Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct NAVSEA to incorporate current cost and program data and an updated cost risk analysis in its planned update of the Columbia class lead submarine cost estimate. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, stating that the Columbia Class Program cost estimate will be updated in 2019 to support the lead ship authorization Decision Acquisition Board in 2020. As of September 2020, we have yet to receive an update on the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct NAVSEA to develop a realistic and well-documented estimate of savings from use of the authorities associated with the Fund and incorporate the savings associated with the lead submarine into the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation, stating that the updated Columbia Class Program cost estimate would incorporate estimated savings from use of the authorities associated with the fund and savings associated with the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate. In August 2020, Navy officials indicated that NAVSEA updated the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate to include updates to the estimate of savings from the use of the authorities associated with the Fund.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Navy should direct the Columbia class program office to update the lead submarine cost estimate and cost risk analysis prior to requesting funds for lead submarine construction. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Navy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation, stating that the lead submarine cost estimate and cost risk analysis will be updated to support the lead ship authorization Decision Acquisition Board in 2020. In August 2020, Navy officials indicated that NAVSEA updated the Columbia lead submarine cost estimate. However, this estimate was completed after funding was requested for lead submarine construction. While the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation plans to conduct an assessment of this estimate in the summer of 2020, the assessment will also be too late to inform the Navy's funding request.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should assess CFIUS resource requirements within the Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy (MIBP) and DOD component reviewers in light of increasing workload, and prioritize personnel and funding resources accordingly to review, mitigate, and monitor transactions that are of concern to the department. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and in August 2020, stated it had augmented the personnel in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy (formally the Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy) to include 15 federal civilians and 60 contractors to support the current CFIUS caseload. Industrial Policy officials stated that DOD CFIUS component reviewers have also augmented their personnel resources, and that approximately 15 of their contractor employees will support DOD CFIUS stakeholders. However, documentation of the efforts to prioritize personnel and funding resources within DOD CFIUS component reviewers was not available at the time of our follow-up.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, should incorporate the results of its efforts to identify, assess, and prioritize national security concerns related to foreign investment in emerging technologies and in proximity to certain critical military locations, into DOD Instruction 2000.25 and communicate the results to DOD component reviewers. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it believes the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) will help the department to address concerns related to foreign investment in emerging technologies and in proximity to critical military locations. In August 2020, officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy stated that some of the regulations implementing FIRRMA are currently being written, and that the department is also still in the process of updating DOD Instruction 2000.25, which they anticipate completing in April 2021.

Recommendation: Following the completion of its emerging technology study, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP should assess what additional authorities may be necessary to address risks related to foreign investment in critical and emerging technologies, and seek legislative action to address risks posed by these investments as appropriate. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it believes the passage of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) should provide the department with the necessary authorities to address concerns related to foreign investment in emerging technologies. However, in August 2020, officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy stated that the regulation implementing FIRRMA requrements related to emerging technology is still in the process of being written by the Department of Commerce, and that until these regulations are issued the Department of Defense cannot assess their ability to address concerns related to foreign investment in critical and emerging technologies.

Recommendation: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP should update DOD Instruction 2000.25, to include additional guidance and clarification regarding DOD component responsibilities during the CFIUS process and DOD processes for identifying non-notified transactions. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it was working with other CFIUS member agencies to make the formal non-notified process DOD established in 2016 a more robust, interagency process. In August 2020, DOD stated it is still in the process of revising DOD Instruction 2000.25 to include additional information on identifying non-notified transactions, but does not anticipate that the revisions will be completed until April 2021.

Recommendation: The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for MIBP should update and implement requirements identified in DOD Instruction 2000.25 regarding management and oversight of mitigation agreements, such as taking into account the resources needed to effectively monitor agreements, improving communication methods between MIBP and the DOD components, and clarifying component responsibilities in developing and monitoring mitigation agreements. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics: Office of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated in July 2019 that it is in the process of revising DOD Instruction 2000.25 regarding the management and oversight of mitigation agreements, and have more than doubled their resources for mitigation monitoring. As of August 2020, officials from the Office of Industrial Policy stated that that revisions to DOD Instruction 2000.25 will not be completed until April 2021.

Recommendation: To fulfill the role assigned to it under the 1980 Act, the Secretary of Commerce should engage with industry stakeholders and continually identify and assess critical materials needs across a broad range of industrial sectors.

Agency: Department of Commerce
Status: Open

Comments: In December 2016, Commerce provided information on its implementation of the recommendation from GAO-16-699. Commerce stated that it had developed an action plan consisting of the following steps: (1) consulting with relevant offices and agencies, including: OSTP, DOD, the U.S. Geological Survey, DOE, the U.S. International Trade Commission, the Bureau of Industry and Security, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; (2) determining criteria to be used when it is necessary to collect information to identify and assess critical materials needs; (3) determining appropriate steps, which might include: (a) developing a summary of information that federal agencies currently collect on the domestic and international supply of critical raw materials; (b) soliciting input from a broad range of industries through a Federal Register notice; (c) assessing aggregate information, as allowable under law, that is submitted through the Miscellaneous Tariff Bill process over the course of fiscal year 2017; and (d) consulting with federal advisory groups for advice; (4) determining the audience for collected information and methodology for information dissemination; (5) determining the process for identifying further information collection needs and methodology for disseminating collected information; and (6) determining the timeline and responsibilities for information collection and distribution. In an April 2017 update, Commerce stated that it had identified points of contacts in seven of the eight agencies listed in its action plan and is in the process of contacting them for input. Commerce stated that it hoped to identify an appropriate contact in the eighth agency in the near future. Commerce stated that it had also drafted questions to ask the agencies in order to implement the action plan. Commerce did not provide a timeframe for when it expected to complete implementation of the action plan. In a June 2018 update, Commerce stated that since the change in Administration, Commerce has not been able to identify staff in all agencies to work with, but that Commerce is now in contact with several agencies who are aware of industry needs. Commerce did not provide a timeframe for when it expected to complete execution of its action plan. We requested additional information on Commerce's efforts to implement this recommendation, including plans to solicit industry input, and will update the status of the recommendation based on additional information received.

Recommendation: To enhance the ability of the Executive Office of the President to coordinate federal agencies to carry out the national materials policy outlined in the 1980 Act, and to broaden future applications of the early warning screening methodology, the Subcommittee should take the steps necessary to include potentially critical materials beyond minerals, such as developing a plan or strategy for prioritizing additional materials for which actions are needed to address data limitations.

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Science and Technology Policy
Status: Open

Comments: In September 2017, OSTP provided updated information on its efforts to implement recommendations from GAO-16-699. OSTP stated that "the Subcommittee shares GAO's interest in improving data availability and granularity. However, in some cases, private entities and foreign governments may be unwilling or unable to provide (or even collect) such data. Additionally, the Subcommittee member agencies' financial and personnel resources are limited, and significant additional resources would be required to prioritize and pursue the data for additional materials and critical materials beyond minerals. Without the appropriation of additional resources, the Subcommittee's work on these additional items will be necessarily circumscribed." In its February 2018 report on the updated application of the early warning screening methodology, the Subcommittee stated that it saw the value in analyzing more minerals and non-minerals to help inform policy decisions, but that fulfilling this need will require additional dedicated personnel and financial resources for data collection, analysis, and distribution. In March 2020, OSTP stated that the Subcommittee has explored the possibility of expanding the scope of the early warning screening methodology to include critical materials beyond minerals. According to OSTP, possible expansion candidates include carbon fiber and critical chemicals. OSTP stated that it has initiated a discussion with the Department of Interior (U.S. Geological Survey), who has been leading the methodology development, and the Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) with regard to possible data that would be needed for such an expansion. In August 2020, OSTP stated that the expertise to expand data collection to additional materials of interest exists in the National Minerals Information Center (NMIC) at the U.S. Geological Survey; however, the capacity to expand beyond the current portfolio is not available due to budgetary constraints. We will update this recommendation when we obtain additional information on these efforts.