The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has more than tripled the number of contracting officers it employs since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, but it does not have a sufficient process in place to prioritize disaster workload and cohesively manage its workforce. Some of the workforce growth is attributed to the establishment of the Disaster Acquisition Response Team (DART) in 2010, which has

The five agencies GAO reviewed used a variety of approaches to estimate and report improper payments related to Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013 (DRAA) funding, in accordance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. Specifically, these agencies, which received approximately 94 percent of the $50 billion provided by DRAA, used various approaches regarding the following: (1) Est

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) obligated $12.7 billion from the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) for its administrative costs from fiscal years 2004 through 2013 and has taken some steps to reduce and better control these costs. This $12.7 billion represents 13 percent of the $95.2 billion obligated from the DRF for the 650 major disasters declared during this time frame. FEMA's average

The U.S. government plans to allocate about $918 million of the $1.14 billion in supplemental Haiti reconstruction funds available through the end of fiscal year 2012 to USAID and State. USAID and State plan to allocate $770 million and $148 million, respectively, to projects in three geographic regions of Haiti, selected for their development potential, and four key sectors: (1) infrastructure a

While Congress and FEMA intended that NFIP be funded with premiums collected from policyholders rather than with tax dollars, the program is, by design, not actuarially sound. NFIP cannot do some of the things that private insurers do to manage their risks. For example, NFIP is not structured to build a capital surplus, is likely unable to purchase reinsurance to cover catastrophic losses, cannot

While Congress and FEMA intended that NFIP be funded with premiums collected from policyholders rather than with tax dollars, the program is, by design, not actuarially sound. NFIP cannot do some of the things that private insurers do to manage their risks. For example, NFIP is not structured to build a capital surplus, is likely unable to purchase reinsurance to cover catastrophic losses, cannot

Louisiana and Mississippi received the largest shares of CDBG disaster funds and targeted the majority toward homeowner assistance, allocating the rest to economic development, infrastructure, and other projects. Between 2006 and 2008, Louisiana's total allocation devoted to housing increased from 77 to 86 percent while Mississippi's decreased from 63 to 52 percent as the state focused on economi

FEMA has significantly improved its fraud prevention controls over disaster assistance. For example, FEMA now conducts identity and address verification on all applications and requires inspections prior to approving rental assistance. In addition, FEMA requires individuals in need of housing assistance to provide valid registration numbers before checking into FEMA-paid-for hotels. FEMA has also

While most policies (41 of 50) that define roles and responsibilities have been completed, such as the National Response Framework, 68 percent (49 of 72) of the plans to implement these policies, including several for catastrophic incidents, are not yet complete. As a result, the roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in responding to a catastrophe have not been fully defined and, t

GAO reported in September 2006 that the experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of government to respond to catastrophic disasters. For example, GAO reported that, in the response to Hurricane Katrina, there was confusion over roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan, including the roles of the DHS Secretary, the FEMA Administrator, t