Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should assess CFIUS resource requirements within the Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (MIBP) and DOD component reviewers in light of increasing workload, and prioritize personnel and funding resources accordingly to review, mitigate, and monitor transactions that are of concern to the department. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and in August 2020, stated it had augmented the personnel in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (formally the Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy) to include 15 federal civilians and 60 contractors to support the current CFIUS caseload. Industrial Policy officials stated that DOD CFIUS component reviewers have also augmented their personnel resources, and that approximately 15 of their contractor employees will support DOD CFIUS stakeholders. However, documentation of the efforts to prioritize personnel and funding resources within DOD CFIUS component reviewers was not available at the time of our follow-up.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, should incorporate the results of its efforts to identify, assess, and prioritize national security concerns related to foreign investment in emerging technologies and in proximity to certain critical military locations, into DOD Instruction 2000.25 and communicate the results to DOD component reviewers. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it believes the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) will help the department to address concerns related to foreign investment in emerging technologies and in proximity to critical military locations. In August 2020, officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy stated that some of the regulations implementing FIRRMA are currently being written, and that the department is also still in the process of updating DOD Instruction 2000.25, which they anticipate completing in April 2021.

Recommendation: Following the completion of its emerging technology study, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP should assess what additional authorities may be necessary to address risks related to foreign investment in critical and emerging technologies, and seek legislative action to address risks posed by these investments as appropriate. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it believes the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) should provide the department with the necessary authorities to address concerns related to foreign investment in emerging technologies. However, in August 2020, officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy stated that the regulation implementing FIRRMA requrements related to emerging technology is still in the process of being written by the Department of Commerce, and that until these regulations are issued the Department of Defense cannot assess their ability to address concerns related to foreign investment in critical and emerging technologies.

Recommendation: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP should update DOD Instruction 2000.25, to include additional guidance and clarification regarding DOD component responsibilities during the CFIUS process and DOD processes for identifying non-notified transactions. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it was working with other CFIUS member agencies to make the formal non-notified process DOD established in 2016 a more robust, interagency process. In August 2020, DOD stated it is still in the process of revising DOD Instruction 2000.25 to include additional information on identifying non-notified transactions, but does not anticipate that the revisions will be completed until April 2021.

Recommendation: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP should update and implement requirements identified in DOD Instruction 2000.25 regarding management and oversight of mitigation agreements, such as taking into account the resources needed to effectively monitor agreements, improving communication methods between MIBP and the DOD components, and clarifying component responsibilities in developing and monitoring mitigation agreements. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it is in the process of revising DOD Instruction 2000.25 regarding the management and oversight of mitigation agreements, and have more than doubled their resources for mitigation monitoring. As of August 2020, officials from the Office of Industrial Policy stated that that revisions to DOD Instruction 2000.25 will not be completed until April 2021.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Treasury, as the chair of CFIUS, and working with member agencies, should coordinate member agencies' efforts to better understand the staffing levels needed to address the current and projected CFIUS workload associated with core committee functions. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of the Treasury
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In commenting on the report in February 2018, Treasury concurred with the recommendation. In December 2018, Treasury noted that the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 requires each CFIUS member agency to submit detailed spending plans annually for seven years to appropriate congressional committees, including estimated expenditures and staffing levels, and requires annual testimony for seven years from the CFIUS staff chairperson regarding anticipated resource needs. As of November 2019, GAO continues to monitor this recommendation.

Recommendation: To ensure that all relevant U.S. agencies have information on the effect of changes in U.S. policy related to Cuba, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Department of Commerce, Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and other relevant agencies, should take steps to identify and begin to collect the information that would allow them to monitor changes in economic engagement, including with the Cuban private sector.

Agency: Department of State
Status: Open

Comments: State concurred with this recommendation. In April 2017, State reported that it was taking steps to identify and collect information that would enable it to monitor the Cuban economy and changes in the economic environment, including with the Cuban private sector. For example, State noted that Embassy Havana had developed a plan for in-country travel and reporting by identifying key sectors and provinces that could provide additional insights on the Cuban economy. As of July 2017, State reported that the U.S. government had paused most bilateral engagement with the Cuban government while the incoming presidential administration conducted an interagency policy review. However, State noted that during this time the U.S. embassy in Havana produced several analytic cables discussing developments in the Cuban economy. With the release of the administration's National Security Presidential Memorandum "Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba" in June 2017, State reported that it would work to implement this policy and would monitor developments in U.S. engagement with the private sector and Cuban economic trends. As of November 2017, State said that it was consulting with interagency partners on developments impacting the Cuban private sector and that it was working with other U.S. agencies to determine how to most effectively redirect resources away from the Cuban government and towards the private sector as called for in the administration's Cuba policy. However, State also noted that operations at Embassy Havana had been significantly affected by Hurricane Irma and the health attacks against U.S. diplomats in Cuba. According to State, the Secretary of State's September 2017 order for all non-emergency U.S. personnel to depart Cuba had limited the ability of Embassy Havana to report on developments there, but that the department would continue to monitor and report on Cuba's private sector to the greatest extent possible and as resources permitted. As of November 2019, State had shared with GAO reporting it had conducted related to Cuba's economy. GAO is in the process of reviewing this documentation and will be making a final decision about whether State has taken sufficient steps to implement GAO's recommendation.