Battlefield Automation:

Requirements Need to Be Updated Before the Air Defense System Is Produced

NSIAD-94-213: Published: Sep 22, 1994. Publicly Released: Sep 22, 1994.

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Louis J. Rodrigues
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GAO reviewed the Army's procurement of a command, control, and intelligence (C2I) system as part of its forward area air defense system (FAADS), focusing on whether the Army has conducted the testing and analyses needed for initial low-rate production.

GAO found that: (1) as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, FAAD C2I systems and subsystems have changed to counter smaller, less capable regional threats; (2) although the Army has updated the requirements for forward area weapon systems, the Army has not revised C2I system requirements; (3) contrary to Department of Defense procurement guidance, the Army is planning to award a $59-million low-rate initial production contract without determining its suitability or completing operational testing of the integrated system; and (4) the Army is fielding an interim configuration of the FAAD C2I system despite the diminished threat and changes to the weapons systems.

Recommendations for Executive Action

  1. Status: Closed - Not Implemented

    Comments: DOD commented that it was confident that the Army had performed sufficient requirements analyses and that it believed that sufficient data were available to go ahead with the LRIP decision. This recommendation has been overtaken by events.

    Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to defer any production and initial operational testing until the Army: (1) updates the requirements for both the ground-based sensor and FAAD C2I system; and (2) selects the best solution, based on a cost and operational effectiveness analysis, for satisfying the updated requirements.

    Agency Affected: Department of Defense

  2. Status: Closed - Not Implemented

    Comments: DOD stated that the Army's planned LRIP was to establish an initial production line and thereby provide for an orderly increase in the production rate to full-rate production and to take advantage of a fixed-price contract. The Army proceeded to LRIP on January 18,1995.

    Recommendation: The Secretary of Defense should direct the Secretary of the Army to cancel the planned low-rate production decision because the full-scale production decision is only a few months later and the Army's reason (training) for initiating low-rate production is inconsistent with the purposes specified in 10 U.S.C. 2400 for initiating low-rate initial production. This would allow more time to evaluate test results before committing to production.

    Agency Affected: Department of Defense


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