Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations creates a life-cycle cost estimate for the Artemis III mission. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with the recommendation and stated that the agency will provide a preliminary cost estimate for the Artemis III mission by the end of 2020. Further, NASA stated that it will provide an updated cost estimate for the Artemis III mission after it establishes cost and schedule commitments for some of the projects that compose the lunar mission, currently planned for the Spring of 2021. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to provide a cost estimate.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NASA should establish a process for conducting an organization-wide cybersecurity risk assessment. (Recommendation 47)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA concurred with this recommendation. As of January 2020, NASA stated that the agency is in the process of documenting its process for conducting an organization-wide cybersecurity risk assessment. NASA's planned completion date for this effort is September 30, 2020. Once NASA has provided evidence of these actions, we plan to verify whether implementation has occurred.

Recommendation: We recommend the NASA Administrator ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations direct the SLS program to calculate its development cost growth using a baseline that is appropriately adjusted for scope and costs NASA has determined are not associated with the first flight, and determine if the development cost growth has increased by 30 percent or more. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. As of February 2020, NASA stated that it is conducting a rebaseline of the cost and schedule commitments for the SLS program and will document final decisions in an Agency Baseline Commitment decision memorandum. NASA officials anticipate they will complete this effort in Spring 2020. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to measure cost growth using a baseline that reflects the scope of work currently planned for the first mission.

Recommendation: We recommend the NASA Administrator ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations direct the Orion program to update its cost estimate to reflect its committed EM-2 baseline date of April 2023. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA partially agreed with this recommendation, stating that providing the estimate to the forecasted launch date rather than to the committed baseline date of April 2023 is the most appropriate approach. In November 2019, program officials told us that they will consider this recommendation as part of updating the joint confidence level analysis for the program's Key Decision Point D review. This review occurs before the program enters the system assembly, integration and test, and launch phase, and is not scheduled to occur until December 2020. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA needs to provide an updated cost estimate through April 2023.

Recommendation: To complete the appropriate assignment of codes to their positions performing IT, cybersecurity, or cyber-related functions, in accordance with the requirements of the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should take steps to review the assignment of the "000" code to any positions at NASA in the 2210 IT management occupational series, assign the appropriate NICE framework work role codes, and assess the accuracy of position descriptions. (Recommendation 24)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would complete a review of the assignment of the "000" code to its positions in the 2210 IT management occupational series, assign the appropriate NICE framework work role codes, and assess the accuracy of position descriptions. In March 2020, NASA indicated that it expected to implement the recommendation by September 30, 2020. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to provide evidence that it has assigned appropriate NICE framework work role codes to its positions in the 2210 IT management occupational series and assessed the accuracy of position descriptions.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should develop and maintain a contingency plan for ensuring a presence on the ISS until a Commercial Crew Program contractor is certified. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. NASA stated that it is in discussions with Russia to obtain additional seats on its Soyuz spacecraft for NASA crew as a contingency plan. NASA is also providing Extra-Vehicular Activity and robotics training for a subset of cosmonauts to support U.S. Operating Segment operations, and looking at a possible extension of the duration of the Space X Demonstration 2 crewed test flight. In November 2019, NASA reported that it completed its actions for this recommendation. However, while NASA is working on potential solutions, there is no contingency plan in place. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA needs to provide documentation of its contingency plan.

Recommendation: To provide the Congress and NASA a reliable estimate of program cost and schedule that are useful to support management and stakeholder decisions, the NASA Administrator should direct the Orion program to perform an updated JCL analysis including updating cost and schedule estimates in adherence with cost and schedule estimating best practices.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA partially agreed with this recommendation, stating that the agency reviewed, in detail, the Orion integrated cost/schedule and risk analysis methodology and determined the rigor to be a sufficient basis for the agency commitments. In November 2019, Orion program officials told us that in response to a recent policy change, the program office will update its joint confidence level analysis when the program has its Key Decision Point D review. This review occurs before the program enters the system assembly integration and test, and launch phase and is not scheduled to occur until December 2020. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to provide evidence that it updated its joint confidence level analysis when the Orion program holds its Key Decision Point D review.

Recommendation: To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program planning and affordability, and to decrease the risk of cost and schedule overruns, NASA's Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to take the following action: To allow for a continued assessment of progress and affordability, NASA should structure each future increment of SLS capability with a total cost exceeding the $250 million threshold for designation as a major project as a separate development effort within the SLS program. In doing so, NASA should require each increment to complete both the technical and programmatic reviews required of other major development projects, per the agency's acquisition and system engineering policies.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. In January 2020, NASA stated that it planned to establish an agency baseline commitment for capability upgrades (e.g., Block 1B upgrades, such as Mobile Launcher-2 and Exploration Upper Stage) above the $250 million threshold. A joint confidence level analysis will be performed at key decision points and will include the cost and schedule range estimates for each of these upgrades. To fully implement this recommendation, however, NASA needs to provide evidence that each capability upgrade is designated a major project and is required to complete the technical and programmatic reviews required of other major development projects.

Recommendation: To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program planning and affordability, and to decrease the risk of cost and schedule overruns, NASA's Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to take the following action: Provide decision makers with an informed basis for making investment decisions regarding the SLS program, NASA should identify a range of possible missions for each future SLS variant that includes cost and schedule estimates and plans for how those possible missions would fit within NASA's funding profile.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. In January 2020, NASA stated that new leadership at the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate is conducting an internal independent assessment to assess the current schedule and technical approach for achieving a lunar landing by 2024, including the utilization of SLS for Artemis missions. With the insights gained from this assessment, NASA will move forward with planning and executing these missions through the annual budgeting process. To fully address this recommendation, NASA will need to identify cost and schedule estimates for possible SLS missions beyond its first exploration mission, now known as Artemis I, and how its planned missions would fit within NASA's funding profile.

Recommendation: To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program affordability, ensure its ability to effectively monitor total program costs and execution, and to facilitate investment decisions, the NASA's Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to establish a separate cost and schedule baseline for work required to support the SLS Block I Exploration Mission-2 (EM-2) and report this information to the Congress through NASA's annual budget submission. If NASA decides to fly the SLS Block I beyond EM-2, establish separate life cycle cost and schedule baseline estimates for those efforts, to include funding for operations and sustainment, and report this information annually to Congress via the agency's budget submission.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA partially agreed with this recommendation, stating that it defined and documented life-cycle costs for SLS to a first demonstrated capability, consistent with cost estimating best practices and NASA project and program management policy and that it would report costs associated with the second exploration mission via its annual budget submission. In January 2020, NASA stated that it is evaluating changes to NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5E, "NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements," to better enable the necessary insight into program affordability and efficient monitoring of total program costs and execution for multi-year, multi-cadence type programs. Further, NASA stated that it is investigating plans to redefine performance expectations for multi-decade programs' formal commitments while maintaining visibility to the entire plan. To address this recommendation, NASA needs to establish separate cost and schedule baselines for work required to support SLS for EM-2, which is now known as Artemis II.

Recommendation: To provide the Congress with the necessary insight into program affordability, ensure its ability to effectively monitor total program costs and execution, and to facilitate investment decisions, because NASA intends to use the increased capabilities of the SLS, Orion, and Ground Systems Development and Operations efforts well into the future and has chosen to estimate costs associated with achieving the capabilities, the NASA's Administrator should direct the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate to establish separate cost and schedule baselines for each additional capability that encompass all life cycle costs, to include operations and sustainment. When NASA cannot fully specify costs due to lack of well-defined missions or flight manifests, forecast a cost estimate range -- including life cycle costs -- having minimum and maximum boundaries. These baselines or ranges should be reported to Congress annually via the agency's budget submission.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA partially agreed with this recommendation, stating that it had established separate programs for SLS, Orion, and the ground systems and adopted a block upgrade approach for SLS. In January 2020, NASA stated that it plans to establish an agency baseline commitment for capability upgrades (e.g., Block 1B upgrades, such as Mobile Launcher-2 and Exploration Upper Stage) above the $250 million threshold. A joint confidence level analysis will be performed at key decision points and will include the cost and schedule range estimates for each of these upgrades. To address this recommendation, NASA needs to provide evidence that it established separate cost and schedule baselines for each additional SLS, Orion, and Ground Systems Development and Operations capability blocks that encompass all life-cycle costs, including operations and sustainment.

Recommendation: To improve NASA management and oversight of its spaceflight projects, and to improve the reliability of project EVM data, the NASA Administrator should direct the appropriate offices to modify the NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5 to require projects to implement a formal surveillance program that: (1) Ensures anomalies in contractor-delivered and in-house monthly earned value management reports are identified and explained, and report periodically to the center and mission directorate's leadership on relevant trends in the number of unexplained anomalies. (2) Ensures consistent use of work breakdown structures (WBS) for both the EVM report and the schedule. (3) Ensures that lower level EVM data reconcile to project level EVM data using the same WBS structure. (4) Improves underlying schedules so that they are properly sequenced using predecessor and successor dependencies and are free of constraints to the extent practicable so that the EVM baseline is reliable.

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA partially agreed with this recommendation, stating that the reliability and utility of the EVM data needed to be improved but that it did not plan to implement a formal surveillance plan due to resource constraints. Since initially commenting on the report, however, in December 2018, NASA included an initiative in its Corrective Action Plan-a plan put in place in response to recent programmatic performance and NASA's designation on GAO's High-Risk List-to enhance EVM implementation. In June 2019, NASA issued EVM guidance that covered several items, including enhancing in-house and contracted earned value management surveillance and requiring EVM reporting at Baseline Performance Review. NASA officials reported that its near-term plans are well-defined to address the reliability of project EVM data, but they have expressed concerns about funding challenges and cultural resistance. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to take action and provide documentary support for several of its identified planned next steps to enhance EVM surveillance. Without implementing proper surveillance, NASA may be utilizing unreliable EVM data in its analyses to inform its cost and schedule decision making.