Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should direct the W87-1 program to ensure consistent, reliable, and objective assessments of remaining feature and component design decisions in Phase 6.2 by developing study plans for remaining design studies consistent with the guidelines for such plans in NNSA's AOA procedure, including documenting and justifying deviations from best practices. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should direct the Office of Defense Programs to revise its program execution instruction to require that design studies for warhead life extension and replacement programs follow AOA best practices, such as by having a study plan, or to justify and document deviations from best practices. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should direct the Office of Defense Programs' plutonium program office to ensure that the integrated master schedule in development for pit production meets NIMS standards, consistent with best practices for schedule development. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should direct the W87-1 program to prioritize the development and documentation of a risk mitigation strategy to address the risk that pit production may be insufficient to meet W87-1 production needs. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should require the W80-4 program, when it issues its baseline cost report prior to entry into phase 6.4, to adopt a date for the delivery of a first production unit, and dates for other key program milestones, based on the program's current schedule risk analysis, or document its justification for adopting alternative schedules and milestones based on other factors. If necessary, the Administrator should alert the Secretary of Energy to the need to engage in the extension or notification processes identified in statute for adopting a first production unit delivery date after September 2025. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should revise the Program Execution Instruction or other related directives to require future LEPs and nuclear weapon modernization programs of similar complexity, when they issue a WDCR or baseline cost report, to establish program schedules and key milestone dates (including the FPU delivery date) on the basis of a formal schedule risk analysis that aligns with best practices, or document the justification for any decision to adopt alternative schedules and milestones based on other factors. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The NPO Cost Savings Program Manager should work with CNS to evaluate the remaining site reinvestment funds and develop and implement a plan for how best to aggregate and use them. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation. In comments on a draft of the report, DOE stated that NPO plans to work with CNS on a plan for the remaining reinvestment funds, with an estimated completion date of December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should gather data on and document an analysis of the Cost Savings Program, including its cost effectiveness, to determine whether it is exportable to existing or future contracts. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred, in principle, with the recommendation. In its comments on a draft of the report, NNSA stated that potential benefits of the cost savings program should be considered for future contracts, as applicable. NNSA stated that it believes this recommendation is closed with actions to address other recommendations. We disagree and continue to believe that NNSA should document an analysis of the cost savings program, including its cost effectiveness, to determine the exportability of the program to other contracts.

Recommendation: The NPO Cost Savings Program Manager should share relevant lessons learned with other NNSA sites so that those sites can determine if efficiencies CNS has achieved can be implemented at other sites. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation. In its comments on a draft of the report, NNSA stated that it plans to upload lessons learned into DOE's Corporate Lessons Learned Database so they can be considered by other sites by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should evaluate whether to require all other sites to institute an Annual Controlled Baseline. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation. In its comments on a draft of the report, NNSA stated that it plans to evaluate whether to expand use of Annual Controlled Baselines to other sites by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should incorporate additional management controls to better oversee and coordinate NNSA's microelectronics activities. Such management controls could include investing the microelectronics coordinator with increased responsibility and authority, developing an overarching management plan, and developing a mission need statement and a microelectronics requirements document. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In a May 2020 letter signed by the NNSA Administrator that provided agency comments on our draft report, NNSA neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendation. However, NNSA stated that by December 2020 the agency plans to complete a strategic management plan that will more clearly articulate the integration of management controls for the various components of its microelectronics activities. NNSA stated that it believes this action is consistent with our recommendation. We are encouraged by this planned action and will evaluate the completed strategic management plan to determine if it meets the intent of our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Program Director for Financial Integration, with input from NNSA's Office of Management and Budget and respective program offices, should establish and implement a work breakdown structure change control process for common financial reporting that ensures changes are approved by program office management, at a minimum; documented; and communicated to M&O contractors on a timely basis. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with the recommendation and officials said they are working to establish a work breakdown structure change control process by June 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Program Director for Financial Integration should assess the extent to which M&O contractors make manual changes to their financial data to reconcile with STARS and determine whether it has an effect on the accuracy of the data collected for common financial reporting. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with the recommendation and plans to review how management and operating (M&O) contractors make manual changes to their financial data as part of an ongoing review of M&O contractors indirect cost data. The review is expected to be completed by September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Program Director for Financial Integration should develop and implement an internal process for NNSA to verify how the M&O contractors crosswalk financial data from their systems to the appropriate NNSA work breakdown structure to ensure the reported data are accurate and consistent. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with the recommendation and plans to establish a process to verify that the management and operating (M&O) contractors are crosswalking their financial data to the appropriate NNSA work breakdown structure by September 30, 2020. As of April 2020, NNSA has hired two federal employees who will be conducting site visits to work with M&O contractors on verifying their crosswalks.

Recommendation: The Program Director for Financial Integration should develop and implement an internal process for NNSA to verify that the M&O contractors are consistently applying common cost element definitions at their sites and across the nuclear security enterprise. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with the recommendation and plans to establish a process to verify that the management and operating (M&O) contractors are consistently applying common cost element definitions at their sites and across the nuclear security enterprise by September 30, 2020. As of April 2020, NNSA has hired two federal employees who will be conducting site visits to work with M&O contractors on verifying their crosswalks.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should report information on all professional SSCs to which funds were obligated during the fiscal year in its annual congressional budget justification materials. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with our recommendation and agreed to update its methodology for the fiscal year 2021 budget justification materials in an effort to ensure that contracts are counted accurately. Based on our review of the contracts listed in the budget justification materials, NNSA inappropriately excluded six contracts from its fiscal year 2021 congressional budget justification reporting. GAO is following up with NNSA officials to determine why these contracts were excluded.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should collect and report all required data regarding the number of FTE contractor personnel employed under an SSC for more than 2 years. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred in principle with the recommendation and planned to meet with congressional staff to discuss ways to further enhance the reported data before the 2021 budget materials were prepared. NNSA provided additional information in its fiscal year 2021 budget justification explaining that it did not have access to the information needed to report information to report required data regarding the number of FTE contractor personnel employed under an support service contract for more than 2 years. We will continue to follow-up on NNSA's progress in collecting and reporting the required data.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should report in NNSA's annual congressional budget justification materials the program appropriations account—Weapons Activities or Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation—used to fund each SSC and total the amounts obligated by appropriations account. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA concurred with the recommendation and included in the fiscal year 2021 budget justification materials additional information on the fund value and description in the table of support service contracts. However, NNSA did not total the amounts for each appropriation account. As a result, information on the total amounts of each appropriation account is not as transparent as it could be to assist Congress for planning purposes. GAO is following up with agency officials to identify any additional actions planned to close the recommendation.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should take steps to ensure that contracting officers document—in the required determination form or elsewhere in the contract file—information on the steps that the contracting officers plan to take to oversee SSCs that NNSA has determined to be at high risk of including inherently governmental functions. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In its comments on a draft of this report, NNSA stated that it considers the recommendation closed based on processes already in place, as well as the complementary activities discussed in response to our sixth recommendation. We continue to believe that documenting planned oversight activities in the contract files is important to ensure that planned oversight is consistent throughout the duration of the contract. We will continue to monitor NNSA's implementation of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Associate Administrator for Acquisition and Project Management should develop a process to verify that contracting officers are carrying out the steps identified to oversee contracts at risk of including inherently governmental functions throughout the term of the contract. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NNSA generally agreed with the recommendation. NNSA stated that, among other things, it will review and revise, as necessary, the designation letters for contractor officers' representatives to ensure they clearly address the expectations for daily operational awareness and monitoring for risks associated with high-risk contracts, including those involving activities closely associated with inherently governmental functions. We will continue to monitor the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: NNSA's Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager and relevant NNSA officials and contractor representatives at NNSA sites should take steps to improve the accuracy of FIMS data related to NNSA's infrastructure supporting explosives activities. These steps should include reviewing and updating information about associations of assets with primary and secondary explosives missions; ensuring that those who provide asset information to FIMS administrators understand the data they need to provide; and clarifying how to accurately enter information in FIMS for explosives assets that are not buildings. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of July 2020, we are currently reviewing agency information and plan to reach out as needed for additional information for this recommendation.

Recommendation: NNSA's Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA's Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include discussion of identified challenges related to explosives activities, such as data quality, workforce levels, and safety as well as any actions to address them, as appropriate, or document the rationale for why identified challenges were not included. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: Based on trade press reports, NNSA appears to be taking several actions that, collectively, may serve to close this recommendation as implemented. As of July 2020, we are awaiting information from agency officials and will update the status of this recommendation when the information is received.

Recommendation: NNSA's Energetic Materials Enterprise Manager, in consultation with members of NNSA's Energetics Coordinating Committee, should, as the agency revises its Defense Programs Strategic Plan for Energetic Materials, include fully developed elements of an effective strategic plan, such as a clearly identified mission statement and performance goals that are quantifiable, set time frames for completion, and list responsible parties to carry out specific activities for all strategic goals. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: Based on trade press reports, NNSA appears to be making progress implementing this recommendation. As of July 2020, we have requested additional information from agency officials and will update the recommendation status when the information is received.

Recommendation: The Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration should develop and document clear procedures for implementing NAP-4C, specifying the process for collecting contractor performance information and describing how officials are to ensure this information can be traced to rating determinations. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) concurred with the recommendation. In February 2020, NNSA issued its fiscal year 2020 Corporate Performance Evaluation Process Annual Implementation Guidance. This guidance included a new section specifying the process for collecting contractor performance information and further details regarding the preparation of interim feedback reports and final performance evaluation reports. However, the guidance is unclear regarding how this information can be traced to rating determinations. In order to provide more transparency and ensure this traceability, NNSA guidance and the Performance Evaluation Reports themselves should more clearly link how collected performance information tracks to rating determinations.

Recommendation: The Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration should update its policy to require that Performance Evaluation Reports include quality information on cost performance to enable an overall assessment of Management and Operating contractor cost performance. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) concurred with the recommendation. In February 2020, NNSA issued its fiscal year 2020 Corporate Performance Evaluation Process Annual Implementation Guidance. This guidance provides instructions regarding the evaluation of cost performance, including examples of the types of cost information that should be collected and how cost data should be analyzed and described. However, the guidance's template for Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plans does not include any explicit cost performance Objectives or Key Outcomes and it is unclear how the cost performance information discussed in the guidance would enable an overall assessment of Management and Operating contractor cost performance. In order to provide quality cost information that does enable such an overall assessment, NNSA should clarify its guidance regarding cost performance information and how this information links to overall Management and Operating contractor performance.

Recommendation: The Program Director for Financial Integration should collect and document requirements to define project scope and meet project objectives. These requirements should be updated periodically throughout the life of the project. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2020, NNSA provided a project plan for tasks to be completed for common financial reporting through 2021. However, NNSA has not developed requirements that define specific or detailed requirements for successful implementation of common financial reporting, such as the types of information that program managers need.

Recommendation: The Program Director for Financial Integration should develop a detailed project schedule. The detailed schedule should be documented as part of the annual report to Congress required in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2020, NNSA established a detailed project schedule for the common financial reporting effort through fiscal year 2021. However, NNSA should communicate this detailed project schedule for the effort to Congress on an annual basis.

Recommendation: The Program Director for Financial Integration should develop a formal process to identify risks, document those risks, and plan how to minimize risk exposure. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In June 2020, NNSA developed a risk management plan for common financial reporting which established a framework for identifying and managing risks. GAO will continue to monitor NNSA's efforts to implement the plan, including how NNSA identifies and documents risks and mitigates risk exposure using its management plan.

Recommendation: The Program Director for Financial Integration should develop an approach to effectively engage with all project stakeholders that incorporates their expectations into project decisions. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: As of September 2020, NNSA has continued to engage on a regular basis with its M&O contractors. However, similar efforts have not continued with stakeholders of the program offices.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NNSA should ensure that the Office of the CIO and other offices, as appropriate, develop and implement policies and procedures that establish agency-wide policy for the level of detail with which planned expenditures for all transactions that include IT resources are to be reported to the CIO. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with this recommendation and plans to develop relevant policies and procedures by June 2020. We will continue to monitor the agency's progress towards implementing our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NNSA should ensure that the Office of the CIO and other offices, as appropriate, develop and implement policies and procedures that include the CIO in the planning and budgeting stages for all programs that are fully or partially supported with IT resources. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with this recommendation and plans to develop relevant policies and procedures by June 2020. We will continue to monitor the agency's progress towards implementing our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NNSA should ensure that the Office of the CIO and other offices, as appropriate, develop and implement policies and procedures that include the CIO as a member of governance boards that inform decisions regarding all IT resources. (Recommendation 12)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with this recommendation and plans to develop relevant policies and procedures by June 2020. We will continue to monitor the agency's progress towards implementing our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NNSA should ensure that the Office of the CIO and other offices, as appropriate, develop and implement policies and procedures that document the process for the CIO's review and approval of the major IT investments portion of the budget request. (Recommendation 13)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with this recommendation and plans to develop relevant policies and procedures by June 2020. We will continue to monitor the agency's progress towards implementing our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NNSA should ensure that the Office of the CIO and other offices, as appropriate, develop and implement policies and procedures that document the CIO's role in reviewing IT resources that are to support major program objectives and significant increases and decreases in IT resources. (Recommendation 14)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with this recommendation and plans to develop relevant policies and procedures by June 2020. We will continue to monitor the agency's progress towards implementing our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NNSA should direct the Office of the CIO and other offices, as appropriate, to take steps to ensure that the actions taken to comply with OMB's common baseline for implementing FITARA on individual investments are adequately documented. (Recommendation 15)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with this recommendation and plans to develop relevant policies and procedures by June 2020. We will continue to monitor the agency's progress towards implementing our recommendation.

Recommendation: OAPM should monitor how field offices currently manage older, existing Management and Operating contract documents and use the results to improve its process for accessing such documents. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA agreed with this recommendation. Per NNSA, as of October 2018, it was developing a plan and schedule for implementing Procurement Management Reviews (PMRs), which will include monitoring how NNSA field offices manage older management and operating contract documents and use the results to improve access to such documents. As of April 2020, we will continue to monitor how NNSA carries out its oversight of field offices contract document management practices.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should revise the scope of the mission need statement to clarify which mission need it seeks to achieve and, as appropriate, adjust the range of options considered in the analysis of alternatives process. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA disagreed with our recommendation and has not taken steps to implement it. In August 2019, GAO requested an update on the status of the small centrifuge project at Oak Ridge since NNSA officials indicated in May 2019 that the status of the small centrifuge project will impact NNSA's ability to complete the analysis of alternatives (AOA) process by December 2019, as originally planned. Early in calendar year 2020, NNSA announced that completion of the AOA would be delayed to the end of fiscal year 2020. In September 2020, NNSA stated that the COVID-19 pandemic had further delayed the AOA and that the agency had not determined a revised target date for completion. We will continue monitoring the AOA process and will review the AOA once it is completed to determine whether we can close this recommendation at that time.

Recommendation: The NNSA Administrator should--following clarification of the scope of the mission need statement--ensure that the agency's cost estimates for whichever options it considers going forward are aligned with the scope of the mission need that the enrichment capability is intended to fulfill and that they are developed consistent with best practices. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA disagreed with our recommendation and has not taken steps to implement it. In August 2019, GAO requested an update on the status of the small centrifuge project at Oak Ridge since NNSA officials indicated in May 2019 that the status of the small centrifuge project will impact NNSA's ability to complete the analysis of alternatives (AOA) process by December 2019, as originally planned. Early in calendar year 2020, NNSA announced that completion of the AOA would be delayed to the end of fiscal year 2020. In September 2020, NNSA stated that the COVID-19 pandemic had further delayed the AOA and that the agency had not determined a revised target date for completion. We will continue monitoring the AOA process and will review the AOA once it is completed to determine whether we can close this recommendation at that time.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NNSA should require an independent entity to validate that contractor EVM systems used for LEPs meet the EVM national standard. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2018, NNSA stated that the integrated baseline reviews, internal reviews of earned value management (EVM) systems used by life extension programs (LEP), and other controls over data integration provide a practical and cost-beneficial approach to the validation of contractor EVM systems. However, in early 2019, NNSA conducted a lessons learned study to more fully assess the cost, benefit, mission impacts, and feasibility of implementing our recommendation for possible application to future LEPs. According to NNSA documentation, based on the results of the lessons learned study, NNSA concluded that the effort and expense needed to validate contractor EVM systems against the EVM national standard could be better used providing resources to improve the agency's ability to establish work breakdown structures, schedules, and integration of scope, cost, and schedule. As a result, as of September 2019, NNSA stated that its actions meet the intent of our recommendation. We disagree. As we stated in our report, without requiring an independent entity to validate that contractor EVM systems meet the EVM national standard, NNSA may not have assurance that its LEPs are obtaining reliable EVM data for managing their programs and reporting their status. We will continue to monitor NNSA's activities to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NNSA should require an independent entity to conduct surveillance reviews of contractor EVM systems used for LEPs to ensure that they maintain compliance with the EVM national standard through program completion. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2018, NNSA stated that it conducts ongoing surveillance through integrated baseline reviews, internal reviews of EVM systems used by LEPs, and other assessments, which consider national standards. However, in early 2019, NNSA conducted a lessons learned study to more fully assess the cost, benefit, mission impacts, and feasibility of implementing our recommendation for possible application to future LEPs. According to NNSA documentation, based on the results of the lessons learned study, NNSA concluded that the effort and expense needed to conduct surveillance reviews of contractor EVM systems to ensure compliance with the EVM national standard could be better used providing resources to improve the agency's ability to establish work breakdown structures, schedules, and integration of scope, cost, and schedule. As a result, as of September 2019, NNSA stated that its actions meet the intent of our recommendation. We disagree. As we stated in our report, without requiring an independent entity to conduct surveillance reviews of contractor EVM systems through program completion, NNSA may not have assurance that its LEPs are obtaining reliable EVM data for managing their programs and reporting their status. We will continue to monitor NNSA's activities to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Administrator of NNSA should require its programs to ensure that LEP critical technologies meet specific technology readiness level benchmarks at decision points, or otherwise document with program executive approval their rationale for not meeting these benchmarks. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In October 2018, NNSA stated that it has already incorporated specific benchmarks for technology readiness levels at decision points. As an example, it stated that it recommends a technology readiness level of 5 at the beginning of phase 6.3 for an LEP. As a result, NNSA stated that its actions meet the intent of our recommendation. We disagree. As we stated in our report, it is important for NNSA to establish a requirement, not just a recommendation, that LEP critical technologies meet specific technology readiness level benchmarks at decision points. We will continue to monitor NNSA's activities to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help NNSA put forth more credible modernization plans, the NNSA Administrator should include an assessment of the affordability of NNSA's portfolio of modernization programs in future versions of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan--for example, by presenting options NNSA could consider to bring its estimates of modernization funding needs into alignment with potential future budgets, such as potentially deferring the start of or canceling specific modernization programs.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: NNSA included a new section in the Fiscal Year 2020 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) of its analysis of the affordability of its weapons modernization plans. However, this section still does not include details about, or an assessment of, the options NNSA might have to take in the future--such as adjusting the schedules or scopes of certain programs or projects--to address an apparent misalignment between the future budget estimates of its portfolio of nuclear modernization programs and the projections of potential future budgets. Therefore, we will continue to review future SSMPs to assess whether NNSA has included additional information or an assessment consistent with this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve the internal control environment for oversight using information from CAS and develop a consistent approach to the use of information from CAS in M&O contractor oversight and performance evaluation across the nuclear security enterprise, the Administrator of NNSA should establish comprehensive NNSA policies and guidance, beyond a general framework as included in NAP-21, for using information from CAS to conduct oversight of M&O contractors, clarifying whether CAS is to cover mission-related activities, and describing how to conduct assessments of risk, CAS maturity, and the level of the contractor's past performance.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: We recommended that NNSA establish comprehensive policies and guidance, beyond a general framework, for using information from contractor assurance systems (CAS) to conduct oversight of management and operating (M&O) contractors, clarifying whether CAS is to cover mission-related activities and describing how to conduct assessments of risk, CAS maturity, and the level of the contractor's past performance. NNSA agreed with the recommendation and has taken an important step to revise its policy. However, NNSA needs to take additional action. Specifically, NNSA approved a revised corporate site governance policy in August 2016, and NNSA further revised its policy in October 2019. The revised policy improves on the agency's prior policy by clarifying one element in our recommendation that CAS is to cover mission-related activities. However the policy is still a general framework and NNSA has not established associated implementing guidance. Specifically, NNSA needs to develop guidance for NNSA headquarters' and field offices' procedures to use information from CAS and appropriately balance use of information from CAS with other more direct activities to oversee M&O contractors. As of April 2020, this recommendation remains open.

Recommendation: To enhance the usefulness of NNSA's future reports to Congress describing the costs and benefits of its competition of M&O contracts under the requirements contained in Section 3121 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2013, as amended, the NNSA Administrator should take steps to ensure that future reports reflect DOE's information quality guidelines, federal cost accounting standards, and GAO's best practices guidance relevant to the clear and complete presentation of information on each of the required topics. In particular, future reports should clearly and completely describe costs and benefits, including the agency's expectations, as well as the associated analysis, assumptions, information sources, and key limitations and uncertainties about costs and benefits described. The description of uncertainties should include key excluded or unspecified costs and benefits, such as those that are anticipated but not fully known at the time of report writing.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA believes it has met the requirements of the recommendation and considers it closed. In our March 2015 report--which examined NNSA's report on the contract to manage and operate the Pantex Plant and the Y-12 National Security Complex under a single management and operating (M&O) contract with Consolidated Nuclear Services (CNS)--we recommended that NNSA enhance the clarity and completeness of its future reports on the costs and benefits of M&O contract competitions. While NNSA demonstrated progress in implementing this recommendation in its September 2017, August 2018, and April 2019 reports to Congress on the costs and benefits of the contract competitions for the Sandia, Nevada, and Los Alamos sites respectively, NNSA did not provide clear and complete information on all required elements of these reports. Specifically, for the Sandia National Laboratories M&O contract, in our August 2018 report we found that NNSA addressed most but not all reporting requirements. For example, NNSA's report addressed all requirements pertaining to cost savings, other benefits, and disruptions or delays, but only partially addressed the reporting requirements on the limitations or uncertainties about cost savings and on the immediate costs of competition and over the life of the contract. NNSA issued a report in August 2018 on the costs and benefits of its competition of the M&O contract for the Nevada National Security Site. In our April 2019 report on NNSA's cost-benefit analysis of that contract competition, we found that, of the five required reporting elements, NNSA's report addressed one with detail but addressed the other four without detail. In April 2019 NNSA issued its cost-benefit analysis of the competition for the Los Alamos National Laboratory contract. In our January 2020 report on NNSA's cost-benefit report for that contract competition, we found that it addressed five reporting elements on costs and disruption during contract transition with detail, partially addressed two reporting elements on uncertainties and benefits, and did not address one reporting element on activities to be covered by the M&O contractor. Since our 2015 recommendation, NNSA's cost-benefit reports on M&O contract competitions have generally provided clearer and more complete information on most of the required reporting elements, but they have not provided clear and complete information on all required reporting elements. In June 2020, NNSA announced that it would end the current CNS contract for Pantex and Y-12 management and operations instead of awarding the contractor its final option term. This will result in a new contract competition and award by the end of the current contract's term on September 30, 2021. The NNSA report on the costs and benefits of that competition may give us another opportunity to assess the quality of NNSA's reports for clarity and completeness on the required reporting elements.

Recommendation: To allow Congress to better oversee management of the nuclear security enterprise and to improve NNSA's management information with respect to the base capabilities necessary to ensure nuclear weapons are safe, secure, and reliable, the Administrator of NNSA should, once the Stockpile Services work breakdown structure reflects a product or capability basis, use this work breakdown structure to develop product/capability cost estimates that adequately justify the congressional budget request for Stockpile Services.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA has significantly improved its work breakdown structure for Stockpile Services. The work breakdown structure now reflects a product or capability basis to a much greater extent than it did previously. NNSA restructured its budget starting with its fiscal year 2021 budget justification materials. GAO, through ongoing work, is continuing to monitor NNSA's development of cost estimates for Stockpile Services products and capabilities that inform future years' budget requests and justifications.

Recommendation: To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, the Administrator of NNSA should direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to develop a realistic schedule for the W76 warhead and future life extension programs that allows NNSA to (1) address technical challenges while meeting all military requirements and (2) build in time for unexpected technical challenges that may delay the program.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: In past and ongoing work, GAO has identified areas where NNSA's modernization plans may not align with planned funding requests over the Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP) and post-FYNSP periods. Based on the FY 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), (GAO-14-45) NNSA plans to work on five life extension programs (LEP) or major alterations through 2038. The FY 2014 SSMP states that the LEP workload represents a resource and production throughput challenge that requires improvements in LEP planning and execution. GAO's analysis indicates there is limited contingency time built into the LEP schedules, all of which are technically ambitious. Any delays in schedules could lead to an increase in program costs or a reduction in the number built for any of the LEPs, both of which have occurred in prior and ongoing LEPs. While NNSA has acknowledged issues and identified some steps to improve the LEP process, this recommendation will remain open and unimplemented until NNSA demonstrates successful LEP and refurbishment execution. We reconfirmed this finding in GAO-17-341 where we found the following: In some cases, NNSA's FY 2017 nuclear security budget materials do not align with the agency's modernization plans, both within the 5-year FYNSP for fiscal years 2017 through 2021 and beyond, raising concerns about the affordability of NNSA's planned portfolio of modernization programs. As of June 2020, this situation has not been fully addressed as evidenced by cost increases and likely delays in the B61-12 and W88 ALTV programs; an aggressive schedule in the W80-4 program, and a large scope in the W87-1 warhead replacement. In addition, new programs contained in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review and the announcement of a new development effort, the W93, may further stress NNSA's program.

Recommendation: To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, the Administrator of NNSA should direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to ensure that the program managers responsible for overseeing the construction of new facilities directly related to future life extension programs coordinate with the program managers of such future programs to avoid the types of delays and problems faced with the construction and operation of the Fogbank manufacturing facility for the W76 program.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: A number of Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plans (SSMP) state that the life extension program (LEP) workload represents a resource and production throughput challenge that requires improvements in LEP planning and execution. The officials elaborated that the main area that will be strained is pit production. NNSA's plutonium strategy needs to be resourced fully and implemented successfully by 2030 to support the W87 warhead replacement. Additionally, the officials said that the UPF project and an arrange of associated programmatic efforts need to be operational by 2025 or there will be challenges in completing all of the planned LEPs. In addition, NNSA needs to re-establish depleted uranium operations, construct a new lithium facility and establish a domestic uranium enrichment function for tritium production by the late 2020s to meet stockpile needs. As such, this recommendation remains open and, given the aggressive warhead and bomb modernization efforts proceeding in parallel with infrastructure modernization efforts, will likely remain open for some time.

Recommendation: To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, the Administrator of NNSA should direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to ensure that program managers for the construction of new facilities for future life extensions base their schedule for the construction and start-up of a facility on the life extension program managers' needs identified in their risk mitigation strategies.

Agency: Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: NNSA has generally improved its management of construction projects, to include requirements setting, Analysis of Alternatives, and independent cost estimates, among other items. However, it is too soon to tell if these positive developments will help--or hinder--LEPs that are underway or are being conducted. Key uranium activities, to include construction and operating funds will not be complete until 2025; key tritium and lithium programs and facilities will not complete until the 2030s; key plutonium activities are underway as well, but will not be complete until the late 2020s. As of June 2020, there are no significant changes related to this recommendation, and it will continue to remain open.