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Recommendations Database
GAO’s recommendations database contains report recommendations that still need to be addressed. GAO’s priority recommendations are those that we believe warrant priority attention. We sent letters to the heads of key departments and agencies, urging them to continue focusing on these issues. Below you can search only priority recommendations, or search all recommendations.
Our recommendations help congressional and agency leaders prepare for appropriations and oversight activities, as well as help improve government operations. Moreover, when implemented, some of our priority recommendations can save large amounts of money, help Congress make decisions on major issues, and substantially improve or transform major government programs or agencies, among other benefits.
As of October 25, 2020, there are 4812 open recommendations, of which 473 are priority recommendations. Recommendations remain open until they are designated as Closed-implemented or Closed-not implemented.
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Results:
Subject Term: "Defense planning"
GAO-19-385, Mar 14, 2019
Phone: (202) 512-3489
including 3 priority recommendations
Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation
Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and, as of January 2020, has taken some steps to address it. Specifically, in May 2019, DOD sent a follow up letter to our final report that said that the Department's position on the report has not substantially changed and that the actions identified in the Department's initial response remain underway. DOD also noted that the FY 2021-2025 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) signed in April 2019 directly addresses many of the report's recommendations and that the Joint Staff is leading an aggressive effort on joint force innovation and experimentation, with Tri-Chair oversight. In September 2019, we reviewed the DPG and found that it partially addressed our recommendation. In the DPG, DOD identified analytic products that would serve as the department's starting point for analysis in fiscal years 2021-2025. DOD has also begun developing some of these analytic products, including several defense planning scenarios that it developed in December 2018 to reflect some of the threats outlined in the National Defense Strategy. To fully implement this recommendation, DOD will need to develop the additional products it needs for the remaining key threats identified in the National Defense Strategy. Additionally, keeping these products updated will require sustained attention by the department, but the direction provided by DOD was limited to budget guidance for fiscal years 2021-2025. The direction would more closely adhere to the intent of our recommendation if it were provided in an enduring guidance or policy document. We will continue to monitor DOD actions in response to this recommendation.
Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation
Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and, as of January 2020, has taken some steps to address it. Specifically, in May 2019, DOD sent a follow up letter to our final report that said that the Department's position on the report has not substantially changed and that the actions identified in the Department's initial response remain underway. DOD also noted that the FY 2021-2025 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) signed in April 2019 directly addresses many of the report's recommendations and that the Joint Staff is leading an aggressive effort on joint force innovation and experimentation, with Tri-Chair oversight. In September 2019, we reviewed the DPG and found that it directed some actions relevant to our recommendation regarding the need to explore a range of innovative force structure approaches. However, it did not directly address the need to require the services to conduct sensitivity analysis on key assumptions. The defense planning scenarios that DOD developed in December 2018 identify critical parameters for analytical exploration and encourage DOD components to conduct excursions and sensitivity analysis of assumptions, which we found has not been sufficient to spur this type of analysis in the past. To fully implement this recommendation, DOD needs to require the services to conduct this analysis. We will continue to monitor DOD actions in response to this recommendation.
Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation
Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and, as of January 2020, has taken some steps to address it. Specifically, in May 2019, DOD sent a follow up letter to our final report that said that the Department's position on the report has not substantially changed and that the actions identified in the Department's initial response remain underway. DOD also noted that the FY 2021-2025 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) signed in April 2019 directly addresses many of the report's recommendations and that the Joint Staff is leading an aggressive effort on joint force innovation and experimentation, with Tri-Chair oversight. In September 2019, we reviewed the DPG and found that it included steps that could lay the groundwork for DOD to compare competing analyses and conduct joint force structure analyses. To fully implement this recommendation, DOD needs to establish an approach for doing so, which could include establishing a body or process for conducting comparisons or joint analyses. We will continue to monitor DOE actions in response to this recommendation.
GAO-18-562, Aug 22, 2018
Phone: (404) 679-1875
including 1 priority recommendation
Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open
Priority recommendation
Comments: DHS agreed with GAO's September 2018 recommendation and is taking actions to address it. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) officials stated in December 2018 that CWMD plans to develop a strategy and implementation plan to help DHS guide, support, integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. According to CWMD officials, the implementation plan would broadly address DHS chemical defense activities and programs to prevent, protect against, and respond to chemical incidents, including support to federal, state, tribal, and territorial operators and agencies, as well as the private sector. CWMD officials provided GAO with the completed strategy in December 2019 and plan to complete the implementation plan by December 2020. The strategy includes four overarching goals that will drive CWMD's mission in protecting American safety and security from chemical threats and incidents. We will continue to monitor the status of the implementation plan, as completion of both documents is essential to help the CWMD Office guide DHS's efforts to address fragmentation and coordination issues and would be consistent with the office's aim to establish a coherent mission.
GAO-16-414, May 13, 2016
Phone: (202) 512- 5431
Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation in GAO-16-414. Although in its comments to that report DOD agreed that it should establish a strategic policy that incorporates key elements of leading practices for sound strategic management planning to inform the military services' plans for retrograde and reset to support overseas contingency operations, DOD did not agree with identifying the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics as the lead for this recommendation. In our August 2018 update (GAO-18-621R) we found that DOD had not yet developed a strategic policy, had not yet determined which DOD organization would lead that effort, and that there was no consensus among officials we spoke with regarding which organization should lead that effort. In is comments to this update, DOD generally concurred with these findings and stated that it had established standardized terms and definitions for the services to use to assess the cost of contingency operations and that the Air Force had recommended OSD form a working group to develop a unified strategic implementation plan and standard terminology, to include a common operating picture. We agree that these are steps in the right direction, but until the department establishes a strategic policy for the retrograde and reset of equipment that incorporates key elements of leading practices for sound strategic management as we recommended in May 2016, it will not be positioned to effectively manage the retrograde and reset of equipment. As of September 2020, DOD has not taken any action to address this recommendation; DOD is in the process of determining who the appropriate PAO should be.
Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation in GAO-16-414. In December 2017, DOD updated the relevant chapter of the its Financial Management Regulation (DOD 7000.14-R) to include definitions of "reset" and "retrograde." However, in our August 2018 update (GAO-18-621R) we found that despite this action, the terms retrograde and reset were not being used or defined consistently by the department and the military services. Specifically, while some services were using the term reset as defined in the regulation, others were not. In commenting on our 2018 update, DOD noted that the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller had established standardized terms and definitions for the services to use to assess the cost of contingency operations, which allows for a common budget framework, while retaining service flexibility to fulfill their Title 10 responsibilities to man, train, and equip. DOD further stated that the Air Force recommended the Office of the Secretary of Defense form a working group to develop a unified strategic implementation plan and standard terminology, to include a common operating picture. We believe that these actions would be a step in the right direction, but to fully meet the intent of our May 2016 recommendation, DOD needs to take action to ensure that these terms are uniformly defined and consistently used throughout the services. As of September 2020, DOD has not taken any action to address this recommendation; DOD is in the process of determining who the appropriate PAO should be.
Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Comments: In its response to our recommendation in GAO-16-414, DOD partially concurred, stating that the department would determine the appropriate Principal Staff Assistant to lead the development and application of service-related implementation plans. However, in our August 2018 update (GAO-18-621R) we found that DOD had not yet identified a lead for this effort, and that the Army, Navy, and Air Force had not yet developed implementation plans for the retrograde and reset of their equipment. Navy and Air Force officials further cited the need for a DOD-wide policy before they can establish service-specific plans for resetting equipment for contingency operations while Army officials told us that the Army relies on multiple guidance documents for the reset of equipment and does not currently have plans to develop a unified reset implementation plan. In its response to GAO-18-621R, DOD notes that detailed guidelines and processes for the rotation of personnel in contingency and non-contingency operations are in place, and that if a strategic policy is developed for the retrograde and reset of equipment, consideration should be given to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment) as the lead. We continue to believe that our recommendation remains valid and that DOD also needs to establish a strategic policy consistent with leading practices on sound strategic management planning to guide and inform the services' plans, as we also recommended in 2016. As of September 2020, DOD has not taken any action to address this recommendation; DOD is in the process of determining who the appropriate PAO should be.