Recommendation: The Director of DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency should assess EPA data when planning outreach to public water system and wastewater treatment works facilities (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The FAA Administrator should assign authority to an office or other entity to oversee use of the Compliance Program across program offices. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The FAA Administrator should collect and analyze data to monitor use of the Compliance Program across all program offices. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The FAA Administrator should conduct an evaluation of the Compliance Program to assess the effectiveness of the program in meeting its goals. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should establish quantifiable targets for the Surface Transportation Security Inspectors Program's activity-level performance measures. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The PHMSA Administrator should analyze the factors affecting states' participation in underground natural gas storage inspections and analyze its workforce needs on an ongoing basis to guide its budget requests. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of February 2020, the Department of Transportation (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is collaborating with an organization of state government oil and gas oversight officials to assess the factors affecting their participation in its underground natural gas storage inspections, according to DOT. PHMSA plans to use this information by December 2020 to assess whether additional measures can be undertaken to increase state participation for its use starting in Fiscal Year 2022.

Recommendation: The TSA Administrator should periodically review, and as appropriate, update the 2010 Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan to ensure the plan reflects relevant changes in pipeline security threats, technology, federal law and policy, and any other factors relevant to the security of the nation's pipeline systems. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that TSA will periodically review, and as appropriate, update the 2010 Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan to ensure the plan reflects relevant changes in pipeline security threats, technology, federal law and policy, and any other factors relevant to the security of the nation's pipeline systems. In October 2019, TSA officials reported that they were in the process of reviewing the 2010 Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan and anticipated completing the review by December 2019. However, this review was delayed and we will continue to monitor TSA's efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction should develop a strategy and implementation plan to help the Department of Homeland Security, among other things, guide, support, integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DHS agreed with GAO's September 2018 recommendation and is taking actions to address it. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) officials stated in December 2018 that CWMD plans to develop a strategy and implementation plan to help DHS guide, support, integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. According to CWMD officials, the implementation plan would broadly address DHS chemical defense activities and programs to prevent, protect against, and respond to chemical incidents, including support to federal, state, tribal, and territorial operators and agencies, as well as the private sector. CWMD officials provided GAO with the completed strategy in December 2019 and plan to complete the implementation plan by December 2020. The strategy includes four overarching goals that will drive CWMD's mission in protecting American safety and security from chemical threats and incidents. We will continue to monitor the status of the implementation plan, as completion of both documents is essential to help the CWMD Office guide DHS's efforts to address fragmentation and coordination issues and would be consistent with the office's aim to establish a coherent mission.

Recommendation: The Administrator of PHMSA should ensure that PHMSA uses other data and information about budgetary resources as they become available to inform and refine its performance goals. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Transportation: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of May 2019, we are following up with PHMSA regarding this recommendation and will provide updated information when we confirm agency actions.

Recommendation: To improve the awareness of how risk-significant radioactive sources are transported within the United States and to better determine whether Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is meeting its goal of providing reasonable assurance for preventing the theft or diversion of these dangerous materials, the Chairman of NRC should take actions to collect information from licensees on the number of shipments and mode of transport for such sources--for example, by identifying the extent to which an existing NRC database (e.g., the National Source Tracking System) may be used to capture this information.

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Status: Open

Comments: In its February 26, 2018 report to Congress on actions NRC has taken in response to GAO recommendations, NRC continued to disagree with the recommendation to expand its existing data collection requirements or to transition such information from its existing NRC databases to the NSTS. NRC stated that, as required by 10 CFR Part 37, "Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material," the NRC currently collects the number of shipments and mode of transport for domestic transfers, and the import and export of Category 1 quantities of radioactive material. Additionally, under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 110, "Export and Import of Nuclear Material," the NRC stated that it collects the number of shipments and mode of transport for the import and export of shipments containing Category 2 or higher quantities of radioactive material. The NRC stated that it is the agency's position that the current information collected provides the NRC with an understanding of the potential modes of transport for Category 1 and 2 quantities of radioactive material and existing regulatory requirements provide robust protection for all such modes. The NRC stated that it does not consider the proposed additional information collection activity to be of sufficient safety or security benefit to justify the associated regulatory actions it would require. In August 2019, and again in August 2020, the NRC reaffirmed its disagreement with this recommendation and that it did not intend to take action to implement it. Despite its disagreement with this recommendation, we will continue to monitor whether NRC takes any actions that would result in addressing the concern GAO raised.

Recommendation: To continue the agency's efforts to improve state and local emergency preparedness for rail accidents involving hazardous materials, the Secretary of Transportation should, after the rulemaking is finalized, develop a process for regularly collecting information from state emergency response commissions on the distribution of the railroad-provided hazardous-materials-shipping information to local planning entities.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: DOT published the Oil Spill Response Plans and Information Sharing for High-Hazard Flammable Trains final rule in February 2019. As of September 2020, PHMSA indicated that it wanted to close out the recommendation by adding 2 questions to the Hazardous Materials Emergency Preparedness grant application asking SERCs whether they receive information on High-Hazard Flammable Train operations and whether they are disseminating this information to local planning entities. OMB is currently reviewing the additional information request. We will continue to monitor DOT's efforts to address the recommendation.

Recommendation: As DOT, in response to the FAST Act, conducts additional evaluation and analysis of ECP brakes and updates the regulatory impact analysis, the Secretary of Transportation should direct FRA and PHMSA to create a plan to collect data from railroads' ongoing and future operational experiences using ECP brakes. The plan should include details on how the agency will work with railroads to collect this data, ensure that such data are reliable, and analyze these data to conduct a retrospective analysis of the ECP brakes requirement that could help inform any potential future actions regarding ECP brakes.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: In December 2017, DOT announced that it would rescind the electronically-controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake rule because its updated Regulatory Impact Analysis estimated that the rule's costs would exceed its benefits. Subsequently, in September 2018, DOT rescinded the ECP brake rule. As a result, DOT confirmed with us in August 2019 that it does not intend to create a plan to collect data from railroads' use of ECP brakes.

Recommendation: As DOT, in response to the FAST Act, conducts additional evaluation and analysis of ECP brakes and updates the regulatory impact analysis, if, based on its updated analysis, DOT promulgates a new rule on the applicable ECP brake system requirements, the Secretary of Transportation should direct FRA and PHMSA to require that freight railroads, once they equip with ECP brakes in response to the requirement, collect and provide data to FRA on their ongoing operational experience with ECP brakes.

Agency: Department of Transportation
Status: Open

Comments: In December 2017, DOT announced that it would rescind the electronically-controlled pneumatic (ECP) brake rule because its updated Regulatory Impact Analysis estimated that the rule's costs would exceed its benefits. DOT subsequently rescinded the ECP brake rule in September 2018. As a result, this recommendation is currently no longer relevant and DOT confirmed with us in August 2019 that it does not plan to implement this regulation.