Air Traffic Control: Ineffective Management Plagues $1.7-Billion Radar Program
IMTEC-90-37
Published: May 31, 1990. Publicly Released: Jul 03, 1990.
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Highlights
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Mode Select (Mode S) air traffic control surveillance and communication program.
Recommendations
Recommendations for Executive Action
| Agency Affected Sort descending | Recommendation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Department of Transportation | The Secretary of Transportation should independently evaluate the economic, operational, and technical risks involved in continuing the Mode S contract. Based on the results of this evaluation, the Secretary should direct the Administrator, FAA, to take appropriate and timely action to ensure that additional government funds are not wasted. |
Closed – Implemented
FAA conducted an audit of Mode S that concluded that: (1) contract work is proceeding in a satisfactory manner; (2) the system had no serious design flaws; (3) FAA is developing a risk abatement plan to address the few remaining areas of program risk; and (4) continuation of contract work is the most cost-effective alternative.
|
| Department of Transportation | The Secretary of Transportation should direct the Administrator, FAA, to cancel plans to replace remaining beacon radars with Mode S and to perform a thorough analysis of requirements, alternatives, benefits, and costs. If the analysis supports replacing remaining beacon systems with Mode S, no decision to acquire additional Mode S systems should be made until the system is demonstrated to work and provide anticipated benefits. |
Closed – Implemented
The Department of Transportation (DOT) agreed with the recommendation and stated that no contracting activity for additional systems will begin until DOT acquisition justification requirements are satisfied.
|
| Department of Transportation | The Secretary of Transportation should report the FAA contract administration and major system procurement processes as containing material internal control weaknesses under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA). |
Closed – Implemented
DOT agreed with the recommendation and reported the weaknesses in its 1990 FMFIA report.
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Topics
Air traffic control systemsComputer equipment contractsContract performanceCost controlFederal procurementNavigation aidsProduct evaluationRadar equipmentRegulatory agenciesTransportation safetyMode S surveillance