Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD Chief Management Officer direct the task force, in consultation with the resale organizations, to reassess its methodology for estimating IT costs of consolidation, and make any necessary adjustments to its range of IT cost estimates and provide that updated information to Congress. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In August 2020, DOD stated that it had intended to convene an IT working group to reassess the methodology and begin detailed IT consolidation planning, but the COVID-19 pandemic delayed this plan. DOD also said that the working group will form as soon as conditions allow and estimated that the working group will complete its work by October 31, 2020. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the DOD Chief Management Officer provide additional written information to Congress on the comments and concerns from the military departments and resale organizations on the task force's November 2018 business case analysis, as well as the task force's response to those comments and concerns. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD did not concur with this recommendation. In its written comments on our report, DOD stated that all the submitted comments were considered in the department's decision-making process; that all of the military department secretariats agreed with above-store consolidation, despite their comments on the business case analysis; and that the military department comments regarding the business case analysis were shared with congressional committee professional staff, even though the comments were not included in DOD's report to Congress so as to protect the department's deliberative process. In an August 2020 memorandum to GAO, DOD provided similar comments, stating that it considered all comments in its decision-making process and did not attach the comments to its report to Congress in order to protect DOD's internal deliberations. If DOD takes action to respond to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in the movement of Marine Corps units by, for example, reconsidering when units should move to Guam to minimize leaving facilities vacant.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation and stated that the Marine Corps' plans for the movement of units from Okinawa to Guam has considered many factors, including, among others, the capabilities required to support Pacific Command and the logistical requirements associated with the movement of forces. In March 2020, DOD stated that the Marine Corps and Pacific Command have done extensive planning and analysis to determine how best to posture, move, and support distributed III Marine Expeditionary Force Marines. However, as of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of this analysis. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI by, for example, identifying other suitable training areas.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation and stated that it has already conducted an extensive analysis of training needs. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility by, for example, selecting other runways that would support mission requirements.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD had not identified any additional runways and stated that this is a Government of Japan responsibility. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To improve the Department of Defense's ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in challenges in Australia regarding seasonal changes and biosecurity requirements that affect equipment downtime by, for example, deciding on a location for the wet season and identifying a solution for biosecurity requirements.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD stated that no new decisions have been made regarding the Australia rotation. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To provide DOD with reliable information on potential sources of delays for the design and construction of infrastructure in Guam, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to update the Marine Corps' integrated master schedule for Guam so that it meets the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. For example, the update to the schedule should include resources for nonconstruction activities.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In March 2020, DOD stated that the updated integrated master schedule for Guam conforms to the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide and accounts for the best practices of a reliable schedule. However, as of May 2020, we have not received an updated integrated master schedule that meets the criteria for a reliable schedule.

Recommendation: To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Guam, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to revise the cost estimates for Guam to address all best practices established by GAO's cost estimating guide. Specifically, the revisions to the cost estimates should include: a unifying Work Breakdown Structure, risk and sensitivity analyses, and an independent cost estimate.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD nonconcurred with this recommendation. In March 2020, DOD stated that the department does not accept the assertion that GAO's best practices for cost estimates are universally applicable to a wide range of activities that includes military construction, acquisition, or basing. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, the Secretary of Defense should direct the appropriate entities to revise the DOD cost estimates for Hawaii to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD stated that it continues to update its cost estimates for the Hawaii program in line with GAO's cost estimating guide but did not agree that detailed cost estimates are required at this early planning stage to make decisions in the 2026 timeframe and beyond. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, the Secretary of Defense should revise the DOD cost estimates for Australia to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. As of March 2020, DOD stated that it continues to update its cost estimates for the Australia program in line with GAO's cost estimating guide. However, DOD stated that since Australia will build or provide much of the infrastructure enhancements in support of the Marine Corps, cost estimates will not incorporate the construction costs. As of May 2020, DOD has not provided documentation of actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation. We continue to believe the recommendation is valid and will monitor DOD's efforts to address it.

Recommendation: To enable the department to meet its Africa-related missions at the least cost, the Secretary of Defense should conduct a more comprehensive and well-documented analysis of options for the permanent placement of the headquarters for AFRICOM, including documentation as to whether the operational benefits of each option outweigh the costs. These options should include placing some AFRICOM headquarters personnel in forward locations, while moving others to the United States. In conducting this assessment, the Secretary should follow key principles GAO has derived for such studies, as well as principles found in DOD Instruction 7041.3, to help ensure that the results are comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. Should DOD determine that maintaining a location in Stuttgart is the best course of action, the Secretary of Defense should provide a detailed description of why the operational or other benefits outweigh the costs and benefits of relocating the command.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially agreed with GAO's recommendation. In its comments on GAO's September 2013 report DOD noted that to meet the requirements of the Budget Control Act of 2011 it would consider a wide range of options, and if any of these options required additional analysis of the location of AFRICOM headquarters, DOD would conduct a more comprehensive and well-documented analysis. However, in June 2019, DOD officials stated that the department had not conducted any additional analysis on the permanent placement of AFRICOM headquarters. Furthermore, DOD officials stated that AFRICOM would remain in Stuttgart, Germany, for the foreseeable future and no additional analysis was being planned. As of January 2020, DOD had not provided additional information to indicate progress on this recommendation. GAO maintains that such an analysis is needed and until the costs and benefits of maintaining AFRICOM headquarters in Germany are specified and weighed against the costs and economic benefits of moving the command, the department may be missing an opportunity to accomplish its missions successfully at a significantly lower cost.

Recommendation: To strengthen NNSA's oversight practices and current and future facility modernization efforts, and to improve the transparency and usefulness of cost analyses prepared for future NNSA nuclear facilities modernization projects, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Administrator of NNSA to ensure that life cycle cost analyses include a thorough and balanced evaluation of short- and long-term construction and financing alternatives. Such analyses should consider the full useful life of the facility rather than the 20-year requirement for GSA leases or any predetermined length of time that might produce results that favor one option over another.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA provided evidence that it requires life cycle cost analyses for projects greater than $20 million. However, this is not fully responsive to GAO's recommendation. For example, the recommendation stated that each life cycle cost analysis performed includes short- and long-term construction and financing alternatives and that these analyses should consider the full life of the facility rather than the 20-year requirements for GSA leases or any predetermined length of time. NNSA's actions do not address this aspect of the life cycle cost analysis. Our work found that facility's life cycle cost analysis only covered 20 years and it failed to reflect cost savings over a longer useful life (possibly over 50 years) that could have been realized if the facility were purchased instead of leased. Nothing in the Order addresses how the life cycle cost period to be analyzed should be established (e.g., 20 years or 50 plus years). Although we requested additional information from NNSA on this recommendation in fiscal year 2019, the agency has not responded. As a result, as of June 2020, the recommendation remains open.

Recommendation: To strengthen NNSA's oversight practices and current and future facility modernization efforts, and because of the importance of mitigating the risks of outsourcing nuclear weapons components and other information that if exported, might allow potential adversaries to develop or advance their nuclear capabilities, the Secretary of Energy should direct the Administrator of NNSA to take immediate action to assess the effectiveness of NNSA's oversight of KCP's current export control and nonproliferation practices and, if appropriate, initiate corrective actions to strengthen that oversight.

Agency: Department of Energy
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2020, there has been no change in the status of this recommendation. While NNSA/contractor actions are commendable and appear to be beneficial, such as adding performance-based incentives, training 950 employees, and including new contract clauses in its supplier purchase orders, these actions do not fully satisfy the recommendation. GAO's recommendation was specifically directed at the effectiveness of NNSA's oversight of the KCP contractor's export control and nonproliferation practices and to initiate corrective actions to strengthen that NNSA oversight. While the Kansas City Site Office's addition of a performance based incentive seems to be a good improvement, NNSA has not demonstrated its own oversight effectiveness. Our review of NNSA's response provided in March 2014 was not persuasive. In addition, GAO-16-710 found that as of May 2016, the Secretary of Energy had not used the enhanced procurement authority to ensure supply chain integrity, and the Department of Energy (DOE) had not developed processes for using the authority, as it had not fully assessed the circumstances under which the authority might be useful. Although NNSA provided additional information on this recommendation in August 2019, these actions relied primarily on contractor self assessments and not on independent federal oversight. As a result, this recommendation will continue to remain open.