Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should establish specific timeliness objectives for completing investigations conducted by the OIG of the IC. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should establish a time frame to finalize revisions to the OIG's investigations manual. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative procedures. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division. This program should consist of routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should develop a process to facilitate external quality assurance reviews of other IC-element OIGs' investigations divisions. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of the IC should ensure that as the ICIG finalizes its draft investigations procedures and investigator training plan, these documents provide an approach that systematically links the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities and training requirements throughout an investigator's career progression. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of CIA should establish a time frame to finalize revisions to the OIG's investigations manual. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of CIA should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative manual and policies. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of CIA should implement routine internal quality assurance reviews as part of the quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations divisions consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of DIA should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative procedures. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of DIA should implement routine external quality assurance reviews in the quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division consistent with CIGIE standards. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of DIA should take steps to ensure that notifications to complainants in reprisal cases occur and are documented in the investigative case file, as required by OIG policy. (Recommendation 12)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NGA should establish specific timeliness objectives for completing investigations conducted by the OIG of NGA. (Recommendation 13)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NGA should develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division. This program should consist of routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 14)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NGA should take steps to ensure that notifications to complainants in reprisal cases occur and are documented in the investigative case file, as required by OIG policy. (Recommendation 15)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should establish a time frame to finalize the OIG's draft investigations manual. (Recommendation 16)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should establish a process to regularly review and update the OIG's investigative procedures. (Recommendation 17)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should continue to develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division, which should incorporate routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 18)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should consider making the use of documented investigative plans a requirement for all investigations. (Recommendation 19)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should revise its training plan to provide an approach that systematically links the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to training requirements throughout an investigator's career progression. (Recommendation 20)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NRO should take steps to ensure that notifications to complainants in reprisal cases occur and are documented in the investigative case files, as required by OIG policy. (Recommendation 21)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Reconnaissance Office: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NSA should develop and implement a quality assurance program for the OIG's investigations division. This program should consist of routine internal and external quality assurance reviews consistent with CIGIE standards and guidance. (Recommendation 22)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Security Agency/Central Security Service: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Inspector General of NSA should develop an investigator training plan that provides an approach that systematically links the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to training requirements to an investigator's career progression. (Recommendation 23)

Agency: Department of Defense: National Security Agency/Central Security Service: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The SBA Administrator should assign and document clear roles, responsibilities, and reporting lines for headquarters offices' implementation of SBA's plan for addressing the White House Initiative on HBCUs in a timely manner. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Small Business Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator of the Office of Entrepreneurial Development should take and document steps to ensure that the office's reporting mechanisms collect the information needed to establish a baseline for, and also inform future monitoring and assessment of, efforts to support HBCUs. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Small Business Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrators of the Office of Entrepreneurial Development and Office of Field Operations should communicate planned efforts to support HBCUs, including expectations, goals, and related measures, to the district offices and Small Business Development Centers with HBCUs in their service areas. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Small Business Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To implement DOD guidance requiring the military departments to prepare readiness and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) budget impact assessments during drawdown planning, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the military departments to develop guidance that assigns responsibility for the preparation of impact assessments and includes direction on how such assessments should be conducted as part of drawdown planning.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on the draft report, DOD concurred with the recommendation. As of August 2018, we are in the process of following up with the department to determine the current status.

Recommendation: To implement DOD guidance requiring the military departments to prepare readiness and O&M budget impact assessments during drawdown planning, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Director, DSCA, to develop an internal control mechanism to determine whether the military departments have completed the required impact assessments before moving forward with drawdown planning and execution.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on the draft report, DOD concurred with the recommendation. As of August 2018, we are in the process of following up with the department to determine the current status.

Recommendation: To improve transparency in the rulemaking process, provide agencies and the public with information on why regulations are considered to be significant regulatory actions, and promote consistency in the designation of rules as significant regulatory actions, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget should work with agencies to clearly communicate the reasons for designating a regulation as a significant regulatory action. Specifically, OMB should encourage agencies to clearly state in the preamble of final significant regulations the section of Executive Order 12866's definition of a significant regulatory action that applies to the regulation.

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget
Status: Open

Comments: In a May 14, 2015 letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Director of OMB stated that nothing in the Executive Order 12866 prevents agencies from identifying the particular relevant definition of significance in rules, and that some rules do contain this information. The letter also stated that OMB believes it is appropriate to leave agencies flexibility in how they comply with Executive Order 12866, since such specific procedures for including such information is not a requirement of the Executive Order itself. However, in written comments submitted to GAO in March 2020, OMB stated that there are numerous examples from the past few years of agencies clearly identifying in the preambles of significant regulations the applicable section(s) of EO 12866's significance definition. OMB further stated that it encourages agencies to continue and expand this practice, especially where doing so has been found to improve agency planning for the regulatory process or to otherwise enhance decision-making. When we can further confirm that OMB has taken steps to encourage agencies to include this information in rules, we will provide an update.

Recommendation: To help ensure that the respective DHS and DOD data systems contain sufficiently complete and accurate information to facilitate effective oversight of the personnel security clearance revocation and appeal process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to take steps to ensure that data are recorded and updated in the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) and the department's new systems, so that the relevant fields are filled.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, DOD requested to close this recommendation per a closure memo signed by Ms. Nancy Spaulding. We are awaiting further documentation supporting the closure of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure independence and the efficient use of resources, the Secretary of Defense should direct the DOD General Counsel to first, resolve the disagreement about the legal authority to consolidate the PSABs (Personnel Security Appeals Board) and, in collaboration with the PSABs and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, address any other obstacles to consolidating DOD's PSABs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. DOD agreed with us to review legal or other impediments to consolidation, and stated that the DOD Office of General Counsel will address any unresolved disagreements about legal authority for consolidation of PSABs. DOD further commented that the DOD Office of General Counsel will work closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to address other issues concerning consolidation of PSABs. However, DOD commented that some DOD components disagreed with PSAB consolidation. Specifically, DOD stated that of the eleven components that provided responses to the draft report, eight concurred or had no issues or comments, while the remaining three components noted that the PSABs should remain at the component level and not be consolidated. As of July 2018, DOD stated that the DOD Office of General Counsel is conducting an ongoing review, with all legal opinions contingent upon a USD(I) funded PERSEREC study to determine the feasibility of PSAB consolidation. USD(I) is coordination with OGC in order to provide the results of the study upon completion. DOD estimates this study will be completed in the third or fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2019. As of November 2019, DOD stated that the PERSEREC study is still ongoing. GAO will continue to monitor the completion of the study.

Recommendation: To help ensure that all employees within DOD receive the same rights during the revocation process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Navy to revise Secretary of the Navy Manual M-5510.30 to specify that any information collected by the Navy PSAB from the employee's command will be shared with the employee, who will also be given the opportunity to respond to any such information provided.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, DOD stated that Navy Instruction 5510.30C and concomitant manual M-5510.30 have been revised and are being coordinated throughout the Department of the Navy at every level--to include the Action Officer level. DOD stated the estimated completion date is the third quarter of FY 2019. We have no updates on whether this instruction and the manual are complete. This recommendation will remain open pending further updates from DOD.

Recommendation: To help ensure independence and the efficient use of resources, and, if the General Counsel determines that there are no legal impediments and that other obstacles to consolidation can be addressed, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Defense Legal Services Agency to take steps to implement the Secretary of Defense's direction to consolidate DOD's PSABs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. DOD stated that some DOD components disagreed with PSAB consolidation. Specifically, DOD stated that of the eleven components that provided responses to the draft report, eight concurred or had no issues or comments, while the remaining three components noted that the PSABs should remain at the component level and not be consolidated. One of these three components also commented that the perceived efficiencies from consolidation described in our report should be validated and that all models for consolidation should be evaluated before a decision is made that would consolidate the PSABs. DOD's comments reflect internal disagreement, which corroborates our finding that there is disagreement within DOD on the legal authority, risks, and benefits of consolidating the department's multiple appeals boards. As we also note in our report, the Secretary of Defense has already directed this consolidation. As of November 2019, DOD stated that the Office of General Counsel's determination on the legal impediments to consolidation is contingent upon the results of the PERSEREC study, which will assess the feasibility of PSAB consolidation. The study results will inform the OGC decision. DOD estimates this study will be completed in the third or fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2019. However, the study has not been released yet. This recommendation will remain open until DOD takes steps to consolidate the PSABs.

Recommendation: To help ensure that all employees within DOD receive the same rights during the revocation process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to revise Army Regulation 380-67 to specify that any information collected by the Army PSAB from the employee's command or by the Army PSAB itself will be shared with the employee, who will also be given the opportunity to respond to any such information provided.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of July 2018, DOD stated that the Army updated its PSAB guidance in 2016 to include the GAO-recommended verbiage regarding new information. Similar language will also be incorporated in Army Regulation 380-67, which is currently under revision. DOD estimates the revision will be completed in the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year 2019. As of November 2019, no further updates were provided by DOD. GAO will monitor the status of this regulation and assess whether the revised regulation meets the intent of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure that all employees are treated fairly and receive the protections established in the executive order, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, to revise the Coast Guard instruction for military personnel to specify that military personnel may be represented by counsel or other representatives at their own expense.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, the Commandant of the Coast Guard issued a policy message stating that individuals may have counsel or other representatives present at the service member's own expense. According to a Coast Guard official, this message serves as interim guidance until the personnel security manual can be finalized. Coast Guard officials stated that the manual will be undergoing revision, and is expected to be updated at the end of March 2019 . We are awaiting documentation from the Coast Guard that this manual is complete. This recommendation will remain open until the Coast Guard finalizes the update to its manual in accordance with our recommendation.

Recommendation: To facilitate department-wide review and assessment of the quality of the personnel security clearance revocation process, the DNI should, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, develop performance measures to better enable them to identify and resolve problems, and direct the collection of related revocation and appeals information.

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, ODNI stated that review proceedings considerations have been a focus of the ongoing Trusted Workforce 2.0 discussions with a view toward whether policy changes were necessary. ODNI further stated that one key to further examination of this issue is to gather metrics which can inform any subsequent adjustment to the current Executive Branch revocation and review proceedings area. They stated that metrics collection has begun with a January 2019 data call which includes the capture of metrics on denials, revocations, and national security adjudications resulting in an adverse adjudication of eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. Metrics collected is expected to be completed in 2020. When we confirm what data fields are included in the metrics collection and whether this meets the intent of our recommendation, we will provide further updates.

Recommendation: To facilitate coordination between personnel security and human capital offices regarding how a security clearance revocation should affect an employee's employment status, and to help ensure that individuals are treated in a fair and consistent manner, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, to review and revise policy regarding coordination between the personnel security and human capital offices to clarify what information can and should be communicated between human capital and personnel security officials at specified decision points in the revocation process, and when that information should be communicated.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, DOD stated that USD(I) has formed a working group to develop a new DOD manual that would respond to this recommendation. DOD further stated that this working group has completed the first half of the manual and will finish the initial review by the fourth quarter of FY 2019. Estimated completion date for the manual is the first quarter of FY 2020. This recommendation remains open pending the department's issuance of this manual.

Recommendation: To help ensure that the DNI report to Congress contains accurate data about the number of current DOD military and federal civilian employees eligible to access classified information, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to review and analyze the discrepancies in the total number of employees and the number of employees eligible to access classified information, and take immediate steps to address the problems.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD stated that this recommendation is tied to recommendation 2 regarding updating information in JPAS and DISS. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I) is facilitating Data Quality Initiatives to identify where gaps may exist and ensure all pertinent data is recorded and updated in JPAS and its successor system, DISS. Officials stated that there is an annual or quarterly service specific personnel center synchronization effort to match the data in JPAS and the personnel centers. Since publication of our report through December 2017, DMDC has conducted 413 DQIs to evaluate and correct data anomalies in JPAS. Further, on a monthly basis, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), DOD components, and industry participate in a meeting which addresses actions to improve the accuracy of information in JPAS. GAO will monitor fielding of the new system and in the process of validating DOD officials' statements that discrepancies have been substantially resolved. As of November 2019, DOD requested to close this recommendation per a closure memo signed by Ms. Nancy Spaulding. We are awaiting further documentation supporting the closure of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure that similarly situated individuals are treated consistently, and to facilitate oversight and help ensure the quality of the security clearance revocation process, the DNI should review whether the existing security clearance revocation process is the most efficient and effective approach. In this review, the DNI should consider whether there should be a single personnel security clearance revocation process used across all executive-branch agencies and workforces, with consideration of areas such as the timing of the personal appearance in the revocation process, and the ability to cross-examine witnesses. Further, to the extent that a single process or changes to the existing parallel processes are warranted, the DNI should consider whether there is a need to establish any policies and procedures to facilitate a more consistent process, and recommend as needed any revisions to existing executive orders or other executive-branch guidance.

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI concurred with our recommendation. As of November 2019, ODNI stated that there is not currently an ongoing effort to review the security clearance revocation process across all executive branch agencies and workforces. Instead, the Trusted Workforce 2.0 efforts is conducting an end-to-end review of the current security clearance process for the executive branch and ODNI is currently gathering metrics on adverse security actions which can inform any subsequent determination on whether the revocation process requires policy adjustment by the DNI. When we confirm what actions DNI has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.