Recommendation: We recommend that the Director, DCMA, in collaboration with the Director, DCAA, develop a mechanism to monitor and assess whether contractor business systems reviews are being completed in a timely manner. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Contract Management Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DCMA concurred with our recommendation and the department notified us in March 2019 that collaboration between DCMA and DCAA to develop a mechanism to increase oversight and improve management of contractor business system audits and determinations had begun. In September 2019, DCMA and DCAA provided lists of the business system reviews planned to be conducted during fiscal year 2020, showing that the data needed for oversight of all CBS reviews is available between the two agencies. Further, an April 2019 DCMA memorandum indicated that DCAA data on planned reviews for fiscal years 2019 and 2020 had been transferred to DCMA and that administrate contracting officers were to conduct risk assessments to identify additional reviews for DCAA to complete in the future. In August 2020, DCMA and DCAA specified the sources of the data provided earlier; DCAA data is collected through its strategic workload and resource initiative and inputted into the DCAA Management Information System while DCMA business system review data continues to be maintained by the functional offices responsible for those reviews. Both agencies stated that progress against planned reviews is tracked and status is reported to management at regular intervals. DCMA also noted a series of new tools designed to enhance surveillance of contractor business systems and implementation of corrective actions. These steps indicate progress towards increased insight into both the completion CBS review and the follow-up that occurs afterward. However It remains unclear to what extent data sharing between DCAA and DCMA to support CBS review planning has been formalized and will continue or the extent to which DCMA headquarters uses this data to assess implementation of its policies for the conduct of CBS reviews.

Recommendation: The DOD Inspector General should implement a process to document employee recusals and impairments to independence and incorporate such information into an aggregate-level evaluation of threats to DODIG's independence. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Inspector General
Status: Open

Comments: The DOD Inspector General concurred with this recommendation and stated in July 2020 that the DOD Office of Inspector General was in the process of implementing it.

Recommendation: To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, and to help ensure that the Air Force strategies to address UAS pilot shortages are tailored to address remaining issues, such as the significant amount of pilots who are temporarily assigned to the UAS pilot career, the limited amount of cadet interest in the UAS pilot career, and the workload of UAS pilots, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to revise the Get Well Plan to address these issues.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: Although the Air Force has taken some steps to address issues such as the use of pilots temporarily assigned to the UAS pilot career and has accelerated its efforts to increase recruit interest in this particular field, high operational tempo, manning shortages and increased workload among UAS pilots still exist. As noted earlier, in July 2018, the Air Force established a new office within its headquarters a focal point for overseeing RPA personnel matters throughout the Air Force and it established a career field manager (CFM) specifically for RPA personnel, placing the career field on par with manned aircraft pilot career fields. These latest efforts show that the Air Force is taking actions to address challenges to the RPA community beyond the stated goals of the Get Well Plan that we identified and on an enterprise-wide level. Because the Air Force efforts are newly instituted and it remains to be seen how UAS aircrew workloads will be affected, we believe that as of November 2019 this recommendation should remain open until more progress is made.

Recommendation: To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, and to help the Air Force ensure that its strategies are having the intended effects, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to monitor the extent to which that achieving the human capital goals in its strategy helps the Air Force achieve its programmatic goals.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. According to headquarters Air Force officials, the Air Force has three program goals that are related to addressing UAS pilot shortfalls: to (1) meet combat demand, (2) staff enough personnel to UAS units to allow UAS pilots time to train and take part in development activities, and (3) provide surge UAS combat capabilities when needed. As of September 2019, the Air Force does not have enough personnel in UAS units to allow UAS pilots time to train and take part in developmental activities-known as being in "dwell." As of November 2019, Air Force officials state that they are able to "meet combat demand" but are not able to provide enough manpower to "surge UAS combat capabilities when needed." Therefore, we believe this recommendation should remain open.

Recommendation: To help the Air Force in its effort to address UAS pilot shortfalls, and to help the Air Force ensure that it is poised to meet future needs for UAS pilots, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to explore the potential use of additional flexibilities that would enable it to increase the number of UAS pilots in its workforce.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In a March 2018 report to Congress, the Air Force stated it had developed a deliberate plan to integrate enlisted pilots in the RQ-4 Global Hawk UAS as it provided the ideal environment to expand mission flexibility. Further, as another way to build capability in support of human capital strategies by using flexibilities, an Air Force selection board met in July 2017 to consider total force officer as well as civilian candidates for various test pilot positions to include test UAS pilots. Finally, the Air Force is seeking legislative changes to allow the Air Reserve Component to perform full time, 24/7, 365 operational missions such as the UAS mission, in Active Guard Reserve status. Additionally, in July 2018, Air Force is in the process of establishing a new division to be the Headquarters focal point for overseeing RPA personnel matters throughout the Air Force and they also stated the Air Force established a career field manager (CFM) specifically for RPA personnel, placing the career field on par with manned aircraft pilot career fields. Further, the Air Force is working on an initiative that would enable it to provide UAS pilots with "dwell time"-a time during which servicemembers are at their home station during which they are able to take leave, attend training, and recuperate. As of November 2019, the Air Force had not implemented this initiative. Additionally, the Air Force has increased the maximum annual retention pay for UAS pilots (and all other pilots) to $35,000. While the Air Force has taken some steps, it is too early to tell whether these steps will result in effective workforce planning outcomes that reduce Air Force UAS pilot shortages. Therefore, we believe that this recommendation should remain open until more progress is made.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in completing their training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to collect feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units, such as by surveying, or conducting focus groups with them.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In its initial comments, DOD stated that incorporating feedback from the field is already an element of the Army's strategy for improving the sustainability, maturity, and health of its UAS workforce. DOD stated that our findings will reinforce the importance of using feedback to improve and refine the Army's overall strategy. In September 2019, Army Headquarters officials reiterated previous statements that they made that the Army has multiple agencies and systems that gather feedback to refine and improve UAS programs. However, the Army has not collected feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units via surveys, focus groups, to help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in completing their training.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army identify challenges that UAS pilots face in completing their training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to incorporate such feedback into the Army's strategy to address UAS training shortfalls.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, and in its initial comments, DOD stated that incorporating feedback from the field is already an element of the Army's strategy for improving the sustainability, maturity, and health of its UAS workforce. DOD stated that our findings will reinforce the importance of using feedback to improve and refine the Army's overall strategy. In July 2018, Army Headquarters officials stated that the Army has multiple agencies and systems that gather feedback to incorporate and improve UAS programs. The officials listed a number of the systems in place to gather feedback on UAS units. However, the Army did not describe any efforts to collect feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units such as by surveying them or conducting focus groups with them. In September 2019, Army officials reiterated their 2018 comments and stated that Army has a number of the systems in place to gather feedback on UAS units. However, the Army has not collected feedback from UAS pilots in UAS units such as by surveying them or conducting focus groups with them and incorporated such feedback into an Army strategy to address UAS training shortfalls.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help ensure that Army Shadow units meet minimum training requirements, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls to ensure that it is fully tailored to address training issues and address factors such as lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army revise its strategy to address UAS training shortfalls to ensure that it is fully tailored to address training issues and address factors such as lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time. DOD stated that the Army has already taken steps to continuously improve its training strategy and that our findings will underline the importance of those initiatives, but that additional direction related to our recommendation is not necessary. In their July 2018 written update, Army officials responded to this recommendation by discussing a regulation regarding readiness reporting; however, the response did not clarify how the regulation might address our recommendation. As of November 2019, the Army has not issued an updated UAS strategy that addresses UAS training shortfalls including a lack of adequate facilities, lack of access to airspace, and the inability to fly more than one UAS at a time.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to validate that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of UAS pilot candidate performance in UAS pilot training and job performance.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Army validate that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of UAS pilot candidate performance in UAS pilot training and job performance. DOD stated that it believes that the current graduation rate of soldiers from its UAS pilot school of 98 percent is an indication that the existing personnel resource predictors and practices are sufficient. It also stated that periodic re-validation is prudent, but specific direction to do so is not necessary. In its July 2018 written update about this recommendation, Army officials stated that the successful graduation rate from UAS Advanced Individual Training and suggested that this graduation rate may indicate that the existing Army approach is adequate. As we stated in our report, Army officials told us that senior Army leaders pressure officials at the Army UAS pilot schoolhouse to ensure that UAS pilot candidates make it through training. As a result, graduation rates may not provide the Army with reliable evidence that its approach to selecting personnel to serve as UAS pilots is providing the Army with personnel who have the aptitude for this career. Validating that the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery is an effective predictor of training and job performance of UAS pilot is an important step that would help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for the UAS pilot career field on sound evidence. As of November 2019, the Army continued to maintain that the successful graduation rate from UAS Advanced Individual Training and suggests that the existing Army approach is adequate.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to assess existing research that has been performed that identifies UAS pilot competencies.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that the Army assess existing research that has been performed that identifies UAS pilot competencies. In its comments, DOD stated that incorporating findings regarding UAS pilot competencies is already an integral part of both workforce and community management and that effective and efficient resource management, as well as force shaping and management processes, will help ensure that the Army's selection of candidates is consistent with the findings of existing research in this area. DOD stated that it does not believe it is necessary to provide additional direction or guidance to the Army to leverage existing research that identifies UAS pilot competencies. In it's July 2018 written update about this recommendation, Army officials indicated that the Army will assess existing research on UAS operator competencies to improve UAS operator selection. As of November 2019, the Army continued to express interest in assessing existing research on UAS operator competencies to improve UAS operator candidate selection.

Recommendation: To help the Army in its effort to address UAS unit training shortfalls, and to help the Army ensure that it is basing its decisions to select individuals for UAS pilot training on sound evidence and to help it take advantage of the key benefits associated with effective personnel selection that could include reducing training costs, improving job performance, improving retention of qualified personnel, enabling leadership development, and enhancing organizational effectiveness, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to incorporate relevant findings from such research into the Army's approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates, as appropriate.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendations that the Army incorporate relevant findings from such research into the Army's approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates, as appropriate. DOD stated that incorporating findings regarding UAS pilot competencies is already an integral part of both workforce and community management and that effective and efficient resource management, as well as force shaping and management processes, will help ensure that the Army's selection of candidates is consistent with the findings of existing research in this area. DOD stated that it does not believe it is necessary to provide additional direction or guidance to the Army to leverage existing research that identifies UAS pilot competencies. In its July 2018 written update on this recommendation, Army officials indicated that the Army will consider a cost benefit analysis on techniques that would potentially improve a process, product, or result related to selecting UAS pilot candidates. Officials went on to state that once the assessment is complete, the Army will incorporate relevant findings into the approach for selecting UAS pilot candidates. As of November 2019, the Army expressed interest in incorporating findings from relevant research into processes for selecting UAS pilot candidates.

Recommendation: To provide greater compliance with the GIDEP reporting requirement among the DOD components and their defense supplier-base, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should establish mechanisms for department-wide oversight of defense agencies' compliance with the GIDEP reporting requirement.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments to this report DOD concurred with this recommendation but has not completed actions to implement it. DOD has drafted new combined DOD instruction and guidance that addresses the process of reporting suspected counterfeit parts to GIDEP. As of August 2020, the document is still in the process of being formally approved. DOD estimated that it could be approved in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021.

Recommendation: To provide greater compliance with the GIDEP reporting requirement among the DOD components and their defense supplier-base, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should develop a standardized process for determining the level of evidence needed to report a part as suspect counterfeit in GIDEP, such as a tiered reporting structure in GIDEP that provides an indication of where the suspect part is in the process of being assessed.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments to this report DOD concurred with this recommendation but has not completed actions to implement it. DOD has drafted new combined DOD instruction and guidance that addresses the process of reporting suspected counterfeit parts to GIDEP. As of August 2020, the document is still in the process of being formally approved. DOD estimated that it could be approved in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021.

Recommendation: To provide greater compliance with the GIDEP reporting requirement among the DOD components and their defense supplier-base, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should develop guidance for when access to GIDEP reports should be limited to only government users or made available to industry.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments to this report DOD concurred with this recommendation but has not completed actions to implement it. DOD has drafted new combined DOD instruction and guidance that addresses the process of reporting suspected counterfeit parts to GIDEP. As of August 2020, the document is still in the process of being formally approved. DOD estimated that it could be approved in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021.

Recommendation: To enable AFRICOM to comprehensively and consistently account for contractor personnel in Africa, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should direct Joint Staff to clarify what types of contractor personnel should be accounted for in its guidance on personnel status reports.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. DOD has taken steps to clarify what types of contractor personnel should be accounted for in its guidance on personnel status reports, but, as of July 2019, revision of that guidance is ongoing. According to Joint Staff officials in May 2018, CJCSM 3150.13C provides policy and guidance on what types of contractor personnel to account for in personnel status reports, and the updated guidance will incorporate lessons learned from USAFRICOM's implementation of that policy. The updated CJCSM 3150.13C is projected to be completed by Summer 2018. Once issued, USAFRICOM officials stated they will incorporate their local policies and standards into the CJCSM 3150.13C, and expect that a coordinated directive on local policies, procedures and standards will mitigate many of the previous interpretation issues. However, additional training and amplifying local procedures issued by the USAFRICOM J-1 may be necessary to fully implement its provisions and ensure consistent interpretation. Additionally, in February 2016, a class deviation became effective for the USAFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR). This deviation superseded Class Deviations 2014-O0005, and 2015-O0003. The deviation stated that contracting officers shall incorporate clause 252.225-7980, Contractor Personnel Performing in the United States Africa Command Area of Responsibility, in lieu of the clause at DFARS 252.225-7040, Contractor Personnel Supporting U.S. Armed Forces Deployed Outside the United States, in all solicitations and contracts, including solicitations and contracts using FAR part 12 procedures for the acquisition of commercial items that will require contractor personnel to perform in the United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) area of responsibility. In addition, to the extent practicable, contracting officers shall modify current, active contracts with performance in the USAFRICOM AOR to include the clause 252.225-7980. The USAFRICOM Commander has identified a need to utilize the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker for all contracts performed in the AOR during all operational phases (including Phase 0), not limited to declared contingency operations. However, until CJCSM 3150.13C clarifying the types of contractor personnel and incorporating lessons learned from AFRICOM's implementation is finalized, this recommendation will remain open. As of July 2020, this CJSM had not been updated. Moreover, in July 2020, DOD stated that reissuance of DOD Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract Support, is required in order to implement this recommendation. When DOD takes further action, we will update this recommendation.

Recommendation: To ensure that combatant commands are not contracting with entities that may be connected to or supporting prohibited organizations, the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should develop guidance that clarifies the conditions under which combatant commands should have a foreign vendor vetting process or cell in place to determine whether potential vendors actively support any terrorist, criminal, or other sanctioned organizations, including clarifying when combatant commands should develop procedures for transmitting the names of any vendors identified through this process for inclusion in prohibited entities lists in the appropriate federal contracting databases, such as the System for Award Management.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of July 2019, DOD has taken steps to develop foreign vendor vetting guidance, but is still working to determine key components of that guidance. Office of the Deputy of the Secretary of Defense issued a directive type memorandum in April 2018 that establishes policy and assigns responsibility for developing vendor vetting guidance to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, DOD established a foreign vendor vetting working group in January 2017 to, among other things, develop guidance that will define foreign vendor vetting as a distinct function and provide combatant commanders with guidance on addressing the risks associated with relying on commercial vendors. As of November 2019, OSD officials stated the working group is making progress to develop a formal charter, identify tools and strategies to enhance vendor vetting across the combatant commands, and establish a department-wide vendor vetting policy. Until DOD develops vendor vetting guidance, this recommendation will remain open. As of July 2020, DOD had extended its directive type memorandum, but had not developed vendor vetting guidance. When we confirm what additional actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To help improve DOD, State, and USAID's ability to track contracts and contractor personnel in contingency operations and to help ensure that DOD possesses the capability to collect and report statutorily required information and to clarify responsibilities and procedures, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to update SPOT provisions during the process of updating operational contract support guidance.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. In August 2018, the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness reported that an update of DOD Instruction 3020.41 is in progress, and will include updated SPOT provisions. However, as of August 2020, the updated instruction had not been issued.

Recommendation: To help improve DOD, State, and USAID's ability to track contracts and contractor personnel in contingency operations and to provide clarity about expectations for the Joint Asset Movement Management System (JAMMS) that can help improve the timeliness and reliability of data for SPOT-ES from JAMMS uploads, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commanders, to develop comprehensive guidance regarding the purpose of JAMMS and its role in supporting plans for different types of missions. Such guidance could include direction on the number and location of JAMMS terminals and how frequently JAMMS's data should be uploaded into SPOT-ES to meet DOD's information needs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. DOD stated that it agreed to provide clarity regarding the purpose and use of JAMMS to improve the timeliness and reliability of JAMMS data, though it did not agree that such guidance could include direction on the number and location of JAMMS terminals and how frequently JAMMS's data should be uploaded into SPOT-ES. DOD stated that it would revise language in DOD Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract Support, to reflect in policy the requirement to use the entire SPOT Enterprise Suite (SPOT-ES), which includes JAMMS. DOD also stated that the combatant commander should establish the requirements for terminal quantities and locations and for data upload schedules based on operational needs in the relevant theater. We agreed with DOD that the combatant commands need flexibility based on operational requirements. In August 2018, the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics & Materiel Readiness reported that the update to DOD Instruction 3020.41 is in progress and will clarify information on the JAMMS capability. However, as of August 2020, the updated instruction had not been issued. Updated SPOT-ES Business Rules dated May 10, 2018 incorporate the role of JAMMS in maintaining visibility of contractor personnel.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's estimates and comparisons of the full cost of its military, civilian, and contractor workforces and to improve DOD's methodology for estimating and comparing the full cost of its various workforces, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to further develop guidance for cost elements that users have identified as challenging to calculate, such as general and administrative, overhead, advertising and recruiting, and training.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: According to DOD's April 2017 report on Comparing the Cost of Civilians and Contractors, DOD's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office is updating fiscal year 2017 estimates in its Full Cost of Manpower (FCoM) system to reflect separate officer and enlisted training costs. If more specific cost estimates are required, users of FCoM are directed to cost estimating tools operated by the military departments.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's estimates and comparisons of the full cost of its military, civilian, and contractor workforces and to improve DOD's methodology for estimating and comparing the full cost of its various workforces, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to develop business rules for estimating the full cost of National Guard and Reserve personnel.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: According to DOD's April 2017 report in Comparing the Cost of Civilians and Contractors, a cost estimating function for Reserve Component personnel far exceeds the combination of variables for developing active component and DOD civilian cost estimates. Due to the scope of the Full Cost of Manpower (FCoM) contract, OSD(CAPE) has not adopted this recommendation in terms of a web-based application. However, OSD(CAPE) intends to address general business rules for Reserve Component cost estimates in the next DoDI revision.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's estimates and comparisons of the full cost of its military, civilian, and contractor workforces and to improve DOD's methodology for estimating and comparing the full cost of its various workforces, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, in coordination with the department's Office of the Actuary and appropriate federal actuarial offices, to reevaluate the inclusion and quantification of pension, retiree health care costs, and other relevant costs of an actuarial nature and make revisions as appropriate.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: According to DOD's April 2017 report on Comparing the Cost of Civilians and Contractors, OSD(CAPE) has reviewed the inclusion of payments that the government makes to retirement and health benefits. All identified costs that are attributable to current retirees and past service of active civilian and military personnel, such as unfunded liabilities, are being revised in the cost estimating guidelines. OSD(CAPE) intends to incorporate these changes in the next DoDI revision and coordinate a review with the Office of the DoD Actuaty.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's estimates and comparisons of the full cost of its military, civilian, and contractor workforces and to improve DOD's ability to estimate contractor support costs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, consistent with established practices for developing credible cost estimates, to research the data sources it is currently using and reassess its contractor support data sources for use when determining contractor support costs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: According to DOD's April 2017 report on Comparing the Cost of Civilian and Contractors, the department's efforts to improve data sources are ongoing.

Recommendation: To further the integration of operational contract support into all areas of the operation planning process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to focus its training about operational contract support, which is currently focused on the logistics planners, on training all planners at the combatant commands and components as necessary.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of September 2019, DOD has taken steps to focus OCS training to all planners, including those outside the logistics directorate. In December 2015, the Joint Staff J7 certified the Joint OCS Planning and Execution (JOPEC) course of instruction for Joint training. The Joint Staff, per this training certification, is working with the Joint Deployment Training Center and the Joint Force Staff College to provide student administrative and course catalog support for future JOPEC training. Additionally, OSD officials stated in August 2019 that the updated OCS instruction will also address training for planners beyond the logistics directorate; officials anticipated the instruction being issued in 2020 but as of September 2020, it had not yet been issued. We will continue to monitor these efforts and this recommendation will remain open at this time.