Although the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps state that they have established requirements for combat clothing that include performance capabilities and characteristics, we found that performance standards are not related to specific combat environments. In addition, we found technical production standards guide the manufacturing of uniforms for all four services. Camouflage effectiveness is no

DOD continues to increase UAS inventories, but in some cases, the Air Force and the Army lack robust plans that account for the personnel, facilities, and some communications infrastructure to support them. Regarding personnel, the Air Force and the Army have identified limitations in their approaches to provide personnel to meet current and projected UAS force levels, but they have not yet fully

The JSF program continues to struggle with increased costs and slowed progress--negative outcomes that were foreseeable as events have unfolded over several years. Total estimated acquisition costs have increased $46 billion and development extended 2 1/2 more years, compared to the approved program baseline approved in 2007. Aircraft unit costs will likely exceed the thresholds established by th

In July 2009, DOD transmitted a report to Congress containing the inventories for fiscal year 2008, in which the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force identified $96 billion spent to acquire contractor services and 596,219 contractor FTEs providing services. In compiling their respective inventories, the military departments used different methodologies, relying on a mixture of existing da

DOD use of a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP vehicles was successful. The program relied only on proven technologies and commercially available products; established minimal operational requirements; and undertook a concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the vehicles. To expand limited production capacity, indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity c

DOD, through its biennial core process, has not comprehensively and accurately assessed whether it has the required core capability to support fielded systems in military depots. Although DOD internally reported that its maintenance workload of 92.7 million hours in 2007 was "well over" the minimum of 70.5 million hours needed to fulfill core requirements at military depots and that the services

DOD is revising and developing new joint policies in each of four areas required-- requirements definition, contingency program management, contingency contracting, and training for personnel outside the acquisition workforce; however, these policies were not finalized by April 2008 as required by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. As of October 1, 2008, the

DOD used a tailored acquisition approach to rapidly acquire and field MRAP vehicles. The program established minimal operational requirements and relied heavily on commercially available products. The program also undertook a concurrent approach to producing, testing, and fielding the vehicles. To expand limited existing production capacity, the department awarded indefinite delivery, indefinite

DOD's report on public-private partnerships at DOD's CITEs provided responses to all six reporting elements; however, it did not directly describe reporting element three, and did not describe reporting element six, as directed by H.R. Conf. Rep. 110-477. Specifically, DOD did not directly describe the implementation procedures for completing contract negotiations for public-private partnerships

DOD obligated nearly $270 billion on contracts for goods and services in fiscal year 2005, an 88 percent increase over the amount obligated in fiscal year 2000. All indications are that this upward trend will continue. Aside from growth in dollar value there have also been changes in what DOD is buying. DOD's new weapons system programs are expected to be the most expensive and complex ever and w