Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the military departments, should assess whether risk mitigation actions have been identified in the event of a loss of each task critical assets (TCA) facility in the defense industrial base and, based on this assessment, develop risk mitigation actions with associated implementation plans and time lines, and provide this information to congressional and DOD decision makers. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In June 2019, DOD provided follow up information and identified key corrective actions for recommendations from this report. The key corrective actions identified for this recommendation include the issuance of the mission assurance instruction in August 2018 that guides the identification, prioritization, and assessment of defense critical infrastructure. Further, Executive Order 13806 required that DOD perform a whole-of-government assessment of the manufacturing and the defense industrial base, assess risk, identify impacts, and propose mitigation strategies. DOD issued the resulting report in October 2018, which includes a focus on numerous single source and sole supply risks. Lastly, DOD officials stated that DOD senior leadership and Congress were briefed in May 2019 on investments planned to reduce risks and updates will be included in an annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress. DOD placed considerable focus on defense industrial base issues in the past year, we will review the next annual report to ensure this focus is continued and that detailed information on DOD's industrial base risks and task critical assets is provided to DOD and Congressional decision makers.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with DCMA and the military departments, should provide congressional and DOD decision makers with information on potential effects on defense capabilities in the event of a loss of each TCA facility in the defense industrial base. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In June 2019, DOD provided follow up information and identified key corrective actions for recommendations from this report. The key corrective actions identified for this recommendation include a description of the mission assurance process and the annual report on the industrial capabilities that were already in place at the time of issuance of this report, therefore do not represent a change or response to this recommendation. Another key corrective action identified is the issuance of the report in response to the Executive Order 13806 in October 2018, which provides a whole of government assessment of the defense industrial base risks and impacts and associated Hill briefing. DOD placed considerable focus on defense industrial base issues in the past year as a result of the Executive Order, we will review the next annual report to ensure this focus is continued and that detailed information on DOD's industrial base risks and task critical assets is provided to DOD and Congressional decision makers.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with DCMA and the military departments, should provide congressional and DOD decision makers with information on DOD organic facilities that have been identified as TCAs, similar to the information provided previously on commercial facilities. This information also should include (1) the potential effects on defense capabilities in the event of a loss of the facility and (2) risk mitigation actions and associated implementation plans with time lines. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In June 2019, DOD provided follow up information and identified key corrective actions for recommendations from this report. The key corrective actions identified for this recommendation include the mission assurance process that was already in place at the time of the issuance of this report, which does not reflect a change in response to this recommendation. However, other key corrective actions identified include the identification of several DOD-owned assets in the report DOD issued in response to Executive Order 13806 in October 2018. Further, DOD states that it will provide yearly updates to Congress in its Industrial Capabilities report. Lastly, the corrective actions state that DOD will continue to execute risk mitigation identified in its October 2018 report. DOD placed considerable focus on defense industrial base issues in the past year as a result of the Executive Order, we will review the next annual report to ensure this focus is continued and that detailed information on DOD's industrial base risks and task critical assets is provided to DOD and Congressional decision makers.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with DCMA and the military departments, should take steps to share information on risks identified through the annual Critical Asset Identification Process with relevant program managers or other designated service or program officials. At a minimum, relevant officials should receive information on the most critical facilities (such as TCAs) that produce parts supporting their programs. This information-sharing could occur through service-specific channels of communication or another method of internal communication deemed appropriate by DOD. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD officials stated that they are in the process of developing proactive steps to share information on risks identified through the annual CAIP with relevant program managers, or other designated service or program officials as necessary. However, in June 2019, DOD shared the key corrective actions identified for this recommendation, which include a description of the mission assurance process that was already in place at the time of issuance of this report, therefore do not represent a change or response to this recommendation. It further states that the Critical Asset Identification Process is addressed in semi-annual Joint Industrial Base Working Group meetings, which are attended by all service and agency industrial base representatives. As of November 2019, DOD officials did not respond to a request for more detail, we will continue to assess DOD's actions.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the military departments, should develop a mechanism to ensure that program offices obtain information from contractors on single source of supply risks. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD officials stated that assessing the health of the defense industrial base and associated supply chains was the focus of an Executive Order issued in July 2017 and that the resulting inter-agency report will be released within the next year. DOD officials stated that the issuance of this report will provide significant information towards addressing this recommendation. However, in June 2019, DOD provided key corrective actions for this recommendation, which stated that multiple services and agencies began in 2018 to incorporate contracting language to require prime contractors to track and provide sub-tier data and that this effort will expand to cover more programs. Further, it states that in the Industrial Base Integrated Data System, suppliers are indicated as either single or sole source suppliers and that the services and agencies have access to this list. As of November 2019, DOD officials did not respond to a request for more detail, we will continue to assess DOD's actions.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the military departments, should issue department-wide DMSMS policy, such as an instruction, that clearly defines requirements of DMSMS management and details responsibilities and procedures to be followed by program offices to implement the policy. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. The DOD official that is the lead for the Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) program stated that as of July 2019, the department has completed the draft DMSMS instruction and accompanying manual that details program requirements, responsibilities, and procedures to be followed. The draft instruction is undergoing legal review and the official expects the instruction and manual to be issued by December 2019. As of November 2019, this recommendation will remain open and we will review the instruction once issued.

Recommendation: To help foster strategic decision making and improvements in the acquisition of services, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should, as part of its effort to update the January 2016 instruction, reassess the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and organizational placement of key leadership positions, including functional domain experts, senior services managers, and component level leads.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. In July 2018, DOD officials told us that they planned to fully implement this recommendation in the revised instruction once it was issued. In January 2020, DOD issued an updated instruction that, among other things, revised elements of the management structure. We plan to begin work later in 2020 that will assess whether the changes reflected in the January 2020 instruction address the issues we identified.

Recommendation: To help foster strategic decision making and improvements in the acquisition of services, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should, as part of its effort to update the January 2016 instruction, clarify the purpose and timing of the Services Requirements Review Board process to better align it with DOD's programming and budgeting processes.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. In July 2018, DOD officials told us that they planned to fully implement this recommendation in the revised instruction once it was issued. In January 2020, DOD issued an updated instruction that, among other things, revised elements of the Services Requirements Review Board process. We plan to begin work later in 2020 that will assess whether the changes reflected in the January 2020 instruction address the issues we identified.

Recommendation: To enhance enterprise-wide biometric strategic planning, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should publish a supporting biometric implementation plan that includes intended outcomes, measures of effectiveness, and responsibilities, among other things.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with the recommendation. As of September 2019, DOD indicated that it has begun taking action to implement it. We will update the status of this recommendation once we confirm the actions DOD has taken.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should identify the specific types of information that would best meet the department's needs and, based on that determination, collect and analyze relevant data after contract performance is sufficiently complete to determine the extent to which contracts with incentives achieved their desired outcomes.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and has taken steps to address it. For example, in April 2018, the department developed a template for the military departments to use to identify specific types of information to collect. Since then, each of the military departments has initiated or planned to initiate efforts to collect and analyze information about outcomes of incentive contracts. In addition, in July 2020 DOD provided examples of selected DOD, Army, and Navy incentive contracts documented in the template previously noted. The department did not provide additional information about the Air Force's efforts, or about how DOD is analyzing the information to determine whether incentives can achieve desired outcomes. GAO has ongoing work to review DOD's use of fixed-price type contracts--including fixed-price incentive contracts--for major DOD systems, which may provide additional insights related to this recommendation.

Recommendation: To provide greater compliance with the GIDEP reporting requirement among the DOD components and their defense supplier-base, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should establish mechanisms for department-wide oversight of defense agencies' compliance with the GIDEP reporting requirement.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments to this report DOD concurred with this recommendation but has not completed actions to implement it. DOD has drafted new combined DOD instruction and guidance that addresses the process of reporting suspected counterfeit parts to GIDEP. As of August 2020, the document is still in the process of being formally approved. DOD estimated that it could be approved in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021.

Recommendation: To provide greater compliance with the GIDEP reporting requirement among the DOD components and their defense supplier-base, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should develop a standardized process for determining the level of evidence needed to report a part as suspect counterfeit in GIDEP, such as a tiered reporting structure in GIDEP that provides an indication of where the suspect part is in the process of being assessed.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments to this report DOD concurred with this recommendation but has not completed actions to implement it. DOD has drafted new combined DOD instruction and guidance that addresses the process of reporting suspected counterfeit parts to GIDEP. As of August 2020, the document is still in the process of being formally approved. DOD estimated that it could be approved in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021.

Recommendation: To provide greater compliance with the GIDEP reporting requirement among the DOD components and their defense supplier-base, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should develop guidance for when access to GIDEP reports should be limited to only government users or made available to industry.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments to this report DOD concurred with this recommendation but has not completed actions to implement it. DOD has drafted new combined DOD instruction and guidance that addresses the process of reporting suspected counterfeit parts to GIDEP. As of August 2020, the document is still in the process of being formally approved. DOD estimated that it could be approved in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021.

Recommendation: Further, to provide greater assurance that the military departments will meet reporting milestones for future projects, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics--in coordination with the Director of the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight-- should revise corrosion-related guidance to clearly define a role for the military departments' Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives to assist the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight in holding their departments' project management offices accountable for submitting infrastructure-related reports in accordance with the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: On July 24, 2013, DOD reported that it non-concurred with our recommendation. DOD reported that the Military Department Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives are given the freedom to manage their programs in the most efficient and effective manner for their respective departments. Additionally, DOD reported that the Corrosion Control and Prevention Executives know the reporting requirements and are working closely with the Corrosion Policy and Oversight Office and the project managers to ensure reports are submitted in accordance with the DoD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. Therefore, DOD reported that further guidance is not necessary as the requirements are already clearly stated in the DoD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan. Our audit work showed that DOD's strategic plan and guidance do not define a role for the Corrosion Executives in assisting the Corrosion Office in the project reporting process. Our recommendation was intended to fortify the role of Corrosion Executives in ensuring that project management offices within the Corrosion Executives' respective military departments submit project reports as required in the strategic plan. We continue to believe that the Corrosion Executives could provide the additional management oversight necessary to strengthen corrosion project reporting. In May 2016, the Senate Armed Services Committee informed us that it have included language in its National Defense Authorization Act Bill for fiscal year 2017. Specifically, the language reads: SEC. 312. REVISION OF GUIDANCE RELATED TO CORROSION CONTROL AND PREVENTION EXECUTIVES. Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in coordination with the Director of Corrosion Policy and Oversight, shall revise corrosion-related guidance to clearly define the role of the corrosion control and prevention executives of the military departments in assisting the Office of Corrosion Policy and Oversight in holding the appropriate project management office in each military department accountable for submitting the report required under section 903(b)(5) of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 10 U.S.C. 2228 note) with an expanded emphasis on infrastructure, as required in the long-term strategy of the Department of Defense under section 2228(d) of title 10, United States Code. As of October 2016, legislation was not passed. As of March 2019, DOD has since decided to take action to implement this recommendation. According to Corrosion Office officials, they will include a definition of the military departments' Corrosion Executives' role in: an update to DOD Instruction 5000.67 (Prevention and Mitigation of Corrosion on DOD Military Equipment and Infrastructure), a new DOD manual on corrosion, an update to the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Mitigation Strategic Plan, and an update to the Corrosion Prevention Control Integrated Product Team charter. The Corrosion Office's goal is to complete these updates and create the new manual by the end of calendar year 2020. We will monitor the extent to which DOD implements this recommendation.

Recommendation: As one of only a few major acquisition programs to award a fixed-price incentive (firm target) development contract in recent years, evaluating performance and identifying lessons learned will be very illustrative and important to inform decision-makers and help guide and improve future defense acquisition programs. Therefore, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should closely monitor the cost, schedule, and performance outcomes of the KC-46 program to identify positive or negative lessons learned.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD compiled lessons learned during the source selection phase of the KC-46 program. As of August 2020, the Department has identified lessons learned during program implementation to evaluate cost, schedule and performance outcomes as we recommended. Program officials provided a copy of the report, which is with SAF/AQ for approval, and will then be distributed across the department.