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Department of Energy: National Security Controls Over Contractors Traveling to Foreign Countries Need Strengthening

RCED-00-140 Published: Jun 26, 2000. Publicly Released: Jun 26, 2000.
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Highlights

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) national security controls for its contractor employees' foreign travel, focusing on: (1) the types of foreign intelligence-gathering incidents that have occurred during foreign travel by contractor employees; (2) the DOE controls that apply to foreign travel by contractor employees; and (3) areas where these controls can be strengthened.

Recommendations

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected Recommendation Status
Department of Energy In order for DOE to strengthen its national security controls over foreign travel, the Secretary of Energy should establish procedures to ensure that DOE and the laboratories apply their resources to the oversight of travel to nonsensitive countries commensurate with the risks associated with such travel.
Closed – Implemented
On August 19, 2003, DOE approved Order 551.1B, which superseded Order 551.1A. The August 2003 Order tightened DOE's oversight of foreign travel by requiring that official foreign travel requests are submitted to the responsible program Secretarial Officer or Deputy Administrator, NNSA, funding the travel for final approval, or if there is no DOE funding, submitted to the official having programmatic responsibilities associated with the requested travel. Order 551.1B also tightened DOE's oversight of official foreign travel by requiring that appropriate prebriefings are provided for all employees 30 calendar days before the start of official foreign travel and debriefings are provided upon return.
Department of Energy In order for DOE to strengthen its national security controls over foreign travel, the Secretary of Energy should require review and approval by counterintelligence officials at all of the laboratories as part of the foreign travel review and approval process.
Closed – Implemented
DOE concurs that actions must be taken to ensure counter-intelligence involvement in the review and approval process of foreign travel. In the aftermath of September 11, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the nuclear weapons operations of DOE, has undertaken an extensive review of all security regulations. This was completed in early 2003. According to DOE officials, requirements are in place at the weapons laboratories which require review and approval of all foreign travel by counter-intelligence officials.
Department of Energy In order for DOE to strengthen its national security controls over foreign travel, the Secretary of Energy should institute a subject-matter review for sensitive information and information of proliferation-related concern by independent technical experts at all of the laboratories as part of the foreign travel review and approval process.
Closed – Implemented
DOE concurs that an independent subject-matter review of foreign travel requests has value in preventing potentially compromising situations and could mitigate the risks associated with foreign travel. DOE supports this type of review. The National Nuclear Security Administration, the weapons operation part of DOE, will be responsible for implementing this recommendation. The Administration has initiated a review of all security regulations. This review has been completed. According to DOE officials, requirements are in place to ensure that subject-matter reviews of foreign travel requests are occurring.

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Topics

Classified informationContractor personnelForeign governmentsInternal controlsInternational travelLaboratoriesMilitary intelligenceNational defense operationsWeapons research and developmentNational security