Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment clarifies the categories of threats within JIDO's counter-improvised threat mission. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation. As of October 2019, DOD indicated that is has begun taking action to implement it. We will update the status of this recommendation once we confirm the actions DOD has taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment clarifies JIDO's authorities for countering improvised threats, including the degree to which JIDO is to focus (lead, advocate, and coordinate) departmental efforts in key areas such as research and rapid fielding. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation. As of October 2019, DOD indicated that is has begun taking action to implement it. We will update the status of this recommendation once we confirm the actions DOD has taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the DTRA Director establishes a process to routinely obtain permission to release applicable information from organizations connected to JIDO research projects so that JIDO can send the information to Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation. As of October 2019, DOD indicated that is has begun taking action to implement it. We will update the status of this recommendation once we confirm the actions DOD has taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure the DTRA Director establishes a process to submit information on JIDO's research projects to DTIC. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation. As of October 2019, DOD indicated that is has begun taking action to implement it. We will update the status of this recommendation once we confirm the actions DOD has taken.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should assess the risks to accomplishing both of the GRF's uses: that is, its use as an augmentation capability available as needed to individual geographic combatant commands; and its use as a tailorable joint force available for rapid response to a specific threat. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2019, DOD has not implemented this recommendation and stated that DOD is developing its Dynamic Force Employment (DFE) concept, which will have a direct impact on the mission, construct, command relationships, and training of the Department's Global Response Force. DOD has not specified when the implementation of the DFE will be complete.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should, as appropriate following the assessment of risk, design responses, such as further defining and prioritizing the GRF's intended uses and missions, to mitigate any identified risks. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2019, DOD has not implemented this recommendation and stated that DOD is developing its Dynamic Force Employment concept, which will have a direct impact on the mission, construct, command relationships, and training of the Department's Global Response Force. DOD has not specified when the implementation of the DFE will be complete.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should designate an authority to establish and enforce integrated joint training for GRF-assigned units, as appropriate. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with this recommendation. As of August 2019, DOD has not implemented this recommendation and stated that DOD is developing its Dynamic Force Employment concept, which will have a direct impact on the mission, construct, command relationships, and training of the Department's Global Response Force. DOD has not specified when the implementation of the DFE will be complete.

Recommendation: To enhance enterprise-wide biometric strategic planning, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics should publish a supporting biometric implementation plan that includes intended outcomes, measures of effectiveness, and responsibilities, among other things.

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with the recommendation. As of September 2019, DOD indicated that it has begun taking action to implement it. We will update the status of this recommendation once we confirm the actions DOD has taken.

Recommendation: To facilitate more effective and efficient acquisition management of DOD's biometric and forensic enterprises, the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, should complete a disposition analysis for the Near Real Time Identity Operations solution before the solution reaches operation and sustainment.

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with the recommendation. As of September 2019, DOD indicated that it has begun taking action to implement it. We will update the status of this recommendation once we confirm the actions DOD has taken.

Recommendation: To facilitate more effective and efficient acquisition management of DOD's biometric and forensic enterprises, the Secretary of the Army, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, should consider including geographic dispersal as part of the selection criteria for the DOD Automated Biometric Information System (ABIS) follow-on system.

Agency: Department of Defense: Department of the Army
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with the recommendation. As of September 2019, DOD indicated that it has begun taking action to implement it. We will update the status of this recommendation once we confirm the actions DOD has taken.

Recommendation: To enable the department to enhance its visibility over contractor personnel for whom it may become responsible in the event of contingency and other applicable operations, the Secretary of Defense should, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, update accountability guidance clarifying the types of contractor personnel that are to be accounted for in a steady-state environment.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, but as of September 2020, has not yet taken steps to implement it. DOD stated that DOD Instruction 3020.41, Operational Contract Support, is being updated, and will include guidance on the types of contractor personnel that are to be accounted for. The department also stated it would update Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.13C, Joint Personnel Reporting Structure-Personnel Manual, to clarify the types of contractor personnel that are to be accounted for. As of September 2020, neither of these guidance documents had been updated. This recommendation will remain open.

Recommendation: To ensure that combatant commands are not contracting with entities that may be connected to or supporting prohibited organizations, the Secretary of Defense should, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develop and issue guidance that clarifies the foreign-vendor vetting steps or process that should be established at each combatant command, including the operational conditions under which a foreign-vendor vetting cell should be established.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD partially concurred with our recommendation but as of September 2020, has not implemented it. In its response to our report, DOD agreed that the development and issuance of overarching guidance and partially concurs with the development and issuance of guidance that clarifies the foreign vendor vetting steps or process that should be established at each combatant command, including operational conditions under which a foreign vendor vetting cell should be established. In April 2018, DOD issued Directive-Type Memorandum 18-002, Prohibition on Providing Funds to the Enemy and Authorization of Additional Access to Records. In August 2020, DOD officials said that they had drafted department-wide vendor vetting guidance (now known as vendor threat mitigation), but had not yet issued it. Since the guidance has not been issued, the recommendation will remain open at this time.

Recommendation: To ensure that PACOM is not contracting with entities that may be connected to or supporting prohibited organizations, while awaiting DOD guidance on vendor vetting, the Secretary of Defense should direct the PACOM commander to consider developing vendor vetting guidance as other combatant commands have done, to prepare for the event that PACOM becomes actively engaged in hostilities.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation, but as of September 2019, has not yet taken the steps necessary to implement it.. When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To ensure that annual training plans are aligned with the Air Force's stated goals to ensure that its forces can successfully achieve missions across a broad range of current and emerging threats, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to comprehensively reassess the assumptions underlying its annual training requirements--including, but not limited to, the total annual training requirements by aircraft, the criteria for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced, and the mix between live and simulator training--and make any appropriate adjustments in future training plans.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD non-concurred with the recommendation. The Air Force has taken steps to address this recommendation. Specifically, Air Force officials stated they have completed one study and have an ongoing study, intended to reassess the assumptions underlying its annual training requirements for fighter aircrews. For example, Air Force officials stated a study was completed in August 2017 reassessing the criteria for designating aircrews as experienced or inexperienced for 4th generation fighter aircraft. In addition, Air Force officials stated that another study was intended to define the optimum mix of annual training requirements for fighter aircrews. These officials stated that the study results were provided to Air Force senior leaders in July 2018 for approval. As of August 2020, the Air Force did not provide any additional documentation on steps taken to address the recommendation. Completion of these studies and the corresponding adjustments to annual training requirements should help the Air Force ensure that their training plans are aligned to achieve a range of missions for current and emerging threats as recommended by GAO in September 2016.

Recommendation: To improve the Air Force's ability to consistently monitor training results and better position it to allocate resources to address factors that limit the effectiveness of training, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Air Force to establish desired learning objectives and training support elements needed to accomplish the training expectations in its annual Ready Aircrew Program tasking memorandums, and develop a process to collect data to assess the effectiveness of annual training against these features.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD non-concurred with the recommendation, stating that the Air Force's Ready Aircrew Program training differs significantly from other syllabus-directed courses of instruction and that desired learning objectives for this training are set at the squadron level in accordance with current Air Force guidance. As of August 2020, DOD did not provide any documentation on steps taken to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: To help improve awareness of OCS roles and responsibilities and to collect OCS issues at the military services and the service component commands, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretaries of the military departments, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to establish an OCS training requirement for commanders and senior leaders.

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: DOD concurred with our recommendation. As of September 2020, DOD has taken steps to focus OCS training to all planners, including those outside the logistics directorate. In December 2015, the Joint Staff J7 certified the Joint OCS Planning and Execution (JOPEC) course of instruction for Joint training. The Joint Staff, per this training certification, is working with the Joint Deployment Training Center and the Joint Force Staff College to provide student administrative and course catalog support for future JOPEC training. In August 2020, OSD officials stated that they have secured funding for development of a new, online strategic-level OCS course, which they plan to develop, test, and field in 2021. Finally, OSD officials said that the updated OCS instruction will also address training for planners beyond the logistics directorate; officials anticipate the instruction being issued in late 2020. We will continue to monitor these efforts and this recommendation will remain open at this time.