. Additionally, the Air Force has increased the maximum annual retention pay for UAS pilots (and all other pilots) to $35,000. While the Air Force has taken some steps, it is too early to tell whether these steps will result in effective workforce planning outcomes that reduce Air Force UAS pilot shortages. Therefore, we believe that this recommendation should remain open until more progress is made.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in completing their training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to collect feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units, such as by surveying, or conducting focus groups with them.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In its initial comments, DOD stated that incorporating feedback from the field is already an element of the Army's strategy for improving the sustainability, maturity, and health of its UAS workforce. DOD stated that our findings will reinforce the importance of using feedback to improve and refine the Army's overall strategy. In September 2019, Army Headquarters officials reiterated previous statements that they made that the Army has multiple agencies and systems that gather feedback to refine and improve UAS programs. However, the Army has not collected feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units via surveys, focus groups, to help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in completing their training.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in completing their training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to incorporate such feedback into the Army's strategy to address UAS training shortfalls.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, and in its initial comments, DOD stated that incorporating feedback from the field is already an element of the Army's strategy for improving the sustainability, maturity, and health of its UAS workforce. DOD stated that our findings will reinforce the importance of using feedback to improve and refine the Army's overall strategy. In July 2018, Army Headquarters officials stated that the Army has multiple agencies and systems that gather feedback to incorporate and improve UAS programs. The officials listed a number of the systems in place to gather feedback on UAS units. However, the Army did not describe any efforts to collect feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units such as by surveying them or conducting focus groups with them. In September 2019, Army officials reiterated their 2018 comments and stated that Army has a number of the systems in place to gather feedback on UAS units. However, the Army has not collected feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units such as by surveying them or conducting focus groups with them and incorporated such feedback into an Army strategy to address UAS training shortfalls.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help ensure that Army Shadow units meet minimum training requirements, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls to ensure that it is fully tailored to address training issues and address factors such as lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls to ensure that it is fully tailored to address training issues and address factors such as lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time. DOD stated that the Army has already taken steps to continuously improve its training strategy and that our findings will underline the importance of those initiatives, but that additional direction related to our recommendation is not necessary. In their July 2018 written update, Army officials responded to this recommendation by discussing a regulation regarding readiness reporting; however, the response did not clarify how the regulation might address our recommendation. As of November 2019, the Army has not issued an updated UAS strategy that addresses UAS training shortfalls including a lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to validate that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of UAS pilot candidate performance in UAS pilot training and job performance.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army validate that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of UAS pilot candidate performance in UAS pilot training and job performance. DOD stated that it believes that the current graduation rate of soldiers from its UAS pilot school of 98 percent is an indication that the existing personnel resource predictors and practices are sufficient. It also stated that periodic re-validation is prudent, but specific direction to do so is not necessary. In its July 2018 written update about this recommendation, Army officials stated that the successful graduation rate from UAS Advanced Individual Training and suggested that this graduation rate may indicate that the existing Army approach is adequate. As we stated in our report, Army officials told us that senior Army leaders pressure officials at the Army UAS pilot schoolhouse to ensure that UAS pilot candidates make it through training. As a result, graduation rates may not provide the Army with reliable evidence that its approach to selecting personnel to serve as UAS pilots is providing the Army with personnel who have the aptitude for this career. Validating that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of training and job performance of UAS pilot is an important step that would help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for the UAS pilot career field on sound evidence. As of November 2019, the Army continued to maintain that the successful graduation rate from UAS Advanced Individual Training and suggests that the existing Army approach is adequate.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to assess existing research that has been performed that identifies UAS pilot competencies.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that the Army assess existing research that has been performed that identifies UAS pilot competencies. In its comments, DOD stated that incorporating findings regarding UAS pilot competencies is already an integral part of both workforce and community management and that effective and efficient resource management, as well as force shaping and management processes, will help ensure that the Army's selection of candidates is consistent with the findings of existing research in this area. DOD stated that it does not believe it is necessary to provide additional direction or guidance to the Army to leverage existing research that identifies UAS pilot competencies. In it's July 2018 written update about this recommendation, Army officials indicated that the Army will assess existing research on UAS operator competencies to improve UAS operator selection. As of November 2019, the Army continued to express interest in assessing existing research on UAS operator competencies to improve UAS operator candidate selection.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to incorporate relevant findings from such research into the Army's approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates, as appropriate.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that the Army incorporate relevant findings from such research into the Army's approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates, as appropriate. DOD stated that incorporating findings regarding UAS pilot competencies is already an integral part of both workforce and community management and that effective and efficient resource management, as well as force shaping and management processes, will help ensure that the Army's selection of candidates is consistent with the findings of existing research in this area. DOD stated that it does not believe it is necessary to provide additional direction or guidance to the Army to leverage existing research that identifies UAS pilot competencies. In its July 2018 written update on this recommendation, Army officials indicated that the Army will consider a cost benefit analysis on techniques that would potentially improve a process, product, or result related to selecting UAS pilot candidates. Officials went on to state that once the assessment is complete, the Army will incorporate relevant findings into the approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates. As of November 2019, the Army expressed interest in incorporating findings from relevant research into processes for selecting UAS pilot candidates.

Recommendation: To improve decision makers' abilities to make fully informed decisions concerning whether training requirements can be met with live and simulation-based training and determine optimal mixes of live and simulation-based training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop outcome-oriented performance metrics that can be used to assess the impact of simulation-based training on improving the performance or proficiency of servicemembers and units.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of 18 Aug 2014, the Army and Marine Corps actions for this recommendation are currently ongoing and the recommendation status currently remains open. On 14 June 2014, the DOD Inspector General reported in the Defense Audit Management Information System that "the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense(Readiness) developed a decision algorithm to determine which military tasks could be taught virtually and which military tasks should only be taught in classroom or field environments (i.e., live). The algorithm was provided to the Services for peer-review and possible implementation. The Army is reviewing its progressive training models through a process called Training Summit IV (TS IV). These models establish how virtual and constructive based training is integrated with live training to optimize training readiness. The TS IV will include training model review by proponent schools, as well as a cross-section of unit commanders and leaders. This effort will be completed in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 and presented for validation and G-3/5/7 approval at the Army Training General Officer Steering Committee in November 2014. Also, the Marine Corps initiated a request for an internal servicewide study of existing and potential approaches to this topic (4th Quarter FY 2013). The initial focus is in determining how metrics can be better used to assess the impact of simulation based on meeting Marine Corps Training Standards. Furthermore, a targeted study began in the 1st Quarter FY 2014 and is focused initially on enhancing the methodology for assessing individual based simulators against Training and Readiness (T&R) Standards. In FY 2015, the study results will shape policy on how future T&R manuals will identify the appropriateness of simulators and simulations for training."

Recommendation: To improve decision makers' abilities to make fully informed decisions concerning whether training requirements can be met with live and simulation-based training and determine optimal mixes of live and simulation-based training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop a methodology--to include identifying the costs that should be included and how these costs should be captured--for comparing the costs associated with the use of live and simulation-based training.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of 18 Aug 2014, the Army and Marine Corps actions for this recommendation are currently ongoing and the recommendation status currently remains open. On 14 June 2014, the DOD Inspector General reported in the Defense Audit Management Information System that "the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) has coordinated with the Army and Marine Corps to identify standard approaches to capture costs and cost benefit analysis that could be used DoD-wide. The Army has undertaken a "cost of training" analysis that is an on-going action to determine cost of readiness and/or training. One area of concentration is to look at the "Other Burdened Resources Required for Training Readiness." This area is further broken down into two areas: Investment/Modernization and Installation Services. The Investment/Modernization area will look at Non-System Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations while Installation Services will look at Post Deployment Software Support. In addition, the Army is gathering data to validate an existing model developed by the Simulations to Mission Command Interoperability Director (Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation) for the Value of Simulation Study consisting of five phases: Phase one focused on development of a working methodology to assess both quantitative and qualitative value of simulations used to support collective training (completed). Phase two is currently gathering data for model validation. Phase three will be an expansion to other simulation capabilities. Phase four is data gathering and validation. Phase five is expanded testing/methodology use case study/validation for return on investment use. The Marine Corps established a study, described in response to Recommendation 1, which will evaluate and propose the initial cost factors not currently captured during Programming yet would be relevant in determining the appropriate mix of live and simulated training. The initial results are expected in FY 2015."