Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Management should ensure that the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management and component heads execute the Component Acquisition Executive nomination and designation process consistently, as described in its guidance. This should include nominating and designating Component Acquisition Executives to oversee all acquisition programs. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Management should ensure that the Component Acquisition Executives that are responsible for oversight of acquisition programs comply with Department of Homeland Security direction to complete Component Acquisition Executive support staffing plans. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Management should identify, in policy or guidance, the expertise that constitutes critical acquisition positions for effective Component Acquisition Executive oversight. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Under Secretary for Management should direct the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management to establish a time frame for completing its assessment of the Investment Evaluation, Submission, and Tracking (INVEST) system data fields for which the Component Acquisition Executive certification is necessary, based on current use and reporting requirements, and take appropriate actions based on the results. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Attorney General ensure that additional guidance is provided to federal agencies to clarify Fix NICS Act certification requirements for record submissions and reporting. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Justice
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue update and implement policies and procedures for developing a courier contingency plan to prohibit managers responsible for overseeing the preparation of taxpayer receipts for deposits from also transporting them to financial institutions. (Recommendation 20-01)

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service
Status: Open

Comments: The IRS agreed with this recommendation and stated that the Wage and Investment organization will update the Courier Contingency Plan polices and procedures to provide for appropriate segregation of duties or other curative measures.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue establish and implement manual refund procedures to direct (1) initiators to document (e.g., record on the taxpayers' accounts or annotate on the related manual refund forms) the justification for bypassing the IAT tool warning related to potential duplicate tax refunds on taxpayers' accounts and (2) managers to monitor whether such warnings were bypassed and review the justifications for reasonableness prior to approving manual refund forms. (Recommendation 20-02)

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service
Status: Open

Comments: The IRS agreed with this recommendation and stated that the Wage and Investment organization agrees that actions need to occur to address duplicate tax refund conditions through improved manual refund procedures to require (1) initiator to document the justification for bypassing the Integrated Automated Technologies (IAT) tool warning related to potential duplicate tax refunds on taxpayers' accounts and (2) managers to review the justification documented for bypassing the IAT tool warning for reasonableness prior to approving manual refund forms. However, IRS also stated that it was unable to commit to implementing a corrective action plan at this time due to budgetary constraints on system enhancements.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue establish and implement actions to provide reasonable assurance that business units record the acceptance of goods and services in a timely manner in accordance with IRS policies and procedures. (Recommendation 20-03)

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service
Status: Open

Comments: The IRS agreed with this recommendation and stated that the CFO organization will determine the reasons for business unit(s) non-compliance with established policies and procedures related to timely recording of receipts and acceptance of goods and services and, based on this evaluation, develop an action plan that once completed will provide additional tools to aid the business units in reasonably ensuring compliance with established requirements.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue establish and implement actions to provide reasonable assurance that the future lease payment amounts for non-cancellable operating leases are calculated correctly. (Recommendation 20-04)

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service
Status: Open

Comments: The IRS agreed with this recommendation and stated that the CFO organization will update policies and procedures to include additional instructions needed to calculate the future lease payments due on the non-cancelable leases with terms greater than one year and will also create an automated calculation to determine the number of remaining months of lease payments.

Recommendation: The Director of OMB, working with DHS, should develop a government-wide communications strategy to inform and, as appropriate, involve Congress, employees, and other stakeholders in implementation of the reform proposal to solve the cybersecurity workforce shortage. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget: Office of the Director
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of OMB, working with DHS, should establish a dedicated government-wide leadership team with responsibility for implementing the reform proposal to solve the cybersecurity workforce shortage. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget: Office of the Director
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of OMB, working with DHS, should develop a government-wide implementation plan with goals, timelines, key milestones, and deliverables to track and communicate implementation progress of the reform proposal to solve the cybersecurity workforce shortage. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget: Office of the Director
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of OMB, working with DHS, should provide additional information to describe how the projects and activities associated with the reform proposal to solve the cybersecurity workforce shortage will address our high-risk issues related to ensuring the cybersecurity of the nation. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget: Office of the Director
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of OMB, working with DHS, should develop a government-wide workforce plan that assesses the effects of the reform proposal to solve the cybersecurity workforce shortage on the current and future federal workforce. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget: Office of the Director
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of OMB should assess the costs and benefits of options for operating the GEAR Center. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget: Office of the Director
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of OMB should develop an implementation plan that includes outcome-oriented goals, timelines, key milestones, and deliverables to track and communicate implementation progress of the reform proposal to establish the GEAR Center. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Executive Office of the President: Office of Management and Budget: Office of the Director
Status: Open

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of USCIS should ensure that, in addition to USCIS's basic asylum officer training, all asylum offices provide pre-departure training on the credible and reasonable fear processes before their officers begin screening cases at the family residential centers. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that USCIS plans to develop a standardized pre-departure training and provide this training to all detailees prior to deployment to the family residential centers. DHS estimated that these actions would be completed by September 2020. As of August 2020, USCIS told GAO that the number of noncitizens processed under expedited removal has decreased dramatically as a result of Coronavirus Disease 2019. Therefore, details to the Family Residential Centers have largely been paused. USCIS noted that the Asylum Division is reviewing the credible fear and reasonable fear training requirements; working on an enhanced training module; and, developing a standardized pre-departure training by December 31, 2020. USCIS plans to provide the training to all detailees prior to deployment to the Family Residential Centers during calendar year 2021, should the details resume. Providing pre-departure training, in addition to USCIS's basic training for new asylum officers, would help USCIS ensure that officers from all asylum offices are conducting efficient and effective fear screenings of families.

Recommendation: The Director of USCIS should ensure asylum officers systematically record in USCIS's automated case management system if individuals receive credible fear determinations as principal applicants, dependents, or in the interest of family unity, pursuant to regulation or USCIS policy. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that USCIS planned to explore ways to modify its case management system so that asylum officers can record whether an individual received a positive credible fear determination as a principal applicant, dependent, or in the interest of family unity. USCIS plans to make any appropriate changes to its case management system and train asylum officers on these changes by December 2020. As of August 2020, USCIS reported that the agency remains on track to complete this work as planned, provided staffing is not affected by USCIS budget issues. Having complete data in its case management system on all outcomes of credible fear screenings at family residential centers would better position USCIS to report on the scope of either the agency's policy for family members who are treated as dependents, pursuant to regulation, or USCIS's use of discretion in the interest of family unity.

Recommendation: The Director of USCIS should collect and analyze additional information on case delays, including specific reasons for delays and how long they last, that asylum officers may face when screening credible and reasonable fear cases. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
Status: Open

Comments: In commenting on a draft of our report, DHS reported that USCIS will explore ways to collect additional information on credible and reasonable fear case delays in its case management system. USCIS plans to modify the system, as appropriate, to instruct users on the changes, and begin collecting and analyzing the information by December 31, 2020. As of August 2020, USCIS reported that the agency remains on track to accomplish this work by the end of calendar year 2020, provided staffing is not adversely affected by the on-going COVID-19 pandemic and USCIS budget issues. Collecting additional information in its automated case management system on case delays would provide USCIS with more readily available information and analyzing such data could help USCIS identify case delay reasons relevant in the current environment for officers conducting fear screenings and better position USCIS to mitigate the reasons for the delays and improve efficiency in case processing.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should ensure that (a) the agency's policies and guidance are specific enough so field office staff know how to apply complex suitability criteria for assessing payee suitability, such as by providing a minimum set of specific questions; and (b) additional regional guidance that is made available to staff is centrally reviewed for compliance and completeness. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: SSA agreed with this recommendation but did not specify plans to address it.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should create safeguards in the Electronic Representative Payee System (eRPS) to ensure that field office staff fully document all required information, such as the rationale for their decision, before approving an application. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: SSA agreed with this recommendation and identified actions to address it. Specifically, SSA reported that, as part of implementing the Strengthening Protections for Social Security Beneficiaries Act of 2018, planned changes to eRPS will improve documentation of selection decisions. SSA also reported it will also consider additional enhancements to eRPS in the future. We will consider closing this recommendation when this effort is complete.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should complete a plan, including timeframes, for comprehensively evaluating if and how to leverage external sources of information on organizations' suitability, such as by conducting background checks or credit checks on organizations or key staff that handle beneficiaries' funds or requiring organizations to conduct their own background checks on key staff. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: SSA agreed with this recommendation and identified actions to address it. SSA officials stated that it is first focusing on implementing provisions of the Strengthening Protections for Social Security Beneficiaries Act of 2018 related to background checks for certain individual payees. After completing this work, the agency plans to evaluate conducting criminal background checks and credit checks on organizational payees and their staff. While we agree that implementing background screening pursuant to the law should take precedence, SSA should seek opportunities to implement screening for organizational payees at the earliest opportunity.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should develop and implement mechanisms to systematically obtain and review feedback from organizational payees and communicate findings to SSA management. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: SSA agreed with this recommendation but did not identify plans to address it.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should (a) establish a plan and time frame for periodically reviewing the predictive model's design; (b) consider additional data sources that would allow for additional screening or modeling of potentially high-risk organizational payees; and (c) ensure that subsequent design decisions are documented in sufficient detail so the development process can be more fully understood and replicated, either by SSA or a knowledgeable third party, with minimal further explanation. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: SSA agreed with this recommendation in 2019 and identified actions to address it. The agency stated that it would pursue other data sources to develop additional screening tools and models to identify potentially high-risk organizational payees, but that it is unable to incorporate additional data into the existing model. They reported they cannot use new data to modify the existing model, which was built from cases and transactions that occurred many years ago. We recognize that the current model, which focuses on misuse findings and is based on historical data, presents challenges for both updating and including new data sources. Therefore, as SSA considers additional screening tools and models to identify high-risk, low-volume organizational payees, SSA should develop a plan for revising the existing model that allows for more timely updates and results in documentation of related design decisions. In April 2020, SSA officials reported that the agency is finalizing a plan to revise the existing model and would pursue other data sources to develop additional screening tools and models to identify potentially high-risk organizational payees.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should require field offices to contact payees about missing or problematic annual accounting forms within a specific time frame. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: SSA agreed with this recommendation but did not identify plans to address it.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should revise the annual accounting form to enhance its effectiveness. Such revisions could include (but not be limited to) more fully ascertaining the use of collective accounts, adopting stakeholders' recommendations on using the form to collect more meaningful data, and reflecting best practices from behavioral science insights in the design of the form. (Recommendation 7)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: SSA agreed with this recommendation but did not identify plans to address it.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should enhance the eRPS system to ensure that field offices are (a) alerted when collective accounts are due to be reviewed; and (b) able to take action on expired collective account information and thereby avoid payees' continued use of these accounts without oversight. (Recommendation 8)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: SSA agreed with this recommendation and identified actions to address it. SSA officials reported that they would work with staff to ensure staff know where to find alerts for expiring accounts and enhance how eRPS displays information on collective accounts that have already expired. We agree with SSA's proposed actions. However, we adjusted our recommendation to clarify that SSA should enhance eRPS in a manner that ensures staff take action on expired accounts and that payees do not continue to use expired accounts without oversight.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration should, as it carries through with its plan to develop a risk assessment for the organizational payee program, ensure that that the plan reflects periodic consideration of findings from onsite reviews and audits. (Recommendation 9)

Agency: Social Security Administration
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: SSA agreed with this recommendation. In April 2020, SSA officials reported starting its Representative Payee Fraud Risk Assessment. We will consider closing this recommendation when SSA ensures that its risk assessment plan reflects periodic consideration of findings from onsite reviews and audits.

Recommendation: The Director of ICE should take action to ensure consistent implementation of ICE's policies for handling cases of potentially removable veterans. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Status: Open

Comments: In June 2019, we reported on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) efforts to handle, track, and monitor cases related to veterans. We found that ICE has developed policies for handling cases of potentially removable Veterans, but does not consistently adhere to those policies. Therefore, some veterans who were removed may not have received the level of review and approval that ICE has determined is appropriate for cases involving veterans. We recommended that ICE take action to ensure consistent implementation of its policies for handling cases of potentially removable veterans. ICE agreed with this recommendation. In November 2019, ICE reported that it had established a working group to gather requirements for ERO officer and HSI agent training and will identify all of the lesson plans, practice exercises, and checklists to ensure veteran status information is collected during the booking process. In July 2020, ICE reported that the efforts of the working group were ongoing. We will continue to monitor ICE's efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of ICE should develop and implement a policy or revise its current polices to ensure that ICE agents and officers identify and document veteran status when interviewing potentially removable individuals. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Status: Open

Comments: In June 2019, we reported on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) efforts to handle, track, and monitor cases related to veterans. We found that ICE has not developed a policy to identify and document all military veterans it encounters. Without such a policy, ICE has no way of knowing whether it has identified all of the veterans it has encountered and, therefore, does not have reasonable assurance that it is consistently implementing its policies and procedures for handling veterans' cases. We recommended that ICE develop and implement a policy or revise its current policies to ensure that ICE offices and agents identify and document veteran status when interviewing potentially removable individuals. ICE agreed with this recommendation. In November 2019, ICE reported that its internal working group is gathering requirements to systematically collect and maintain veteran status information. ICE noted that once the requirement gathering is complete it will revise existing ICE guidance on the issuance of issuing Notices to Appear for individuals with U.S. military service. In July 2020, ICE reported that the working group reviewed and updated its current policy and the Office of Policy and Planning is in the process of reviewing the updates. However, ICE was unable to provide an estimated completion date for finalizing the policy. We will continue to monitor ICE's efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of ICE should collect and maintain complete and electronic data on veterans in removal proceedings or who have been removed. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Status: Open

Comments: In June 2019, we reported on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) efforts to handle, track, and monitor cases related to veterans. We found that ICE does not maintain complete electronic data on veterans who have been placed in removal proceedings or removed. As a result, ICE does not know exactly how many veterans have been placed in removal proceedings or removed, or if their cases have been handled according to ICE's policies. We recommended that ICE collect and maintain electronic data on veterans in removal proceedings or who have been removed. ICE agreed with this recommendation. In November 2019, ICE reported that its internal working group is analyzing systems and processes used by ICE officers and agents to identify the components in need of updating to properly capture veteran status. As of July 2020, the working group has identified fields that will be added to its integrated database to capture and maintain veterans' status information. Once the working group is done gathering systems, procedural, and training requirements, this work will also identify updates needed for ICE policies for handling cases of potentially removable veterans. We will continue to monitor ICE's efforts to address this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Chief Management Officer establishes a process for identifying and prioritizing available funding to develop and implement initiatives from the cross-functional reform teams. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense
Status: Open
Priority recommendation

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Director of the Defense Security Service should determine how it will collaborate with stakeholders as it pilots a new approach to overseeing contractors with cleared facilities (DSS in Transition), including identifying roles and responsibilities and the related resources needed. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Defense: Defense Security Service
Status: Open

Comments: DOD agreed with this recommendation and as of February 2019, stated that it continues to pilot DSS in Transition at cleared facilities and use information gathered from stakeholders, including key government and industry stakeholder organizations to refine the process. On August 12, 2020, DOD stated that DSS was in the process of drafting a Corrective Action Plan. At that time, DOD officials explained that this plan would be completed in the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2019. As of September 2020, this plan has not been completed.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence, in his capacity as Security Executive Agent, and in coordination with the other Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council Principals--the Deputy Director for Management of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in his capacity as Chair of the PAC, the Director of OPM, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence--should establish a milestone for the completion of government-wide performance measures for the quality of investigations. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI stated that it non-concurred with many of the report's recommendations, but did not state with which recommendations it did not concur. In August 2019, ODNI officials pointed to the Quality Assessment Reporting Tool as the mechanism to measure the quality of background investigations. However, officials also stated that they had not finalized collection of all required data to establish performance measures and, while QART contains a significant data sample size, the data call issued in January 2019 will provide additional information for comparative analysis to develop performance measures for the entire Executive Branch. Officials agreed that since DOD does not use QART, there needed to be ongoing discussions with them to ensure quality standards are met. We will continue to follow-up on the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence, in his capacity as Security Executive Agent, and in coordination with the other Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council Principals--the Deputy Director for Management of OMB in his capacity as Chair of the PAC, the Director of OPM, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence--should conduct an evidence-based review of the investigation and adjudication timeliness objectives for completing the fastest 90 percent of initial secret and initial top secret security clearances.(Recommendation 2)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI stated that it non-concurred with many of the report's recommendations, but did not state with which recommendations it did not concur. ODNI officials stated in August 2019 that Trusted Workforce 2.0 is specifically developing timeliness goals which are achievable and based on empirical evidence. We will continue to follow-up on the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence, in his capacity as Security Executive Agent, and in coordination with the other Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council Principals--the Deputy Director for Management of OMB in his capacity as Chair of the PAC, the Director of OPM, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence--should develop a government-wide plan, including goals and interim milestones, to meet those timeliness objectives for initial personnel security clearance investigations and adjudications. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI stated that it non-concurred with many of the report's recommendations, but did not state with which recommendations it did not concur. In its August 2019 response on the status of this recommendation, ODNI officials stated that the transfer of background investigations from NBIB to DOD will provide an opportunity for the Executive Agents to reassess and address investigative timeliness issues and strengthen management of sensitive information. Moreover, they stated that Trusted Workforce 2.0 will give them the ability to significantly reduce the timelines required to deliver a Secret and Top Secret clearance. We will continue to follow-up on the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should develop a plan for monitoring continuous evaluation performance, to include assessing continuous evaluation at various phases of implementation. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI generally concurred with this recommendation. As of November 2019, ODNI has provided information that may allow us to close this recommendation. We are currently evaluating that information and will update this recommendation once that evaluation is complete.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should develop performance measures for continuous evaluation that agencies must track and determine a process and schedule for agencies to regularly report those measures to ODNI. At minimum, these performance measures should be clear, quantifiable, objective, and linked to measurable goals. (Recommendation 4)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI generally concurred with this recommendation. As of November 2019, ODNI provided information that may allow us to close this recommendation. We are currently evaluating this information and once that evaluation is complete, we will update the status.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget in the capacity as Chair of the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council, conduct an evidence-based review of the timeliness goal of 195 days for completing the fastest 90 percent of periodic reinvestigations and the associated goals for the different phases of periodic reinvestigations, and adjust the goal if appropriate, taking into consideration available resources, the additional workload of continuous evaluation, and the risks associated with individuals retaining access to classified information without determining their continued eligibility. (Recommendation 5)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI generally concurred with this recommendation. As of November 2019, ODNI stated that with the advent of Trusted Workforce 2.0, discussions are being held about timeliness goals and the periodic reinvestigation model writ large. Once we confirm what actions have been taken, we will update the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: The Director of National Intelligence should, once ODNI has further defined the continuous evaluation program, to include issuing a Security Executive Agent Directive and developing an implementation plan, in coordination with the Deputy Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget in the capacity as Chair of the Security, Suitability, and Credentialing Performance Accountability Council, assess the potential effects of continuous evaluation on agency resources and develop a plan, in consultation with implementing agencies, to address those effects, such as modifying the scope of periodic reinvestigations, changing the frequency of periodic reinvestigations, or replacing periodic reinvestigations for certain clearance holders. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Status: Open

Comments: ODNI generally concurred with this recommendation. As of November 2019, ODNI provided information that may allow us to close this recommendation. We are currently evaluating that information and once that evaluation is complete, we will update the status of this recommendation.

Recommendation: To enhance its ability to fulfill its role as the facilitator of cross-sector collaboration and best-practices sharing, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary of Infrastructure Protection, Office of Infrastructure Protection, to explore with key critical infrastructure partners, whether and what opportunities exist to harmonize federally-administered screening and credentialing access control efforts across critical infrastructure sectors.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security
Status: Open

Comments: As of 2/12/2020, awaiting additional evidence/clarification from DHS.

Recommendation: The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services should direct the Office of Refugee Resettlement to develop a process to ensure all information collected through its existing post-release efforts are reliable and systematically collected so that they can be compiled in summary form and provide useful information to other entities internally and externally.

Agency: Department of Health and Human Services
Status: Open

Comments: In March of 2016, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) created a new section in its unaccompanied children's policy guide that require ORR staff to make safety and well-being (SWB) follow-up calls to children and their sponsors after the child is release from ORR custody. In addition, in October of 2016, ORR added another section to its policy guide that included case reporting, records management, retention, and information sharing requirements for post-release service (PRS) providers. According to ORR officials, ORR collects and analyzes data from both its SWB calls and PRS providers. SWB call data include efforts made to contact both sponsor and child; participation rates; confirmation the child is currently residing with the sponsor; referrals made to the ORR National Call Center (NCC) for additional resources; any concerns regarding the child's safety and well-being; and whether any reports were made to the ORR Federal Field Specialist, child protective services, local law enforcement, and/or the ORR Sexual Abuse Hotline. PRS data include the reason for referral; level of services provided; services areas accessed by the child and/or sponsor; outcomes; any concerns regarding the child's safety and well-being; and when services were discontinued, according to ORR officials. According to ORR officials, because ORR is currently in the process of developing a new case management system, the majority of information from SWB calls and post-release efforts is collected manually, outside of ORR's current case management system. Information collected through ORR's SWB calls is aggregated quarterly and a fact sheet containing aggregate data is distributed internally to ORR leadership. ORR officials say the new case management system will include information on SWB calls and post-release efforts. ORR tentatively plans for the first phase of the system to be operational by November 2020 and to deploy a finished product with all planned enhancements in late 2021. GAO will close this recommendation once ORR completes this system and demonstrates that it can be used for the purpose of collecting reliable safety and well-being and post-release services data and disseminating it internally and externally, as appropriate.

Recommendation: To effectively plan and manage its acquisitions of IT systems and increase the likelihood of delivering promised system capabilities on time and within budget, the Librarian should establish and implement an organization-wide policy for developing cost estimates that includes key practices as discussed in this report.

Agency: Library of Congress
Status: Open

Comments: The Library of Congress generally agreed with, and has begun to take steps to implement, this recommendation. Specifically, in January 2017 the Library established a centralized Library-wide Project Management Office, located within the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO). Additionally, in June 2017 the Library updated its regulations to give the Project Management Office the authority to establish organization-wide policy for developing cost estimates. Further, in August 2017 the Project Management Office finalized guidance for developing cost estimates that generally includes the key practices discussed in our report. However, none of the cost estimates for three key investments fully met the practices associated with a comprehensive estimate. In October 2019, the Library provided evidence of its Monte-Carlo risk assessment process. We are currently assessing whether this process is consistent with the practices found in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. We will continue to evaluate the Library's progress in implementing this recommendation.

Recommendation: To effectively plan and manage its acquisitions of IT systems and increase the likelihood of delivering promised system capabilities on time and within budget, the Librarian should establish a time frame for finalizing and implementing an organization-wide policy for developing and maintaining project schedules that includes key practices as discussed in this report, and finalize and implement the policy within the established time frame.

Agency: Library of Congress
Status: Open

Comments: The Library of Congress generally agreed with, and has begun to take steps to implement, this recommendation. Specifically, in January 2017 the Library established a Project Management Office within the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) and tasked the office with communicating and enforcing Library requirements for project management and systems development. Additionally, in June 2017 the Library updated its regulations to give the Project Management Office the authority to establish organization-wide policy for developing and maintaining schedules. Further, in August 2017 the Project Management Offices finalized guidance for developing schedules that generally includes the key practices discussed in our report. However, none of the schedules for three key investments fully met the practices associated with a well-constructed schedule. In October 2019, the Library provided the schedules that it uses to manage select projects. We are currently reviewing this scheduling documentation to determine the extent to which the Library is implementing its scheduling guidance.

Recommendation: The Commissioner of the IRS should direct the appropriate IRS officials to revise the post orders for the service center campuses (SCC) and lockbox bank security guards to include specific procedures for timely reporting exterior lighting outages to SCC or lockbox bank facilities management. These procedures should specify (1) whom to contact to report lighting outages and (2) how to document and track lighting outages until resolved.

Agency: Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service
Status: Open

Comments: IRS's actions to address this recommendation are ongoing. IRS officials stated that during fiscal year 2020, Facilities Management and Security Services (FMSS) will update the Internal Revenue Manual to reflect the necessary guidance for service center guards and FMSS physical security specialists to know (1) whom the guards are to contact to report lighting outages and (2) how lighting outages are to be documented and tracked until resolved.