DOD continues to increase UAS inventories, but in some cases, the Air Force and the Army lack robust plans that account for the personnel, facilities, and some communications infrastructure to support them. Regarding personnel, the Air Force and the Army have identified limitations in their approaches to provide personnel to meet current and projected UAS force levels, but they have not yet fully

DOD, through its biennial core process, has not comprehensively and accurately assessed whether it has the required core capability to support fielded systems in military depots. Although DOD internally reported that its maintenance workload of 92.7 million hours in 2007 was "well over" the minimum of 70.5 million hours needed to fulfill core requirements at military depots and that the services

DOD is revising and developing new joint policies in each of four areas required-- requirements definition, contingency program management, contingency contracting, and training for personnel outside the acquisition workforce; however, these policies were not finalized by April 2008 as required by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. As of October 1, 2008, the

The use of nonstandard forces--individuals in certain temporary positions, and units with missions that require the unit personnel to learn new skills or operate in different environments--has helped DOD fulfill U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) requirements that the Army otherwise would not have been able to fill, but these efforts have also caused challenges across the force. For certain Navy and

GAO noted that: (1) QDR did not examine alternatives that would provide greater assurance that it identified the force structure that is best suited to implement the defense strategy; (2) the QDR's force assessments built on DOD's Bottom-Up Review analysis by examining requirements for a broader range of military operations beyond major theater wars, and by analyzing the potential impact of some

GAO noted that: (1) in the 1800s, the Coast and Geodetic Survey--the organization that eventually became NOAA--relied on personnel from the Army and Navy to augment its civilian complement that was charged with surveying the then uncharted U.S. shoreline; (2) by World War I, both departments had withdrawn their detailed personnel; (3) however, ships and men qualified to operate them were needed i

GAO found that: (1) from April 1, 1995, to March 31, 1996, readiness of the 87 units GAO reviewed and covered by GAO's prior report was at levels consistent with service goals in 80, or 92 percent, of the units; (2) this represents an improvement of 12 percentage points, compared with the unit status during the prior period; (3) readiness reductions were caused primarily by shortages of available

GAO found that: (1) DOD-wide, the percentage of military units with the ability to undertake all or major portions of assigned missions remained generally stable from January 1, 1990, to March 31, 1995; (2) of the 94 units GAO reviewed, readiness remained at levels consistent with service goals in 75 (80 percent) of the units; (3) however, readiness declined below the goals in 19 (20 percent) of

GAO found that: (1) inadequate Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) oversight has perpetuated limited joint training of U.S. forces; (2) most joint training exercises are conducted to maintain U.S. access or presence in a region, promote regional stability, or foster relations with foreign military forces; (3) although these objectives are important, they have taken precedence over joint military training

GAO discussed the Department of Defense's (DOD) ability to provide a comprehensive assessment of overall military readiness, focusing on whether readiness indicators: (1) reflect the components that contribute to overall military readiness; and (2) can predict changes in military readiness. GAO noted that: (1) although DOD indicators for measuring readiness provide limited, though valuable, infor