Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Program to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia and Other Countries Needs to Be Reassessed

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program (formerly known as the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program) was created in 1994 to reduce the risk that former weapons of mass destruction scientists in Russia and other countries could sell their expertise to terrorist organizations or countries of proliferation concern. The program is implemented by DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through a series of projects between scientists at institutes in the former Soviet Union, U.S. national laboratories, and U.S. partner companies, with the goal of engaging the former Soviet weapons scientists in nonmilitary research activities in the short-term, and transitioning them to sustainable, private sector jobs over the long-term. In December 2007, GAO concluded that DOE paid many foreign scientists who claimed no WMD experience, which undermined the credibility of the IPP program. GAO recommended that the Secretary of Energy, working with the NNSA Administrator, establish a more rigorous process for verifying the WMD background and experiences of foreign scientists participating in the IPP program. In October 2008, the Secretary of Energy stated that the GIPP program would continue to make progress in documenting the experience of former weapons scientists engaged in GIPP-funded projects. Specifically, in November 2008, DOE officials told GAO that DOE's Office of Intelligence now reviews the lists of foreign participants involved in all IPP projects to verify their WMD backgrounds and identify other potential concerns.

DOE initially concurred with this recommendation and wrote that "a new business metric that better reflects program accomplishments will be included in our budget documents." However, DOE has not provided GAO with information about this new metric, and we observed that DOE's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Justification does not include a new performance metric for the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program. Instead the budget request eliminates the previous metrics on the number of scientists reemployed into private sector jobs and on the overall number of former weapons scientists engaged by the program. The only program performance measure in the budget document for the GIPP program is a measure identifying the cumulative percentage of non-U.S. government funding contributions to the program relative to the cumulative U.S. government funding provided to GIPP. We will continue to monitor the implementation of this recommendation. In September 2011 DOE informed us that the program has worked with the U.S. Industry Coalition to improve the collection of commercialization data. The program has also improved collection of other data, including the number of WMD experts engaged. As a result of various internal reviews, DOE has determined that commercialization is no longer a leading program metric; it is a secondary benefit of the program as it is not the main nonproliferation objective of the program. Therefore there is no published commercialization objective. However, DOE continues to collect the data for internal purposes. Non-U.S. government cost sharing is the only current program performance measure.

On April 15, 2009, NNSA provided GAO with a copy of the revised Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program guidance. Specifically, for the purposes of the GIPP Program, commercialization is defined as the realization, from a GIPP project, of a product, process or service which generates revenue, or the conclusion, from a GIPP project and as a follow-on to that project, of a contractual relationship for research and development services by and between a U.S. industry partner on that GIPP project and one or more institutes or other entities involved in that project. From the standpoint of development economics, the formation of the follow-on R&D relationship means that a result has been achieved independent of DOE funding; one which offers promise of creation of a revenue-generating product, process or service.

In its formal response to our draft report on November 21, 2007, DOE/NNSA agreed with our recommendation and undertook consultations with congressional staff of the program's authorizing and appropriations committees. Those consultations revealed that the current authorization is sufficient and confirmed that the Congress had been notified in the course of the federal budget process for fiscal year 2008.

DOE/NNSA concurred with this recommendation and, on June 13, 2008, informed GAO that NNSA agrees that it is prudent to have clear guidance when the results of one program support the goals of another. However, NNSA subsequently terminated all GNEP-related GIPP projects that dealt with advanced nuclear energy and fuel cycle issues. In addition, two other projects involving nuclear safeguards development were shifted to another unit in NNSA's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security. As a result, there does not appear to be a continued need to develop additional program guidance for GIPP projects intended to support GNEP.

On June 13, 2008, DOE/NNSA informed GAO that it is working with DOE's financial element to develop a streamlined payment process for the GIPP program. Actions taken include the reduction of steps needed to validate invoices for work performed by foreign scientists and the implementation of a new web-based invoice approval and payment arrangement system. In addition, NNSA has simplified the GIPP payment process by reducing paper transactions, removing unnecessary levels of review and eliminating procedural bottlenecks. In response to a follow-up question in April 2009 regarding possible financial savings associated with streamlining the payment process, NNSA officials said that these savings, if they exist, are not determinable.

In August 2005, we reported on problems with internal controls over nonproliferation programs within the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In particular, we found problems with internal controls on contracts we reviewed in DOE's Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program, which assists former weapons of mass destruction scientists in Russia and other countries by re-employing them in peaceful commercial activities. In our August 2005 report, we recommended that NNSA's program managers maintain quick access to key contract records, such as deliverables and invoices that relate to management controls, regardless of whether the records are located at a national laboratory or headquarters. During the course of our review of the IPP program in 2007, DOE officials told us that, as part of the department's effort to address our recommendation to improve internal controls, they initiated an extensive review of IPP financial and procurement procedures at participating national laboratories and worked with each laboratory's financial department to reduce unspent program funds. As a result, DOE officials told us they redirected about $15 million in unspent program funds in 2006 for use on existing IPP projects. DOE concurred with our recommendation and noted that it has set ambitious targets for reducing the IPP program's uncosted balances in the future.

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) program (formerly known as the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program) was created in 1994 to reduce the risk that former weapons of mass destruction scientists in Russia and other countries could sell their expertise to terrorist organizations or countries of proliferation concern. The program is implemented by DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) through a series of projects between scientists at institutes in the former Soviet Union, U.S. national laboratories, and U.S. partner companies, with the goal of engaging the former Soviet weapons scientists in peaceful research activities in the short-term, and transitioning them to sustainable, private sector jobs over the long-term. In December 2007, GAO reported that the absence of a joint plan between DOE's IPP program and the International Science and Technology Center's (ISTC) Commercialization Support Program, which is funded by State, raised questions about the lack of coordination between these two U.S. government programs that share similar goals of finding peaceful commercial opportunities for foreign weapons of mass destruction scientists. As a result, we recommended that the Secretaries of Energy and State, working with the Administrator of NNSA, develop a joint plan to better coordinate the efforts of DOE's IPP program and ISTC's Commercialization Support Program, which is funded by State. On June 13, 2008, NNSA informed GAO that both NNSA and State concurred with this recommendation and have initiated a joint project through the ISTC Commercialization Support Program involving specialists from the Russian nuclear city of Seversk. This project will serve as the basis for creating a joint plan to better coordinate these efforts.

Although DOE initially did not concur with this recommendation, the department did undertake an internal review of the program following the release of and a congressional hearing on our report. On October 2, 2008, the Secretary of Energy wrote to the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House of Representatives' Committee on Energy and Commerce that NNSA had assessed the program based on GAO's recommendation and concluded that the program's continued engagement of former weapons scientists in Russia and other countries served U.S. nonproliferation interests. According to NNSA, a thorough review of all Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) project payments since the program inception in 1994 was conducted. This review identified at least one institute of possible concern and, as a result, two projects at that institute were promptly canceled. In addition, NNSA's review of the program resulted in a reprioritization of the institutes that the program will emphasize for future engagement. Specifically, beginning in fiscal year 2008, NNSA has phased-out or will phase-out by 2010, more than 50 projects at institutes that it has identified as lower priority. In addition, NNSA plans to reevaluate the continuing need for the GIPP program by the end of fiscal year 2010. At that time, GAO will reassess whether to close this recommendation based on DOE/NNSA actions. In September 2011, DOE informed us that a reassessment had taken place based on our recommendation. DOE/NNSA commissioned a threat-based assessment of expertise proliferation risk, including an intelligence component. The assessment was informed by two external panels that included representatives from the interagency, business and NGO communities and was briefed out to the Hill in 2010/2011. Different options for program scope, direction and range of activities are being reviewed and analyzed.

On September 30, 2008, NNSA reported that IPP projects had received $2 million in cost-sharing from Russian sources in fiscal year 2007. On October 2, 2008, the Secretary of Energy wrote that the GIPP program will pursue cost-sharing for all new projects in Russia and other countries, as appropriate. NNSA has informed Russian officials of this new requirement.