Recommendation: The Executive Assistant Administrator / Director of FAMS should identify and utilize a suitable system that provides information about air marshals' medical qualification status. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and in January 2020, DHS officials stated that FAMS is evaluating case management software to track this information and plans to pursue funding for this effort in fiscal year 2021.This action, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. When we confirm what actions DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Executive Assistant Administrator / Director of FAMS should develop and implement a plan to assess the health and fitness of the FAMS workforce as a whole, including trends over time. (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and in January 2020, DHS officials stated that FAMS had established a team to develop a plan for assessing workforce health and wellness issues. Adopting and implementing a plan that assesses the health and fitness of the FAMS workforce as a whole, should address the intent of the recommendation. When we confirm what actions DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Executive Assistant Administrator / Director of FAMS should identify and implement a means to monitor the extent to which air marshals' actual shifts and rest hours are consistent with scheduling guidelines. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and in January 2020, DHS officials stated that FAMS will begin tracking air marshals' actual hours and examine the extent to which air marshals' actual and scheduled hours vary. This information could be helpful, for example, in assessing air marshals' schedule predictability. However, to address the intent of this recommendation, FAMS would need to monitor the extent that air marshals' actual work and rest hours are consistent with FAMS's scheduling guidelines. When we confirm what actions DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Executive Assistant Administrator / Director of FAMS should take steps to reaffirm and strengthen efforts to prevent discrimination by, for example, updating and following through on its 2012 action plan and renewing leadership commitment to the plan's goals. (Recommendation 6)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and in January 2020, DHS officials stated that FAMS plans to review the goals of its 2012 action plan and develop steps to strengthen efforts to prevent discrimination. These actions, if fully implemented, should address the intent of the recommendation. When we confirm what actions DHS has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Administrator of TSA should document which rule review process TSA I&A uses (exigent or standard) for each new rule or rule change; (Recommendation 2)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and agreed to document which rule review process TSA I&A uses (exigent or standard) for each new rule or rule change. In March 2020, TSA updated its SOP to require that the selected rule review process be documented for each new rule and rule change. TSA's policy change is a positive first step, but to fully address this recommendation, TSA will need to demonstrate that the selected rule review process is now being documented.

Recommendation: The Administrator of TSA should explore additional data sources measuring the effectiveness of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies rules. (Recommendation 3)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and, in May 2020, DHS officials stated that they are reviewing data sources and assessing potential ways to assess the effectiveness of Quiet Skies and Silent Partner screening rules. DHS officials stated that they plan to fully address this recommendation by December 2020.

Recommendation: The Administrator of TSA should explore and pursue methods to assess the deterrent effect of TSA's passenger aviation security countermeasures; such an effort should identify FAMS—a countermeasure with a focus on deterring threats—as a top priority to address. (Recommendation 1)

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: Open

Comments: DHS concurred with this recommendation and has begun taking steps intended to address it. In May 2018, officials with DHS's Requirements and Capabilities Analysis (RCA) reported conducting a literature review to identify ways DHS might be able to measure deterrence. ORCA officials reported looking to published studies and other agencies to identify data sources and methods, and were in the process of developing a model to assess the deterrent value of various aviation security countermeasures. In July 2019, TSA officials reported that they were continuing to develop this model which could better inform deployment of deterrence-related countermeasures. As of October 2020, DHS has provided no further updates on steps taken to implement this recommendation. To fully address this recommendation, TSA will need to fully develop this or another method to assess the deterrent effect of TSA's aviation security countermeasures.

Recommendation: To better ensure that FAMS uses its resources to cover the highest-risk flights, in addition to considering risk when determining how to divide FAMS's international flight coverage resources among international destinations, the Director of FAMS should incorporate risk into FAMS's method for initially setting its annual target numbers of average daily international and domestic flights to cover.

Agency: Department of Homeland Security: Transportation Security Administration: Office of Law Enforcement - Federal Air Marshal Service
Status: Open

Comments: In May 2016, we found that FAMS officials considered risk when selecting specific domestic and international flights to cover, but they did not consider risk when deciding how to initially divide their annual resources between domestic and international flights. Rather, each year FAMS considered two variables--travel budget and number of air marshals--to identify the most efficient way to divide the agency's resources between domestic and international flights. As a result, we recommended that FAMS incorporate risk into FAMS's method for initially setting its annual target numbers of average daily international and domestic flights to cover. In March 2018, FAMS revised its deployment methodology to no longer set an annual target number of average daily international and domestic flights to cover. Rather, FAMS now prioritizes deploying air marshals on as many flights as possible with passengers who have been identified as potentially higher risk because they match TSA's intelligence-based screening rules, among other risk-based priorities. In August 2020, FAMS officials explained that they were evaluating their concept of operations and planned to more fully develop a risk basis for dividing its resources between international and domestic flights. By doing so, FAMS could better ensure it is targeting its limited resources to the highest risk flights and better aligning with FAMS's stated goal of using risk-based decisions to guide mission operations. As a result, this recommendation remains open.