Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment develop and implement a plan to guide and coordinate efforts to implement the Wideband AOA recommendations to support timely, informed decisions on its next wideband satellite communications architecture. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, but as of July 2020 is still working to implement its corrective action plan.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Commanding General of SOCOM, clarify its guidance on perstempo thresholds as long as the statutory thresholds are waived by either establishing specific and measurable department-wide perstempo thresholds in DOD policy or ensuring that the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps establish and follow their own service-specific guidance on thresholds. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department concurred with this recommendation. In July 2019, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD/P&R) issued a memo that, among other things, directed the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to (1) direct the Military Departments to comply with reporting of the military personnel data and reporting requirements necessary to support the measurement and reporting of the perstempo of the military forces as laid out in DoDI 1336.07; and (2) develop threshold policies for perstempo events. In addition, it stated that the OUSD/P&R will chair a working group to refine optempo and perstempo policy proposals for inclusion into a formal policy document(s). In November 2019, the OUSD/P&R issued another memo that provided broad perstempo policy and emphasized adherence to modified guidance codified in DODI 1336.07, which as of July 2020 is undergoing DOD directives review for issuance. The OUSD/P&R memo further directed the military departments to provide service-level perstempo guidance, to include thresholds and compliance measures, for their components. We will continue to monitor these actions and update the status of our recommendation as appropriate.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Commanding General of SOCOM, take steps to emphasize the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data so that DOD, the services, and SOCOM can monitor perstempo. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department concurred with this recommendation. In July 2019, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD/P&R) issued a memo that, among other things, directed the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness) to develop policies for the accurate measurement and reporting of unit operational deployment data. In addition, the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) will (1) conduct department-wide coordination to develop the necessary technical capabilities for DOD to collect, monitor, and evaluate optempo and perstempo data; (2) develop procedures for perstempo and operational deployment data validation to ensure quality checks are conducted regularly and feedback mechanisms to the military departments for error detection and correction are in place, if necessary; and (3) ensure coordination efforts for optempo and perstempo data collection efforts do not duplicate or interfere with current systems collecting such information. In November 2019, the OUSD/P&R issued another memo that provided broad perstempo policy and emphasized adherence to modified guidance codified in DODI 1336.07, which as of July 2020 is undergoing DOD directives review for issuance. This memo and draft instruction provide direction on the reporting of perstempo events and emphasize the collection of complete and reliable perstempo data. Additionally, to enhance data processing and rectify data quality issues, DOD has drafted Uniformed Services Human Resources Information System Procedures, which is also undergoing DoD directives review for official issuance, and DMDC has worked with the services to make specific data improvements. We will continue to monitor for the issuance of the draft DODI and System Procedures and update the status of our recommendation as appropriate.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should assess the risks to accomplishing both of the GRF's uses: that is, its use as an augmentation capability available as needed to individual geographic combatant commands; and its use as a tailorable joint force available for rapid response to a specific threat. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2019, DOD has not implemented this recommendation and stated that DOD is developing its Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) concept, which will have a direct impact on the mission, construct, command relationships, and training of the Department's Global Response Force. DOD has not specified when the implementation of the DFE will be complete.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should, as appropriate following the assessment of risk, design responses, such as further defining and prioritizing the GRF's intended uses and missions, to mitigate any identified risks. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2019, DOD has not implemented this recommendation and stated that DOD is developing its Dynamic Force Employment concept, which will have a direct impact on the mission, construct, command relationships, and training of the Department's Global Response Force. DOD has not specified when the implementation of the DFE will be complete.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should designate an authority to establish and enforce integrated joint training for GRF-assigned units, as appropriate. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2019, DOD has not implemented this recommendation and stated that DOD is developing its Dynamic Force Employment concept, which will have a direct impact on the mission, construct, command relationships, and training of the Department's Global Response Force. DOD has not specified when the implementation of the DFE will be complete.

Recommendation: To enable the department to enhance its visibility over contractor personnel for whom it may become responsible in the event of contingency and other applicable operations, the Secretary of Defense should, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, update accountability guidance clarifying the types of contractor personnel that are to be accounted for in a steady-state environment.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, but as of September 2020, has not yet taken steps to implement it. DOD stated that DOD Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract Support, is being updated, and will include guidance on the types of contractor personnel that are to be accounted for. The department also stated it would update Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.13C, Joint Personnel Reporting Structure-Personnel Manual, to clarify the types of contractor personnel that are to be accounted for. As of September 2020, neither of these guidance documents had been updated. This recommendation will remain open.

Recommendation: To ensure that combatant commands are not contracting with entities that may be connected to or supporting prohibited organizations, the Secretary of Defense should, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop and issue guidance that clarifies the foreign-vendor vetting steps or process that should be established at each combatant command, including the operational conditions under which a foreign-vendor vetting cell should be established.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation but as of September 2020, has not implemented it. In its response to our report, DOD agreed that the development and issuance of overarching guidance and partially concurs with the development and issuance of guidance that clarifies the foreign vendor vetting steps or process that should be established at each combatant command, including operational conditions under which a foreign vendor vetting cell should be established. In April 2018, DOD issued Directive-Type Memorandum 18-002, Prohibition on Providing Funds to the Enemy and Authorization of Additional Access to Records. In August 2020, DOD officials said that they had drafted department-wide vendor vetting guidance (now known as vendor threat mitigation), but had not yet issued it. Since the guidance has not been issued, the recommendation will remain open at this time.

Recommendation: To ensure that PACOM is not contracting with entities that may be connected to or supporting prohibited organizations, while awaiting DOD guidance on vendor vetting, the Secretary of Defense should direct the PACOM commander to consider developing vendor vetting guidance as other combatant commands have done, to prepare for the event that PACOM becomes actively engaged in hostilities.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, but as of September 2019, has not yet taken the steps necessary to implement it.. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To better enable DOD to provide congressional decision makers with complete and reliable information on the total anticipated costs for the JIAC consolidation efforts, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment's Basing Office--in coordination with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Installations, Environment and Energy-- should update future construction cost estimates for consolidating the JIAC at RAF Croughton using best practices for cost estimating as identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Specifically, cost estimates for the JIAC consolidation should fully incorporate all four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable estimate.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on this report, DOD did not concur with our recommendation. DOD agreed that many components in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide are broadly applicable in the decision process leading up to a military construction budget request. However, DOD further stated that once military construction funds are authorized and appropriated by Congress, the department transitions to a project management mode, and it would be a waste of resources to continue to generate cost estimates once they have transitioned to managing project execution using actual cost data. However, as we note in the report, DOD guidance for estimating construction costs, DOD's Unified Facilities Criteria 3-740-05, states that in the MILCON program, construction cost estimates are prepared throughout the planning, design, and construction phases of a construction project to account for the refinement of the project?s design and requirements. The final estimate should document the department?s assessment of the program's most probable cost and ensure that enough funds are available to execute it. As of October 2016, the military construction funds had not been authorized by Congress for the third phase of the JIAC construction project. According to DOD officials, construction is not scheduled to begin until fall of 2017, and the contract has not yet been awarded. Further, the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that regardless of whether changes to the program result from a major contract modification or an overtarget budget, the cost estimate should be regularly updated to reflect all changes. This is also a requirement outlined in OMB's Capital Programming Guide. The purpose of updating the cost estimate is to check its accuracy, defend the estimate over time, and archive cost and technical data for use in future estimates. After the internal agency and congressional budgets are prepared and submitted, it is imperative that cost estimators continue to monitor the program to determine whether the preliminary information and assumptions remain relevant and accurate. Keeping the estimate updated gives decision makers accurate information for assessing alternative decisions. Cost estimates must also be updated whenever requirements change, and the results should be reconciled and recorded against the old estimate baseline. Therefore, we continue to believe that DOD's implementation of our recommendation to update future JIAC cost estimates using the best practices identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide would assist in ensuring that decision makers have complete and reliable information about costs associated with the JIAC consolidation and as the third phase of the JIAC project is authorized. Implementing our recommendation would also ensure that DOD develops a reliable historical record for the cost of the JIAC that can be used to estimate other similar projects in the future. As of June 2017, the agency had not taken any action to implement this recommendation. As of July 2018, a senior DOD official said that DOD is developing a new analysis of alternatives (AOA) for JIAC consolidation and will use, as appropriate, our AOA best practices. Those best practices include several focused on cost estimation. We have requested information on the extent to which the AOA team will use best practices for cost estimating to update the JIAC consolidation cost estimate. When we confirm what actions DOD has taken, we will provide updated information. As of September 2019, a senior DOD official said that DOD's prior non-concur with our recommendation is still valid for the reasons mentioned above.

Recommendation: To fully assess the size and composition of the medical force, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to conduct a new analysis of the required number of active-duty and civilian medical personnel that mitigates known limitations.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2020, DOD has not addressed this recommendation. In response to a provision in Senate Report 115-125, we assessed DOD's interim and final draft responses to a requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 to assess the required number of wartime medical and dental personnel. In our ensuing February 2019 report, we found that DOD had not determined the required size and composition of its operational medical and dental personnel who support the wartime mission or submitted a complete report to Congress. Specifically, leaders from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) disagreed with the military departments' initial estimates of required personnel that were developed to report to Congress. OSD officials cited concerns that the departments had not applied assumptions for operating jointly in a deployed environment and for leveraging efficiencies among personnel and units. We found that the military departments applied different planning assumptions in estimating required personnel, such as the definition of "operational" requirements. Further, although not required by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD's assessment did not include civilian medical personnel. Until DOD completes such an analysis, it cannot be assured that its medical force is appropriately sized.

Recommendation: To strengthen ongoing efforts to analyze the costs of medical force readiness and establish clinical currency standards, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to take steps to identify and mitigate limitations regarding the standard for maintaining providers' clinical skills, including improving the accuracy of information concerning providers' workload and conducting an analytically rigorous calculation of active-duty providers' time devoted to military-specific responsibilities.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2020, DOD has taken steps to address this recommendation, but has not completed all necessary actions. In February 2019, we reported that DOD had begun work on a metric to assess the clinical readiness of providers, but noted that the department's methodology was limited. In particular, the methodology did not provide complete, accurate, and consistent data or fully demonstrate results. Further, although DOD provided documentation in February 2020 outlining the medical specialties to which its clinical readiness metric would apply, it has not fully budgeted for the cost of implementing the metric. DOD's July 2018 report in response to Section 703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 notes steps taken to assess the accuracy of information concerning providers' workload, but does not address the time active-duty providers devote to military-specific responsibilities. Until DOD addresses these issues, its efforts to analyze the costs of medical force readiness and establish clinical currency standards will remain limited.

Recommendation: To help achieve DOD's goals for transferring health care into its own facilities and increasing the productivity of active-duty medical providers, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to develop a strategy for achieving these goals that reflects the leading practices of effective federal strategic planning.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of September 2020, DOD has not yet addressed this recommendation.

Recommendation: To strengthen ongoing efforts within DOD to address the Study's recommendations to use the provider model outputs to inform execution of health care delivery and to refine the model for future use, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to modify DOD's model to reflect the military service of the physicians and military treatment facilities included in the model.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of September 2020 DOD has not implemented this recommendation. In its July 2018 report in response to Section 703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD stated in response to this recommendation that facilities in several large Military Health System (MHS) markets are staffed in a multi-service manner. While this is an important point, it remains true that, as the report notes, DOD's model "assumed uniformed providers were interchangeable," and that such an approach does not reflect the single-service nature of most medical treatment facilities within the MHS. Until DOD's model reflects this, the results of its approach will continue to be limited.

Recommendation: To strengthen any future assessments of additional changes to DOD's network of military treatment facilities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to describe steps taken to assess the reliability of data supporting the assessment, including, at a minimum, the sources of data, data limitations, and efforts to test data reliability.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of September 2020, DOD has taken steps to address this recommendation, but has not completed all necessary actions. In its July 2018 report in response to Section 703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD included the sources of its data and some data limitations, but not efforts to test data reliability. Until DOD fully incorporates assessments of data reliability into its analysis of future changes to the Military Health System, such as its implementation plan Section 703, it will continue to lack assurance that its approach is fully supported by reliable information.

Recommendation: To strengthen any future assessments of additional changes to DOD's network of military treatment facilities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) to include in any accompanying cost estimates an appropriate level of detail, all significant costs, and an assessment of the reliability of the data supporting the cost estimate.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of September 2020, DOD has not addressed this recommendation. As we reported in May 2020, DOD's plan to restructure MTFs in response to Section 703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD concluded that civilian health care was more cost-effective than care in its MTFs without considering other assumptions that could affect its conclusions. For example, DOD applied assumptions about the cost of military personnel salaries, MTF workloads, and reimbursement rates for TRICARE that likely underestimated the cost-effectiveness of MTFs. Until DOD's approach to assessing changes to its network of MTFs is accompanied by cost estimates with an appropriate level of detail, all significant costs, and an assessment of the reliability of the data supporting the cost estimate, its approach will remain limited.

Recommendation: To ensure that the department can implement readiness rebuilding efforts, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to establish comprehensive readiness rebuilding goals to guide readiness rebuilding efforts and a strategy for implementing identified goals, to include resources needed to implement the strategy.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD partially concurred with the recommendation in our draft report. In our draft, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense provide direction to the U.S. Marine Corps, in addition to the Secretary of the Navy; DOD stated that separate guidance to the U.S. Marine Corps was unnecessary because the U.S. Marine Corps is part of the Department of the Navy. We agreed, and revised our recommendation as we finalized our report for publishing. Otherwise, in its comments on this recommendation, DOD noted that the department was currently working to define the "ready for what" for the military services which would provide the target for their readiness recovery goals. Since we reported in 2016, the military services established both readiness rebuilding goals and a strategy for implementing them. Through the department's Readiness Recovery Framework, the military services have identified key readiness issues that their respective forces face and actions to address these issues. These efforts are detailed every other quarter in reports to Congress. Since the establishment of the Readiness Recovery Framework, the military services have been revising their readiness rebuilding goals. GAO will continue to monitor their evolution, as well as the progress of DOD's Readiness Recovery Framework, before it closes this recommendation as implemented.

Recommendation: To ensure that Congress will have more complete information on DOD's full funding needs for its O&M base budget and to conduct oversight of DOD's use of OCO funds to support base programs and activities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller to revise its guidance on preparing budget justification materials and execution reports for Congress to require the addition of O&M obligations used for base programs and activities at the level of information presented for each account.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD non-concurred with our recommendation. DOD stated in its initial response to our recommendation that there is no legal or administrative subdivision of the O&M appropriation for base and OCO; however, we continue to believe that the recommendation is valid and will follow up annually on the status of the recommendation. As of May 2019, DOD reaffirmed its initial response and has not taken any action to implement our recommendation.

Recommendation: In order to better integrate virtual training devices into operational training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to specify in Army guidance for developing virtual training device requirements that training developers consider and document the time available to train with the devices and intended usage rates to achieve training tasks and proficiency goals during operational training.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with this recommendation. As of December 2019, the Army had taken some steps to improve its guidance, as GAO recommended in August 2016, but did not plan to fully address the recommendation until 2021. Officials stated that the Army established target usage rates for existing virtual training devices and issued guidance and tracking tools for recording device usage. However, the Army had not modified the guidance, cited in GAO's August 2016 report, to require that training developers consider the amount of time available to train with or expected usage rates of new virtual training devices. According to Army officials, they will implement GAO's recommendation in a planned update to guidance on the justification and validation of new virtual training devices scheduled for 2021. By updating this guidance, the Army will have the information it requires to evaluate the amount of virtual training capabilities needed to achieve training tasks and proficiency goals during operational training.

Recommendation: To help improve awareness of OCS roles and responsibilities and to collect OCS issues at the military services and the service component commands, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish an OCS training requirement for commanders and senior leaders.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of September 2020, DOD has taken steps to focus OCS training to all planners, including those outside the logistics directorate. In December 2015, the Joint Staff J7 certified the Joint OCS Planning and Execution (JOPEC) course of instruction for Joint training. The Joint Staff, per this training certification, is working with the Joint Deployment Training Center and the Joint Force Staff College to provide student administrative and course catalog support for future JOPEC training. In August 2020, OSD officials stated that they have secured funding for development of a new, online strategic-level OCS course, which they plan to develop, test, and field in 2021. Finally, OSD officials said that the updated OCS instruction will also address training for planners beyond the logistics directorate; officials anticipate the instruction being issued in late 2020. We will continue to monitor these efforts and this recommendation will remain open at this time.

Recommendation: To ensure that the geographic combatant commands are properly sized to meet their assigned missions and to improve the transparency of the commands' authorized manpower, assigned personnel, and mission and headquarters-support costs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to revise Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1001.01A to require a comprehensive, periodic evaluation of whether the size and structure of the combatant commands meet assigned missions.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) did not concur with our recommendation, stating that the combatant commands had already been reduced during previous budget and efficiency reviews. The department also noted that any periodic review of the combatant commands' size and structure must include a review of assigned missions, and that a requirement for a mission review was not appropriate for inclusion in the commands' guiding instruction on personnel requirements. However, DOD has taken some actions to better manage the combatant command headquarters activities and personnel as GAO recommended in May 2013. First, DOD has taken actions to control management headquarters authorized positions and funding levels across the department, including those at the combatant commands, through the budget process. For example, in a May 2017 memorandum entitled: Lifting the Hiring Freeze for Civilian Employees, the Deputy Secretary of Defense stated that components must operate within the full-time equivalent authorization and funding limits established in the fiscal year 2017 President's budget, including the Future Years Defense Program. Notably, current baselines, divestiture requirements, and hiring limitations applicable to major headquarters activities remain in effect. Major headquarters activities billet adjustments or growth was not authorized unless approved through the program review and budget process. Additionally, in the conference report accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the defense committees by January 1, 2020 that provides a description of the headquarters staff of each geographic combatant command, as well as each sub-unified command and service component command under the geographic combatant command. According to DOD officials, as of March 2020, the Department has not completed the report and they could not provide an estimated timeframe for its completion. As part of this effort, the Secretary of Defense was also directed to submit a report by January 1, 2021 recommending the number of military and civilian personnel required in the headquarters element to execute the missions and functions of each geographic combatant command. Further, in a January 6, 2020 memorandum entitled: Department of Defense Reform Focus in 2020, the Secretary of Defense announced plans to lead a series of reviews with the combatant commands in 2020, to focus on strategic priorities, harvest opportunities to reduce costs, and realign forces and manpower in order to support National Defense Strategy priorities and rebuild readiness. This effort includes establishing a common baseline understanding of all tasks, missions, and overall resources and costs within the commands. According to the memorandum, the goal is to review all the commands in time to inform the fiscal year 2022-2026 program budget review. GAO will continue to monitor DOD's efforts to better manage the combatant command headquarters activities and personnel. Although the department has taken some positive steps, GAO continues to believe that institutionalizing a comprehensive, periodic evaluation of the combatant commands would help to ensure efficient use of resources.

Recommendation: To further the integration of operational contract support into all areas of the operation planning process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to focus its training about operational contract support, which is currently focused on the logistics planners, on training all planners at the combatant commands and components as necessary.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of September 2019, DOD has taken steps to focus OCS training to all planners, including those outside the logistics directorate. In December 2015, the Joint Staff J7 certified the Joint OCS Planning and Execution (JOPEC) course of instruction for Joint training. The Joint Staff, per this training certification, is working with the Joint Deployment Training Center and the Joint Force Staff College to provide student administrative and course catalog support for future JOPEC training. Additionally, OSD officials stated in August 2019 that the updated OCS instruction will also address training for planners beyond the logistics directorate; officials anticipated the instruction being issued in 2020 but as of September 2020, it had not yet been issued. We will continue to monitor these efforts and this recommendation will remain open at this time.

Recommendation: To better understand the extent to which deployed DOD civilian employees have access to needed medical care, as appropriate, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Combatant Commander of U.S. Central Command to clarify the level of care that deployed DOD civilian employees can expect in theater, including their eligibility for routine care.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD has not implemented this recommendation. In July 2019, DOD officials responsible for policy concerning deployed civilians clarified that DOD policy states deployed civilians are eligible for medical care at the same level and scope as military personnel. However, as of November 2019 they were unable to confirm whether policy in U.S. Central Command reflects this requirement. .