Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Management should ensure that the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management and component heads execute the Component Acquisition Executive nomination and designation process consistently, as described in its guidance. This should include nominating and designating Component Acquisition Executives to oversee all acquisition programs. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Management should ensure that the Component Acquisition Executives that are responsible for oversight of acquisition programs comply with Department of Homeland Security direction to complete Component Acquisition Executive support staffing plans. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Management should identify, in policy or guidance, the expertise that constitutes critical acquisition positions for effective Component Acquisition Executive oversight. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Management should direct the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management to establish a time frame for completing its assessment of the Investment Evaluation, Submission, and Tracking (INVEST) system data fields for which the Component Acquisition Executive certification is necessary, based on current use and reporting requirements, and take appropriate actions based on the results. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Management should develop and implement a mechanism to compare component marine operating costs across components and locations, including a cost per vessel underway (float) hour methodology (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should take steps to develop a streamlined enforcement approach to counterfeit goods in small packages. This may include assessing the feasibility and impact of such an approach, including any potential for cost savings. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Biometric Entry-Exit Program's privacy notices contain complete and current information, including all of the locations where facial recognition is used and how travelers can request to opt out as appropriate. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Biometric Entry-Exit Program's privacy signage is consistently available at all locations where CBP is using facial recognition. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should direct the Biometric Entry-Exit Program to develop and implement a plan to conduct privacy audits of its commercial partners', contractors', and vendors' use of personally identifiable information. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement a plan to ensure that the biometric air exit capability meets its established photo capture requirement. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop a process by which Biometric Entry-Exit program officials are alerted when the performance of air exit facial recognition falls below established thresholds. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement additional guidance for ensuring funds appropriated for specific purposes are obligated consistent with the purpose of the funds. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. In July 2020, CBP's Office of Finance issued new guidance on how to execute the remaining funds CBP received in the 2019 Emergency Supplemental. In September 2020, the CBP Budget Directorate's Program Analysis Division also updated its standard operating procedures to describe how it will review samples of purchase requests for supplemental funds. To fully implement our recommendation, CBP should develop and implement guidance for ensuring all funds appropriated for specific purposes, including future appropriations CBP may receive, are obligated consistent with the purpose of the funds.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should establish and document oversight roles and responsibilities to ensure funds appropriated for specific purposes are obligated consistent with the purpose of the funds. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. In September 2020, the CBP Budget Directorate's Program Analysis Division updated its standard operating procedures to describe how it will review samples of purchase requests for supplemental funds. To fully implement our recommendation, CBP should establish and document oversight roles and responsibilities to ensure all funds appropriated for specific purposes, including regular appropriations, are obligated consistent with the purpose of the funds.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement oversight mechanisms for CBP's implementation of policies and procedures relating to medical care for individuals in its custody to include documentation of expected practices, metrics and corresponding performance targets, and roles and responsibilities for taking corrective action. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should document what information it is using to assess whether to offer the influenza vaccine to individuals in custody, including how it weighs costs and benefits. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement training on recognizing medical distress in children for all CBP officers and Border Patrol agents who may come into contact with children in custody. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should provide additional guidance to field personnel to ensure they classify significant incident reports on deaths, serious injuries, and suicide attempts, in accordance with CBP policy. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should update the Significant Incident Reporting System to include categories that align with CBP's directive on the reporting of significant incidents. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should provide additional guidance to components on the procedures for reporting deaths in custody to OPR and other entities within CBP. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that timely, reliable information on deaths in custody is reported to Congress, as directed, and maintain documentation on those reports. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and said it would take steps to implement it. We will continue to monitor DHS' efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of State should ensure that State/INL establishes procedures that verify that monitoring officials for Mérida Initiative projects follow the key practices. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of State
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The USAID Administrator should establish procedures to ensure that monitoring officials for Mérida Initiative projects develop monitoring plans that address risks. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: United States Agency for International Development
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should issue updated Border Patrol and OFO training materials that reflect the correct definition of a family unit and guidance for recording that information. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the CBP has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should provide written guidance to Border Patrol agents and OFO officers about what narrative information should be recorded on the child's and the accompanying adult's Forms I-213 to document cases in which CBP determines that a parent–child relationship may be invalid. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the CBP has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should develop and implement additional controls to ensure that Border Patrol agents accurately record family unit separations in its data system. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS reported that CBP plans to add enhancements to Border Patrol's processing system that will prompt agents to create family units within the system, when applicable. Upon completion of these enhancements, CBP plans to provide training to agents to describe the enhancements to help ensure that family units are recorded when necessary. DHS estimates these actions will be completed by September 30, 2020. To fully address our recommendations, CBP should develop and implement controls to ensure agents are accurately recording family unit separations in its data system.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should update Border Patrol's and OFO's data systems to ensure data captured on family unit separation reasons clearly align with CBP policy. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and provided documentation of guidance that OFO and Border Patrol issued about data system updates. We are reviewing the information and documents DHS provided to assess the extent to which CBP fully addressed this recommendation.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should develop and implement additional controls to ensure that Border Patrol agents include a narrative description of a family unit separation on the parent's / legal guardian's and child's Forms I-213, including the reason for the separation. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the CBP has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should provide guidance to Border Patrol agents and OFO officers on the narrative information they are to include about family unit separation events on the parent's / legal guardian's and child's Forms I-213. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. When we confirm what actions the CBP has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The ICE Director should develop and implement a mechanism to systematically track in its data system the family units ICE separates. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that ICE is modifying its data system to track separations and reunification throughout the Office of Enforcement and Removal Operations' enforcement process. DHS estimates that this process will be complete by September 30, 2020. To fully address this recommendation, ICE should ensure that it has a mechanism in its data system to systematically track the family units it separates.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security, jointly with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, should collaborate to address information sharing gaps identified in this report to ensure that ORR receives information needed to make decisions for UAC, including those apprehended with an adult. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans will work with relevant components and HHS to document current information-sharing practices to validate the remaining gaps and draft a joint plan between DHS and HHS to ensure that HHS receives information needed to make decisions for unaccompanied children, including those apprehended with an adult. DHS estimated that these actions will be completed by December 31, 2020. Further DHS and HHS collaboration about information sharing methods and ways to enhance interagency agreements would better position HHS to make informed and timely decisions for unaccompanied children.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Health and Human Services, jointly with the Secretary of Homeland Security, should collaborate to address information sharing gaps identified in this report to ensure that ORR receives information needed to make decisions for UAC, including those apprehended with an adult. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, HHS reported that the department plans to coordinate with DHS, beginning in June 2020, on periodic updates to the interagency Joint Concept of Operations. To fully address this recommendation, HHS and DHS should address the information sharing gaps identified in our report.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should identify the information about family members apprehended together that its components collectively need to process those family members and communicate that information to its components. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: According to DHS, in June 2020, DHS's Office of Immigration Statistics launched a Family Status Data Standards Community of Interest (COI) under the purview of the DHS Immigration Data Integration Initiative. In August 2020, DHS reported that the Family Status COI includes subject matter experts and data system managers from DHS components, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review. The COI's mandate includes drafting common DHS-wide and interagency data standards (common codes, common definitions, common formats) for all topics related to family status, including codes to identify the reasons for family separation, members apprehended together, and unaccompanied children. DHS expects to complete these actions by September 30, 2020. Identifying and communicating department-wide information needs with respect to family members who have been apprehended together should help provide DHS with greater assurance that its components are identifying all individuals who may be eligible for relief from removal from the United States based on their family relationships.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that, at the time of apprehension, CBP collects the information that DHS components collectively need to process family members apprehended together. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that its Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) will work with relevant components and offices to ensure all required information is collected at the time of apprehension on the Form I-213 when processing family members apprehended together. As of August 2020, DHS reported that DHS OIS continues to work with relevant components and offices to ensure all required information is collected at the time of apprehension on Form I-213 when processing family members apprehended together. DHS expects to complete these actions by September 30, 2020. Collecting information about the relationships between family members apprehended together and documenting that information on the Form I-213 could help address fragmentation among DHS components and improve the information available to other agencies.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that CBP documents the information that DHS components collectively need to process family members apprehended together on the Form I-213. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that, upon implementation of the steps the department plans to take in response to our second recommendation, CBP will issue guidance to the field to ensure that CBP agents and officers document the information that DHS components collectively need to process family members. In August 2020, DHS reported that component agencies continue to collaborate to define the process of family members apprehended together, as will be reflected on CBP Form I-213. DHS estimates issuing this guidance by March 31, 2021. Collecting information about the relationships between family members apprehended together and documenting that information on the Form I-213 could help address fragmentation among DHS components and improve the information available to other agencies.immigration or other proceedings.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should evaluate options for developing a unique identifier shared across DHS components' data systems to link family members apprehended together. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that its Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) plans to work with relevant components to develop a unique shared identifier linking family members apprehended together. According to DHS, DHS OIS launched the Family Status Community of Interest (COI) in June 2020, and the COI has since established a bi-weekly meeting schedule. The COI's initial focus is on standard codes describing the reasons for family separations. Upon completing the family separation reason standard, DHS reported that the COI will prioritize developing common codes to identify family members apprehended together. DHS estimates completing these actions by March 31, 2021. Evaluating options for developing a shared unique family member identifier across components that would allow each component access to certain information about family members apprehended together would help bridge the information gaps about family relationships between components caused by DHS's fragmented data systems.

Recommendation: The Director of USCIS should ensure that, in addition to USCIS's basic asylum officer training, all asylum offices provide pre-departure training on the credible and reasonable fear processes before their officers begin screening cases at the family residential centers. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that USCIS plans to develop a standardized pre-departure training and provide this training to all detailees prior to deployment to the family residential centers. DHS estimated that these actions would be completed by September 2020. As of August 2020, USCIS told GAO that the number of noncitizens processed under expedited removal has decreased dramatically as a result of Coronavirus Disease 2019. Therefore, details to the Family Residential Centers have largely been paused. USCIS noted that the Asylum Division is reviewing the credible fear and reasonable fear training requirements; working on an enhanced training module; and, developing a standardized pre-departure training by December 31, 2020. USCIS plans to provide the training to all detailees prior to deployment to the Family Residential Centers during calendar year 2021, should the details resume. Providing pre-departure training, in addition to USCIS's basic training for new asylum officers, would help USCIS ensure that officers from all asylum offices are conducting efficient and effective fear screenings of families.

Recommendation: The Director of USCIS should ensure asylum officers systematically record in USCIS's automated case management system if individuals receive credible fear determinations as principal applicants, dependents, or in the interest of family unity, pursuant to regulation or USCIS policy. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that USCIS planned to explore ways to modify its case management system so that asylum officers can record whether an individual received a positive credible fear determination as a principal applicant, dependent, or in the interest of family unity. USCIS plans to make any appropriate changes to its case management system and train asylum officers on these changes by December 2020. As of August 2020, USCIS reported that the agency remains on track to complete this work as planned, provided staffing is not affected by USCIS budget issues. Having complete data in its case management system on all outcomes of credible fear screenings at family residential centers would better position USCIS to report on the scope of either the agency's policy for family members who are treated as dependents, pursuant to regulation, or USCIS's use of discretion in the interest of family unity.

Recommendation: The Director of USCIS should collect and analyze additional information on case delays, including specific reasons for delays and how long they last, that asylum officers may face when screening credible and reasonable fear cases. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that USCIS will explore ways to collect additional information on credible and reasonable fear case delays in its case management system. USCIS plans to modify the system, as appropriate, to instruct users on the changes, and begin collecting and analyzing the information by December 31, 2020. As of August 2020, USCIS reported that the agency remains on track to accomplish this work by the end of calendar year 2020, provided staffing is not adversely affected by the on-going COVID-19 pandemic and USCIS budget issues. Collecting additional information in its automated case management system on case delays would provide USCIS with more readily available information and analyzing such data could help USCIS identify case delay reasons relevant in the current environment for officers conducting fear screenings and better position USCIS to mitigate the reasons for the delays and improve efficiency in case processing.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the Undersecretary for Management develops an oversight process to confirm that programs' schedule goals are developed and updated in accordance with GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide, to include ensuring traceability between APB schedule goals and IMSs. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open

Comments: In providing comments on this report, DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that the Management Directorate's Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) developed a checklist based on GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide, among other things, to evaluate programs' IMSs. PARM also plans to develop guidance on schedules which is intended to assist the Component Acquisition Executives (CAE) and acquisition program staff responsible for building IMSs and APBs. In July 2020, PARM officials reported that the schedule checklist was already being used to evaluate and ensure program IMSs adhered to GAO's Schedule Assessment Guide. In addition, PARM officials are updating and drafting guidance on schedules to assist CAEs and program staff when building IMSs and APBs. As of July 2020, PARM was still in the process of executing these efforts.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the Undersecretary for Management revises the schedule development guidance in the Systems Engineering Life Cycle Guidebook to state clearly that an IMS should be used as the basis for APB schedule goals. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with our recommendation and stated that Management Directorate's Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM) was in the process of revising the Systems Engineering Life Cycle Guidebook and would clarify the language relating to IMSs to ensure guidance is consistent. As of July 2020, PARM was still in the process of revising the Systems Engineering Life Cycle Guidebook.

Recommendation: The Secretary of State should direct the Department's relevant bureaus to work with Embassy Beirut to establish, as appropriate, and consolidate targets for each of the security-related performance indicators. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of State: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of State should direct the Department's relevant bureaus to work with Embassy Beirut to collect and review performance data for key security-related performance indicators. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of State: Office of the Secretary
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct DSCA to revise the inspection due dates it establishes for items requiring enhanced EUM for the Office of Defense Cooperation in Beirut to align with DOD's standards for EUM by considering the date of last inspection. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Defense: Office of the Secretary of Defense
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Field Operations, in consultation with the Office of Trade, develops a plan for managing its increased workload. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. According to CBP, the new ACE drawback module provides the capability to extract data for workload management. Further enhanced reporting capabilities for drawback claims are under development. CBP's Office of Field Operations and Office of Trade continue to collaborate on a plan to employ risk management principles and automation to resolve the drawback claims backlog and lay the foundation for processing current drawback claims workload. They estimate the completion of this workload management system by October 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade assesses the feasibility of flagging excessive export submissions across multiple claims and takes cost-effective steps, based on the assessment, to prevent over claiming. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. According to CBP, the Office of Trade is exploring alternatives to track and automatically flag duplicate exports across multiple drawback claims. CBP expects to complete their assessment and plan for implementation by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade develops a plan, with time frames, to establish a reliable system of record for proof of export. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. According to CBP, the Office of Trade will work to develop a plan for the use of the Automated Export System (and possibly other systems) for electronic proof of export in the future. They expect this to be complete by September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade turns the claim selection feature in ACE back on and finalizes and implements procedures to target claims for review that were accepted into ACE during the period in which the selection feature was disabled. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with our recommendation. According to CBP, the Office of Trade, in collaboration with the Office of Information Technology, will automate updates that turn the claim selection feature on in ACE. The Office of Trade plans to retroactively identify drawback claims accepted during the lapse period, and is working to implement a solution by December 31, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade analyzes the results of its targeting of claims for review and designs responses to mitigate identified risks. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. According to CBP, on March 25, 2020, the Office of Trade initiated an analysis to improve automation and targeting on an ongoing basis. Based on the results of this analysis, the Office of Trade will make any needed adjustments to policy and procedures to assist with data quality, by September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade prioritizes developing a plan to conduct an ex post analysis of the impact on industry and government of key changes to the drawback program, including time frames and methodology. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurs with this recommendation. According to CBP, the Office of Trade is finalizing a plan to conduct an ex post analysis of the impact on industry and government of key changes to the drawback program. CBP's analytical plan will include a timeline and methodology for assessing changes to the program. They expect to complete this by November 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should review and update policies related to land port of entry inspections in accordance with Office of Field Operations guidance. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and stated that it intends to implement it by January 2021. We will continue to monitor CBP's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should analyze the results of the Self-Inspection Program over time and at a level necessary to identify and address potentially reoccurring inspection deficiencies at individual ports of entry. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and stated that it intends to implement it by November 2021. We will continue to monitor CBP's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should implement a policy to conduct periodic comprehensive analyses of covert test findings. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in March 2020, it provided information on its plans to conduct a comprehensive analysis after completing several covert tests. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should implement a policy to conduct periodic comprehensive analyses of covert test findings. We will continue to monitor CBP's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop a new target for the land border interception rate for passengers in privately-owned vehicles with major violations that sets an ambitious and realistic goal based on past performance. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and stated that it intends to implement it by January 2021. We will continue to monitor CBP's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the fiscal year 2019 plan includes the statutorily required elements or discloses why any element was not included in the plan. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS agreed with our recommendation and in August 2020, DHS issued the Fiscal Year 2019-2020 Border Security Improvement Plan. The plan includes a description and the status for satisfying of each of the 11 statutorily required elements. GAO has on-going work to review the plan.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner, in conjunction with the DHS Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer, should develop and implement a plan to ensure that CBP executes its Facility Condition Assessments (FCA) program by conducting FCAs at each CBP-owned land border crossing consistent with DHS Directive 119-02-004. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in March 2020, provided a plan for conducting FCAs at some, but not all, CBP-owned land border crossings. According to officials, CBP will update this plan to include all CBP-owned land border crossings and may coordinate with the DHS Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer to ensure the plan is consistent with DHS Directive 119-02-004. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should complete the FCA plan to include all CBP-owned land border crossings.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should share FCA reports with GSA and use facility condition information in GSA's Building Assessment Tool to inform FCAs. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in February 2020, GSA confirmed that it received FCA reports from CBP for GSA-owned land border crossings. GSA also confirmed that it provided CBP with a spreadsheet containing data from GSA Building Assessment Tools. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should demonstrate that it is using GSA Building Assessment Tool information to inform its FCAs at GSA-owned land border crossings.

Recommendation: The GSA Administrator should share Building Assessment Tool reports with CBP and use facility condition information in CBP's FCAs to inform its assessments through the Building Assessment Tool. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: General Services Administration
Status: Open

Comments: GSA concurred with the recommendation and, in April 2020, provided documentation that it received CBP FCAs and provided Building Assessment Tool information to CBP. GSA further provided updated guidance describing how it will share this information with CBP going forward. To fully address this recommendation, GSA should demonstrate that it using CBP FCA reports to inform its Building Assessment Tool assessments.

Recommendation: The GSA Administrator, in conjunction with CBP, should share with CBP information on GSA maintenance and repair work at GSA-owned land border crossings at the level of detail necessary to inform CBP's data in TRIRIGA. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: General Services Administration
Status: Open

Comments: GSA concurred with the recommendation and, in December 2019, stated that it would share this information with CBP on a monthly basis until it is available to CBP for self-service on a shared data system. To fully address this recommendation, GSA should provide documentation that CBP has access to the shared data system.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should use information on maintenance and repair work conducted by GSA at GSA-owned land border crossings to update facility condition information in TRIRIGA on an ongoing basis. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in December 2019, reported that it began documenting processes for validating and correcting existing records in TRIRIGA using information on maintenance and repair work conducted by GSA. In addition, CBP reported that it is developing a standard operating procedure for TRIRIGA data entry. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should demonstrate that it is regularly receiving information on maintenance and repair work performed by GSA and that it is using this information to update data in TRIRIGA.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should establish review time frames for stakeholders involved in its Five-year Capital Investment Plan review and approval process. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in April 2020, provided a document establishing time frames for stakeholders involved in the five-year plan review and approval process. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should demonstrate that it has communicated these time frame expectations to stakeholders.

Recommendation: The CBP Commissioner should establish and document a methodology for its annual land border crossing capital prioritization process that includes procedures and time frames for each step. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with the recommendation and, in April 2020, provided a document that formally establishes and documents a methodology for its land border crossing prioritization process, including procedures and time frames for each step. To fully address this recommendation, CBP should demonstrate that it is implementing this methodology during its annual five-year capital investment planning process.

Recommendation: The Chief of Border Patrol should develop and implement performance measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry (Recommendation 1).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner: U.S. Border Patrol
Status: Open

Comments: Border Patrol concurred with this recommendation and in an April 2020 update and stated that it is developing new northern border security metrics. Border Patrol is in the process of evaluating them and coordinating with subject matter experts to ensure they are valid. We will continue to monitor Border Patrol's ongoing efforts.

Recommendation: The Executive Assistant Commissioner of AMO should develop and implement performance measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry in the air and maritime environments (Recommendation 2).

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Air and Marine Operations
Status: Open

Comments: AMO concurred with this recommendation and in a July 2020 update, stated that it has developed preliminary performance measures and established a working group to assess their effectiveness. According to AMO, they remain on track to implement the performance measures and report on them beginning in fiscal year 2022. We will continue to monitor AMO's efforts.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should develop and implement a process to systematically review the reliability of the data used in its Border Security Metrics Report and comprehensively identify any limitations with the data and methodologies that underlie its metrics. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with the recommendation and in a May 2020 update stated that it plans to address this recommendation in its FY2019 Border Security Metrics Report scheduled to be issued in the summer of 2020. We will continue to monitor DHS's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure the communication of the limitations of the metrics identified through the systematic review in the department's annual Border Security Metrics Report. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: In its comment letter, DHS concurred with the recommendation and requested that we consider it closed as implemented because the department already detailed some of the limitations in its fiscal year 2017 report, and plans to continue to identify known limitations and the progress made to mitigate previously identified limitations in future reports. As discussed in the report, we agree that DHS identified and disclosed limitations for some metrics in its fiscal year 2017 Border Security Metrics Report; however, we identified at least one additional limitation for 21 of the 35 metrics on which DHS reported that DHS did not disclose or about which it could have been more transparent. To address the intent of this recommendation, once DHS has implemented a process to systematically review the reliability of the data used in its report and comprehensively identified related limitations, it should disclose those limitations in its annual Border Security Metrics Report. In a May 2020 update, DHS stated that it plans to address this recommendation in its FY2019 Border Security Metrics Report scheduled to be issued in the summer of 2020. We will continue to monitor DHS's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans should include the results of sensitivity analyses to key assumptions in its statistical models of unlawful entry estimates in its annual Border Security Metrics Report. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with the recommendation and in a May 2020 update stated that it plans to address this recommendation in its FY2019 Border Security Metrics Report scheduled to be issued in the summer of 2020. We will continue to monitor DHS's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans should include measures of statistical uncertainty for all metrics based on estimates derived from statistical models in its annual Border Security Metrics Report. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with the recommendation and in a May 2020 update stated that it plans to address this recommendation in its FY2019 Border Security Metrics Report scheduled to be issued in the summer of 2020. We will continue to monitor DHS's ongoing efforts to do so.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Homeland Security should create corresponding processes and procedures to help implement the mission, roles, and responsibilities defined in the delegation of authority or similar document to help ensure predictability, repeatability, and accountability in departmentwide and crosscutting strategy and policy efforts. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: The Department of Homeland Security agreed with GAO's recommendation, and finalized a delegation of authority, which is a requisite step in being able to complete this action, in December 2019. As of February 2020, however, the agency had not taken action that addresses GAO's September 2018 recommendation to create processes and procedures corresponding to the mission, roles, and responsibilities defined in the delegation of authority. To close this recommendation, PLCY will need to create such processes and procedures to help ensure predictability, repeatability, and accountability in department-wide and crosscutting strategy and policy efforts. Until DHS creates these processes and procedures, the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans' ability to lead and coordinate policy will continue to be limited. Taking this recommended action would enhance the department's efficiency and reduce risks associated with fragmentation in the development of department-wide and crosscutting strategies, policies, and plans

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should use the DHS Workforce Planning Guide to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY's workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: On December 3, 2019, PLCY restated its concerns with this recommendation--specifically, that due to changes in administration and secretarial priorities, PLCY has to recalibrate and base budget and staffing projections on what officials expect will be needed, rather than current needs due to changing priorities. PLCY's ability to properly align resources with current needs must remain flexible and the workforce planning guidance that GAO references does not allow for that in whole. GAO maintains that utilizing the workforce planning guidance can be done while still maintaining the desired flexibility.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should enhance the use of collaboration and communication mechanisms to connect with staff in the components with responsibilities for policy and strategy to better identify and address emerging needs. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: On March 5, 2019, PLCY officials told us PLCY has instituted many cross-component efforts to more clearly define its roles and responsibilities. For example, PLCY convenes frequent engagements with components via the Immigration Policy Council, the Strategy and Policy Executive Steering Committee, the Deputies Management Action Group, and the Threat Prevention and Security Policy Council. On December 3, 2019, PLCY officials told us that the pending delegation of authority will help address this recommendation, and the delegation of authority is expected to be completed in calendar year 2020. To close this recommendation, PLCY must provide documentary evidence of collaboration and communication mechanisms to connect staff and better identify emerging needs.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection through the Executive Assistant Commissioner for Operations Support updates the 2013 workforce assessment to account for the independent requirements organization's current workforce needs. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. Customs and Border Protection provided an estimated completion date for their workforce assessment of September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency establishes a policy for requirements development. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. The Federal Emergency Management Agency plans to establish a policy for requirements development by September 30, 2020, about one year after it completes changes to its governance processes.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement establishes a policy for requirements development. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation but has not yet taken action to implement it as of August 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement establishes the planned independent requirements development organization within Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation but has not yet taken action to implement it as of August 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement conducts a workforce assessment to account for an independent requirements organization's workforce needs. (Recommendation 10)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation but has not yet taken action to implement it as of August 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement establishes component specific training for requirements development. (Recommendation 11)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation but has not yet taken action to implement it as of August 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for the National Protection and Programs Directorate finalizes and promulgates the National Protection and Programs Directorate's draft policy for requirements development. (Recommendation 12)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: The National Protection and Programs Directorate changed its name to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency in January 2018. DHS concurred with this recommendation. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency estimates that it will have a final policy by September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for the National Protection and Programs Directorate establishes the planned independent requirements development organization within the National Protection and Programs Directorate. (Recommendation 13)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. In January 2018, the National Protection and Programs Directorate changed its name to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency estimates that it will establish an independent requirements organization by September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for the National Protection and Programs Directorate conducts a workforce assessment to account for an independent requirements organization's workforce needs. (Recommendation 14)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. In January 2018, the National Protection and Programs Directorate changed its name to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency estimates it will complete an assessment to account for an independent requirements organization's workforce needs by September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services establishes the planned independent requirements development organization within U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. (Recommendation 21)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services estimates that it will establish an independent requirements development organization by September 30, 2020.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should analyze the costs associated with future barrier segments and include cost as a factor in the Impedance and Denial Prioritization Strategy. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: In July 2018, we reported on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) efforts to construct new physical barriers along the southwest border. We found that the Impedance and Denial Prioritization Strategy--CBP's decision support tool for prioritizing locations for barrier construction projects--did not include analysis of the costs of deploying barriers in each location, which can vary depending on topography, land ownership, and other factors. We recommended that CBP analyze the costs associated with future barrier segments and include cost as a factor in the Impedance and Denial Prioritization Strategy. CBP agreed with this recommendation. CBP officials stated that, after prioritizing locations, CBP conducts detailed cost estimates as part of the acquisitions process. As of January 2020, CBP officials stated that this cost information may affect how the construction projects are executed, but that it would not influence how CBP prioritizes barrier construction projects across various locations. As we have previously reported, organizations should use an integrated approach to the requirements, acquisitions, and budget processes to prioritize needs and allocate resources, so they can optimize return on investment, and maintain program affordability. To fully address our recommendation, Border Patrol needs to incorporate its analysis of the costs of barrier projects into its process for prioritizing locations for construction of barriers.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should take steps to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP's IPR enforcement efforts, such as by improving its metrics to track the overall effectiveness of its IPR enforcement efforts, evaluating selected activities to enhance IPR enforcement, and developing a process to assess and share information on port-led initiatives to enhance IPR enforcement (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. In September 2018, CBP stated that it had established an IPR working group that meets every 4-6 weeks to implement its Fiscal Year 2018 IPR Strategic Plan and develop priorities and metrics. CBP stated that, in these meetings, headquarters and field personnel share information on the results and effectiveness of local and national port initiatives and develop policies for improving IPR enforcement. Additionally, CBP provided evidence that it has begun efforts to improve its tracking of metrics and evaluation of selected activities to enhance IPR enforcement. For example, CBP provided data for 5 of the 16 measurement indicators included in its IPR Strategic Plan. Additionally, the IPR Strategic Plan includes at least 5 action items to assess or evaluate aspects of CBP's IPR enforcement. As of February 2020, CBP officials indicated they are continuing to work on these efforts. We will continue to monitor their implementation.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP, in consultation with ICE, should assess what, if any, additional information would be beneficial to share with the private sector and, as appropriate, take action to enhance information sharing, where possible, such as by proposing regulatory revisions or requesting additional legal authorities from Congress. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: CBP concurred with this recommendation. CBP stated that, in May 2018, it briefed the Senate Finance Committee on six policy goals to improve IPR, import safety, and e-commerce enforcement that require additional legislative authority to implement. In December 2018, CBP stated that it had identified the need to establish an information sharing structure for e-commerce as a first step in implementing its E-Commerce Strategy. CBP officials stated that they would work with offices throughout CBP and with key stakeholders in the trade community and the Commercial Customs Advisory Committee (COAC) to build an information sharing structure and identify the necessary statutory and regulatory changes to implement it. CBP said that, when statutory changes have been identified, it will work through the interagency process to make any necessary Congressional recommendations. In January 2020, the Department of Homeland Security published a report that identified actions to combat trafficking of counterfeit and pirated goods in conjunction with the private sector. These actions included steps to share additional information with the private sector. For example, the report said that when CBP identifies suspected counterfeit merchandise that is destined for a U.S. fulfillment center or warehouse, it will notify the e-commerce platform or other third-party intermediary operating the facility. This will allow the operator of the fulfillment center or warehouse to remove or destroy any identical items from the same seller in coordination with rights holders. The report also recommends the formation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Consortium to Identify Online Nefarious Actors and a framework for sharing information with sellers, shippers, and other third-party intermediaries. If implemented, these steps could help to enhance information sharing with the private sector. GAO continues to monitor the implementation of these actions.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop a monitoring system to help ensure that CBP officials comply with license verification policies and procedures. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: CBP agreed with our recommendation and said they would complete their corrective actions by April 30, 2020. To fully implement it, CBP should develop a monitoring system that observes agency verification of licenses for imported radiological materials to ensure CBP officials are complying with existing policies and procedures.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of CBP should develop a system that better identifies shipments of radiological material that pose the greatest risk and revise CBP's policies and procedures as necessary to verify licenses for these shipments. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: CBP agreed with our recommendation and said they would complete their corrective actions by April 30, 2020. To fully implement it, CBP should develop a system to better identify which shipments of radiological material pose the greatest risk and revise their policies and procedures for verification of the licenses for these shipments accordingly.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess and document how the alternative technological solutions being considered will fully meet operational needs related to ultralight aircraft.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that it plans to assess and document requirements related to ultralight aircraft threats and how technological solutions will address these requirements as part of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and Marine Operations (AMO) air domain awareness efforts. In March 2018, CBP completed an Air Domain Awareness Capability Analysis Report that identifies current capability gaps, including those related to ultralight aircraft. CBP stated that it plans to build upon the Capability Analysis Report to identify mission needs, a concept of operations, and operational requirements to address ultralight aircraft and other threats in the air domain. In February 2020, AMO reported that, in 2019, it conducted a technical assessment of one technology and plans to assess other systems in 2020 and 2021 to help determine if they fit into AMO's larger strategic vision for persistent wide area surveillance to address ultralight aircraft and other threats in the air domain. To fully address our recommendation, CBP should assess and document how alternative solutions will meet operational requirements related to ultralight aircraft.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of ICE to jointly establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to cross-border tunnels.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated that U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement will review available information and develop performance measures and targets as deemed appropriate. As of March 2020, CBP and ICE have not reported taking any actions to develop performance measures and targets. To fully address our recommendation, CBP and ICE should establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to cross-border tunnels.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP to establish and monitor performance targets related to ultralight aircraft.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred and stated that within U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Air and Marine Operations and the U.S. Border Patrol are developing a joint performance measure and targets for interdicting ultralight aircraft. However, in December 2019, CBP reported that it will no longer pursue establishing a performance measure because it found that the ultralight aircraft interdiction rate fluctuated year to year, and that the number of ultralight aircraft incidents had been trending downward. Subsequently, in September 2020, CBP officials stated that they had reinitiated efforts to develop a performance measure and target in response to our continued belief that they can be set and would help CBP monitor performance to ensure that technology investments and operational responses to address ultralight aircraft are effective. To fully address our recommendation, CBP should establish a measure and monitor performance related to ultralight aircraft.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)-U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) tunnel committee to convene and establish standard operating procedures for addressing cross-border tunnels, including procedures for sharing information.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS did not concur with this recommendation. However, CBP and ICE agreed that strengthening operational procedures may be beneficial and stated that they will jointly review procedures and discuss revising and/or consolidating the procedures. In May 2018, CBP stated that it is looking for opportunities to standardize procedures for the detection, interdiction, mapping, and remediation of cross-border tunnels. To this end, CBP has plans to develop a standardized training on tunnel identification and tactics, techniques, and procedures for different types of tunnels. In addition, CBP is working to develop a consistent process that will facilitate coordination and collaboration with ICE. In March 2019, CBP reported that CBP and ICE have begun to routinely meet to collectively develop processes for using tunnel robotics, including processes to enhance communication between CBP and ICE. In September 2020, CBP and ICE reported that they do not plan to take any additional steps to address this recommendation. To fully address our recommendation, CBP and ICE should establish standardized procedures for addressing tunnels, including procedures for sharing information with one another.

Recommendation: To help ensure that efforts to address smuggling through cross-border tunnels, ultralight aircraft, panga boats, and recreational vessels are effective and that managers and stakeholders have the information needed to make decisions, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Commissioner of CBP, and the Director of ICE to establish and monitor Regional Coordinating Mechanisms performance measures and targets related to panga boat and recreational vessel smuggling.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: DHS did not concur with this recommendation. DHS stated that that it believes that by establishing common terminology to address our first recommendation, the RECOMs will have more reliable, usable analyses to inform their maritime interdiction efforts. However, DHS did not believe that performance measures and targets related to smuggling by panga boats would provide the most useful strategic assessment of operations to prevent all illicit trafficking, regardless of area of operations or mode of transportation. DHS also cited the recent creation of the DHS Office of Policy, Strategy, and Plans that is to work with U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and other components and offices to better evaluate the effectiveness of all operations that work to prevent the illegal entry of goods and people into the country, as appropriate. In February 2020, DHS reported that the department had not taken any further actions to implement this recommendation. We continue to believe that the recommendation is valid and will monitor any actions DHS takes that are responsive to it. For example, in response to a requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, DHS issued reports in May 2018, February 2019, and August 2020 that contain metrics and planned metrics to measure the effectiveness of border security in the maritime environment and other domains. Planned metrics that DHS does not yet have a methodology to measure across all components include situational awareness in the maritime environment, illicit drugs removal rate, and DHS maritime threat response rate. To fully address our recommendation, DHS should measure its performance related to smuggling across U.S. maritime borders.

Recommendation: To ensure Border Patrol has the best available information to inform future investments in TI and resource allocation decisions among TI and other assets Border Patrol deploys in the furtherance of border security operations, and to ensure that key parties within Border Patrol's Requirements Management Process are aware of their roles and responsibilities within the process, the Chief of the Border Patrol should develop metrics to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border security along the southwest border using the data Border Patrol already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making investment and resource allocation decisions.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection: Office of the Commissioner: U.S. Border Patrol
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: DHS agreed with the recommendation and stated that it planned to develop metrics for southwest border security operations. To fully implement it, the Border Patrol should complete its efforts to develop metrics for assessing the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to border security operations and apply these metrics when making resource allocation decisions. As of October 2019, DHS stated that they have developed and are testing the initial metrics. DHS stated that they will continue to gather data over the next two fiscal years (FY20-FY21) which will help to identify if these metrics are accurately representing realities in the field. The estimated completion date is September 2021.

Recommendation: To better ensure that CBP's Office of Field Operations' (OFO) staffing processes are transparent and to help ensure CBP can demonstrate that these resource decisions have effectively addressed CBP's mission needs, the Commissioner of CBP should document the methodology and process OFO uses to allocate staff to land ports of entry on the southwest border, including the rationales and factors considered in making these decisions.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Customs and Border Protection
Status: Open

Comments: In May 2017, CBP's Office of Field Operations began working with a contractor to develop a comprehensive CBP position allocation methodology and tool. According to CBP officials, the purpose of this tool was to ensure a data driven, transparent process for allocating CBP resources--including staff--to land ports of entry on the southwest border. CBP officials stated that the contractor completed the tool in January 2018, CBP tested the tool in fiscal year 2018, and CBP planned to implement the tool in fiscal year 2019. However, CBP officials told us in September 2020 that a subsequent reorganization of the Office of Field Operations rendered the tool unusable without further modification. As a result, they used a manual method to allocate staff in fiscal year 2020 and plan to do the same in fiscal year 2021. As of September 2020, CBP officials planned to document the methodology and process they are now using to allocate staff to land ports of entry, including rationales and factors considered, by November 2020. This recommendation remains open.