The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has established a five-step process for developing and overseeing the implementation of binding operational directives, as authorized by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA). The process includes DHS coordinating with stakeholders early in the directives' development process and validating agencies' actions on the directives.

The 24 federal agencies GAO surveyed reported using the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) for authorizing cloud services. From June 2017 to July 2019, the number of authorizations granted through FedRAMP by the 24 agencies increased from 390 to 926, a 137 percent increase. However, 15 agencies reported that they did not always use the program for authorizing cloud servic

In recent years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has acted to improve and promote the cybersecurity of federal and private-sector computer systems and networks, but further improvements are needed. Specifically, consistent with its statutory authorities, DHS has made important progress in implementing programs and activities that are intended to mitigate cybersecurity risks on the compu

The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) is partially, but not fully, meeting its stated system objectives: (1) <b>Intrusion detection:</b> NCPS provides DHS with a limited ability to detect potentially malicious activity entering and exiting computer networks at federal agencies. Specifically, NCPS compares network traffic to known patterns of m

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken preliminary steps to begin to understand the cyber risk to building and access controls systems in federal facilities. For example, in 2013, components of DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) conducted a joint assessment of the physical security and cybersecurity of a federal facility. However, significant work remains. ? La

Reliance on a global supply chain introduces multiple risks to federal information systems. These risks include threats posed by actors-such as foreign intelligence services or counterfeiters-who may exploit vulnerabilities in the supply chain and thus compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an end system and the information it contains. This in turn can adversely affect an

Cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure and federal systems are evolving and growing. These threats can come from a variety of sources, including criminals and foreign nations, as well as hackers and disgruntled employees. These potential attackers have a variety of techniques at their disposal that can vastly expand the reach and impact of their actions. In addition, the interconnectivity

Of the 24 recommendations in the President's May 2009 cyber policy review report, 2 have been fully implemented, and 22 have been partially implemented. The two fully implemented recommendations involve appointing within the National Security Council a cybersecurity policy official (Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity Coordinator) responsible for coordinating the nation's cyberse

Cyber-based threats to federal systems and critical infrastructure are evolving and growing. These threats can come from a variety of sources, including criminals and foreign nations, as well as hackers and disgruntled employees. These potential attackers have a variety of techniques at their disposal, which can vastly enhance the reach and impact of their actions. For example, cyber attackers do

The goals of TIC are to secure federal agencies' external network connections, including Internet connections, and improve the government's incident response capability by reducing the number of agencies' external network connections and implementing security controls over the connections that remain. In implementing TIC, agencies could either provide their own access points by becoming an access