Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should direct the MPF program to update its cost estimate to include analyses to support the development of a range of possible cost outcomes for decision makers in a manner consistent with GAO's Cost Estimation Guide. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: The Army concurred with this recommendation and stated that it plans to provide decision makers a range of possible cost outcomes to support future program milestone decisions. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should direct the OMFV program to update its cost estimate to include analyses to support the development of a range of possible cost outcomes for decision makers in a manner consistent with GAO's Cost Estimation Guide. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: The Army concurred with this recommendation and stated that it plans to provide decision makers a range of possible cost outcomes to support future program milestone decisions. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should direct the OMFV program to inform requirements by conducting systems engineering reviews at key decision points consistent with our leading practices for acquisition, as the program office finalizes its acquisition approach. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: The Army concurred with this recommendation and stated that it plans to perform system and design reviews to inform the development of final requirements. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment should establish procedures requiring the military departments to collect and share findings from their peer reviews of MDAP contracting approaches—including choice of contract type—such as by updating the existing online compendium of best practices and lessons learned as they complete their reviews.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation, but as of August 2020 has not taken any action to implement it.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should direct the Chief Architect to develop a plan to attain mature technologies when needed for each ABMS development area, which includes an initial list of technologies and an assessment of their maturity that is updated to reflect changes, and update Congress quarterly. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation but, as of August 2020, has not yet taken any action to implement it. Officials indicated that in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021 the department expects to provide Congress with an initial list of technologies and an assessment of their maturity, and a plan to attain mature technologies for each development area. We will continue to monitor DOD's actions to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should direct the Chief Architect to prepare a cost estimate that is developed in accordance with cost estimating leading practices, to include regularly updating the estimate to reflect ABMS changes and actual costs, and update Congress quarterly. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation but, as of August 2020, has not yet taken any action to implement it. Officials indicated that in the first quarter of fiscal year 2021 the department expects to provide Congress with a cost estimate of ABMS development activities. We will continue to monitor DOD's actions to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should direct the Chief Architect to prepare an affordability analysis that should be regularly updated, and update Congress quarterly. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation but, as of August 2020, has not yet taken any action to implement it. Officials indicated that in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020 the department expects to provide Congress with the affordability analysis for the fiscal year 2021 budget request. In addition, the department plans to provide an affordability analysis as part of the fiscal year 2022 budget request submission to Congress. We will continue to monitor DOD's actions to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should formalize and document acquisition authority and decision-making responsibilities of the Air Force offices involved in the planning and execution of ABMS, to include the Chief Architect. This document should be included as part of the submission to Congress in June 2020 and communicated to the Air Force offices that support ABMS. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition)
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation but, as of August 2020, has not yet taken any action to implement it. Officials indicated that in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2020 the department expects to provide Congress with documentation of decision-making authorities. We will continue to monitor DOD's actions to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: We recommend the Secretary of the Air Force issue policy emphasizing the following three key reliability practices when planning and executing acquisition programs: (1) leveraging reliability engineers early and often, (2) establishing realistic reliability requirements, and (3) employing reliability engineering activities to improve a system's design throughout development. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
Status: Open

Comments: The Air Force agreed with this recommendation and told us they will be updating Air Force Instruction AFI63-101/20-101 to ensure the inclusion of key practices to improve weapon system reliability, including leveraging reliability engineers early and often, establishing realistic reliability requirements, and employing reliability engineering activities to improve a system's design throughout development. The Air Force said it plans to complete this effort by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: We recommend the Secretary of the Navy issue policy emphasizing the following three key reliability practices when planning and executing acquisition programs: (1) leveraging reliability engineers early and often, (2) establishing realistic reliability requirements, and (3) employing reliability engineering activities to improve a system's design throughout development. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open

Comments: The Navy agreed with this recommendation and told us they plan to address GAO's recommendation in two ways. First, they are developing a guidebook for program managers and leadership to emphasize the importance of leveraging reliability engineers early and often, establishing realistic reliability requirements, and employing reliability engineering activities to improve a system's design throughout development. The Navy anticipates the guidebook will be completed by the end of fiscal year 2021. Second, the Navy plans to update the SECNAV 5000.2 when it is open for changes. They noted, this is dependent on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) completing its ongoing update to DOD-wide acquisition guidance. The Navy anticipates OSD's efforts will be completed by end of calendar year 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment develop and implement a plan to guide and coordinate efforts to implement the Wideband AOA recommendations to support timely, informed decisions on its next wideband satellite communications architecture. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, but as of July 2020 is still working to implement its corrective action plan.

Recommendation: The Director, MDA should coordinate with the defense intelligence community on the agency's collective priorities for threat assessments and work with the defense intelligence community to determine if additional resources are needed to support the agency's threat assessment needs. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Missile Defense Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that MDA will continue to follow established processes to identify threat assessment needs and to determine if additional resources are required. However, we have yet to see sufficient evidence that MDA is collectively prioritizing its threat assessment requests. We understand that MDA prioritizes its threat assessment requests within the distinct lanes of intelligence product types. We have yet to see evidence that shows MDA has taken steps to also prioritize amongst those lanes. For example, MDA could coordinate with the intelligence community to establish a formal process or venue through which such macro-level prioritization could be conveyed and discussed. In April 2020, MDA told us that it did not plan to transfer funds to the intelligence community in fiscal year 2021 for any unique MDA intelligence needs. By not taking actions to collectively prioritize its threat assessment needs or providing the intelligence community with resources, MDA continues to run the risk of not receiving the threat assessments it needs when it needs them.

Recommendation: The Director, MDA should fully engage the defense intelligence community on key threat-related missile defense acquisition processes and decisions, including providing insight into and obtaining input from the defense intelligence community on the threat space MDA establishes for the BMDS and the threat parameters and threat models MDA assigns to BMDS elements as design requirements and test cases. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Missile Defense Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that MDA will continue to fully engage the intelligence community on key threat-related Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) acquisition processes and decisions. We have observed improvements in MDA including the intelligence community in some of these key threat-related processes and decisions, some of which were discussed in our report. Also, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the NGI and include in the report, among several items, updated threat assessments by the intelligence community informing system threshold and objective requirements. To this end, we are aware that MDA consulted with the intelligence community on the threat space and threat-related requirements that are being considered for the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI). The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering stated in a September 2019 memo to GAO that MDA also coordinates in weekly Technical Interchange Meetings with the intelligence community on the threat space bounds for parameters that have high uncertainty. We are also aware of ongoing efforts between MDA and the intelligence community to jointly model missile threats that could directly be used in MDA ground tests. These efforts address much of our recommendation; however, we have yet to see whether MDA will coordinate with the intelligence community on the threat parameters assigned to BMDS elements in the BMD System Specification. We intend to follow up with MDA to determine the extent to which MDA has implemented our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should require the Director, MDA and the Director, DIA to coordinate on establishing a process for MDA to obtain validation of its threat models. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, stating that the department will re-examine the most cost-effective approach to meet the intent of DIA validation to support development and fielding of effective Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) elements. We have observed significant progress on this recommendation, primarily through the joint coordination occurring through the Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee (DIBMAC) Joint Modeling Tiger Team, where multiple pathways are being explored. Our recommendation calls for the intelligence community and MDA to coordinate on establishing a process for MDA to obtain validation of its threat models. We are also open to other pathways, such as intelligence community and MDA jointly producing threat models or MDA making direct use of threat models built by the intelligence community. Our objective is that MDA use threat models that are validated by the intelligence community when such models are necessary to inform formal BMDS processes, products, and decisions. Any pathway that MDA and the intelligence community agree upon that yields this result meets the intent of our recommendation. We believe that through the tiger team initiative, such coordination is occurring and therefore the closure of this recommendation as implemented in imminent. We are waiting to see: (1) whether MDA and intelligence community establish a formal process and/or jointly sign a memorandum of agreement to codify the process; and (2) the production and use of an intelligence community-validated threat model by MDA in a ground test or other Models and Simulation application.

Recommendation: The Director, MDA, should utilize additional schedule margin afforded by the EPAA Phase 3 delay to conduct additional testing necessary to thoroughly assess the capabilities and limitations of Phase 3 against IRBMs and a raid scenario prior to delivery. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Missile Defense Agency
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense partially concurred with this recommendation, stating that all EPAA Phase 3 BMDS functions requiring a flight test environment were already successfully demonstrated and that MDA has addressed the intent of our recommendation by adding ground tests to further assess EPAA Phase 3 Capabilities. However, in order for the agency to meet the full intent of our recommendation, additional flight testing to demonstrate capability against EPAA Phase 3 threats, including intermediate-range threats and raid scenarios, is necessary.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment to determine and identify in final guidance for middle-tier acquisition programs the metrics that will be used to assess the performance of middle-tier acquisition programs across the military departments, including whether programs are meeting statutory objectives. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, and stated that it planned to determine performance metrics in coordination with its release of its final guidance on middle-tier programs, which DOD expected to release in late 2019. In December 2019, Congress passed the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. Section 837 in the Conference Report accompanying the Act requires DOD to submit a report to the congressional defense committees no later than December 15, 2019, that includes guidance on the use of middle-tier acquisition authority and the metrics required to assess the performance of such a program, among other topics. DOD's report, provided to Congress in January 2020, identified metrics that DOD planned to use to assess the performance of these programs. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment subsequently leveraged these metrics in its March 2020 bi-annual review of middle-tier acquisition programs to assess program execution. However, DOD has yet to identify these metrics in guidance as we recommended, which we continue to believe is important to facilitate consistent reporting across the military departments and DOD components.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should develop a plan for how the department will assess the effect of recent acquisition reforms, including identifying who will be responsible for the assessment and what data will be needed. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, and stated that it has included a division in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition to analyze the effect of recent acquisition reforms and other high-level oversight and policy issues. In December 2019, Congress took additional action. The Conference Report accompanying the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to submit a report with the budget for fiscal year 2021 on the progress of implementing acquisition reform initiatives. In response, DOD provided a report to Congress in March 2020 that includes how the Secretary will identify, quantify, assess and manage program risk, describes changes to DOD's data collection and sharing processes, and describes new acquisition frameworks to be implemented. However, the report does not address how DOD will assess the acquisition reforms, what data is needed, or who is responsible. Additionally, in August 2020, the Assistant Secretary of Defense approved a plan for assessing the implementation of new acquisition pathways at DOD. However, DOD is still identifying the specific data needed to assess each acquisition pathway, as well as determining how to assess the remaining acquisition reforms we covered in our June 2019 report. Therefore, we will continue to monitor DOD efforts to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office assesses whether the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) R&M targets are still feasible and revise the ORD accordingly. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would review its Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) requirements and possibly revise them. In late 2019, the F-35 Program Executive Officer (PEO) developed an initiative to clearly identify what, if any, revisions DOD should make to the ORD. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office, as it revises its Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program (RMIP), identifies specific and measurable R&M objectives in its RMIP guidance. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would update its Reliability & Maintainability (R&M) RMIP guidance. In late 2019, DOD reported that a revised RMIP will be delivered to program leadership for approval. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office, as it revises its RMIP, identifies and documents which RMIP projects will achieve the identified objectives of the RMIP guidance. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would update its RMIP guidance. In late 2019, DOD reported that a revised RMIP will be delivered to program leadership for approval. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the F-35 program office prioritizes funding for the RMIP. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would plan for R&M funding going forward. In Sept. 2019, the F-35 Program Office reported that it was coordinating with the services to increase its Reliability & Maintainability investment. In Nov. 2019, the F-35 Program Office reported that it would allocate significant additional funding for RMIP for calendar year 2020. As of July 2020, no additional actions have been taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the department's guidance that addresses software development provides specific, required direction on when and how often to involve users so that such involvement is early and continues through the development of the software and related program components. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and issued an interim Software Acquisition Pathway policy in January 2020 that addresses software development, including direction on user involvement. As of August 2020, this interim policy has not yet been finalized. According to DOD officials, a final policy is currently under development and is expected to be issued by the end of December 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the department's guidance that addresses software development provides specific, required direction on documenting and communicating user feedback to stakeholders during software system development. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2020, DOD has issued an interim Software Acquisition Pathway that addresses software development, including direction on user involvement. According to DOD officials, this interim pathway is planned to be replaced by a final policy that is currently under development and is expected to be issued by the end of December 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the military services and other DOD components to identify the universe of space acquisition programs, as well as the various organizations that support these programs, and report this information to Congress. In doing so, DOD should implement procedures to maintain and periodically update the list. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: In its written response, which is included in our report, DOD concurred with this recommendation. In its Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provided in August 2020, DOD states that this recommendation is no longer applicable due to the establishment of the U.S. Space Force on December 20, 2019. All space acquisition programs previously in the Air Force were transferred to the Space Force upon stand up and funding followed with the FY21 President's Budget submission. DOD also states in the CAP that the transfer of the other military services' and defense agencies' space acquisition programs and funding to the Space Force is currently in process. Once the other organizations' space acquisition programs are fully transferred to the U.S. Space Command, we will consider whether the recommendation should be closed.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, in conjunction with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Research and Development and for Personnel and Readiness, should collect and maintain data on acquisition-coded military and civilian personnel that support space acquisition programs and related activities—including those that may do so less than full time—as well as track the contractor and Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) workforce general levels of effort supporting space acquisition programs and related activities and the total resources annually committed to perform that work. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD has not taken action to implement this recommendation. As discussed in our report, DOD did not concur with this recommendation. DOD stated that the manner in which personnel data are captured in its human resource and development systems makes it difficult to identify, collect, and maintain data on the military and civilian personnel working on space acquisition programs. Further, DOD raised concerns over contractual limitations on collecting and maintaining data on contractor and FFRDC personnel supporting space acquisitions. We continue to believe that collecting and maintaining more robust data on the space acquisition workforce will support DOD's planning efforts for establishing new space organizations and better inform Congress. In our report, we point out that DOD could make minor modifications to its personnel data system to facilitate identifying and routinely tracking accurate information on the military and civilian segments of the space acquisition workforce. Further, collecting information on the general levels of contractor and FFRDC effort supporting space acquisition activities and the resources spent to obtain this assistance, could be useful in helping DOD determine the right number and mix of military and civilian personnel needed in the new space organizations. In its Corrective Action Plan (CAP) provided in August 2020, DOD states that it has determined that due to the fluidity of support provided by individual workforce members to specific programs, it is not feasible to collect data attributing individual support to specific space acquisition programs. In the CAP, DOD also states that since the U.S. Space Force has been established, DOD has a limited ability to produce data on the organic space acquisition workforce comprised of former USAF units, and DOD will determine the best format and means of reporting this data. DOD further states that once the space acquisition programs from other military services and Defense Agencies are transferred to the Space Force, it will need to determine how best to integrate acquisition workforce data from the newly assigned agencies and units. Once that is determined, DOD will attempt to provide an aggregate report of available space acquisition workforce data to the Congress. Once the other organizations' space acquisition programs are fully transferred to the U.S. Space Command and are included under its reporting, we will consider whether to close the recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment updates or issues new policy clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems, including fixed-wing aircraft. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. In August 2019, DOD told us that draft language reinforcing and clarifying the requirement that all weapon system programs - including legacy weapon systems - have a current Life Cycle Sustainment Plan that is updated every five years had been drafted and submitted as part of the internal DOD coordination process for an update to DOD Instruction 5000.02. DOD estimates that the DOD Instruction 5000.02 will be updated by December 2019.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should update or issue new guidance clarifying the requirements for documenting sustainment strategies for legacy weapon systems, including fixed-wing aircraft. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Navy concurred with the recommendation. In August 2019, DOD told us that the Navy is working to update its policy to reinforce and clarify the requirement that all weapon system programs - including legacy weapon systems - have a current Life Cycle Sustainment Plan that is updated every five years. The Navy estimates that the policy will be updated by December 2019.

Recommendation: As MIBP moves forward with its plans to improve data collection and analysis, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense, Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy should determine a solution to make better use of existing lower-tier supplier information from program offices. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, noting that it plans to takes steps to identify and incorporate available supplier data from across the department into its defense industrial base data system, but noted that they only planned to rely on one data system, DIBNow, instead of continuing to develop its second data system, the Defense Planning Guidance Input and Retrieval System. The Industrial Policy Office, formerly Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy, has taken some steps to improve sharing of industrial base analysis information across the Department, such as establishing a web repository of industrial base assessment information and subject matter expert contacts. However, these sharing tools continue to rely primarily on summary narratives and Industrial Policy has not incorporated program office lower-tier supplier data into this web repository or DIBnow. Industrial Policy has incorporated sub-tier supplier information into DIBnow from commercial industry sources, but these sources do not have the same level of insight into the supply chain as program offices. An Industrial Policy official said there are no plans to incorporate supply chain information from program offices because this information is proprietary and therefore cannot be incorporated into DIBnow, which is built and maintained by a contractor. DOD General Counsel has determined that contractors cannot have access to this proprietary information for the purposes of DIBnow. We continue to believe that program offices have the most complete insight into sub-tier suppliers, which is essential for DOD to achieve its goal of proactive industrial base risk analysis. Industrial Policy should continue to pursue risk reductions solutions, such as non-disclosure agreements and/or data masking, to make better use of existing lower-tier supplier information from program offices.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 program office to resolve all critical deficiencies before making a full-rate production decision. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and stated that critical deficiencies would be resolved before full-rate production, due in December 2019. In May 2020, we reported that DOD delayed its full-rate production decision from December 2019 to between September 2020 and March 2021.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the F-35 program office to identify what steps are needed to ensure the F-35 meets reliability and maintainability requirements before each variant reaches maturity and update the Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program with these steps. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. According to a DOD official, as of July 2020, the F-35 program office is in the process of revising its plan for improving the F-35's reliability and maintainability.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA revises MDA policies to require that all integrated capabilities--capabilities that require integration of two or more elements--be included in a Technical Capability Declaration. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. While DOD agreed with the intent of this recommendation, DOD stated that the MDA Director will determine which major integrated capabilities should be delivered via the Technical Capability Declaration (TCD) process. MDA also noted that it is updating MDA Directive 5000.17 (estimated release in 4Q FY2020), which is intended to address this recommendation. GAO will assess the revisions when they are available. We continue to believe that in order for the agency to meet the full intent of our recommendation, it should establish in policy, a clear, definitive standard for which capabilities require a TCD delivery.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA clarifies, in written policy, the exact requirements, process, and key milestones necessary to issue a Technical Capability Declaration, including a requirement that the Assessment Requirements Review be held in such a time frame that it can provide meaningful input to MDA's test plans. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and contends that its new Policy Memorandum 90 meets the intent of our recommendation. However, this new Policy Memorandum leaves open the possibility of continued inconsistent application of the Technical Capability Declaration (TCD) process. In order for the agency to meet the full intent of our recommendation, MDA should establish in policy, a clear, definitive standard for which capabilities require a TCD for delivery that should be tracked over several years to ensure that the policy is followed. MDA officials noted that revisions to MDA Directive 5000.17 expected at the end of Fiscal Year 2020 will address the recommendation. We will assess the new parameters set out in the revised policy directive, when it is available. We will also continue to track how MDA implements any new policies on TCDs and whether the information is transparent.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA includes information on current undefinitized contract actions in the BMDS Accountability Report, including the not-to-exceed price, the definitization schedule, the amount of funds obligated for the undefinitized period, and any changes since the contract action was entered into. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and has taken steps to implement it. While we noted in our report that the BMDS Accountability Report for 2018, approved by the MDA Director on March 9, 2018 reflected that the agency had taken steps to implement this recommendation, we plan to leave this recommendation open to ensure that the BMDS Accountability Report accurately contains all undefinitized contract actions that the agency enters into through the fiscal year and whether the reporting contains the information necessary to satisfy our recommendation.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA, ensures that models used for operational tests are validated and accredited for such assessments. To help achieve this, MDA should provide the BMDS Operational Test Agency all evidence previously agreed to and needed to accredit models before ground testing events, as specified in the BMDS OTA accreditation plan. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and stated that MDA is actively working with the BMDS Operational Test Agency (BMDS OTA) to resolve any issues associated with, and the reporting of, modeling limitations. However, according to BMDS OTA officials, while the number of accredited models has risen in recent years, some remain unaccredited. We, therefore, believe it is premature to closeout this recommendation but we will continue to track MDA's progress on taking the necessary steps to implement this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA includes in capability delivery packages, such as the Technical Capability Declaration memos and Operational Capability Baseline change packages, the following: a. The verification, validation, and accreditation status of the models used in operational ground tests; and b. Modeling and simulation limitations that affect operational ground test results. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and stated that MDA has made significant progress over the last year in these efforts. MDA will provide the Technical Capability Declaration (TCD) and Operational Capability Baseline (OCB) packages for us to assess. Until we are able to do so, we believe it is premature to closeout this recommendation. We will continue to monitor MDA's progress in taking the necessary steps.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering should ensure that the Director, MDA and the Secretaries of the Armed Services responsible for operating BMDS elements develop written agreements as soon as feasible for modeling and simulations technical and funding requirements for any BMDS elements that are service-operated but represented in BMDS performance assessments. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation and are taking steps to implement this recommendation. We will continue to monitor the efforts necessary including finalizing and executing written agreements between MDA and any BMDS elements that are Service-operated but represented in BMDS performance assessments.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should take steps to ensure that the Marine Corps not enter full-rate production until the Marine Corps has determined that the contractor has achieved an MRL of at least 9 for all risk areas. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation, stating that it agreed that manufacturing readiness levels (MRL) for the Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1 should be assessed prior to the decision to award the option for the second lot of low-rate production, but disagreed that an MRL assessment of any individual risk area, in itself, should delay the contract award. We maintained that achieving an overall MRL-9 by the by the start of full-rate production represents best practice to minimize production risk. According the Marine Corp, the most recent MRL Assessment as of August 2020 assessed the program at an overall MRL-8. The Marine Corps indicated that another MRL assessment is estimated to be completed in November 2020 to support the decision to enter full-rate production, which is planned for December 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should take steps to address areas of civilian and military program manager training, mentoring, retention, and selection that do not align extensively with leading practices. This could include using approaches already used by the other military services or commercial companies. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, and indicated the Department of the Navy plans to improve its civilian and military program manager training, mentoring, retention, and selection programs across the program management community and the acquisition workforce as a whole. Regarding training, in January 2019 the Navy sent its first cohort of participants to a DOD talent exchange program with industry, open to both civilian and military acquisition personnel, and including a focus on the program management workforce. Of the second Navy cohort that started in this program in early 2020, eight were civilians in the program management career field. Regarding mentoring, in October 2018 the Department of the Navy issued a program management career field guidebook that included career path roadmaps and descriptions of skills and competencies - such as mentoring individuals and teams - needed to advance for program management personnel across the Navy. Regarding selection, the Navy is developing a talent management system to enable talent identification, career development, and succession management across the acquisition workforce. A pilot of this system started in 2020, and includes the program management career field. The Navy expects to complete this pilot in fiscal year 2021, and to use data from the system to support the selection of key leadership positions including program managers and deputy program managers.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and the military departments, should assess whether risk mitigation actions have been identified in the event of a loss of each task critical assets (TCA) facility in the defense industrial base and, based on this assessment, develop risk mitigation actions with associated implementation plans and time lines, and provide this information to congressional and DOD decision makers. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In June 2019, DOD provided follow up information and identified key corrective actions for recommendations from this report. The key corrective actions identified for this recommendation include the issuance of the mission assurance instruction in August 2018 that guides the identification, prioritization, and assessment of defense critical infrastructure. Further, Executive Order 13806 required that DOD perform a whole-of-government assessment of the manufacturing and the defense industrial base, assess risk, identify impacts, and propose mitigation strategies. DOD issued the resulting report in October 2018, which includes a focus on numerous single source and sole supply risks. Lastly, DOD officials stated that DOD senior leadership and Congress were briefed in May 2019 on investments planned to reduce risks and updates will be included in an annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress. DOD placed considerable focus on defense industrial base issues in the past year, we will review the next annual report to ensure this focus is continued and that detailed information on DOD's industrial base risks and task critical assets is provided to DOD and Congressional decision makers.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with DCMA and the military departments, should provide congressional and DOD decision makers with information on potential effects on defense capabilities in the event of a loss of each TCA facility in the defense industrial base. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In June 2019, DOD provided follow up information and identified key corrective actions for recommendations from this report. The key corrective actions identified for this recommendation include a description of the mission assurance process and the annual report on the industrial capabilities that were already in place at the time of issuance of this report, therefore do not represent a change or response to this recommendation. Another key corrective action identified is the issuance of the report in response to the Executive Order 13806 in October 2018, which provides a whole of government assessment of the defense industrial base risks and impacts and associated Hill briefing. DOD placed considerable focus on defense industrial base issues in the past year as a result of the Executive Order, we will review the next annual report to ensure this focus is continued and that detailed information on DOD's industrial base risks and task critical assets is provided to DOD and Congressional decision makers.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with DCMA and the military departments, should provide congressional and DOD decision makers with information on DOD organic facilities that have been identified as TCAs, similar to the information provided previously on commercial facilities. This information also should include (1) the potential effects on defense capabilities in the event of a loss of the facility and (2) risk mitigation actions and associated implementation plans with time lines. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. In June 2019, DOD provided follow up information and identified key corrective actions for recommendations from this report. The key corrective actions identified for this recommendation include the mission assurance process that was already in place at the time of the issuance of this report, which does not reflect a change in response to this recommendation. However, other key corrective actions identified include the identification of several DOD-owned assets in the report DOD issued in response to Executive Order 13806 in October 2018. Further, DOD states that it will provide yearly updates to Congress in its Industrial Capabilities report. Lastly, the corrective actions state that DOD will continue to execute risk mitigation identified in its October 2018 report. DOD placed considerable focus on defense industrial base issues in the past year as a result of the Executive Order, we will review the next annual report to ensure this focus is continued and that detailed information on DOD's industrial base risks and task critical assets is provided to DOD and Congressional decision makers.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with DCMA and the military departments, should take steps to share information on risks identified through the annual Critical Asset Identification Process with relevant program managers or other designated service or program officials. At a minimum, relevant officials should receive information on the most critical facilities (such as TCAs) that produce parts supporting their programs. This information-sharing could occur through service-specific channels of communication or another method of internal communication deemed appropriate by DOD. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD officials stated that they are in the process of developing proactive steps to share information on risks identified through the annual CAIP with relevant program managers, or other designated service or program officials as necessary. However, in June 2019, DOD shared the key corrective actions identified for this recommendation, which include a description of the mission assurance process that was already in place at the time of issuance of this report, therefore do not represent a change or response to this recommendation. It further states that the Critical Asset Identification Process is addressed in semi-annual Joint Industrial Base Working Group meetings, which are attended by all service and agency industrial base representatives. As of November 2019, DOD officials did not respond to a request for more detail, we will continue to assess DOD's actions.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the military departments, should develop a mechanism to ensure that program offices obtain information from contractors on single source of supply risks. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2018, DOD officials stated that assessing the health of the defense industrial base and associated supply chains was the focus of an Executive Order issued in July 2017 and that the resulting inter-agency report will be released within the next year. DOD officials stated that the issuance of this report will provide significant information towards addressing this recommendation. However, in June 2019, DOD provided key corrective actions for this recommendation, which stated that multiple services and agencies began in 2018 to incorporate contracting language to require prime contractors to track and provide sub-tier data and that this effort will expand to cover more programs. Further, it states that in the Industrial Base Integrated Data System, suppliers are indicated as either single or sole source suppliers and that the services and agencies have access to this list. As of November 2019, DOD officials did not respond to a request for more detail, we will continue to assess DOD's actions.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, in conjunction with the military departments, should issue department-wide DMSMS policy, such as an instruction, that clearly defines requirements of DMSMS management and details responsibilities and procedures to be followed by program offices to implement the policy. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. The DOD official that is the lead for the Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages (DMSMS) program stated that as of July 2019, the department has completed the draft DMSMS instruction and accompanying manual that details program requirements, responsibilities, and procedures to be followed. The draft instruction is undergoing legal review and the official expects the instruction and manual to be issued by December 2019. As of November 2019, this recommendation will remain open and we will review the instruction once issued.

Recommendation: To help foster strategic decision making and improvements in the acquisition of services, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should, as part of its effort to update the January 2016 instruction, reassess the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and organizational placement of key leadership positions, including functional domain experts, senior services managers, and component level leads.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. In July 2018, DOD officials told us that they planned to fully implement this recommendation in the revised instruction once it was issued. In January 2020, DOD issued an updated instruction that, among other things, revised elements of the management structure. We plan to begin work later in 2020 that will assess whether the changes reflected in the January 2020 instruction address the issues we identified.

Recommendation: To help foster strategic decision making and improvements in the acquisition of services, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should, as part of its effort to update the January 2016 instruction, clarify the purpose and timing of the Services Requirements Review Board process to better align it with DOD's programming and budgeting processes.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with the recommendation. In July 2018, DOD officials told us that they planned to fully implement this recommendation in the revised instruction once it was issued. In January 2020, DOD issued an updated instruction that, among other things, revised elements of the Services Requirements Review Board process. We plan to begin work later in 2020 that will assess whether the changes reflected in the January 2020 instruction address the issues we identified.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics should identify the specific types of information that would best meet the department's needs and, based on that determination, collect and analyze relevant data after contract performance is sufficiently complete to determine the extent to which contracts with incentives achieved their desired outcomes.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation and has taken steps to address it. For example, in April 2018, the department developed a template for the military departments to use to identify specific types of information to collect. Since then, each of the military departments has initiated or planned to initiate efforts to collect and analyze information about outcomes of incentive contracts. In addition, in July 2020 DOD provided examples of selected DOD, Army, and Navy incentive contracts documented in the template previously noted. The department did not provide additional information about the Air Force's efforts, or about how DOD is analyzing the information to determine whether incentives can achieve desired outcomes. GAO has ongoing work to review DOD's use of fixed-price type contracts--including fixed-price incentive contracts--for major DOD systems, which may provide additional insights related to this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure DOD takes a strategic approach for its prototyping and innovation initiatives and overcomes funding and cultural barriers, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to develop a high-level DOD-wide strategy, in collaboration with the military services and other appropriate DOD components, to communicate strategic goals and priorities and delineate roles and responsibilities among DOD's prototyping and innovation initiatives.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, but its progress on addressing it has stalled. In November 2019, DOD's Prototyping Guidebook indicated that the department was developing policy and strategy documents pertaining to prototyping. As part of this effort, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering was drafting a broad DOD Research and Engineering strategy that would include strategies pertaining to prototyping and innovation and address this recommendation. As of August 2020, DOD had not published this strategy.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Army should conduct a comprehensive assessment to better understand the resources necessary for the requirements development process and determine the extent to which the shortfalls can be addressed given other funding priorities.

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: The Army concurred with our recommendation. Previously, Army officials told GAO that they planned to implement this recommendation after the new Army Futures Command-which currently manages capabilities development for the Army-became fully operational. Although this command became fully operational in July 2019, Army officials stated that more time is needed to fully coordinate and implement this recommendation. The Army Futures Command will work with the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency to assess the capabilities development workforce focused on requirements prior to programs entering the system development phase. Army officials estimate that this assessment will be completed in March 2021. In June 2020, GAO staff received a brief status update from the Army PAO who confirmed that this is still the plan.

Recommendation: To improve insight into cost changes for individual ships in the Ford Class, the program office should prepare cost summary and funding summary sections for each individual ship in the class as part of the SAR for the overall Ford-Class program.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In its comments on our draft report DOD disagreed with our recommendation, stating that it currently provides progress reports to Congress on costs for CVN 78 and CVN 79. In July 2020, Navy officials stated that the department continues to disagree with this recommendation. We continue to maintain that Selected Acquisition Reports represent the primary statutorily required means for DOD to report on program status. Grouping average unit costs for all Ford-class ships obscures individual ship cost growth and does not provide Congress with an adequate level of insight to monitor this over $55 billion program. Our recommendation would ensure that Congress receives insight into the costs of each existing and planned Ford-class ship. To fully implement this recommendation, the report should include cost information on individual ships.

Recommendation: In collaboration with cognizant officials within DOD components, the Director of Human Capital Initiatives should ensure that components have processes in place to verify the accuracy and completeness of data on the execution of initiatives funded by DAWDF.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: Office of Human Capital Initiatives
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation and the Human Capital Initiatives office has taken several actions to address it, including establishing a more detailed reporting process and providing new guidance to DOD components on how to use the reporting tools. The DOD components, however, have not yet provided Human Capital Initiatives responses to the updated guidance requiring them to provide information on the processes they use to confirm that the data submitted to Human Capital Initiatives on DAWDF initiatives were reliable and complete. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2020 made changes to the way that the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF) was funded. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021 proposes additional changes to the way that DAWDF is funded and managed. Some DAWDF funding may go directly to the DOD components and will not be overseen by Human Capital Initiatives. Once the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2021 is finalized, we will reassess to determine if the recommendation is still relevant.

Recommendation: To enhance program oversight and provide more robust input to budget deliberations, Congress should consider requiring DOD to report on each major acquisition program's systems engineering status in the department's annual budget request, beginning with the budget requesting funds to start development. The information could be presented on a simple timeline--as done for the case studies in this report--and at a minimum should reflect the status of a program's functional and allocated baselines as contained in the most current version of the program's systems engineering plan.

Agency: Congress
Status: Open

Comments: As of August 2020, Congress has not yet taken action on the matter for consideration. The Department of Defense (DOD) non-concurred and as of March 16, 2018, DOD officials reported they had closed this recommendation because they did not agree that the systems engineering plan was the most effective means to provide Congress insight into program risk. DOD officials stated that the timing of the systems engineering plan and any updates are not aligned to inform a budget decision that could occur as much as 18 months prior to program initiation; and existing statutory certifications and reports, such as 2366a and 2366b requirements, submitted to Congress contain adequate information regarding program risk and technical maturity. GAO initiated work in 2020 to examine recent congressionally mandated changes in DOD's acquisition and requirements processes and will assess whether those changes meet the intent of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence support to major defense acquisition programs, and to better enable personnel to provide intelligence inputs to their portfolios of acquisition programs, the Secretary of Defense should direct--as appropriate--the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with one another, to establish certifications that include having these personnel complete required training.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the recommendation. DOD provided corrective action plans that show they expect to complete efforts that will address this recommendation in 2019. We will continue to monitor the status of DOD's actions and whether these actions address the intent of our recommendations.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence support to major defense acquisition programs, and to facilitate implementation of improved processes and procedures developed by the Acquisition Intelligence Requirements Task Force and by the Air Force for the integration of intelligence into major defense acquisition programs, the Secretary of Defense should direct--as appropriate--the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with one another, to revise relevant guidance and procedures--including DOD Instruction 5000.02 and DOD Directive 5250.01-- require that intelligence mission data at the acquisition program, service, and department levels be prioritized.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the recommendation. DOD provided corrective action plans that show they expect to complete efforts that will address this recommendation in 2019. We will continue to monitor the status of DOD's actions and whether these actions address the intent of our recommendations.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence support to major defense acquisition programs, and to better ensure that DOD obtains useful feedback from stakeholders and the intended users of the Validated Online Lifecycle Threat tool, the Secretary of Defense should direct--as appropriate--the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with one another, to instruct the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to develop a communication plan for the tool that includes plans for communicating with and obtaining feedback from stakeholders and intended users such as acquisition program offices and personnel providing intelligence support to acquisition programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the recommendation. DOD provided corrective action plans that show they expect to complete efforts that will address this recommendation by the end of 2018. We will continue to monitor the status of DOD's actions and whether these actions address the intent of our recommendations.

Recommendation: To enhance DOD's efforts to better integrate and improve intelligence support to major defense acquisition programs, and to ensure that it fulfills the needs of acquisition programs and the intelligence community and works as intended, the Secretary of Defense should direct--as appropriate--the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and/or the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with one another, to assess the need for the Acquisition Intelligence Support Assessment tool and, if validated by this assessment, define this tool's requirements for development and identify the entity responsible for providing oversight and funding for its continued development, implementation, and operation.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Defense (DOD) concurred with the recommendation. DOD provided corrective action plans that show they expect to complete efforts that will address this recommendation sometime in the future. We will continue to monitor the status of DOD's actions and whether these actions address the intent of our recommendations.

Recommendation: In the event that operational test results for PDB-8 and PDB-8.1 reveal performance shortfalls that require additional development of the near and mid-term upgrades tested, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to establish mechanisms for overseeing those upgrades commensurate with other major defense acquisition programs, to include an initial report--similar to a Selected Acquisition Report--as soon as practical following operational testing for both PDB-8 and PDB-8.1, on the near and mid-term upgrades evaluated during these tests, including: (1) cost, schedule, and performance estimates for any additional development that is needed; and (2) an estimate of the amount of development costs it has incurred since 2013 for near- and mid-term Patriot upgrades operationally tested along with PDB-8 and PDB-8.1.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In 2017, operational testing for PDB-8 was completed and results show some performance shortfalls although DOD asserts that there is no additional development required. DOD plans to reassess the need for any additional action after operational testing for PDB-8.1 is completed as planned in the first quarter of fiscal year 2022.

Recommendation: In the event that operational test results for PDB-8 and PDB-8.1 reveal performance shortfalls that require additional development of the near and mid-term upgrades tested, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to establish mechanisms for overseeing those upgrades commensurate with other major defense acquisition programs, to include annual updates to Congress comparing the latest cost and schedule estimates against the initial estimates and providing explanations for any major deviations until development is complete.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with this recommendation. In 2017, operational testing for PDB-8 was completed and results show some performance shortfalls although DOD asserts that there is no additional development required. DOD plans to reassess the need for any additional action after operational testing for PDB-8.1 is completed as planned in the first quarter of fiscal year 2022.

Recommendation: To ensure that senior leadership within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments are better positioned to make informed decisions regarding the volume and type of services that should be acquired over the future year defense program, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should revise their programming guidance to collect information on how contracted services will be used to meet requirements beyond the budget year.

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Air Force
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the Department did not identify what action, if any, it planned to take to implement this recommendation, and noted the difficulties in accurately quantifying service contract requirements beyond the budget year. We maintain that collecting this information will assist the department in gaining insights into contracted service requirements and making more strategic decisions about the services it plans to acquire. In December 2019, DOD officials stated that DOD annually reviews requirements for services during program budget reviews and services requirements review boards. These officials noted, however, that the volatility of future program and budget cycles constrains the department's ability to accurately quantify contract service requirements beyond the budget year. We agree that the reviews identified by DOD have merit, but they do not provide senior leadership the visibility necessary to make informed decisions regarding the volume and type of services that should be acquired over the future year defense program. In August 2020, DOD officials stated the department is working to identify actions to address this recommendation. We will continue to monitor this recommendation and will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To ensure that senior leadership within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments are better positioned to make informed decisions regarding the volume and type of services that should be acquired over the future year defense program, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should revise their programming guidance to collect information on how contracted services will be used to meet requirements beyond the budget year.

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. In its response, the Department did not identify what action, if any, it planned to take to implement this recommendation, and noted the difficulties in accurately quantifying service contract requirements beyond the budget year. We maintain that collecting this information will assist the department in gaining insights into contracted service requirements and making more strategic decisions about the services it plans to acquire. In December 2019, DOD officials stated that DOD annually reviews requirements for services during program budget reviews and services requirements review boards. These officials noted, however, that the volatility of future program and budget cycles constrains the department's ability to accurately quantify contract service requirements beyond the budget year. We agree that the reviews identified by DOD have merit, but they do not provide senior leadership the visibility necessary to make informed decisions regarding the volume and type of services that should be acquired over the future year defense program. In August 2020, DOD officials stated the department is working to identify actions to address this recommendation. We will continue to monitor this recommendation and will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To ensure the military departments' efforts to integrate services into the programming process and senior service managers efforts to develop forecasts on service contract spending provide the department with consistent data, the Secretary of Defense should establish a mechanism, such as a working group of key stakeholders--which could include officials from the programming, budgeting and requirements communities as well as the senior services managers--to coordinate these efforts.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. In its response, DOD did not indicate any actions it planned to take to implement this recommendation, and instead noted a number of efforts intended to aid in the management and oversight of services acquisitions. We maintain that a coordinated approach is needed to ensure that collected data is consistent to inform DOD leadership on future contract spending. In December 2019, DOD officials stated that DOD annually reviews requirements for services during program budget reviews and services requirements review boards. These officials noted, however, that the volatility of future program and budget cycles constrains the department's ability to accurately quantify contract service requirements beyond the budget year. We agree that the reviews identified by DOD have merit, but they do not provide senior leadership the visibility necessary to make informed decisions regarding the volume and type of services that should be acquired over the future year defense program. In August 2020, DOD officials stated the department is working to identify actions to address this recommendation. We will continue to monitor this recommendation and will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's use of portfolio management for its weapon system investments and ensure that its investment plans are affordable, strategy-driven, balance near- and long-term needs, and leverage efforts across the military services, as well as to provide a solid foundation for future portfolio management efforts at the enterprise-level, the Secretary of Defense should revise DOD Directive 7045.2 on Capability Portfolio Management in accordance with best practices and promote the development of better tools to enable more integrated portfolio reviews and analyses of weapon system investments. Key elements of this recommendation would include (1) designating the Deputy Secretary of Defense or some appropriate delegate responsibility for implementing the policy and overseeing portfolio management in DOD; (2) requiring annual enterprise-level portfolio reviews that incorporate key portfolio review elements, including information from the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes; (3) directing the Joint Staff, AT&L, and CAPE to collaborate on their data needs and develop a formal implementation plan for meeting those needs either by building on the database the Joint Staff is developing for its analysis or investing in new analytical tools; and (4) incorporating lessons learned from military service portfolio reviews and portfolio management activities, such as using multiple risk and funding scenarios to assess needs and re-evaluate priorities.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. DOD agreed with the need to further develop portfolio management tools, ensure access to authoritative data, and incorporate lessons learned by others performing portfolio management. However, DOD stated that other aspects of our recommendation were redundant to, and would conflict with other processes and activities in place to perform portfolio management. As of January 2020, DOD has taken steps to implement parts of this recommendation. In January 2019, responsibility for DOD Directive 7045.20 was transferred to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which sponsored the directive when it was issued. This office began revising DOD Directive 7045.2 in summer 2019, and plans to update the directive by the end of fiscal year 2020. In addition, in October 2016 and September 2017, the Joint Staff informed GAO that they had been updating two of their databases on military capabilities and capability requirements to provide DOD with better analytical tools to support portfolio management. They also reported that they completed a crosscutting study in collaboration with the acquisition community to improve the information sharing and analytical tools for their capability requirements database. In July 2020, the Joint Staff completed an update one of these databases. Joint Staff officials said they anticipated the database update would increase speed and provide a better search engine to help the Joint Staff more effectively conduct portfolio reviews, assess potential redundancy, and collect and analyze the information needed prioritize capabilities across DOD. However, a Joint Staff official stated that it is too soon to tell if the Joint Staff has experienced any improvements with regard to portfolio management as a result of the update. DOD has not taken action on the other aspects of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's use of portfolio management for its weapon system investments and ensure that its investment plans are affordable, strategy-driven, balance near- and long-term needs, and leverage efforts across the military services, and to help ensure the military services' portfolio reviews are conducted regularly and effectively integrate information from the requirements, acquisition, and budget communities, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to update or develop policies that require them to conduct annual portfolio reviews that incorporate key portfolio review elements, including information from the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. However, DOD did not indicate that it would take any action to address it. Instead, DOD responded that the services' budget processes and Office of the Secretary of Defense's review of the services' budgets meet the intent of our recommendation. Our report findings showed otherwise. As of July 2020, DOD has not taken any actions to implement this recommendation, but an ongoing update of the department's portfolio management guidance (DOD Directive 7045.20) could lead to further actions on this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in consultation with DOD components, to establish guidelines on what constitutes a "current" ACAT II or III program for reporting purposes; the types of programs, if any, that do not require ACAT designations; and whether the rules for identifying current MDAPs would be appropriate for ACAT II and III programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that it planned to review existing policy to see if revisions were needed. Since that time, DOD has taken some steps to implement this recommendation, but has not established department-wide guidelines as we recommended. Starting in September 2018, DOD began providing the military departments with a capability to identify ACAT II and III programs using the Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE) system. The DAVE system is now considered to be a trusted source for ACAT II and III program data. DOD, in consultation with the military departments, established standard data elements for collection across ACAT II and III programs for inclusion in DAVE, but the military departments determine individually what constitutes a "current" program and the types of programs that do not require ACAT designations. As of August 2019, the Army and Navy have established guidance regarding what constitutes an active ACAT II or III program for reporting purposes. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, in consultation with DOD components, to determine what metrics should be used and what data should be collected on ACAT II and III programs to measure cost and schedule performance; and whether the use of DAMIR and the MDAP selected acquisition report format may be appropriate for collecting data on ACAT II and III programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that it planned to review existing policy to see if revisions were needed. DOD has taken steps to implement this recommendation, but has yet to determine at the department level what metrics should be collected on ACAT II and III cost and schedule performance as we recommended. DOD determined that the use of the Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE) system, which is closely related to DAMIR, was appropriate to collect information on ACAT II and III programs and has made that system available to the military departments. Specifically, DOD provided the military departments with the capability to identify ACAT II and III programs in DAVE/DAMIR in September 2018 and made the DAVE/DAMIR Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) workflow tool for cost and schedule data collection available for components' use in April 2019. However, according to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the military departments are responsible for individually determining what cost and schedule metrics to collect and monitor for ACAT II and III programs. According to December 2018 Army guidance, the Army will require all ACAT II and III programs use DOD's APB tool by the end of fiscal year 2019 to capture baseline cost, schedule, and performance parameters for ACAT II and III programs. According to Navy officials, the Navy is developing an APB tool in its for a future update of its acquisition information system that will collect APB cost and schedule information for ACAT II and III programs. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy and the Commander of SOCOM to assess the reliability of data collected on ACAT II and III programs and work with PEOs to develop a strategy to improve procedures for the entry and maintenance of data.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would direct DOD components to evaluate data on ACAT II and III programs and report back on the reliability of the data and plans to improve it. In September 2015, the Assistant Secretary of Defense directed the military departments and DOD components to assess the reliability of ACAT II and III data, but in July 2018, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment confirmed that based on the results of the assessments reported by the components, it does not plan to take any additional action to implement this recommendation. Since that time, as of September 2018, DOD began providing standard data elements and definitions of those elements that it collects for ACAT II and III program identification in order to improve the consistency of data. However, officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment stated that it is still up to the military departments to ensure the accuracy of data entered. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To improve DOD's ability to collect and maintain reliable data on its acquisitions, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy and the Commander of SOCOM to develop implementation plans to coordinate and execute component initiatives to improve data on ACAT II and III programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that it would direct DOD components to evaluate data on ACAT II and III programs and report back plans to improve it. In September 2015, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition requested that DOD components provide an update on their plans to improve the availability and quality of ACAT II and III data. In July 2018, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment confirmed that based on an assessment of the information reported by the components, it does not plan to take any additional action to implement this recommendation. Officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment reiterated in August 2019 that while DOD now provides a department-wide system to be used for collecting basic program data for ACAT II and III programs, it remains the responsibility of the military departments to enter complete and accurate data. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure compliance with relevant provisions of DOD acquisition policy with the purpose of improving DOD's ability to provide oversight for ACAT II and III programs, including those programs that may become MDAPs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force and Commander of SOCOM to establish a mechanism to ensure compliance with APB requirements in DOD policy.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would issue guidance to DOD components related to APB requirements for ACAT II and III programs. DOD has taken some steps related to this recommendation. In September 2015, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition requested that DOD components review their mechanisms for establishing and enforcing the APB requirements for all ACAT II and III programs. In July 2018, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment confirmed that, based on the results of these reviews, it does not plans to take any action to implement this recommendation. However, in 2019, DOD made its DAVE/DAMIR APB workflow tool available for military department use, and the Air Force elected to use the tool to create and track APBs for ACAT II and III programs. We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help ensure compliance with relevant provisions of DOD acquisition policy with the purpose of improving DOD's ability to provide oversight for ACAT II and III programs, including those programs that may become MDAPs, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy to improve component procedures for notifying the Defense Acquisition Executive of programs with a cost estimate within 10 percent of ACAT I cost thresholds.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics would issue guidance to DOD components related to notification requirements for programs approaching ACAT I cost thresholds. The Army and Navy have reiterated existing guidance and the Air Force is evaluating additional actions it might take to improve its notification procedures. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Sustainment confirmed in July 2018 that it does not plan to take additional actions to implement this recommendation, and as of August 2019, that office has not directed DOD components to improve their processes as we recommended .We have requested an update on DOD's recent actions to address this recommendation, but have not received information as of September 2020. We will continue to monitor DOD's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to require MAIS programs to establish their first acquisition program baseline within 2 years of beginning work on the programs.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: As of January 2020, DOD had made limited progress addressing our recommendation for business system programs; however, it had not addressed the recommendation for non-business system programs. Specifically, the department updated its instruction on business systems requirements and acquisition to include, among other things, guidance on establishing baselines against which to measure progress for developing needed business capability. However, the instruction did not explicitly require that a program baseline be established within 2 years. Specifically, according to the instruction, baselines may be established at the program level or at the release level (i.e., for a manageable subset of functionality in support of the business capability), within 2 years after programs have validated a business capability is needed and received approval to conduct solution analysis. If at the program level, the baseline is to be set prior to the development of the first release or deployment. If at the release level, the baseline is to be set prior to the development of each release or deployment. In January 2020, the department also issued interim policy for software-intensive systems. However, while the interim policy requires program managers to develop an acquisition strategy that includes delivering software within one year from the date funds are first obligated to acquire or develop new software capability, the interim policy does not require software-intensive system programs to establish a program baseline within 2 years.

Recommendation: To help improve DOD's milestone decision process, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics in collaboration with the military service acquisition executives, program executive officers, and program managers to, as a longer-term effort, select several current or new major defense acquisition programs to pilot, on a broader scale, different approaches for streamlining the entire milestone decision process, with the results evaluated and reported for potential wider use. The pilot programs should consider the following: (1) Defining the appropriate information needed to support milestone decisions while still ensuring program accountability and oversight. The information should be based on the business case principles needed for well-informed milestone decisions including well defined requirements, reasonable life-cycle cost estimates, and a knowledge-based acquisition plan. (2) Developing an efficient process for providing this information to the milestone decision authority by (a) minimizing any reviews between the program office and the different functional staff offices within each chain of command level and (b) establishing frequent, regular interaction between the program office and milestone decision makers, in lieu of documentation reviews, to help expedite the process.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, and as of February 2020 the Services each identified one pilot program for implementation of streamlined acquisition processes. The Army chose the Improved Turbine Engine Program; the Navy chose the MQ-25 Stingray Unmanned Carrier Aviation Program; and the Air Force chose the MH-139 Grey Wolf Program. In July 2020, DOD indicated that specific streamlining initiatives for these programs will be developed in the near future after Executive Review at the Service level and after the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment) has been informed.