GAO reviewed information system general controls over the financial systems that process and account for the financial activities of the District of Columbia's Highway Trust Fund. GAO identified serious computer security weaknesses that place District information at risk of deliberate or inadvertent misuse. These general control problems affected the District's ability to (1) prevent or detect un

This testimony compares federal agency Internet privacy policies with the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) fair information principles. The World Wide Web requires the collection of certain data, such as Internet addresses, from individuals who visit web sites. However, the collection of even this most basic data can be controversial because of the public's apprehension about what information is

GAO noted that: (1) in September 1998, GAO reported that computer security weaknesses placed critical VA operations, including health care delivery, at risk of misuse and disruption; (2) since then, VA's New Mexico and North Texas health care systems have corrected most of the specific computer security weaknesses that were identified in 1998; (3) however, serious computer security problems persi

GAO noted that: (1) unclassified information systems for scientific research are not consistently protected at all DOE laboratories; (2) although some laboratories are taking significant measures to strengthen access controls, many systems remain vulnerable; (3) in four recent cases, Internet-based attacks forced specific laboratories to disconnect their networks from the Internet, interrupting s

GAO noted that: (1) the nation's computer-based infrastructures are at increasing risk of severe disruption; (2) the dramatic increase of computer interconnectivity has provided pathways among systems that can be used to gain unauthorized access to data and operations from remote locations; (3) government officials are increasingly worried about attacks from individuals and groups with malicious

GAO noted that: (1) GAO's review found serious and pervasive problems that essentially render EPA's agencywide information security program ineffective; (2) current security program planning and management is largely a paper exercise that has done little to substantively identify, evaluate, and mitigate risks to the agency's data systems; (3) GAO's tests of computer-based controls have concluded

GAO noted that: (1) the agencies generally concurred with GAO recommendations and are taking steps to address the weaknesses; (2) GAO routinely follows up on recommendations made to agencies; (3) GAO has performed several reviews and issued a number of reports related to the status of computer security at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA); (4) however, although periodic independent reviews

GAO noted that: (1) in September 1998, GAO reported that VA's information system controls placed critical department operations, such as financial management, health care delivery, benefit payments, and other operations, at risk of misuse and disruption; (2) since then, VA organizations have taken actions to correct some of the weaknesses GAO reported and independently initiated actions to improv

GAO noted that: (1) the dramatic increase of computer interconnectivity and the popularity of the Internet, while facilitating access to information, are factors that also make it easier for individuals and groups with malicious intentions to intrude into inadequately protected systems and use such access to obtain sensitive information, commit fraud, or disrupt operations; (2) attacks on and mis

GAO noted that: (1) serious weaknesses in DOD information security continue to provide both hackers and hundreds of thousands of authorized users the opportunity to modify, steal, inappropriately disclose, and destroy sensitive DOD data; (2) these weaknesses impair DOD's ability to: (a) control physical and electronic access to its systems and data; (b) ensure that software running on its systems