Recommendation: To more effectively and efficiently integrate virtual training devices into operational training, that the Secretary of Defense should direct the Commandant of the Marine Corps to develop guidance for the development and use of virtual training devices that includes (1) developing requirements for virtual training devices that consider and document training tasks and objectives, required proficiency, and available training time; (2) setting target usage rates and collecting usage data; and (3) conducting effectiveness analysis of virtual training devices that defines a consistent process for performing the analysis, including the selection of the devices to be evaluated, guidelines on conducting the analysis, and the data that should be collected and assessed.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with this recommendation. In December 2018, the Marine Corps had completed some actions and has other ongoing actions intended to address the recommendation. For example, in June 2017 the Marine Corps issued the Marine Corps Ground Training Simulations Implementation Plan. The plan provides a framework for the Marine Corps' use of current and future simulations technology and virtual training environments to align training efforts and resource requirements. In addition, the Marine Corps continues to revise its training and readiness program manuals to articulate requirements that document training tasks, objectives, and required proficiency and reemphasize the importance of more effectively integrating ground simulations within current ground training approaches. Further, the Marine Corps is currently staffing a comprehensive Ground Simulations Training Reference Guide and is testing a new process, termed the Ground Simulation Training Effectiveness Process. This process will provide guidelines on conducting effectiveness analysis, including the selection of the devices to be evaluated and an identification of the data to be collected and assessed. As of August 2020, these actions remain in progress. Once fully implemented, these actions should help the Marine Corps more effectively and efficiently integrate virtual training devices into operational training, as GAO recommended in September 2017.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise the Navy's ship delivery policy to clarify what types of deficiencies need to be corrected and what mission capability (including the levels of quality and capability) must be achieved at (1) delivery and (2) when the ship is provided to the fleet (at the obligation work limiting date (OWLD)). In doing so, the Navy should clearly define what constitutes a complete ship and when that should be achieved.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD disagreed with our recommendation to clarify the Navy's ship delivery policy and stated that other existing policies help ensure the completion and capability of ships at delivery. However, as of August 2020, Navy officials stated that they are working on a new response based on ongoing discussions with GAO and they expect to develop a new proposal for responding to this recommendation by December 2020. We maintain that the Navy's ship delivery policy is a key instruction for ensuring that complete, mission-capable ships are provided to the fleet and should be revised in line with our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to reconcile policy with practice to support INSURV's role in making a recommendation for fleet introduction. Accomplishing this may require a study of the current timing of ship trials, and the costs and benefits associated with adding an INSURV assessment prior to providing ships to the fleet.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD and the Navy did not concur with this recommendation, noting that the current timing of Navy Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) trials provides the Navy with an opportunity to ensure contractual obligations have been met and identify construction deficiencies for correction during the post-delivery period. DOD and the Navy also stated that adding another INSURV trial at the end of the post-delivery period would not be cost-effective and could delay ship deployment schedules. However, we found that most of the significant construction deficiencies identified prior to delivery were not corrected until the post-delivery period and, therefore, INSURV generally did not have an opportunity to inspect these corrections before ships were provided to the fleet. Given this, we maintain that the Navy should re-assess the timing of its post-delivery trials in support of INSURV's responsibility to make recommendations for fleet introduction. As of August 2020, DOD officials stated that they are working on a proposal to address this recommendation based on ongoing discussions with GAO and they expect to complete this proposal by December 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to reflect additional ship milestones in Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress, including OWLD and readiness to deploy.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. DOD and the Navy agreed to report obligation work limiting dates (OWLD) in its Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress, and, as of December 2018, has implemented this portion of the recommendation. The department added the OWLDs for all ships that have yet to achieve this milestone to its Selected Acquisition Reports and plans to continue reporting this information in all subsequent Selected Acquisition Reports. However, DOD did not agree to report ready-to-deploy dates in the Selected Acquisition Reports to Congress, noting that operational factors outside of acquisition concerns can affect the timing of this milestone. While we agree that readiness to deploy is a fleet determination, we continue to believe that this date is important for Congressional oversight, as it remains the best milestone for determining when a ship has achieved a sufficient level of completeness to operate, under the Navy's current framework for ship delivery. As of August 2020, DOD and Navy officials stated that they are working on a new proposal for addressing the recommendation based on ongoing discussions with GAO and they expect to complete this proposal by December 2020.

Recommendation: To improve insight into cost changes for individual ships in the Ford Class, the program office should prepare cost summary and funding summary sections for each individual ship in the class as part of the SAR for the overall Ford-Class program.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In its comments on our draft report DOD disagreed with our recommendation, stating that it currently provides progress reports to Congress on costs for CVN 78 and CVN 79. In July 2020, Navy officials stated that the department continues to disagree with this recommendation. We continue to maintain that Selected Acquisition Reports represent the primary statutorily required means for DOD to report on program status. Grouping average unit costs for all Ford-class ships obscures individual ship cost growth and does not provide Congress with an adequate level of insight to monitor this over $55 billion program. Our recommendation would ensure that Congress receives insight into the costs of each existing and planned Ford-class ship. To fully implement this recommendation, the report should include cost information on individual ships.

Recommendation: To improve transparency in allocating its limited resources, and to help ensure that its resource allocation decisions are the most effective ones for fulfilling its missions given existing risks, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should document how the risk assessments conducted were used to inform and support its annual asset allocation decisions.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: In February 2018, the Coast Guard liaison stated that Coast Guard management made a decision to not to address this recommendation within the annual Strategic Planning Direction (SPD) or Operational Planning Direction (OPD) products as previously planned, but rather within the Standard Operational Planning Process/Global Force Management Process Guide. The liaison further stated that both of these documents are currently under revision and expected to be completed by March 31, 2018. On October 11, 2018, the Coast Guard liaison stated that The Standard Operational Planning Process/Global Force Management Instruction is in routing for edits, comment, and final approval. The new estimated completion date is the 2nd quarter of FY 2019. GAO sent an inquiry to the Coast Guard on April 24, 2019 and is awaiting a reply. On March 30, 2020, the Coast Guard liaison informed GAO that the update to the Standard Operational Planning Process (SOPP)/Global Force Management (GFM) Instruction, which includes the addition and test of Strategic Priorities Planning Guidance and the new Coast Guard Force Allocation Matrix, was further delayed due to recent discussions of changing to a 2-year SOPP planning cycle to align with the Department of Defense Global Force Management process. This change would further require an update of the SOPP/GFM Instruction. The COVID-19 crisis as well as the need to finalize the Strategic Planning Direction by June 2020 are also factors in this delay. New Estimated Completion Date (ECD): June 30, 2021.

Recommendation: To ensure that high priority mission activities are fully supported with the appropriate number of staff possessing the requisite mix of skills and abilities, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop a systematic process that prioritizes manpower requirements analyses for units that are the most critical for achieving mission needs.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: On December 14, 2016, the Coast Guard noted that it submitted two FY 2019 Resource Proposals to staff and equip the Manpower Requirements Determination Division to conduct the analysis as described in the recommendation. In April, 2016, the Coast Guard liaison stated that, resources permitting, the Coast Guard is to address the following steps: (1) Validate the "unit-type" list so that it encompasses the vast majority of active duty and civilian billets in a logical framework that can be readily analyzed, review/update the list as changes (e.g., asset mix, organizations) occur. (2) Develop the requirements for the envisioned Manpower Analysis & Simulation Tool (MAST). (3) Prioritize unit list according to strategic alignment and risk assessment (4) Conduct the manpower requirements analyses (MRA) in accordance with established priorities. As of August 2020, the Coast Guard reported it had not implemented the actions. Specifically, the Coast Guard reported that in response to GAO's February 2020 modernization report (GAO-20-223, rec#2), it was developing new guidance for executing the manpower requirement determination process. Officials told us that the new guidance would include a systematic process for prioritizing manpower analysis. In this way, the actions for implementing the GAO-20-223 recommendation may also serve to meet the intent of the recommendation for GAO-16-379. Officials told us the Coast Guard estimated implementing the actions by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: To improve the strategic allocation of assets, the Commandant of the Coast Guard should incorporate field unit input, such as information on assets' actual performance from Operational Performance Assessment Reports and Planning Assessments, to inform more realistic asset allocation decisions--in addition to asset performance capacities currently used--in the annual Strategic Planning Directions to more effectively communicate strategic intent to field units.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: In February 2018, the Coast Guard liaison stated that Coast Guard management made a decision to not to address this recommendation within the annual Strategic Planning Direction (SPD) or Operational Planning Direction (OPD) products as previously planned, but rather within the Standard Operational Planning Process/Global Force Management Process Guide. The liaison further stated these documents are under revision and expected to be completed by March 31, 2018. On October 11, 2018, the Coast Guard liaison stated that The Standard Operational Planning Process/Global Force Management Instruction is in routing for edits, comment, and final approval. The new estimated completion date is the 2nd quarter of FY 2019. GAO sent an inquiry to the Coast Guard on April 24, 2019 asking for an update. On March 30, 2020, the Coast Guard liaison informed GAO that the update to the SOPP/GFM Instruction, which includes the addition and test of Strategic Priorities Planning Guidance and the new Coast Guard Force Allocation Matrix, was further delayed due to recent discussions of changing to a 2-year SOPP planning cycle to align with the Department of Defense Global Force Management process. The liaison stated that the COVID-19 crisis as well as the need to finalize the Strategic Planning Direction by June 2020 are also factors in this delay. The new estimated completion date for this recommendation is June 30, 2021.

Recommendation: To improve the use of warranties and guarantees in Navy shipbuilding, the Secretary of the Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy, for future ship construction contracts, to determine whether or not a warranty as provided in the FAR, provides value and document the costs, benefits, and other factors used to make this decision. To inform this determination, the Navy should begin differentiating the government's and shipbuilder's responsibility for defects and track the costs to correct all defects after ship delivery.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation in February 2016 by committing to study policy changes with regard to warranties, but disagreed that additional cost data were needed to inform these decisions, and questioned whether warranties are suitable for ship acquisitions. In February 2017, a Navy-funded study found that the Navy had no policy to collect data, and that the little data available were not useful for determining when warranties are suitable. In response to the study, the Navy agreed that, by December 2017, it would make some policy and contractual changes to collect data, but it continued to maintain that warranties are likely not suitable for ship contracts. In January 2018, the Navy issued guidance to help contracting officers determine when and how to use a warranty or guarantee, but the Navy has collected only one warranty cost proposal from one shipbuilder for a contract for a single ship and, going forward, Navy officials stated that they do not have plans to systematically collect such data. In August 2019, we recommended in GAO-19-512 that the Navy collect warranty pricing on its new class of frigates, as the Navy initially did not include warranty pricing as part of its request for proposals for the ship class. However, as of August 2020, the Navy has not made meaningful efforts to gain pricing data for warranties and has stated that the department does not plan to take any further action. To fully implement this recommendation, the Navy needs to collect additional data in order to determine cases in which warranties could contribute to improvements in the cost and quality of Navy ships.

Recommendation: To balance combatant commanders' demands for forward presence with the Navy's needs to sustain a ready force over the long term and identify and mitigate risks consistent with Federal Standards for Internal Control, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to, to fully implement its optimized fleet response plan, develop and implement a sustainable operational schedule for all ships homeported overseas.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In August 2015, the Navy reported that it had approved and implemented revised optimized fleet response plan schedules for all ships homeported overseas-six different operational schedules for various naval forces homeported in different overseas locations. We closed the recommendation as implemented in 2015. In 2017, the Navy suffered four significant mishaps at sea resulting in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of the four ships involved were homeported in Japan. The resulting Navy investigations revealed that due to heavy operational demands, the Navy had not fully implemented the revised operational schedules it developed in 2015 for ships based in Japan. In light of this information, GAO re-opened this recommendation. As of February 2020, the Navy had developed a change to the operational schedule for ships homeported in Japan, but has not yet codified this change in Navy guidance. The Navy also established Commander, Naval Surface Group, Western Pacific (CNSGWP) to oversee surface ship maintenance, training, and certification for ships based in Japan. Due to continuing heavy operational demands, GAO will continue to monitor the Navy's adherence to the revised schedules before it closes this recommendation as implemented.

Recommendation: To improve the quality of the Navy's future decommissioning decisions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to direct the Chief of Naval Operations to document the Navy's early decommissioning in decision memorandums in accordance with the General Policy for the Inactivation, Retirement, and Disposition of U.S. Naval Vessels prior to approving any future recommendations for early decommissioning of Navy ships.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, stating that the Navy should have followed the policy that requires the decision memorandum, but did not do so because of "compressed timelines." DOD added that it would ensure the completion of decision memorandums for any future early decommissioning recommendations. We have been unable to determine whether DOD has implemented this recommendation since our report was issued. Most recently, DOD has not responded to our October 2019 request for an update. Given the significance of this recommendation, we will continue to leave it open until we are satisfied that DOD has or has not implemented it.

Recommendation: To enhance the likelihood that those decisions will be implemented, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to direct the Chief of Naval Operations to update the Navy's General Policy for the Inactivation, Retirement, and Disposition of U.S. Naval Vessels to incorporate key elements of federal standards for internal control, such as communicating with and obtaining information from external stakeholders, comparing actual performance to planned or expected results, evaluating performance measures and indicators, such as risk, and comparing and assessing different sets of data to establish relationships and take appropriate action. In updating the policy, the Chief of Naval Operations should also consider requiring that its early decommissioning decision memorandums specifically address capacity as well as capability gaps.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, stating that although it recognizes the importance of engaging with congressional stakeholders, it did not do so regarding its decommissioning decisions because those decisions were made in the context of budget development. DOD's comments added that until the Secretary of Defense and the President have approved the budget request, all such actions are predecisional and internal, and therefore are not discussed with Congress. DOD also disagreed with the part of our recommendation to require that its early decommissioning decision memorandums specifically address capacity as well as capability gaps, stating that by definition a decommissioning creates a capacity gap. Since our report was issued, we have been unable to determine the extent to which DOD has taken steps to implement this recommendation. Most recently, DOD has not responded to our October 2019 request for an update. Given the significance of this recommendation, we will continue to leave it open until we can determine whether DOD has or has not taken steps to implement it.