Recommendation: The Coast Guard should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Deployable Specialized Forces' workforce needs. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: In November 2019, GAO reported that the Coast Guard did not fully apply a leading practice for using data and evidence when it reorganized its Deployable Specialized Forces because it had not assessed its overall Specialized Forces workforce needs, as recommended by this practice. The Coast Guard, through DHS, concurred with GAO's recommendation that it conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Specialized Forces' workforce needs. In its May 2020 180-day letter response, DHS stated that the Coast Guard identified its Maritime Safety and Security Team as the highest priority Specialized Forces unit for workforce analysis and that it is scheduled to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2021 but noted that the overall completion of all five unit types is subject to available funding and is not estimated to be completed until September 20, 2025. As GAO reported in November 2019, officials from some of these units stated that they experienced periods of underutilization, while other units with the same or similar capabilities turned down operations for lack of available personnel. Without a comprehensive analysis in place, the Coast Guard does not have the assurance that it has the requisite number of personnel in the right units to conduct the required missions. GAO will continue to monitor Coast Guard actions to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Coast Guard should assess the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication exists among Deployable Specialized Forces' capabilities. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: In November 2019, GAO reported that the Coast Guard did not address potential overlap and duplication within its Specialized Forces. GAO identified some overlap among the capabilities of the different Specialized Forces units and the Coast Guard missions they support. The Coast Guard did not agree with the recommendation in its November 2019 response to GAO's draft report. At that time, DHS stated that GAO's conclusions illustrate a fundamental misunderstanding of the corresponding missions of Specialized Forces units. However, in technical comments provided in March 2020, the Coast Guard indicated that as of February 2020 it had not conducted the analysis necessary to fully identify potential overlap among the units. The Coast Guard stated that it is planning to begin analyzing the units this fiscal year. In its May 2020 180-day letter response, DHS stated that given current funding constrains and competing mission requirements, the Coast Guard could not consider conducting analyses not directly tied to improving mission outcomes. GAO continues to maintain that overlapping capabilities among units could indicate inefficiencies in how units are used as well as missed opportunities for use in others. Further, it is unclear why DHS and the Coast Guard simultaneously agreed to conduct the comprehensive workforce analyses of its Specialized Forces in the same 180-day letter (in response to recommendation #1 for this report), analyses that could inform an assessment of the extent to which unnecessary overlap and duplication exists among these units, while declining to address this recommendation. Without a comprehensive analysis in place, the Coast Guard does not have the assurance that it has the requisite number of personnel in the right units to conduct the required missions. GAO will continue to monitor Coast Guard actions to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish and follow a sound air station optimization process similar to its process for analyzing boat stations to allow it to comprehensively analyze its need for air stations and air facilities and determine what changes may be needed. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open

Comments: In 2017, GAO reported that a 2014 Coast Guard contracted analysis of selected air stations and air facilities identified overlap and unnecessary duplication but it did not comprehensively review all air stations and air facilities. The analysis determined that certain air facilities (Newport, Oregon, and Charleston, South Carolina) provided overlapping search and rescue coverage, some of which was unnecessarily duplicative. Coast Guard officials used the results of this analysis to support proposed closures of the air facilities in the President's Fiscal Year 2014 Budget. However, shortly before their planned closure date, the Coast Guard encountered strong opposition to the closures at the local, state, and Congressional levels, and did not close them. The Coast Guard agreed with GAO's recommendation that it establish and follow a sound air station optimization process and comprehensive analysis to determine what changes may be needed. In its December 2017 60-Day letter response, DHS said the Coast Guard will utilize the FY 2020 Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution cycle to identify efficiencies in air station optimization and that the cycle is proceeding as planned. However, the response did not say whether the Coast Guard will act on findings and permanently close stations identified as overlapping, unnecessarily duplicative, and unnecessary, if any are identified. As of March 2020, the agency has identified the need for further analysis and estimates completion of these analyses in March 2021.

Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish a plan with target dates and milestones for closing boat stations that it has determined, through its 9-step process and subsequent analysis, provide overlapping search and rescue coverage and are unnecessarily duplicative. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In 2017, GAO reported that the Coast Guard has a sound process for analyzing its boat stations that includes clear and specific steps for analyzing the need for stations using terms that can be readily defined and measured. A 2013 analysis of Coast Guard stations identified unnecessary duplication and recommended certain stations that could be permanently closed without negatively affecting the Coast Guard's ability to meet its 2-hour search and rescue response standard and other mission requirements; however, as of August 2017 the Coast Guard had not closed any stations, nor developed a plan with time frames for closing stations even though leaders said the results of the analysis remain valid. Closing unneeded stations has historically been difficult due to public concern about the effect of closures on local communities and other factors. In some cases over the years, Congress has intervened and enacted federal laws that have affected Coast Guard's proposed closures. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard agreed with GAO's recommendation that it establish a plan with target dates and milestones for closing stations. In its December 2017 60-Day letter response, DHS said the Coast Guard Office of Boat Forces continues to evaluate the optimal number, location, and configuration of stations to better meet mission requirements, and is finalizing analysis of operational needs in Coast Guard Districts One (D1) and Five (D5). As of December 2019, the agency had completed additional analyses and reported that it was considering changes in operations for several stations. The Coast Guard estimated that it will continue to consider changes until spring 2020. However, the Coast Guard did not establish target dates or milestones for closing stations. By developing a plan with target dates and milestones for closing stations that are unnecessarily duplicative, the Coast Guard would be better positioned to improve operations and achieve cost savings over time.

Recommendation: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should take action to close the stations identified according to its plan and target dates. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Coast Guard
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In 2017, GAO reported that the Coast Guard has not taken action to implement the results of its analyses which recommended station closures even though it has completed requirements to pursue some station closures. For example, a 2013 analysis of Coast Guard stations identified unnecessary duplication and recommended certain stations that could be permanently closed without negatively affecting the Coast Guard's ability to meet its 2-hour search and rescue response standard and other mission requirements. However, as of August 2017 the Coast Guard had not closed any stations, nor developed a plan with time frames for closing stations even though Coast Guard leaders said the results of the analysis remain valid. GAO reported that the Coast Guard had not closed stations because past efforts to close stations (eight attempts since 1973) were met with resistance from affected communities and instances where the Congress intervened. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard agreed with GAO's recommendation that it establish a plan with target dates and milestones for closing stations. In its December 2017 60-Day letter response, DHS said that once analyses of the need for and locations of boat stations are completed for Coast Guard Districts One and Five, the Coast Guard will commence Congressional engagement and public outreach regarding any operational changes to D1 and D5 stations, if any, including processing feedback from stakeholders before making final decisions on recommended changes. As of December 2019, the Coast Guard reported that it was considering changes in operational status for several stations. The Coast Guard estimated that it will continue to consider changes until spring 2020, which, if implemented, will be more than 7 years after it proposed station closures. By closing unnecessarily duplicative stations, the Coast Guard could be better positioned to improve its operations and achieve cost savings over time.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess and document how the alternative technological solutions being considered will fully meet operational needs related to ultralight aircraft.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that it plans to assess and document requirements related to ultralight aircraft threats and how technological solutions will address these requirements as part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) air domain awareness efforts. In March 2018, CBP completed an Air Domain Awareness Capability Analysis Report that identifies current capability gaps, including those related to ultralight aircraft. CBP stated that it plans to build upon the Capability Analysis Report to identify mission needs, a concept of operations, and operational requirements to address ultralight aircraft and other threats in the air domain. In February 2020, AMO reported that, in 2019, it conducted a technical assessment of one technology and plans to assess other systems in 2020 and 2021 to help determine if they fit into AMO's larger strategic vision for persistent wide area surveillance to address ultralight aircraft and other threats in the air domain. To fully address our recommendation, CBP should assess and document how alternative solutions will meet operational requirements related to ultralight aircraft.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of ICE to jointly establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to cross-border tunnels.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement will review available information and develop performance measures and targets as deemed appropriate. As of March 2020, CBP and ICE have not reported taking any actions to develop performance measures and targets. To fully address our recommendation, CBP and ICE should establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to cross-border tunnels.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP to establish and monitor performance targets related to ultralight aircraft.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred and stated that within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Air and Marine Operations and the U.S. Border Patrol are developing a joint performance measure and targets for interdicting ultralight aircraft. However, in December 2019, CBP reported that it will no longer pursue establishing a performance measure because it found that the ultralight aircraft interdiction rate fluctuated year to year, and that the number of ultralight aircraft incidents had been trending downward. Subsequently, in September 2020, CBP officials stated that they had reinitiated efforts to develop a performance measure and target in response to our continued belief that they can be set and would help CBP monitor performance to ensure that technology investments and operational responses to address ultralight aircraft are effective. To fully address our recommendation, CBP should establish a measure and monitor performance related to ultralight aircraft.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)-U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) tunnel committee to convene and establish standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, including procedures for sharing information.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS did not concur with this recommendation. However, CBP and ICE agreed that strengthening operational procedures may be beneficial and stated that they will jointly review procedures and discuss revising and/or consolidating the procedures. In May 2018, CBP stated that it is looking for opportunities to standardize procedures for the detection, interdiction, mapping, and remediation of cross-border tunnels. To this end, CBP has plans to develop a standardized training on tunnel identification and tactics, techniques, and procedures for different types of tunnels. In addition, CBP is working to develop a consistent process that will facilitate coordination and collaboration with ICE. In March 2019, CBP reported that CBP and ICE have begun to routinely meet to collectively develop processes for using tunnel robotics, including processes to enhance communication between CBP and ICE. In September 2020, CBP and ICE reported that they do not plan to take any additional steps to address this recommendation. To fully address our recommendation, CBP and ICE should establish standardized procedures for addressing tunnels, including procedures for sharing information with one another.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commissioner of CBP, and the Director of ICE to establish and monitor Regional Coordinating Mechanisms performance measures and targets related to panga boat and recreational vessel smuggling.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS did not concur with this recommendation. DHS stated that that it believes that by establishing common terminology to address our first recommendation, the RECOMs will have more reliable, usable analyses to inform their maritime interdiction efforts. However, DHS did not believe that performance measures and targets related to smuggling by panga boats would provide the most useful strategic assessment of operations to prevent all illicit trafficking, regardless of area of operations or mode of transportation. DHS also cited the recent creation of the DHS Office of Policy, Strategy, and Plans that is to work with U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other components and offices to better evaluate the effectiveness of all operations that work to prevent the illegal entry of goods and people into the country, as appropriate. In February 2020, DHS reported that the department had not taken any further actions to implement this recommendation. We continue to believe that the recommendation is valid and will monitor any actions DHS takes that are responsive to it. For example, in response to a requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DHS issued reports in May 2018, February 2019, and August 2020 that contain metrics and planned metrics to measure the effectiveness of border security in the maritime environment and other domains. Planned metrics that DHS does not yet have a methodology to measure across all components include situational awareness in the maritime environment, illicit drugs removal rate, and DHS maritime threat response rate. To fully address our recommendation, DHS should measure its performance related to smuggling across U.S. maritime borders.

Recommendation: To balance combatant commanders' demands for forward presence with the Navy's needs to sustain a ready force over the long term and identify and mitigate risks consistent with Federal Standards for Internal Control, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to, to fully implement its optimized fleet response plan, develop and implement a sustainable operational schedule for all ships homeported overseas.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In August 2015, the Navy reported that it had approved and implemented revised optimized fleet response plan schedules for all ships homeported overseas-six different operational schedules for various naval forces homeported in different overseas locations. We closed the recommendation as implemented in 2015. In 2017, the Navy suffered four significant mishaps at sea resulting in serious damage to its ships and the loss of 17 sailors. Three of the four ships involved were homeported in Japan. The resulting Navy investigations revealed that due to heavy operational demands, the Navy had not fully implemented the revised operational schedules it developed in 2015 for ships based in Japan. In light of this information, GAO re-opened this recommendation. As of February 2020, the Navy had developed a change to the operational schedule for ships homeported in Japan, but has not yet codified this change in Navy guidance. The Navy also established Commander, Naval Surface Group, Western Pacific (CNSGWP) to oversee surface ship maintenance, training, and certification for ships based in Japan. Due to continuing heavy operational demands, GAO will continue to monitor the Navy's adherence to the revised schedules before it closes this recommendation as implemented.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to counter piracy and maritime crime are coordinated and prioritized to effectively address the evolving threat, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense and State, should work through the Counter-Piracy Steering Group or otherwise collaborate with the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury, and the Attorney General to determine whether additional actions to address counterpiracy and maritime security, such as developing an action plan that includes elements of a strategic approach, are needed to guide and coordinate activities.

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Status: Open

Comments: In June 2014, the Executive Office of the President issued the United States Counter Piracy and Maritime Security Action Plan, which includes an annex specific to activities in and around the Gulf of Guinea. While the plan outlines some of the planned indicators of effectiveness for activities in and around the Gulf of Guinea, the extent to which the agencies have assessed or plan to assess costs and benefits are not explicitly addressed. The plan states that the Counter Piracy Steering Group will coordinate, implement, and monitor the objectives outlined in the plan and will assess methods and agency activities to reduce risk and protect the maritime industry from acts of piracy and related maritime crime. The plan identifies an increase in investigating and prosecuting cases and a reduction in the trend of piracy and related maritime crime as tangible indicators of successful implementation of the plan. However, GAO's past work on piracy off the Horn of Africa recommended that, as part of a strategic approach, agencies (1) identify the costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts including operational, support, and personnel costs; and (2) assess the benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities. The 2014 plan and its Gulf of Guinea annex do not include a discussion of these elements of a strategic approach. In August 2018, officials from the State Department noted that the Action Plan has not been updated because the drafting of the U.S. National Strategy for Maritime Security-which was being led by the National Security Council staff and would have addressed the Action Plan-was indefinitely suspended in June 2018. As of September 2019, neither the Strategy nor the Action plan have been updated. Including these elements of a strategic approach in the plan can help assess the effectiveness of current efforts, prioritize future efforts, and leverage resources. GAO will continue to monitor progress in this area.