Recommendation: As the Board of Governors implements plans to develop an ERM framework, it should include a component to identify and assess risks of regulatory capture across the LISCC program. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2020, the Federal Reserve told us the status of their response to this recommendation had remained unchanged since their August 2018 update. In August 2018, the Board of Governors reported to us that it was developing its ERM framework. The Board added that it was establishing a Board Risk Committee (comprised of senior leaders) to oversee its ERM program and serve as the central forum for addressing Board-wide risk issues. The Board also said that it has begun to implement a number of strategic components of the ERM framework. In August 2019, the Board stated that in their view, the ERM framework they are developing would not significantly alter the management processes that the Board and System have in place under the LISCC program that continue to work effectively. The Board reported to us that it has continued to develop the ERM program with guidance of the Board Risk Committee, which meets quarterly, and continues to serve as the central forum for Board-wide risk issues and oversight of the ERM program. In August 2020, the Board added that it would take several years to develop the ERM program. The Board also will continue to implement strategic components of the ERM framework throughout the Board.

Recommendation: The Board of Governors should finalize and implement program-wide guidance for the LISCC Reserve Banks on implementing LISCC policies. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2020, the Federal Reserve told us the status of their response to this recommendation had remained unchanged since their August 2019 update. In August 2019, the Board of Governors told us that the LISCC supervisory program had taken several steps to "finalize and implement program-wide guidance for the LISCC Reserve Banks on implementing LISCC policies." The Board reported that in 2017 it had issued a near-final LISCC program manual, which they said will memorialize all aspects of the LISCC supervisory program. The Board added the updated manual will reflect the results of a self-assessment of the LISCC Program's first full year of operations under the LISCC core program model, and the initial implementation of the new Large Financial Institution Ratings Framework. The Board also said that, since the last update, the LISCC supervisory program's operating policies, procedures, and templates for the conduct of supervisory activities have been completed and implemented.

Recommendation: The Board of Governors should streamline its conflict-of-interest disclosure review process for participants in the LISCC program, such as by storing disclosure information in compatible electronic systems. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2020, the Federal Reserve told us the status of their response to this recommendation had remained unchanged since their August 2018 update. In August 2018, the Board of Governors told us that they were assessing the feasibility of integrating existing electronic systems. They added that they have drafted guidance that develops a LISCC-specific conflicts of interest and examiner credential program that will seek to ensure consistency in the interpretation and application of conflicts of interest rules for all staff, both at the Board and the Reserve Banks, that participate in the LISCC supervisory program. They said that the Board plans to issue this guidance and begin implementation of a more consistent and centralized disclosure review approach in 2018. In addition, they said that they have begun collecting and storing conflicts of interest disclosure information for all LISCC participants, including Board LISCC staff, in one electronic system. They added that they have provided initial training to Board LISCC staff on the disclosure review process and the electronic system to ensure consistent collection of conflicts of interest data for all LISCC participants.

Recommendation: The Board of Governors should systematically collect and maintain information on the institutions supervisory employees work for before they are hired by the Federal Reserve and their employment destination when they leave. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2020, the Federal Reserve told us the status of their response to this recommendation had remained unchanged since their August 2018 update. In August 2018, the Board of Governors told us that they had implemented policies intended to mitigate the risk that an employee may be influenced by prior employment or the prospect of future employment and place their private interests ahead of the organization's supervisory mission. As an example, they said that recently the Federal Reserve broadened the scope of post-employment restrictions applicable to senior examiners. They added that the Board has begun to develop a more systematic approach to collect and monitor pre- and post-employment data through the use of an electronic system. They said that this updated electronic system is scheduled to be released, for both Board and Reserve Banks use, in 2019.

Recommendation: The Board of Governors should conduct a periodic self-assessment of ethics programs, policies, and procedures that apply to LISCC program participants. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2020, the Federal Reserve told us the status of their response to this recommendation had remained unchanged since their August 2018 update. In August 2018, the Board of Governors told us that their Ethics program staff and Supervision & Regulation staff are jointly assessing the current ethics programs, policies, and procedures applicable to LISCC program participants. The Federal Reserve expects to finalize and implement new conflicts of interest policies and procedures applicable to LISCC participants in 2019.

Recommendation: To strengthen the scenario design process, the Federal Reserve should assess--and adjust as necessary--the overall level of severity of its severely adverse scenario by expanding consideration of the trade-offs associated with different degrees of severity.

Agency: Federal Reserve System
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In January 2019, the Federal Reserve said it had initiated two projects that would allow a more efficient evaluation of multiple scenarios, including assessing trade-offs associated with different levels of scenario severity. In December 2019, Federal Reserve staff provided updates on these projects, which remain in progress. We will continue to monitor the Federal Reserve's completion and implementation of these projects and any additional actions it takes that may be responsive to our recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve understanding of the range of potential crises against which the banking system would be resilient and the outcomes that might result from different scenarios, the Federal Reserve should assess whether a single severe supervisory scenario is sufficient to inform CCAR decisions and promote the resilience of the banking system. Such an assessment could include conducting sensitivity analysis involving multiple severe supervisory scenarios--potentially using CCAR data for a cycle that is already complete, to avoid concerns about tailoring the scenario to achieve a particular outcome.

Agency: Federal Reserve System
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In January 2019, the Federal Reserve said it had initiated two projects that would allow a more efficient evaluation of multiple scenarios. In December 2019, Federal Reserve staff provided updates on these projects, which remain in progress. We will continue to monitor the Federal Reserve's completion and implementation of these projects and any additional actions it takes that may be responsive to our recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve the Federal Reserve's ability to manage model risk and ensure that decisions based on supervisory stress test results are informed by an understanding of model risk, the Federal Reserve should design and implement a process to test and document the sensitivity and uncertainty of the model system's output--the post-stress capital ratios used to make CCAR quantitative assessment determinations--including, at a minimum, the cumulative uncertainty surrounding the capital ratios and their sensitivity to key model parameters, specifications, and assumptions from across the system of models.

Agency: Federal Reserve System
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In January 2019, the Federal Reserve said it had previously initiated multiple projects to fully respond to our recommendation, several of which were now complete. In December 2019, Federal Reserve staff provided updates on the remaining projects, which remain in various stages of completion. We will continue to monitor the Federal Reserve's completion and implementation of these projects and, once we receive documentation demonstrating the completion of responsive actions, we will update the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve the Federal Reserve's ability to manage model risk and ensure that decisions based on supervisory stress test results are informed by an understanding of model risk, the Federal Reserve should design and implement a process to communicate information about the range and sources of uncertainty surrounding the post-stress capital ratio estimates to the Board during CCAR deliberations.

Agency: Federal Reserve System
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In January 2019, the Federal Reserve said it had previously initiated a project to fully respond to our recommendation. In December 2019, Federal Reserve staff provided updates on the project, but as of February 2020, had not provided documentation fully supporting implementation of a process consistent with our recommendation. We will continue to monitor the Federal Reserve's completion and implementation of this project, and we will update the status of this recommendation once we receive documentation demonstrating the completion of responsive actions.

Recommendation: To improve the Federal Reserve's ability to manage model risk and ensure that decisions based on supervisory stress test results are informed by an understanding of model risk, the Federal Reserve should design and implement a process for the Board and senior staff to articulate tolerance levels for key risks identified through sensitivity testing and for the degree of uncertainty in the projected capital ratios.

Agency: Federal Reserve System
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In January 2019, the Federal Reserve said it had previously initiated a project to fully respond to our recommendation. In December 2019, Federal Reserve staff provided updates on the project, but as of February 2020, had not provided documentation fully supporting implementation of a process consistent with our recommendation. We will continue to monitor the Federal Reserve's completion and implementation of this project, and we will update the status of this recommendation once we receive documentation demonstrating the completion of responsive actions.

Recommendation: To ensure that NCUA has adequate authority to determine the safety and soundness of credit unions, Congress should consider modifying the Federal Credit Union Act to grant NCUA authority to examine technology service providers of credit unions.

Agency: Congress
Status: Open

Comments: In July 2015, we suggested that Congress modify the Federal Credit Union Act to grant NCUA authority to examine technology service providers of credit unions. As of July 2020, Congress had not granted NCUA this authority.

Recommendation: To help ensure that FSOC is comprehensively identifying and considering companies, the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with FSOC members, should establish procedures to evaluate companies in Stage 2 and Stage 3 under both statutory determination standards when an evaluation in either stage concludes that a company does not meet one of the standards, or document--on a company-specific or more general basis--why the second determination standard is not relevant for determination evaluations.

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight Council
Status: Open

Comments: In December 2019, FSOC adopted final interpretive guidance that revises its approach to evaluating and determining whether to designate nonbank financial companies. The final revised guidance prioritizes an activities-based approach to identifying and addressing potential risks to financial stability and states that FSOC will pursue company-specific determinations only if the activities-based approach is not sufficient. The guidance further states that if FSOC does consider a company-specific determination, its evaluation will focus primarily on the first determination standard. The guidance does not indicate the establishment of procedures to evaluate companies under both determination standards for the purpose of comprehensively identifying and considering companies or to document why the other standard is not relevant. We will continue to monitor FSOC's implementation of the guidance and any additional actions that may be responsive to our recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure that FSOC is comprehensively identifying and considering companies, the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with FSOC members, should develop a process to collect information necessary for Stage 1 analysis, as appropriate, from certain nonbank financial companies for which public or regulatory information is otherwise unavailable. For example, FSOC could have companies for which such information is unavailable and that meet certain characteristics (such as quantitative thresholds similar to those used in Stage 1) report necessary information to the Office of Financial Research.

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight Council
Status: Open

Comments: In December 2019, FSOC adopted final interpretive guidance that revises its approach to evaluating and determining whether to designate nonbank financial companies. The final revised guidance introduces a new stage 1 of the designation process in which FSOC would notify a nonbank financial company under review and consider available public and regulatory information. While the guidance states that a company under review in stage 1 may submit information it deems relevant to the evaluation, FSOC would not require the company to submit information during stage 1. We will continue to monitor FSOC's implementation of the revised guidance and any additional actions that may be responsive to our recommendation.

Recommendation: FSOC and OFR should clarify responsibility for implementing requirements to monitor threats to financial stability across FSOC and OFR, including FSOC members and member agencies, to better ensure that the monitoring and analysis of the financial system are comprehensive and not unnecessarily duplicative.

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight Council
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2019, Treasury staff said that steps continue to be taken to clarify roles and responsibilities across FSOC and OFR for monitoring threats to financial stability. Treasury staff said that they are working with OFR to reorganize and restructure the organization to better fulfill its mission and support FSOC. That work is still underway and will include additional clarification of roles and responsibilities. In June 2019, the Senate confirmed a new OFR Director. Treasury published a report in response to the President's executive order (13772) on Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System that recommended the structure and mission of the Office of Financial Research should be reformed to improve its effectiveness and to ensure greater accountability. We will continue to monitor progress in implementing these steps.

Recommendation: FSOC and OFR should clarify responsibility for implementing requirements to monitor threats to financial stability across FSOC and OFR, including FSOC members and member agencies, to better ensure that the monitoring and analysis of the financial system are comprehensive and not unnecessarily duplicative.

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Financial Stability Oversight Council: Office of Financial Research
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2019 Treasury staff said that steps are being taken to clarify roles and responsibilities across FSOC and OFR for monitoring threats to financial stability. Treasury staff said that they are working with OFR to reorganize and restructure the organization to better fulfill its mission and support FSOC. That work is still underway as staff from both entities meet on a weekly basis and will include additional clarification of roles and responsibilities. The Senate confirmed a new OFR director in June 2019. In June 2017, Treasury published a report in response to the President's executive order (13772) on Core Principles for Regulating the United States Financial System that recommended the structure and mission of the Office of Financial Research should be reformed to improve its effectiveness and to ensure greater accountability. We continue to monitor FSOC and OFR actions that would be responsive to clarifying responsibilities for monitoring threats to financial stability.

Recommendation: While creating control systems at the same time that the emergency programs were being designed and implemented posed unique challenges, the recent crisis provided invaluable experience that the Federal Reserve System can apply in the future should the use of these authorities again become warranted. Going forward, to further strengthen policies for selecting vendors, ensuring the transparency and consistency of decision making involving the implementation of any future emergency programs, and managing risks related to these programs, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board should direct Federal Reserve Board and Reserve Bank staff to strengthen procedures in place to guide Reserve Banks' efforts to manage emergency program access for higher-risk borrowers by providing more specific guidance on how Reserve Bank staff should exercise discretion and document decisions to restrict or deny program access for depository institutions and primary dealers that would otherwise be eligible for emergency assistance.

Agency: Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
Status: Open

Comments: We most recently sought information from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in July 2018 regarding the status of the recommendation but did not receive any new information. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.

Recommendation: While creating control systems at the same time that the emergency programs were being designed and implemented posed unique challenges, the recent crisis provided invaluable experience that the Federal Reserve System can apply in the future should the use of these authorities again become warranted. Going forward, to further strengthen policies for selecting vendors, ensuring the transparency and consistency of decision making involving the implementation of any future emergency programs, and managing risks related to these programs, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board should direct Federal Reserve Board and Reserve Bank staff to document a plan for estimating and tracking losses that could occur under more adverse economic conditions within and across all emergency lending activities and for using this information to inform policy decisions, such as decisions to limit risk exposures through program design or restrictions applied to eligible borrowing institutions.

Agency: Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
Status: Open

Comments: We most recently sought information from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in July 2018 regarding the status of the recommendation but did not receive any new information. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.

Recommendation: While creating control systems at the same time that the emergency programs were being designed and implemented posed unique challenges, the recent crisis provided invaluable experience that the Federal Reserve System can apply in the future should the use of these authorities again become warranted. Going forward, to further strengthen policies for selecting vendors, ensuring the transparency and consistency of decision making involving the implementation of any future emergency programs, and managing risks related to these programs, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board should direct Federal Reserve Board and Reserve Bank staff to document the Federal Reserve Board's guidance to Reserve Banks on types of emergency program decisions and risk events that require approval by or consultation with the Board of Governors, the Federal Open Market Committee, or other designated groups or officials at the Federal Reserve Board.

Agency: Federal Reserve System: Board of Governors
Status: Open

Comments: We most recently sought information from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in July 2018 regarding the status of the recommendation but did not receive any new information. Therefore, the recommendation remains open.