Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of the Navy, determine whether it can assign the required number of Navy officers to the other military departments' JPME programs, consistent with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the military services, develop policy concerning actions, if any, the military services can take to mitigate JPME seminar student mix shortfalls and still meet the intent of the OPMEP's joint acculturation requirement. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, develop and issue a department-wide mission statement for PME that will explain the program's purpose and goals, and serve as a basis for performance measures. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issue and implement performance measures—to include the tracking of costs—that align with the department-wide mission statement for PME. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, require the military services to periodically report information to its office about the military services' PME and JPME programs—such as results of program reviews. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense(Comptroller) updates the DOD Financial Management Regulation to require the Marine Corps to include a budget request data exhibit for the Marine Corps War College in support of DOD's annual budget request. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), in coordination with the military services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issue guidance to standardize the cost data that the military services should include in their annual PME budget request data submissions. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should update Army manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 15, 2020, the Department of the Army has neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Air Force should update Air Force manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 15, 2020, the Department of the Air Force has neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should update Navy and Marine Corps manpower guidance, or other guidance as appropriate, to ensure that all missions conducted by EOD forces, including DSCA missions, are considered in determining the required number of EOD forces. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 15, 2020, the Department of the Navy has neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in collaboration with the combatant commands, incorporate into the appropriate guidance a requirement that the military services notify the Joint Staff and the affected combatant commands when the execution of VIP support missions negatively affects the preparedness of EOD units for combat-related missions. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 15, 2020, the Department of Defense has neither concurred nor non-concurred with this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the department implements the pilot program by releasing at least 20 percent of newly custom-developed code as open source software (OSS). (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense did not concur with this recommendation and as of July 2020 has not yet implemented it. According to a December 2019 department letter provided to GAO, the 20 percent software release target is unlikely achievable due to the nature of code that is custom developed by the department. However, the department is mandated by law to implement the open source software pilot program established by the Office of Management and Budget's memorandum M-16-21. Releasing at least 20 percent of newly custom-developed code is a requirement of this program. GAO will continue to follow-up on the status of the pilot program.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the department identifies a measure to calculate the percentage of code released to gauge its progress on implementing the pilot program. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense partially agreed with this recommendation and as of July 2020 has not yet implemented it. According to a December 2019 department letter sent to GAO, the department intends to release updated guidance on the release of custom-developed code as open-source software and will include metrics. The department estimated that the updated policy will be completed in the 3rd quarter of fiscal year 2020. GAO will follow-up with the agency to obtain the status of the updated guidance.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment designates an accountable official responsible for (a) developing job specialty descriptions to help identify non-acquisition personnel supporting services acquisitions; and (b) establishing a schedule to identify these personnel. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, but has not yet taken any necessary actions to implement it. In its concurrence, DOD noted that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) would develop and provide the guidance and job specialty descriptions for DOD components to use for identifying acquisition and non-acquisition personnel supporting services acquisitions. DOD also noted that the Director of Human Capital Initiatives has deployed an enterprise-wide coding capability for components to use in identifying acquisition and non-acquisition civilians across DOD. A DOD official stated that during 2020, both OSD and the Office of Human Capital Initiatives have developed reports that discuss issues related to the identification and training of non-acquisition personnel, including those supporting services acquisitions. This official noted that both of these reports are going through the coordination and staffing process and have not been issued. Additionally, DOD has not yet designated an accountable official responsible for efforts to help identify non-acquisition personnel supporting services acquisitions.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Component Acquisition Executives provide non-acquisition personnel training needs to the Defense Acquisition University as part of the annual planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In July 2020, a DOD official stated that DOD is planning a revision to its instruction related to the education and training of DOD's acquisition workforce. The official said the revision is intended to help define the acquisition and non-acquisition workforces and the responsibilities for their respective training needs, among other things. However, the revision is in the planning stages and not be expected to be completed until the end of 2021. As a result, DOD is still not ensuring that Component Acquisition Executives provide non-acquisition personnel training needs to the Defense Acquisition University.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO meets DOD's September 2019 deadline for review and approval of DOD's training curriculum for cross-functional team members and their supervisors. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. According to an OCMO official, as of April 2020, DOD's training curriculum for cross-functional team members and their supervisors had been approved. However, as of September 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of that approval.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO meets DOD's September 2019 deadline for review and approval of DOD's training curriculum for presidential appointees. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. According to an OCMO official, as of April 2020, DOD's training curriculum for cross-functional team members and their supervisors had been approved, and the training had been provided to presidential appointees and their staffs. However, as of September 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of that approval or training.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO meets DOD's November 2019 deadline for drafting, review, and approval of DOD's report on the success and failures of cross-functional teams and final submission to the Secretary for review and approval. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. According to an OCMO official, as of April 2020, work on the report on the successes and failures of cross-functional teams was ongoing. We will continue to monitor DOD's process of developing its report; as of September 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of the report being drafted, reviewed, or approved.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO and the electromagnetic spectrum operations cross-functional team clarify roles and responsibilities for providing administrative support and funding for the team beyond fiscal year 2019 in accordance with the memorandum establishing the team. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In its comments on a subsequent report on the department's implementation of section 911, the department stated that funding for all Secretary of Defense-empowered cross functional teams, including the electromagnetic spectrum operations cross-functional team, was in place through fiscal year 2020, and that they were exploring options for dedicated funding for cross-functional teams in future years. As of April 2020, according to an OCMO official, these dedicated funding sources had not been established. DOD has not provided evidence of their funding as of September 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should ensure that the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 assess the risk associated with staffing, equipping, and training of new units that it plans to activate in an accelerated manner for the purposes of conducting multi-domain operations, taking into consideration the assessments performed on the first activated ICEWS battalion and the 915th Cyber Warfare Support Battalion. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: The Army concurred with this recommendation. In its February 2020 corrective action plan, the Army indicated that it will conduct a FIFA or similar risk assessment in accordance with its policy and procedures before activating any new units for MDO employment. The Army has indicated that it plans to create additional units in support of multi-domain operations in coming years, so we will continue to monitor.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Administrator of NNSA, should formally communicate to the relevant congressional committees concerns about, and suggested changes to, the enhanced procurement authority in a timely manner. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with the recommendation. NNSA officials said they submitted an assessment that includes information on suggested changes to the authority to the congressional committees in March 2020. We requested a copy of the assessment and will update the status of this recommendation after we receive and review it.

Recommendation: The Director, MDA, should utilize additional schedule margin afforded by the EPAA Phase 3 delay to conduct additional testing necessary to thoroughly assess the capabilities and limitations of Phase 3 against IRBMs and a raid scenario prior to delivery. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Missile Defense Agency
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense partially concurred with this recommendation, stating that all EPAA Phase 3 BMDS functions requiring a flight test environment were already successfully demonstrated and that MDA has addressed the intent of our recommendation by adding ground tests to further assess EPAA Phase 3 Capabilities. However, in order for the agency to meet the full intent of our recommendation, additional flight testing to demonstrate capability against EPAA Phase 3 threats, including intermediate-range threats and raid scenarios, is necessary.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to determine and identify in final guidance for middle-tier acquisition programs the metrics that will be used to assess the performance of middle-tier acquisition programs across the military departments, including whether programs are meeting statutory objectives. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, and stated that it planned to determine performance metrics in coordination with its release of its final guidance on middle-tier programs, which DOD expected to release in late 2019. In December 2019, Congress passed the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 837 in the Conference Report accompanying the Act requires DOD to submit a report to the congressional defense committees no later than December 15, 2019, that includes guidance on the use of middle-tier acquisition authority and the metrics required to assess the performance of such a program, among other topics. DOD's report, provided to Congress in January 2020, identified metrics that DOD planned to use to assess the performance of these programs. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment subsequently leveraged these metrics in its March 2020 bi-annual review of middle-tier acquisition programs to assess program execution. However, DOD has yet to identify these metrics in guidance as we recommended, which we continue to believe is important to facilitate consistent reporting across the military departments and DOD components.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should develop a plan for how the department will assess the effect of recent acquisition reforms, including identifying who will be responsible for the assessment and what data will be needed. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, and stated that it has included a division in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to analyze the effect of recent acquisition reforms and other high-level oversight and policy issues. In December 2019, Congress took additional action. The Conference Report accompanying the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to submit a report with the budget for fiscal year 2021 on the progress of implementing acquisition reform initiatives. In response, DOD provided a report to Congress in March 2020 that includes how the Secretary will identify, quantify, assess and manage program risk, describes changes to DOD's data collection and sharing processes, and describes new acquisition frameworks to be implemented. However, the report does not address how DOD will assess the acquisition reforms, what data is needed, or who is responsible. Additionally, in August 2020, the Assistant Secretary of Defense approved a plan for assessing the implementation of new acquisition pathways at DOD. However, DOD is still identifying the specific data needed to assess each acquisition pathway, as well as determining how to assess the remaining acquisition reforms we covered in our June 2019 report. Therefore, we will continue to monitor DOD efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict updates existing guidance or develops new guidance to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and relationships with DOD components that have vested interests in the SOF enterprise—such as the military services, SOCOM, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with GAO's May 2019 recommendation that ASD-SO/LIC update existing guidance or develop new guidance to clarify the roles and responsibilities of ASD-SO/LIC and relationships with DOD components that have vested interests in the SOF enterprise-such as the military services and SOCOM to name a few. In September 2020, ASD-SO/LIC officials stated that DOD is in the process of revising guidance that would help clarify ASD- SO/LIC's roles and responsibilities. DOD estimated that this will not be completed until January 2025.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office assesses whether the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) R&M targets are still feasible and revise the ORD accordingly. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would review its Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) requirements and possibly revise them. In late 2019, the F-35 Program Executive Officer (PEO) developed an initiative to clearly identify what, if any, revisions DOD should make to the ORD. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office, as it revises its Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program (RMIP), identifies specific and measurable R&M objectives in its RMIP guidance. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would update its Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) RMIP guidance. In late 2019, DOD reported that a revised RMIP will be delivered to program leadership for approval. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office, as it revises its RMIP, identifies and documents which RMIP projects will achieve the identified objectives of the RMIP guidance. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would update its RMIP guidance. In late 2019, DOD reported that a revised RMIP will be delivered to program leadership for approval. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office prioritizes funding for the RMIP. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would plan for R&M funding going forward. In Sept. 2019, the F-35 Program Office reported that it was coordinating with the services to increase its Reliability & Maintainability investment. In Nov. 2019, the F-35 Program Office reported that it would allocate significant additional funding for RMIP for calendar year 2020. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD (Policy)), the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation—in consultation with the services—determine the analytic products needed and the level of detail that is sufficient to serve as a common starting point but flexible to allow for variation of analysis to support senior leader decisions, and update these products to reflect current strategy and intelligence estimates, as well as the anticipated operational approaches needed to address future threats. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and, as of January 2020, has taken some steps to address it. Specifically, in May 2019, DOD sent a follow up letter to our final report that said that the Department's position on the report has not substantially changed and that the actions identified in the Department's initial response remain underway. DOD also noted that the FY 2021-2025 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) signed in April 2019 directly addresses many of the report's recommendations and that the Joint Staff is leading an aggressive effort on joint force innovation and experimentation, with Tri-Chair oversight. In September 2019, we reviewed the DPG and found that it partially addressed our recommendation. In the DPG, DOD identified analytic products that would serve as the department's starting point for analysis in fiscal years 2021-2025. DOD has also begun developing some of these analytic products, including several defense planning scenarios that it developed in December 2018 to reflect some of the threats outlined in the National Defense Strategy. To fully implement this recommendation, DOD will need to develop the additional products it needs for the remaining key threats identified in the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, keeping these products updated will require sustained attention by the department, but the direction provided by DOD was limited to budget guidance for fiscal years 2021-2025. The direction would more closely adhere to the intent of our recommendation if it were provided in an enduring guidance or policy document. We will continue to monitor DOD actions in response to this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that OUSD (Policy) provide specific guidance requiring the services to explore a range of innovative force structure approaches relevant to the key threats identified in the National Defense Strategy, including identifying key assumptions on which the services must conduct sensitivity analyses. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and, as of January 2020, has taken some steps to address it. Specifically, in May 2019, DOD sent a follow up letter to our final report that said that the Department's position on the report has not substantially changed and that the actions identified in the Department's initial response remain underway. DOD also noted that the FY 2021-2025 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) signed in April 2019 directly addresses many of the report's recommendations and that the Joint Staff is leading an aggressive effort on joint force innovation and experimentation, with Tri-Chair oversight. In September 2019, we reviewed the DPG and found that it directed some actions relevant to our recommendation regarding the need to explore a range of innovative force structure approaches. However, it did not directly address the need to require the services to conduct sensitivity analysis on key assumptions. The defense planning scenarios that DOD developed in December 2018 identify critical parameters for analytical exploration and encourage DOD components to conduct excursions and sensitivity analysis of assumptions, which we found has not been sufficient to spur this type of analysis in the past. To fully implement this recommendation, DOD needs to require the services to conduct this analysis. We will continue to monitor DOD actions in response to this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should establish an approach for comparing competing analyses and conducting joint analyses for force structure to support senior leaders as they seek to implement the National Defense Strategy. This could include establishing a separate body with these capabilities and/or specifying the organizational responsibilities and processes for conducting these comparisons and analyses. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and, as of January 2020, has taken some steps to address it. Specifically, in May 2019, DOD sent a follow up letter to our final report that said that the Department's position on the report has not substantially changed and that the actions identified in the Department's initial response remain underway. DOD also noted that the FY 2021-2025 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) signed in April 2019 directly addresses many of the report's recommendations and that the Joint Staff is leading an aggressive effort on joint force innovation and experimentation, with Tri-Chair oversight. In September 2019, we reviewed the DPG and found that it included steps that could lay the groundwork for DOD to compare competing analyses and conduct joint force structure analyses. To fully implement this recommendation, DOD needs to establish an approach for doing so, which could include establishing a body or process for conducting comparisons or joint analyses. We will continue to monitor DOE actions in response to this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Deputy Secretary of Defense makes a determination as to how the CMO is to direct the business-related activities of the military departments. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 mandated that DOD assess the CMO's position, and the accompanying conference report indicated that the conferees intend to disestablish the position, pending the outcome of DOD's assessments. We continue to believe that DOD needs a CMO, codified in statute as a separate position, at the right level, and with the adequate amount of resources and appropriate authority to be responsible and accountable for its business transformation efforts. In light of pending requirements to assess the CMO position, GAO will continue to monitor the department's response to these recommendations as those assessments and any related actions are completed.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Deputy Secretary of Defense makes a determination regarding the CMO's relationship with the DAFAs, including whether additional DAFAs should be identified as providing shared business services and which DAFAs will be required to submit their proposed budgets for enterprise business operations to the CMO for review. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 mandated that DOD assess the CMO's position, and the accompanying conference report indicated that the conferees intend to disestablish the position, pending the outcome of DOD's assessments. We continue to believe that DOD needs a CMO, codified in statute as a separate position, at the right level, and with the adequate amount of resources and appropriate authority to be responsible and accountable for its business transformation efforts. In light of pending requirements to assess the CMO position, GAO will continue to monitor the department's response to these recommendations as those assessments and any related actions are completed.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the CMO and Chief Information Officer (CIO) conduct an analysis to determine which responsibilities should transfer from the CIO to the CMO, including identifying any associated resource impacts, and share the results of that analysis with the Congress. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 mandated that DOD assess the CMO's position, and the accompanying conference report indicated that the conferees intend to disestablish the position, pending the outcome of DOD's assessments. We continue to believe that DOD needs a CMO, codified in statute as a separate position, at the right level, and with the adequate amount of resources and appropriate authority to be responsible and accountable for its business transformation efforts. In light of pending requirements to assess the CMO position, GAO will continue to monitor the department's response to these recommendations as those assessments and any related actions are completed.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Deputy Secretary of Defense, on the basis of the determinations regarding the CMO's statutory and discretionary authorities, codify those authorities and how they are to be operationalized in formal department-wide guidance. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 mandated that DOD assess the CMO's position, and the accompanying conference report indicated that the conferees intend to disestablish the position, pending the outcome of DOD's assessments. We continue to believe that DOD needs a CMO, codified in statute as a separate position, at the right level, and with the adequate amount of resources and appropriate authority to be responsible and accountable for its business transformation efforts. In light of pending requirements to assess the CMO position, GAO will continue to monitor the department's response to these recommendations as those assessments and any related actions are completed.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issue a more detailed implementation plan or include implementation plan details in identified formal department-wide guidance to include a description of the resources (i.e., relevant operational and financial information) required to implement the plan including dollar and personnel amounts. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. On February 25, 2020, DOD issued its revised Pre-Positioned War Reserve Materiel Strategic Implementation Plan. However, the updated plan did not include a description of the resources-- including dollar and personnel amounts--required to implement the plan. Instead, the updated plan states that no additional personnel or resources will be required to execute and manage the plan, and that those personnel executing and managing the plan are expected to do so in addition to their normal duties. In May 2020, DOD stated it intends to include additional information about the required resources in the plan's next revision. We will keep this recommendation open pending our review of the next iteration of the plan.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, take steps to fully implement joint oversight of DODs prepositioned stock programs, including providing detailed information on how to implement such an oversight approach in department guidance and reviewing other joint oversight efforts, in order to synchronize the military services' preposition stock strategies to avoid fragmentation. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. On February 25, 2020, DOD issued its revised Pre-Positioned War Reserve Materiel Strategic Implementation Plan which lays out a method for joint oversight. While GAO is encouraged and will monitor DOD's implementation efforts, it is too soon to determine the extent to which these efforts-when completed-will address DOD's fragmented management of its prepositioned stock programs. To fully address this recommendation, DOD needs to fully implement the joint oversight method outlined in the plan.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chief Management Officer establishes a process for identifying and prioritizing available funding to develop and implement initiatives from the cross-functional reform teams. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director, Defense Pricing and Contracting , addresses how contracting officials using the LPTA process should apply the Section 813 criterion regarding procurement for goods that are predominantly expendable in nature, nontechnical, or have a short life expectancy or shelf life as revisions to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) are considered. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and issued supplemental guidance in September 2019. The guidance does not clarify what goods qualify as being predominantly expendable in nature, nontechnical, or have a short life expectancy or shelf life. It states contracting officers should check with the requiring activity to make this determination. However, since there is no clear definition of these terms, requiring activities will not have any better insight how to apply this criterion than contracting officers. We maintain that DOD needs to clarify how these terms should apply to goods..

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Director, Defense Pricing and Contracting addresses how contracting officials using the LPTA process should apply the Section 813 criterion regarding full life-cycle costs, including for operations and support as revisions to the DFARS are considered. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and issued supplemental guidance in September 2019. This guidance states it is up to the requiring activity to document that the lowest price reflects the full life cycle costs. However, through our work it was unclear to those we interviewed how to determine a full life cycle costs for services. The guidance cites DoD Instruction 4140.01, DoD Supply Chain Material Management Policy for further guidance on how to determine life cycle costs for services. This policy does not clarify how life cycle costs should be applied to services. We maintain that DOD needs to clarify how this requirement should be implemented by contracting officers as the guidance issued does not do this.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Air Force should (a) establish and implement a formal process to collect and monitor information on the extent to which all implemented IGSAs have resulted in financial and nonfinancial benefits and (b) document that process in Air Force IGSA policy or procedures. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force
Status: Open

Comments: The Air Force concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the Air Force has taken in response to it, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should (a) establish and implement a process to monitor whether Navy installations are evaluating opportunities for using IGSAs and to obtain explanations from installations on the outcome of their evaluations and (b) document that process in Navy IGSA policy or procedures. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: The Navy concurred with this recommendation, and in March 2019 the Department of the Navy directed Commander, Navy Installations Command to implement the recommendation. When we confirm any further actions the Navy has taken in response to it, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commandant of the Marine Corps should (a) establish and implement a process to monitor whether Marine Corps installations are evaluating opportunities for using IGSAs and to obtain explanations from installations on the outcome of their evaluations and (b) document that process in Marine Corps IGSA policy or procedures. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Defense: United States Marine Corps
Status: Open

Comments: The Marine Corps did not concur with this recommendation. However, in written comments, DOD stated that the Department of the Navy would implement this recommendation and that it would be applicable to both the Navy and Marine Corps. In March 2019, the Department of the Navy directed Marine Corps Installation Command to implement the recommendation. When we confirm what actions the Marine Corps has taken in response to this direction, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Air Force should document in Air Force IGSA policy or procedures its process for monitoring whether Air Force installations are evaluating opportunities for using IGSAs. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force
Status: Open

Comments: The Air Force concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the Air Force has taken in response to it, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should develop and, as appropriate, implement options for collecting reliable information on the ANDSF conventional forces' ability to operate and maintain U.S.-purchased equipment. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on the report, DOD concurred with the recommendation and stated DOD advisors will continue to work with their Afghan counterparts to build their capacity to reliably report information on equipment status. As of September 2020, DOD had not provided an update on actions taken in response to this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Veterans Affairs should ensure that the role and responsibilities of the Interagency Program Office are clearly defined within the governance plans for acquisition of the department's new electronic health record system. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Veterans Affairs
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) concurred with our recommendation to ensure that the role and responsibilities of the Interagency Program Office (IPO) were clearly defined within the governance plans for acquisition of the department's new electronic health record system. As of December 2019, VA and the Department of Defense (DOD) have replaced the IPO with a new joint governance body. Specifically, the Federal Electronic Health Record Modernization (FEHRM) program office has been established to serve as the single point of accountability in the delivery of a common health record between the departments and the advancement of interoperability with the private sector. In its charter, the FEHRM was described as a single decision-making authority to manage issues in support of the departments' integrated electronic health record objectives and its leadership is responsible for, among other things, working to formulate, oversee, de-conflict, and ensure adherence to electronic health record-related VA and DOD policies. However, the corresponding Implementation Plan that is intended to document how the FEHRM executes its full responsibilities has yet to be issued. To fully implement this recommendation, VA needs to document the role and responsibilities of the FEHRM with respect to VA's acquisition of its new electronic health record system, explaining the role, if any, the FEHRM will have in the governance process. We will continue to monitor the departments' incorporation of the FEHRM into the plans for the ongoing acquisition.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 program office to resolve all critical deficiencies before making a full-rate production decision. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that critical deficiencies would be resolved before full-rate production, due in December 2019. In May 2020, we reported that DOD delayed its full-rate production decision from December 2019 to between September 2020 and March 2021.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 program office to identify what steps are needed to ensure the F-35 meets reliability and maintainability requirements before each variant reaches maturity and update the Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program with these steps. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. According to a DOD official, as of July 2020, the F-35 program office is in the process of revising its plan for improving the F-35's reliability and maintainability.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Defense Laboratories Office routinely obtain and monitor defense laboratory hiring data to improve the oversight of the defense laboratories' use of hiring authorities. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and cited steps the department was and would be taking to improve oversight and coordination of the defense laboratories' hiring efforts. In June 2018, DOD acknowledged receipt of our final report and stated that the department's overall position on the report had not changed. We will provide further updates once additional information is received.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Defense Laboratories Office develop performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of the defense laboratories' use of hiring authorities as part of the labs' overall hiring to better inform future decision making about hiring efforts and policies. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and cited steps the department was and would be taking to improve oversight and coordination of the defense laboratories' hiring efforts. In June 2018, DOD acknowledged receipt of our final report and stated that the department's overall position on the report had not changed. We will provide further updates once additional information is received.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Defense Laboratories Office, in collaboration with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Laboratory Quality Enhancement Panel's Personnel Subpanel, establish and document time frames for its coordination process to direct efforts across the relevant offices and help ensure the timely approval and implementation of hiring authorities. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and cited steps the department was and would be taking to improve oversight and coordination of the defense laboratories' hiring efforts. In June 2018, DOD acknowledged receipt of our final report and stated that the department's overall position on the report had not changed. We will provide further updates once additional information is received.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA revises MDA policies to require that all integrated capabilities--capabilities that require integration of two or more elements--be included in a Technical Capability Declaration. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. While DOD agreed with the intent of this recommendation, DOD stated that the MDA Director will determine which major integrated capabilities should be delivered via the Technical Capability Declaration (TCD) process. MDA also noted that it is updating MDA Directive 5000.17 (estimated release in 4Q FY2020), which is intended to address this recommendation. GAO will assess the revisions when they are available. We continue to believe that in order for the agency to meet the full intent of our recommendation, it should establish in policy, a clear, definitive standard for which capabilities require a TCD delivery.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA clarifies, in written policy, the exact requirements, process, and key milestones necessary to issue a Technical Capability Declaration, including a requirement that the Assessment Requirements Review be held in such a time frame that it can provide meaningful input to MDA's test plans. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and contends that its new Policy Memorandum 90 meets the intent of our recommendation. However, this new Policy Memorandum leaves open the possibility of continued inconsistent application of the Technical Capability Declaration (TCD) process. In order for the agency to meet the full intent of our recommendation, MDA should establish in policy, a clear, definitive standard for which capabilities require a TCD for delivery that should be tracked over several years to ensure that the policy is followed. MDA officials noted that revisions to MDA Directive 5000.17 expected at the end of Fiscal Year 2020 will address the recommendation. We will assess the new parameters set out in the revised policy directive, when it is available. We will also continue to track how MDA implements any new policies on TCDs and whether the information is transparent.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA includes information on current undefinitized contract actions in the BMDS Accountability Report, including the not-to-exceed price, the definitization schedule, the amount of funds obligated for the undefinitized period, and any changes since the contract action was entered into. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and has taken steps to implement it. While we noted in our report that the BMDS Accountability Report for 2018, approved by the MDA Director on March 9, 2018 reflected that the agency had taken steps to implement this recommendation, we plan to leave this recommendation open to ensure that the BMDS Accountability Report accurately contains all undefinitized contract actions that the agency enters into through the fiscal year and whether the reporting contains the information necessary to satisfy our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA, ensures that models used for operational tests are validated and accredited for such assessments. To help achieve this, MDA should provide the BMDS Operational Test Agency all evidence previously agreed to and needed to accredit models before ground testing events, as specified in the BMDS OTA accreditation plan. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and stated that MDA is actively working with the BMDS Operational Test Agency (BMDS OTA) to resolve any issues associated with, and the reporting of, modeling limitations. However, according to BMDS OTA officials, while the number of accredited models has risen in recent years, some remain unaccredited. We, therefore, believe it is premature to closeout this recommendation but we will continue to track MDA's progress on taking the necessary steps to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA includes in capability delivery packages, such as the Technical Capability Declaration memos and Operational Capability Baseline change packages, the following: a. The verification, validation, and accreditation status of the models used in operational ground tests; and b. Modeling and simulation limitations that affect operational ground test results. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and stated that MDA has made significant progress over the last year in these efforts. MDA will provide the Technical Capability Declaration (TCD) and Operational Capability Baseline (OCB) packages for us to assess. Until we are able to do so, we believe it is premature to closeout this recommendation. We will continue to monitor MDA's progress in taking the necessary steps.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA and the Secretaries of the Armed Services responsible for operating BMDS elements develop written agreements as soon as feasible for modeling and simulations technical and funding requirements for any BMDS elements that are service-operated but represented in BMDS performance assessments. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and are taking steps to implement this recommendation. We will continue to monitor the efforts necessary including finalizing and executing written agreements between MDA and any BMDS elements that are Service-operated but represented in BMDS performance assessments.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Commanding General of SOCOM, clarify its guidance on perstempo thresholds as long as the statutory thresholds are waived by either establishing specific and measurable department-wide perstempo thresholds in DOD policy or ensuring that the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps establish and follow their own service-specific guidance on thresholds. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department concurred with this recommendation. In July 2019, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD/P&R) issued a memo that, among other things, directed the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to (1) direct the Military Departments to comply with reporting of the military personnel data and reporting requirements necessary to support the measurement and reporting of the perstempo of the military forces as laid out in DoDI 1336.07; and (2) develop threshold policies for perstempo events. In addition, it stated that the OUSD/P&R will chair a working group to refine optempo and perstempo policy proposals for inclusion into a formal policy document(s). In November 2019, the OUSD/P&R issued another memo that provided broad perstempo policy and emphasized adherence to modified guidance codified in DODI 1336.07, which as of July 2020 is undergoing DOD directives review for issuance. The OUSD/P&R memo further directed the military departments to provide service-level perstempo guidance, to include thresholds and compliance measures, for their components. We will continue to monitor these actions and update the status of our recommendation as appropriate.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Commanding General of SOCOM, take steps to emphasize the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data so that DOD, the services, and SOCOM can monitor perstempo. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department concurred with this recommendation. In July 2019, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD/P&R) issued a memo that, among other things, directed the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) to develop policies for the accurate measurement and reporting of unit operational deployment data. In addition, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) will (1) conduct department-wide coordination to develop the necessary technical capabilities for DOD to collect, monitor, and evaluate optempo and perstempo data; (2) develop procedures for perstempo and operational deployment data validation to ensure quality checks are conducted regularly and feedback mechanisms to the military departments for error detection and correction are in place, if necessary; and (3) ensure coordination efforts for optempo and perstempo data collection efforts do not duplicate or interfere with current systems collecting such information. In November 2019, the OUSD/P&R issued another memo that provided broad perstempo policy and emphasized adherence to modified guidance codified in DODI 1336.07, which as of July 2020 is undergoing DOD directives review for issuance. This memo and draft instruction provide direction on the reporting of perstempo events and emphasize the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data. Additionally, to enhance data processing and rectify data quality issues, DOD has drafted Uniformed Services Human Resources Information System Procedures, which is also undergoing DoD directives review for official issuance, and DMDC has worked with the services to make specific data improvements. We will continue to monitor for the issuance of the draft DODI and System Procedures and update the status of our recommendation as appropriate.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should take steps to ensure that the Marine Corps not enter full-rate production until the Marine Corps has determined that the contractor has achieved an MRL of at least 9 for all risk areas. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, stating that it agreed that manufacturing readiness levels (MRL) for the Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1 should be assessed prior to the decision to award the option for the second lot of low-rate production, but disagreed that an MRL assessment of any individual risk area, in itself, should delay the contract award. We maintained that achieving an overall MRL-9 by the by the start of full-rate production represents best practice to minimize production risk. According the Marine Corp, the most recent MRL Assessment as of August 2020 assessed the program at an overall MRL-8. The Marine Corps indicated that another MRL assessment is estimated to be completed in November 2020 to support the decision to enter full-rate production, which is planned for December 2020.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other appropriate DOD components, should update the department's cyber incident coordination training to incorporate the tenets of PPD-41.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should maintain a list of senior DOD officials from organizations that could represent DOD during a Cyber Unified Coordination Group and that are trained in the National Incident Management System.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To provide reasonable assurance that DOD's Pilot Mentor-Protege Program meets its mission, the Director, DOD's Office of Small Business Programs, should conduct periodic reviews of the processes DOD components follow to approve agreements and take oversight actions, as appropriate.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of Small Business Programs
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with this recommendation and stated that it would implement a new standard operating procedure for DOD's Mentor-Protege Program component program managers. According to DOD, the new standard operating procedure would require each component program manager to provide quarterly program management review reports to DOD's Office of Small Business Programs, in addition to annual and monthly reporting, as required by Appendix I of DOD's policies and procedures for the Mentor-Protege Program. DOD's new Standard Operating Procedure would also centralize the implementation of the Mentor Protege Program and, according to DOD, would create process efficiency, and enhanced oversight of the program. The new Standard Operating Procedure would also include a new standardized checklist each Mentor-Protege Program component would utilize to approve mentor protege agreements. The standardized checklist would also include the company North American Industry Classification System code, a mentor approval letter, and a fully completed copy of the mentor protege agreement signed by both parties. Last, DOD would then determine program improvement, once the aforementioned controls are implemented and monitored for effectiveness. As of August 2018, DOD had not provided GAO with documentation of the new standard operating procedure. GAO will continue to monitor the department's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To provide reasonable assurance that DOD's Pilot Mentor-Protege Program meets its mission, the Director, DOD's Office of Small Business Programs, should complete actions to develop performance goals and related measures that are consistent with the program's stated purpose.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of Small Business Programs
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with this recommendation and stated that Mentor-Protege Program components would establish goals for the Mentor Protege Program and those goals would be focused on the Industrial Base and Technology Transfer categories. In addition, DOD stated that it would establish additional surveillance requirements to ensure prime and subcontract opportunities are afforded to the proteges and that instituting a baseline performance goal for all components will ensure the Program achieves the intent desired by Congress. As of August 2018, DOD had not provided GAO with documentation of the new goals or standard operating procedure. GAO will continue to monitor the department's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To fully assess the size and composition of the medical force, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to conduct a new analysis of the required number of active-duty and civilian medical personnel that mitigates known limitations.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2020, DOD has not addressed this recommendation. In response to a provision in Senate Report 115-125, we assessed DOD's interim and final draft responses to a requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 to assess the required number of wartime medical and dental personnel. In our ensuing February 2019 report, we found that DOD had not determined the required size and composition of its operational medical and dental personnel who support the wartime mission or submitted a complete report to Congress. Specifically, leaders from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) disagreed with the military departments' initial estimates of required personnel that were developed to report to Congress. OSD officials cited concerns that the departments had not applied assumptions for operating jointly in a deployed environment and for leveraging efficiencies among personnel and units. We found that the military departments applied different planning assumptions in estimating required personnel, such as the definition of "operational" requirements. Further, although not required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD's assessment did not include civilian medical personnel. Until DOD completes such an analysis, it cannot be assured that its medical force is appropriately sized.

Recommendation: To strengthen ongoing efforts to analyze the costs of medical force readiness and establish clinical currency standards, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to take steps to identify and mitigate limitations regarding the standard for maintaining providers' clinical skills, including improving the accuracy of information concerning providers' workload and conducting an analytically rigorous calculation of active-duty providers' time devoted to military-specific responsibilities.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2020, DOD has taken steps to address this recommendation, but has not completed all necessary actions. In February 2019, we reported that DOD had begun work on a metric to assess the clinical readiness of providers, but noted that the department's methodology was limited. In particular, the methodology did not provide complete, accurate, and consistent data or fully demonstrate results. Further, although DOD provided documentation in February 2020 outlining the medical specialties to which its clinical readiness metric would apply, it has not fully budgeted for the cost of implementing the metric. DOD's July 2018 report in response to Section 703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 notes steps taken to assess the accuracy of information concerning providers' workload, but does not address the time active-duty providers devote to military-specific responsibilities. Until DOD addresses these issues, its efforts to analyze the costs of medical force readiness and establish clinical currency standards will remain limited.

Recommendation: To help achieve DOD's goals for transferring health care into its own facilities and increasing the productivity of active-duty medical providers, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to develop a strategy for achieving these goals that reflects the leading practices of effective federal strategic planning.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of September 2020, DOD has not yet addressed this recommendation.

Recommendation: To strengthen ongoing efforts within DOD to address the Study's recommendations to use the provider model outputs to inform execution of health care delivery and to refine the model for future use, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to modify DOD's model to reflect the military service of the physicians and military treatment facilities included in the model.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of September 2020 DOD has not implemented this recommendation. In its July 2018 report in response to Section 703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD stated in response to this recommendation that facilities in several large Military Health System (MHS) markets are staffed in a multi-service manner. While this is an important point, it remains true that, as the report notes, DOD's model "assumed uniformed providers were interchangeable," and that such an approach does not reflect the single-service nature of most medical treatment facilities within the MHS. Until DOD's model reflects this, the results of its approach will continue to be limited.

Recommendation: To strengthen any future assessments of additional changes to DOD's network of military treatment facilities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to describe steps taken to assess the reliability of data supporting the assessment, including, at a minimum, the sources of data, data limitations, and efforts to test data reliability.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of September 2020, DOD has taken steps to address this recommendation, but has not completed all necessary actions. In its July 2018 report in response to Section 703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD included the sources of its data and some data limitations, but not efforts to test data reliability. Until DOD fully incorporates assessments of data reliability into its analysis of future changes to the Military Health System, such as its implementation plan Section 703, it will continue to lack assurance that its approach is fully supported by reliable information.

Recommendation: To strengthen any future assessments of additional changes to DOD's network of military treatment facilities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to include in any accompanying cost estimates an appropriate level of detail, all significant costs, and an assessment of the reliability of the data supporting the cost estimate.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of September 2020, DOD has not addressed this recommendation. As we reported in May 2020, DOD's plan to restructure MTFs in response to Section 703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD concluded that civilian health care was more cost-effective than care in its MTFs without considering other assumptions that could affect its conclusions. For example, DOD applied assumptions about the cost of military personnel salaries, MTF workloads, and reimbursement rates for TRICARE that likely underestimated the cost-effectiveness of MTFs. Until DOD's approach to assessing changes to its network of MTFs is accompanied by cost estimates with an appropriate level of detail, all significant costs, and an assessment of the reliability of the data supporting the cost estimate, its approach will remain limited.

Recommendation: To ensure that annual training plans are aligned with the Air Force's stated goals to ensure that its forces can successfully achieve missions across a broad range of current and emerging threats, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to comprehensively reassess the assumptions underlying its annual training requirements--including, but not limited to, the total annual training requirements by aircraft, the criteria for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced, and the mix between live and simulator training--and make any appropriate adjustments in future training plans.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD non-concurred with the recommendation. The Air Force has taken steps to address this recommendation. Specifically, Air Force officials stated they have completed one study and have an ongoing study, intended to reassess the assumptions underlying its annual training requirements for fighter aircrews. For example, Air Force officials stated a study was completed in August 2017 reassessing the criteria for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced for 4th generation fighter aircraft. In addition, Air Force officials stated that another study was intended to define the optimum mix of annual training requirements for fighter aircrews. These officials stated that the study results were provided to Air Force senior leaders in July 2018 for approval. As of August 2020, the Air Force did not provide any additional documentation on steps taken to address the recommendation. Completion of these studies and the corresponding adjustments to annual training requirements should help the Air Force ensure that their training plans are aligned to achieve a range of missions for current and emerging threats as recommended by GAO in September 2016.

Recommendation: To improve the Air Force's ability to consistently monitor training results and better position it to allocate resources to address factors that limit the effectiveness of training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish desired learning objectives and training support elements needed to accomplish the training expectations in its annual Ready Aircrew Program tasking memorandums, and develop a process to collect data to assess the effectiveness of annual training against these features.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD non-concurred with the recommendation, stating that the Air Force's Ready Aircrew Program training differs significantly from other syllabus-directed courses of instruction and that desired learning objectives for this training are set at the squadron level in accordance with current Air Force guidance. As of August 2020, DOD did not provide any documentation on steps taken to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: To ensure that Congress will have more complete information on DOD's full funding needs for its O&M base budget and to conduct oversight of DOD's use of OCO funds to support base programs and activities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller to revise its guidance on preparing budget justification materials and execution reports for Congress to require the addition of O&M obligations used for base programs and activities at the level of information presented for each account.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD non-concurred with our recommendation. DOD stated in its initial response to our recommendation that there is no legal or administrative subdivision of the O&M appropriation for base and OCO; however, we continue to believe that the recommendation is valid and will follow up annually on the status of the recommendation. As of May 2019, DOD reaffirmed its initial response and has not taken any action to implement our recommendation.

Recommendation: To increase department-wide supply chain efficiencies and effectiveness in support of maintenance at the Army and Marine Corps depots and Navy shipyards, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, in conjunction with the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, and the Secretaries of the Army and Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to assess through a comprehensive business case analysis-drawing on lessons learned from previous efforts-the costs and benefits of DLA managing the retail supply, storage, and distribution functions at the Army and Marine Corps depots and Navy shipyards.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD had designated the transfer of these retail functions as an operating priority and identified it as a key reform effort within logistics in the department. The Marine Corps has conducted its analysis and decided to transition additional supply, storage, and distribution functions to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) over a 4-year period, with all implementation activities scheduled to be complete by 2022. The Army continues to analyze requirements for the full transition of supply, storage, and distribution functions to DLA with final decisions to be made in late 2018. Lastly, the Navy and DLA are working on a strategic memorandum of understanding to guide decision on the role of DLA at the Navy shipyards, according to a senior DOD official. Without the Army and Navy finalizing its business case analyses, decision makers will not be positioned to make cost-effective decisions regarding supply operations at military depots.

Recommendation: To increase department-wide supply chain efficiencies and effectiveness in support of maintenance at the Army and Marine Corps depots and Navy shipyards, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, in conjunction with the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, and the Secretaries of the Army and Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to use the analysis to make a decision on the degree to which DLA should manage these functions at the Army and Marine Corps depots and Navy shipyards.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD had designated the transfer of these retail functions as an operating priority and identified it as a key reform effort within logistics in the department. The Marine Corps has conducted its analysis and decided to transition additional supply, storage, and distribution functions to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) over a 4-year period, with all implementation activities scheduled to be completed by 2022. However, the Army and Navy have not made any decisions regarding the additional transfer of supply, storage and distribution functions to DLA. Without the Army and Navy making decisions based on business case analyses on the degree to which additional supply, storage, and distribution functions will transfer to DLA, DOD will not be ensured that it is operating its supply operations at military depots in a cost-effective manner.

Recommendation: To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of supply and maintenance operations, in accordance with DOD guidance, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, in conjunction with the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop and implement metrics that measure the accuracy of planning factors, such as the schedule, bill of materials, and replacement factors, used for depot maintenance.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD has begun to identify metrics that measure the accuracy of planning factors used for depot maintenance. However, these metrics are not scheduled to be implemented fully implemented in December 2018.

Recommendation: To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of supply and maintenance operations, in accordance with DOD guidance, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, in conjunction with the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take action, as appropriate and necessary, to resolve any issues identified through measuring the accuracy of planning inputs in an effort to improve supply and depot maintenance operations.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD has begun to identify metrics that measure the accuracy of planning factors used for depot maintenance. However, these metrics are not scheduled to be implemented fully implemented in December 2018. Thus, no actions have been taken to resolve any identified issues based on the results of the metrics.

Recommendation: To be able to assess the cost-effectiveness of supply and depot maintenance operations, in accordance with DOD supply chain management guidance, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, in conjunction with the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take steps to develop and implement metrics, to the extent feasible, to measure and track disruption costs created by the lack of parts at depot maintenance industrial sites by, for example, establishing a team of supply and depot maintenance experts from DLA and the services to assess potential data sources, approaches, and methods.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD has begun to develop metrics that measure and track disruption costs created by the lack of parts at depot maintenance industrial sites. However, these metrics are not scheduled to be implemented until October 2018.

Recommendation: To be able to assess the cost-effectiveness of supply and depot maintenance operations, in accordance with DOD supply chain management guidance, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, in conjunction with the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps to take action, as appropriate, to address any inefficiencies identified by the disruption cost metrics in supply and depot maintenance operations.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD has begun to develop metrics that measure and track disruption costs created by the lack of parts at depot maintenance industrial sites. However, these metrics are not scheduled to be implemented until October 2018. Thus, no actions have been taken to resolve any identified issues based on the results of the metrics.