The JSF program continues to struggle with increased costs and slowed progress--negative outcomes that were foreseeable as events have unfolded over several years. Total estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 billion and development extended 2 1/2 more years, compared to the approved program baseline approved in 2007. Aircraft unit costs will likely exceed the thresholds established by th

DOD, through its biennial core process, has not comprehensively and accurately assessed whether it has the required core capability to support fielded systems in military depots. Although DOD internally reported that its maintenance workload of 92.7 million hours in 2007 was "well over" the minimum of 70.5 million hours needed to fulfill core requirements at military depots and that the services

DOD is revising and developing new joint policies in each of four areas required-- requirements definition, contingency program management, contingency contracting, and training for personnel outside the acquisition workforce; however, these policies were not finalized by April 2008 as required by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. As of October 1, 2008, the

GAO published advance sheets of decisions of the Comptroller General for the month of September 1995.

GAO found that: (1) 19 percent, or 5,100, of the DOD personnel who left in fiscal years 1983 and 1984, worked for defense contractors; (2) 26 percent of the 5,100 former DOD employees had the same responsibilities at DOD as they did with the defense contractors; (3) 21 percent subsequently worked on the same system, project, or program; (4) 7 percent were responsible for DOD contracts that later

GAO found that: (1) the standard operating procedure (SOP) for preparing phaseout plans was inadequate; (2) logistics managers inadequately completed only a small percentage of the plans required for weapons systems and equipment; (3) MCLB was not providing PICA with sufficient information to compute requirements for some items being phased out, which could have caused PICA to buy unnecessary spa

GAO found that, in the early 1980's, the Army provided most heavy divisions and one light division with an automated artillery fire command and control (C2) system. The Army began development of a new system with improved mobility and capability called Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS); however, most of the light divisions do not have an automated fire support C2 capability a

GAO found that the Air Force's use of an unpriced contract modification without timely price negotiation to obtain certain items of support equipment for the F-16 aircraft resulted in excessive prices for many of the items. The excessive prices occurred primarily because: (1) the requirements determination process did not ensure that only needed items were authorized and that the authorized items

GAO found that the Army, in making the sole-source procurements, has complied with recurring congressional guidance to acquire a single, common-utility, transport aircraft. After a competitive solicitation was cancelled when only one bidder submitted a proposal, a sole-source contract was negotiated with the offerer. In response to a bid protest, GAO found that the cancellation and sole-source aw

Officials at 9 of the 15 organizations which GAO contacted said that an extension of the act's implementation date was not warranted at their locations. Officials at four organizations stated that time extensions ranging from 45 to 180 days should be granted, while two officials stated that a 30-day extension should be granted to those offices that want to exercise the option. The basic problem i