Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations directs the Advanced Exploration Systems division to define and determine a schedule for synchronization reviews, including the role of the proposed Lunar Exploration Control Board, to help ensure that requirements between mission and program levels are reconciled. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated that the Advanced Exploration Systems division will review program life-cycle review plans to ensure enterprise and program requirements are reconciled across the mission. NASA is in the process of determining the organizational structure of the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. Following this completion, NASA officials stated that the appropriate control board and division structures for review and program direction will become active.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations directs the Gateway program to conduct a joint cost and schedule confidence level at the program level for the Artemis III mission. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated it would conduct a joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis or equivalent. The Gateway program is planning to conduct a series of project- and program-level reviews and assessments aligned with key decision point reviews. This includes conducting a joint cost and schedule confidence level analysis or equivalent of the Gateway initial configuration to support a program key decision point planned for fall 2021. NASA has not yet taken action on this recommendation.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations directs the Gateway program to update its overall schedule for 2024 to add a KDP II to occur before system integration. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation, but has not yet taken action on it. NASA stated that it would provide a schedule for future reviews, including whether there will be a Key Decision Point (KDP) II, at the KDP-I review currently scheduled for fall 2021.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations creates a life-cycle cost estimate for the Artemis III mission. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with the recommendation and stated that the agency will provide a preliminary cost estimate for the Artemis III mission by the end of 2020. Further, NASA stated that it will provide an updated cost estimate for the Artemis III mission after it establishes cost and schedule commitments for some of the projects that compose the lunar mission, currently planned for the Spring of 2021. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA will need to provide a cost estimate.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations directs the Advanced Exploration Systems division to commit to a completion date and finalize a cohesive document outlining the rationale for selecting its current lunar architecture and lunar programs. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation and stated that it is developing a document that will summarize the trades and architectural studies, but the document is not yet complete.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should ensure that the Office of the Chief Engineer determines under what conditions it is appropriate to complete an analysis of alternatives, particularly when there are multiple pathways—including architectures or programs—that NASA could pursue in the future, and document the justification for not completing an analysis. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation, but has not yet taken any action on it. NASA stated that it will provide additional clarifying guidance for conducting analyses of alternatives for new programs in the next update to NASA Procedural Requirements 7120.5E, "NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements." NASA plans to complete the update of the procedural requirement in September 2021.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator of AST should develop workload metrics that encompass the whole office and that would allow AST to determine an appropriate workforce size and composition. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 2020, AST has developed an initial set of metrics for the office's workload and is working with the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Labor Analysis to enhance and validate the metrics.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator of AST should establish a timeline for finalizing workload projections that extend beyond the 2-year budget cycle and that include an approach for addressing uncertainty. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 2020, AST said that it has extended the projection period of the staffing model to five years and that it is working with the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Labor Analysis to validate the extended projections and to include an approach to address uncertainty.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator of AST should ensure that its skills assessment survey collects information from staff on skills and competencies in those areas that are both currently needed and may be needed in the future. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In May 2020, AST provided documentation showing that in November and December 2019, AST administered surveys to engineering staff and supervisors to assess the skills of engineering staff in specific competency areas that are needed to successfully perform their jobs. The documentation provided also showed that the surveys asked engineering staff and supervisors about the skills they believed AST would need in the future.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator of AST should develop and document a plan for periodically assessing whether staff possess the necessary skills and competencies to achieve programmatic goals, such as annually administering a skills assessment survey. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In July 2020, AST officials told us they plan to assess employee skills and competencies on a 3-year cycle and that they will establish a process to do so by the end of 2020. We will continue to monitor AST's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations should direct the Commercial Crew Program to include the results of its schedule risk analysis in its mandatory quarterly reports to Congress. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA did not concur with our recommendation that the Commercial Crew Program should include the results of its schedule analysis in its quarterly reports to Congress. In July 2019, NASA reaffirmed that it will be working to ensure that the contractors' schedules and the program's internal assessments sync up as the program gets closer to launch, which is the process it used in March 2019 leading up to SpaceX's uncrewed test flight. GAO continues to believe that the recommendation is valid because the program's schedule risk analysis would provide Congress with valuable insight into potential delays, which are likely.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should develop and maintain a contingency plan for ensuring a presence on the ISS until a Commercial Crew Program contractor is certified. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NASA agreed with this recommendation. NASA stated that it is in discussions with Russia to obtain additional seats on its Soyuz spacecraft for NASA crew as a contingency plan. NASA is also providing Extra-Vehicular Activity and robotics training for a subset of cosmonauts to support U.S. Operating Segment operations, and looking at a possible extension of the duration of the Space X Demonstration 2 crewed test flight. In November 2019, NASA reported that it completed its actions for this recommendation. However, while NASA is working on potential solutions, there is no contingency plan in place. To fully implement this recommendation, NASA needs to provide documentation of its contingency plan.

Recommendation: The NASA Administrator should direct the Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations, the Commercial Crew Program Manager, and the Commercial Crew Program Contracting Officer to collectively determine and document before the agency certification review how the agency will determine its risk tolerance level with respect to loss of crew. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA partially concurred with our recommendation, stating it documented the agency's risk tolerance level with respect to loss of crew for the program in its May 2011 safety memo. NASA stated that ultimately the Commercial Crew Program is accountable for ensuring that the contractors' systems meet the loss of crew value of 1 in 270. In July 2019, the Commercial Crew Program noted that it will continue to determine its risk tolerance with respect to loss of crew and formally document its decisions at program management meetings. We continue to believe that, before agency certification, the key parties must collectively determine how the agency will determine its risk tolerance with response to loss of crew, as the risk tolerance for the loss of crew requirement depends on which entity is presenting the results of its analysis. We believe this approach will reduce confusion and increase transparency. In late September 2020, GAO received additional information from NASA on actions taken to implement this recommendation. We are currently assessing this information.

Recommendation: After completing the agency certification review, NASA's Chief Engineer and Chief of Safety and Mission Assurance, with support from the NASA Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations and the Commercial Crew Program Manager, should document lessons learned related to loss of crew as a safety threshold for future crewed spaceflight missions, given the complexity of the metric. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NASA concurred with our recommendation to document lessons learned related to the loss of crew requirement. In June 2020, NASA told us that they expect to take action to close this recommendation by the end of May 2021.

Recommendation: To better ensure spaceport operators' understanding of FAA's financial responsibility regulations for commercial space launches, the Secretary of Transportation should ensure that the FAA Administrator provides additional communication to clarify FAA's interpretation of the financial responsibility regulations for commercial space launches. The forms of communication could include, among other things, issuing additional guidance or using other forums to clarify when a spaceport operator is a third party to a launch and when it is not.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: In May 2018, FAA officials said that they were working towards implementing the recommendation, but did not have documented efforts at this time and do not have an estimated completion date.