Recommendation: The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should implement a documented process for reviewing and, if deemed necessary, revising its guidance for implementing cybersecurity measures at regularly defined intervals. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that CISA's Infrastructure Security Division (ISD) will work to develop a documented process for reviewing CFATS cybersecurity guidance at regularly defined intervals. DHS stated in its comments that once the process is documented and implemented, ISD will revise or supplement existing guidance, as appropriate. We will continue to monitor DHS's actions to address the recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should incorporate measures to assess the contribution that its cybersecurity training is making to program goals, such as inspector- or program-specific performance improvement goals. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation stated that CISA agrees that it is important to ensure training supports program goals, whether relating to inspector-specific or program-specific performance maintenance or improvement goals. Regarding inspector performance maintenance or improvement, DHS stated that, among other things, management will ensure that each inspector's individual performance plan fully captures their expected performance goals in the area of cybersecurity. We will continue to monitor DHS's actions to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should track delivery and performance data for its cybersecurity training, such as the completion of courses, webinars, and refresher trainings. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that CISA agrees that process improvements to better document and evaluate the effectiveness of the training provided to CFATS staff are worthwhile. DHS stated in its comments that CISA will establish policies and procedures intended to ensure that all cybersecurity training provided to chemical security personnel is accounted for in a centralized mechanism. We will continue to monitor DHS's actions taken to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should develop a plan to evaluate the effectiveness of its cybersecurity training, such as collecting and analyzing course evaluation forms. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that evaluating the effectiveness of training is beneficial and CISA will work to ensure that all cybersecurity courses provided to CISA chemical security staff are evaluated for effectiveness. DHS also stated that, among other things, CISA will require course evaluation forms from each attendee of any cybersecurity training provided by CISA to its chemical facility staff. We will continue to monitor DHS's actions to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should develop a workforce plan that addresses the program's cybersecurity-related needs, which should include an analysis of any gaps in the program's capacity and capability to perform its cybersecurity-related functions, and human capital strategies to address them. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that CISA will develop a concept of operations, which will include goals and requirements for a workforce review and planning effort to ensure the organization addresses the new program's capacity and capability to perform its regulatory, voluntary, and programmatic goals, to include its cybersecurity related functions. We will continue to monitor DHS's actions to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should maintain reliable, readily available information about the cyber integration levels of covered chemical facilities and inspector cybersecurity expertise. This could include updating the program's inspection database system to better track facilities' cyber integration levels. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that CISA retains information on cyber integration levels for regulated facilities but that it is not in a readily accessible format. DHS stated in its comments that ISD will execute a contract for new information technology development support for the CSAT system which, once executed, will work with the new support contractor to build a tool to automate the locating and reporting of a facility's cyber integration level data in a more accessible format. We will continue to monitor the status of DHS's actions to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Assistant Secretary for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction should develop a strategy and implementation plan to help the Department of Homeland Security, among other things, guide, support, integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DHS agreed with GAO's September 2018 recommendation and is taking actions to address it. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) officials stated in December 2018 that CWMD plans to develop a strategy and implementation plan to help DHS guide, support, integrate and coordinate its chemical defense programs and activities; leverage resources and capabilities; and provide a roadmap for addressing any identified gaps. According to CWMD officials, the implementation plan would broadly address DHS chemical defense activities and programs to prevent, protect against, and respond to chemical incidents, including support to federal, state, tribal, and territorial operators and agencies, as well as the private sector. CWMD officials provided GAO with the completed strategy in December 2019 and plan to complete the implementation plan by December 2020. The strategy includes four overarching goals that will drive CWMD's mission in protecting American safety and security from chemical threats and incidents. We will continue to monitor the status of the implementation plan, as completion of both documents is essential to help the CWMD Office guide DHS's efforts to address fragmentation and coordination issues and would be consistent with the office's aim to establish a coherent mission.

Recommendation: If DHS's proposed CBRNE program consolidation is approved by Congress, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy to use, where appropriate, the key mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in our previous work to help ensure that a CBRNE consolidated office benefits from lessons learned from other organizational transformations.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: We found that key mergers and organizational transformation practices identified in previous GAO work could benefit the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) during implementation of the proposed CBRNE consolidation. As a result, we recommended that should Congress approve DHS's CBRNE consolidation plan, the department use these key mergers and organizational transformation practices. In December 2018, the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 was enacted into law (Public Law 115-387) authorizing the proposed consolidation of CBRNE functions into a new Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD office). In a memo to Congress regarding the new CWMD office, DHS stated that it remained committed to evaluating GAO's identified practices when implementing the consolidation. In August 2019, DHS provided us with information outlining efforts to use the key mergers and organizational transformation practices during the CWMD implementation phase. However, we requested additional evidence that all practices were considered. For example, one of the key practices is to use the performance management system to define responsibility and assure accountability for change. DHS created position descriptions for CWMD office leadership but we did not receive evidentiary support to demonstrate that DHS has added CWMD office transition goals to relevant employee performance plans. In April 2020, DHS estimated June 2020 for completing steps responsive to this recommendation. We will update the status of this recommendation as additional information is made available.