Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should establish specific timeliness objectives for completing investigations conducted by the OIG of the IC. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should establish a time frame to finalize revisions to the OIG's investigations manual. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative procedures. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division. This program should consist of routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should develop a process to facilitate external quality assurance reviews of other IC-element OIGs' investigations divisions. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should ensure that as the ICIG finalizes its draft investigations procedures and investigator training plan, these documents provide an approach that systematically links the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities and training requirements throughout an investigator's career progression. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of CIA should establish a time frame to finalize revisions to the OIG's investigations manual. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of CIA should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative manual and policies. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of CIA should implement routine internal quality assurance reviews as part of the quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations divisions consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of DIA should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative procedures. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of DIA should implement routine external quality assurance reviews in the quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division consistent with CIGIE standards. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of DIA should take steps to ensure that notifications to complainants in reprisal cases occur and are documented in the investigative case file, as required by OIG policy. (Recommendation 12)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NGA should establish specific timeliness objectives for completing investigations conducted by the OIG of NGA. (Recommendation 13)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NGA should develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division. This program should consist of routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 14)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NGA should take steps to ensure that notifications to complainants in reprisal cases occur and are documented in the investigative case file, as required by OIG policy. (Recommendation 15)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should establish a time frame to finalize the OIG's draft investigations manual. (Recommendation 16)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative procedures. (Recommendation 17)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should continue to develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division, which should incorporate routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 18)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should consider making the use of documented investigative plans a requirement for all investigations. (Recommendation 19)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should revise its training plan to provide an approach that systematically links the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to training requirements throughout an investigator's career progression. (Recommendation 20)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should take steps to ensure that notifications to complainants in reprisal cases occur and are documented in the investigative case files, as required by OIG policy. (Recommendation 21)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NSA should develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division. This program should consist of routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 22)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Security Agency/Central Security Service: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NSA should develop an investigator training plan that provides an approach that systematically links the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to training requirements to an investigator's career progression. (Recommendation 23)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Security Agency/Central Security Service: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director, MDA should coordinate with the defense intelligence community on the agency's collective priorities for threat assessments and work with the defense intelligence community to determine if additional resources are needed to support the agency's threat assessment needs. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Missile Defense Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that MDA will continue to follow established processes to identify threat assessment needs and to determine if additional resources are required. However, we have yet to see sufficient evidence that MDA is collectively prioritizing its threat assessment requests. We understand that MDA prioritizes its threat assessment requests within the distinct lanes of intelligence product types. We have yet to see evidence that shows MDA has taken steps to also prioritize amongst those lanes. For example, MDA could coordinate with the intelligence community to establish a formal process or venue through which such macro-level prioritization could be conveyed and discussed. In April 2020, MDA told us that it did not plan to transfer funds to the intelligence community in fiscal year 2021 for any unique MDA intelligence needs. By not taking actions to collectively prioritize its threat assessment needs or providing the intelligence community with resources, MDA continues to run the risk of not receiving the threat assessments it needs when it needs them.

Recommendation: The Director, MDA should fully engage the defense intelligence community on key threat-related missile defense acquisition processes and decisions, including providing insight into and obtaining input from the defense intelligence community on the threat space MDA establishes for the BMDS and the threat parameters and threat models MDA assigns to BMDS elements as design requirements and test cases. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Missile Defense Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that MDA will continue to fully engage the intelligence community on key threat-related Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) acquisition processes and decisions. We have observed improvements in MDA including the intelligence community in some of these key threat-related processes and decisions, some of which were discussed in our report. Also, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the NGI and include in the report, among several items, updated threat assessments by the intelligence community informing system threshold and objective requirements. To this end, we are aware that MDA consulted with the intelligence community on the threat space and threat-related requirements that are being considered for the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering stated in a September 2019 memo to GAO that MDA also coordinates in weekly Technical Interchange Meetings with the intelligence community on the threat space bounds for parameters that have high uncertainty. We are also aware of ongoing efforts between MDA and the intelligence community to jointly model missile threats that could directly be used in MDA ground tests. These efforts address much of our recommendation; however, we have yet to see whether MDA will coordinate with the intelligence community on the threat parameters assigned to BMDS elements in the BMD System Specification. We intend to follow up with MDA to determine the extent to which MDA has implemented our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should require the Director, MDA and the Director, DIA to coordinate on establishing a process for MDA to obtain validation of its threat models. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that the department will re-examine the most cost-effective approach to meet the intent of DIA validation to support development and fielding of effective Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements. We have observed significant progress on this recommendation, primarily through the joint coordination occurring through the Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee (DIBMAC) Joint Modeling Tiger Team, where multiple pathways are being explored. Our recommendation calls for the intelligence community and MDA to coordinate on establishing a process for MDA to obtain validation of its threat models. We are also open to other pathways, such as intelligence community and MDA jointly producing threat models or MDA making direct use of threat models built by the intelligence community. Our objective is that MDA use threat models that are validated by the intelligence community when such models are necessary to inform formal BMDS processes, products, and decisions. Any pathway that MDA and the intelligence community agree upon that yields this result meets the intent of our recommendation. We believe that through the tiger team initiative, such coordination is occurring and therefore the closure of this recommendation as implemented in imminent. We are waiting to see: (1) whether MDA and intelligence community establish a formal process and/or jointly sign a memorandum of agreement to codify the process; and (2) the production and use of an intelligence community-validated threat model by MDA in a ground test or other Models and Simulation application.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should establish and document results-oriented goals that include specific targets or milestones for the IC CAE program. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) concurred with this recommendation. In its August 2020 response, ODNI noted that in preparation for the transition of the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program from the Defense Intelligence Agency to ODNI, the ODNI commissioned an independent study in 2019 to assess program performance and barriers to success. ODNI noted that this study, in conjunction with the GAO report, are informing the development of a program strategy and sound business practices that will prescribe goals and measurable objectives. These efforts are expected to be completed in late 2020, at which time ODNI plans to develop a companion Strategic Implementation Plan that will set the foundation for behavior and reporting criteria across all IC CAE grant-receiving institutions, legacy schools, and stakeholders. ODNI noted that the plan which is expected to be completed in the third quarter of fiscal year 2021, will include an annual evaluation process linked to survey results and documented lessons learned. We will continue to monitor the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should establish and document strategies to achieve the results-oriented goals that are established for the IC CAE program. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) concurred with this recommendation. In its August 2020 response, ODNI noted that in preparation for the transition of the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program from the Defense Intelligence Agency to ODNI, the ODNI commissioned an independent study in 2019 to assess program performance and barriers to success. ODNI noted that this study, in conjunction with the GAO report, are informing the development of a program strategy and sound business practices that will prescribe goals and measurable objectives. These efforts are expected to be completed in late 2020, at which time ODNI plans to develop a companion Strategic Implementation Plan that will set the foundation for behavior and reporting criteria across all IC CAE grant-receiving institutions, legacy schools, and stakeholders. ODNI noted that the plan which is expected to be completed in the third quarter of fiscal year 2021, will include an annual evaluation process linked to survey results and documented lessons learned. We will continue to monitor the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should develop and document a process to identify and continuously evaluate external factors that could affect the program's ability to achieve identified goals. This should include, but not be limited to, a consideration of program branding and post-grant sustainment. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) concurred with this recommendation. In its August 2020 response, ODNI noted that in preparation for the transition of the Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program from the Defense Intelligence Agency to ODNI, the ODNI commissioned an independent study in 2019 to assess program performance and barriers to success. ODNI noted that this study, in conjunction with the GAO report, are informing the development of a program strategy and sound business practices that will prescribe goals and measurable objectives. These efforts are expected to be completed in late 2020, at which time ODNI plans to develop a companion Strategic Implementation Plan that will set the foundation for behavior and reporting criteria across all IC CAE grant-receiving institutions, legacy schools, and stakeholders. ODNI noted that the plan which is expected to be completed in the third quarter of fiscal year 2021, will include an annual evaluation process linked to survey results and documented lessons learned. We will continue to monitor the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should define and document comprehensive performance measures for the IC CAE program, collect and evaluate the completeness and reliability of information it receives from grant recipients and IC elements, and report this information on a regular basis. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) concurred with this recommendation. In its August 2020 response, ODNI noted that it held virtual listening session in early fiscal year 2020 with Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program managers and principal investigators to inform the development of meaningful performance measures and reporting criteria. ODNI noted that the criteria was collected using standardized, repeatable processes to ensure both accuracy and completeness during site visits and performance reviews for active grant recipients. ODNI further noted that it plans to integrate the criteria from the listening sessions into the Strategic Implementation Plan, which it expects to complete in the third quarter of fiscal year 2021. We will continue to monitor the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should establish a requirement for and develop a plan to periodically evaluate the IC CAE program's performance through objective measurement and systematic analysis. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) concurred with this recommendation. In its August 2020 response, ODNI noted that it held virtual listening session in early fiscal year 2020 with Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) program managers and principal investigators to inform the development of meaningful performance measures and reporting criteria. ODNI noted that the criteria was collected using standardized, repeatable processes to ensure both accuracy and completeness during site visits and performance reviews for active grant recipients. ODNI further noted that it plans to integrate the criteria from the listening sessions into the Strategic Implementation Plan, which it expects to complete in the third quarter of fiscal year 2021. We will continue to monitor the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should develop a process for assessing why some IC elements are not participating in the IC CAE program and address these reasons in order to ensure the program is structured to meet the needs of IC elements. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) concurred with this recommendation. In its August 2020 response, ODNI noted that was in the process of developing an engagement strategy for the reintegration of Intelligence Community Centers for Academic Excellence (IC CAE) legacy schools to ensure prior investments are capitalized on and to maximize outreach efforts. ODNI also noted that it is routinely leveraging multiple interagency IC-wide working groups to engage with IC elements and stakeholders to increase its understanding of barriers to engaging with IC CAE, as well as to develop a community-wide understanding of the benefits associated with engagement. ODNI plans to include the results in the Strategic Implementation Plan, which it expects to complete in the third quarter of fiscal year 2021, and noted that it will routinely update these efforts to ensure best practices are being implemented. The ODNI stated that it will use this ongoing process and dialogue to assess and seek to address such barriers and to improve ongoing IC element participation. We will continue to monitor the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should clearly define IC elements' roles and responsibilities for participation in the IC CAE program to better facilitate interagency collaboration in support of the program. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) concurred with this recommendation. In its March 2020 response, ODNI noted that it was leveraging multiple interagency forums in an effort to improve IC element participation in the IC CAE program. ODNI also noted that it would and encourage the standardization and use of common practices by leveraging IC CAE schools for recruitment and hiring within diverse communities. Together, ODNI noted that it will use input from these efforts to shape a collaborative way ahead for increased and improved IC engagement based on community roles and responsibilities. These efforts will also be integrated into the program's Strategic Implementation Plan, which is expected to be completed in late 2021 and will set the foundation for behavior and reporting criteria across all IC CAE institutions and stakeholders. We will continue to monitor the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of the Defense Security Service should determine how it will collaborate with stakeholders as it pilots a new approach to overseeing contractors with cleared facilities (DSS in Transition), including identifying roles and responsibilities and the related resources needed. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Security Service
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and as of February 2019, stated that it continues to pilot DSS in Transition at cleared facilities and use information gathered from stakeholders, including key government and industry stakeholder organizations to refine the process. On August 12, 2020, DOD stated that DSS was in the process of drafting a Corrective Action Plan. At that time, DOD officials explained that this plan would be completed in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019. As of September 2020, this plan has not been completed.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, in coordination with the DOD Chief Information Officer, the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy; Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and Personnel and Readiness; and with military service and agency stakeholders, should conduct operations security surveys that identify IoT security risks and protect DOD information and operations, in accordance with DOD guidance, or address operations security risks posed by IoT devices through other DOD risk assessments.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. We reached out to DOD in August 2018 on this recommendation and are awaiting their response.

Recommendation: The Principal Cyber Advisor, in coordination with the DOD Chief Information Officer; the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy; Intelligence; Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and Personnel and Readiness; and with military service and agency stakeholders, should (1) review and assess existing departmental security policies and guidance--on cybersecurity, operations security, physical security, and information security--that may affect IoT devices; and (2) identify areas where new DOD policies and guidance may be needed--including for specific IoT devices, applications, or procedures--and where existing security policies and guidance can be updated to address IoT security concerns.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. DOD has implemented one geo-location policy in 2018 relating to operations security that addresses a portion of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To better enable DOD to provide congressional decision makers with complete and reliable information on the total anticipated costs for the JIAC consolidation efforts, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment's Basing Office--in coordination with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Installations, Environment and Energy-- should update future construction cost estimates for consolidating the JIAC at RAF Croughton using best practices for cost estimating as identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Specifically, cost estimates for the JIAC consolidation should fully incorporate all four characteristics of a high-quality, reliable estimate.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on this report, DOD did not concur with our recommendation. DOD agreed that many components in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide are broadly applicable in the decision process leading up to a military construction budget request. However, DOD further stated that once military construction funds are authorized and appropriated by Congress, the department transitions to a project management mode, and it would be a waste of resources to continue to generate cost estimates once they have transitioned to managing project execution using actual cost data. However, as we note in the report, DOD guidance for estimating construction costs, DOD's Unified Facilities Criteria 3-740-05, states that in the MILCON program, construction cost estimates are prepared throughout the planning, design, and construction phases of a construction project to account for the refinement of the project?s design and requirements. The final estimate should document the department?s assessment of the program's most probable cost and ensure that enough funds are available to execute it. As of October 2016, the military construction funds had not been authorized by Congress for the third phase of the JIAC construction project. According to DOD officials, construction is not scheduled to begin until fall of 2017, and the contract has not yet been awarded. Further, the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that regardless of whether changes to the program result from a major contract modification or an overtarget budget, the cost estimate should be regularly updated to reflect all changes. This is also a requirement outlined in OMB's Capital Programming Guide. The purpose of updating the cost estimate is to check its accuracy, defend the estimate over time, and archive cost and technical data for use in future estimates. After the internal agency and congressional budgets are prepared and submitted, it is imperative that cost estimators continue to monitor the program to determine whether the preliminary information and assumptions remain relevant and accurate. Keeping the estimate updated gives decision makers accurate information for assessing alternative decisions. Cost estimates must also be updated whenever requirements change, and the results should be reconciled and recorded against the old estimate baseline. Therefore, we continue to believe that DOD's implementation of our recommendation to update future JIAC cost estimates using the best practices identified in the GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide would assist in ensuring that decision makers have complete and reliable information about costs associated with the JIAC consolidation and as the third phase of the JIAC project is authorized. Implementing our recommendation would also ensure that DOD develops a reliable historical record for the cost of the JIAC that can be used to estimate other similar projects in the future. As of June 2017, the agency had not taken any action to implement this recommendation. As of July 2018, a senior DOD official said that DOD is developing a new analysis of alternatives (AOA) for JIAC consolidation and will use, as appropriate, our AOA best practices. Those best practices include several focused on cost estimation. We have requested information on the extent to which the AOA team will use best practices for cost estimating to update the JIAC consolidation cost estimate. When we confirm what actions DOD has taken, we will provide updated information. As of September 2019, a senior DOD official said that DOD's prior non-concur with our recommendation is still valid for the reasons mentioned above.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence support to major defense acquisition programs, and to better enable personnel to provide intelligence inputs to their portfolios of acquisition programs, the Secretary of Defense should direct--as appropriate--the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with one another, to establish certifications that include having these personnel complete required training.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the recommendation. DOD provided corrective action plans that show they expect to complete efforts that will address this recommendation in 2019. We will continue to monitor the status of DOD's actions and whether these actions address the intent of our recommendations.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence support to major defense acquisition programs, and to facilitate implementation of improved processes and procedures developed by the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force and by the Air Force for the integration of intelligence into major defense acquisition programs, the Secretary of Defense should direct--as appropriate--the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with one another, to revise relevant guidance and procedures--including DOD Instruction 5000.02 and DOD Directive 5250.01-- require that intelligence mission data at the acquisition program, service, and department levels be prioritized.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the recommendation. DOD provided corrective action plans that show they expect to complete efforts that will address this recommendation in 2019. We will continue to monitor the status of DOD's actions and whether these actions address the intent of our recommendations.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence support to major defense acquisition programs, and to better ensure that DOD obtains useful feedback from stakeholders and the intended users of the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat tool, the Secretary of Defense should direct--as appropriate--the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with one another, to instruct the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to develop a communication plan for the tool that includes plans for communicating with and obtaining feedback from stakeholders and intended users such as acquisition program offices and personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the recommendation. DOD provided corrective action plans that show they expect to complete efforts that will address this recommendation by the end of 2018. We will continue to monitor the status of DOD's actions and whether these actions address the intent of our recommendations.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence support to major defense acquisition programs, and to ensure that it fulfills the needs of acquisition programs and the intelligence community and works as intended, the Secretary of Defense should direct--as appropriate--the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with one another, to assess the need for the Acquisition Intelligence Support Assessment tool and, if validated by this assessment, define this tool's requirements for development and identify the entity responsible for providing oversight and funding for its continued development, implementation, and operation.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the recommendation. DOD provided corrective action plans that show they expect to complete efforts that will address this recommendation sometime in the future. We will continue to monitor the status of DOD's actions and whether these actions address the intent of our recommendations.

Recommendation: To improve the acquisition management of the Plan and the reliability of its cost estimates and schedules, assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies, and better inform CBP's deployment decisions, once data on asset assists are required to be recorded and tracked, the Commissioner of CBP should analyze available data on apprehensions and seizures and technological assists, in combination with other relevant performance metrics or indicators, as appropriate, to determine the contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP's border security efforts.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In 2014, CBP expanded its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan to the Southwest Border Technology Plan. In February 2015, the Border Patrol took steps to address this recommendation by developing the Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP) with the support of Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Lab to examine the effects of technology and other assets. In May 2017, Border Patrol officials demonstrated a new system, intended to allow for more comprehensive analysis of the contributions of surveillance technologies to Border Patrol's mission during the CGAP process. As of March 2019, Border Patrol is now able to generate a performance report, using data collected from multiple systems, on how surveillance technologies have assisted agents during operations, including Border Patrol apprehensions. In February 2020 Border Patrol officials stated the data gathered in the report were reliable. They also provided examples of how they use available performance data to help identify gaps in capabilities and inform future investments in surveillance technologies. Border Patrol officials are also developing a surveillance capability score intended to represent the combined contributions of individual technology assets and agents on patrol to conduct surveillance in a given area. Border Patrol plans to report this score in fiscal year 2021, according to documentation provided by Border Patrol. We view these efforts, as described, as important progress toward fulfilling our recommendation, and will review the planned surveillance capability score once it is implemented to determine whether Border Patrol has fully implemented our recommendation.