Air Traffic Control: FAA Reports Progress in System Acquisitions, but Changes in Performance Measurement Could Improve Usefulness of Information

In our December 2007 report we stressed the importance of ensuring that key administration and congressional decision makers and stakeholders have complete information on the budget and schedule performance of FAA's critical Air Traffic Control acquisition programs. We recommended in that FAA improve the objectivity, reliability, and inclusion of core programs in ATO's acquisition performance measures by establishing written, objective criteria and guidance for managers to use in determining which programs are major and thus selected for performance reporting and in selecting schedule milestones. Since 2009, FAA has defined "major programs" as new investments with acquisition category levels of 1, 2, or 3 (there are 5 levels in total). Each of the three category levels contains programs that require special management attention because of their importance to the agency's mission as defined in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-11, Part 7. Programs in the three categories include those with high development, operating or maintenance costs; high risk; high return; or a significant role in the administration of FAA programs, finances, property, or other resources. FAA reports on the performance of the major programs contained in acquisition categories' 1 through 3 in Appendix D of its Capital Investment Plan which it submits to Congress. With this action, FAA can provide assurance that programs important to the transition to NextGen are on time and within budget.

In December 2007, we reported that FAA's acquisition performance measure focused on performance during the preceding year, rather than from the initiation of the acquisition--a period that often spans many years. FAA would report that it met its performance goal if a defined percentage of its major acquisitions remained within budget and on schedule during the fiscal year. However, the budget and schedule baselines, as stated at the start of a fiscal year, often reflect decisions in prior years to increase acquisitions' budgets or to delay schedules beyond the original budget and schedule estimates. Comparing an acquisition's current budget and schedule baselines against its original baselines would, in many cases, show more acquisitions being over budget or behind schedule than FAA was reporting. Consequently, FAA's performance reporting could give the impression to Congress and the American people that FAA's acquisitions performance was better than was actually the case. We recommended that FAA improve the clarity of its annual acquisition performance measurement process by disclosing in its Performance and Accountability Reports that (1) the measurement for on-budget performance is measured against the most recently approved budget baselines, and (2) the target and reporting for on-schedule acquisitions measures 1 year of performance against selected program milestones. In FAA's 2009 Performance and Accountability Report, the "Critical Acquisitions on Budget" performance measurement is "By FY 2009, 90% of Major System Investments are within 10% variance of current baseline total budget estimate at completion." The "Critical Acquisitions on Schedule" performance measurement is "In FY 2009, 90% of Major System Investments selected annual milestones are achieved." By including "current baseline" in the on-budget performance measure and "annual" in the on-schedule performance measure, FAA has improved the clarity of its performance reporting.

In December, 2007, we reported that FAA's acquisition performance measure focused on performance during the preceding year, rather than from the initiation of the acquisition--a period that often spans many years. FAA would report that it met its performance goal if a defined percentage of its major acquisitions for air traffic control modernization remained within budget and on schedule during the fiscal year. However, the budget and schedule baselines, as stated at the start of a fiscal year, often reflect earlier increases over the acquisition's original budget estimate, or reflect decisions in prior years to delay schedules beyond the original schedule estimates. Comparing an acquisition's current budget and schedule baselines against its original baselines would, in many cases, show more acquisitions being over budget or behind schedule than FAA was reporting. We reported that FAA's performance reporting could give the impression to Congress and the American people that FAA's acquisitions performance was better than was actually the case. We recommended that FAA establish a vehicle for regularly reporting to Congress and the public on its overall, long-term systems acquisitions performance by providing original budget and schedule baselines for each rebaselined program, and the reasons for the rebaselining. In response, FAA established a new appendix to Capital Investment Plan, which is reported annually to Congress and made available to the public over the internet. FAA first published the new appendix, titled "Response to GAO Report," in its fiscal year 2010 - 2014 Capital Investment Plan, but the appendix did not contain sufficient information to address our recommendation. FAA included additional baseline information in its fiscal year 2011 - 2015 Capital Investment Plan, including each acquisition's original and current budget and schedule as well as the reasons for changes, as we recommended. For example, the appendix shows that FAA had extended the completion date for its Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) from the original completion date of July 2003 to June 2010 and increased its budget from $276.1 million to $282.1 million. The appendix explained that the rebaselining was necessary due to, among other things, added requirements. By presenting the most accurate and complete assessment possible when reporting its performance in acquiring air traffic control systems, FAA will better facilitate congressional understanding and oversight of FAA's progress in implementing NextGen.

In our December 2007 report we stressed the importance of ensuring that key administration and congressional decision makers and stakeholders have complete information on the budget and schedule performance of FAA's critical Air Traffic Control acquisition programs. We recommended that FAA improve the usefulness of ATO's acquisition performance reporting by including information on the potential effects that any budget or schedule slippages could have on the overall transition to NextGen. In our February 2012 report on FAA's air traffic control modernization acquisitions (GAO-12-223) we stated that FAA had begun developing an integrated master schedule for the entire NextGen initiative that would, in part, capture related NextGen program schedules, governance activities, and other performance and financial data to provide real-time monitoring of the overall NextGen effort. We further noted that having a reliable integrated master schedule would enable FAA to determine how delays in one program impact other programs and the overall NextGen implementation timeline. According to FAA, by the end of 2012, it will update its NextGen Segment Implementation Plan to show dependencies through 2018 and this will serve as the Integrated Master Schedule. With this action, FAA will have more assurance that the NextGen in on track