

United States Government Accountability Office Washington, DC 20548

September 19, 2008

The Honorable Charles E. Schumer Chairman Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate

Subject: Social Security Numbers Are Widely Available in Bulk and Online Records, but Changes to Enhance Security Are Occurring

Various public records in the United States contain Social Security numbers (SSN) and other personal identifying information that could be used to commit fraud and identity theft. For the purposes of this report, public records are generally defined as government agency-held records made available to the public in their entirety for inspection, such as property and court records. Although public records were traditionally accessed locally in county courthouses and government records centers, public record keepers in some states and localities have more recently been maintaining electronic images of their records. In electronic format, records can be made available through the Internet or easily transferred to other parties in bulk quantities. Although we previously reported on the types of public records that contain SSNs and access to those records, less is known about the extent to which public records containing personal identifying information such as SSNs are made available to private third parties through bulk sales. In light of these developments, you asked us to examine (1) to what extent, for what reasons, and to whom are public records that may contain SSNs available for bulk purchase and online, and (2) what measures have been taken to protect SSNs that may be contained in these records.

To answer these questions, we collected and analyzed information from a variety of sources. Specifically, we conducted a survey of county record keepers on the extent and reasons for which they make records available in bulk or online, the types of records that they make available, and the types of entities (e.g., private businesses or individuals) that obtain their records. We focused on county record keepers because, in scoping our review, we determined that records with SSNs are most likely to be made available in bulk or online at the county level. We surveyed a sample of 247 counties—including the 97 largest counties by population and a random sample of 150 of the remaining counties, received responses from 89

percent, and used this information to generate national estimates to the extent possible. Our survey covered 45 states and the District of Columbia, excluding five states where recording of documents is not performed at the county level (Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Vermont). We used the information gathered in this survey to calculate estimates about the entire population of county record keepers.¹

To obtain information on how businesses use information from public records, we identified and interviewed a judgmentally selected group of private businesses representing a cross section of industries that obtain records in bulk or online. Furthermore, we conducted site visits in Illinois, Texas, California, and the Washington, D.C. area to speak with county record keepers and businesses that obtain records in bulk or online. We visited these locations based on the large volume of records they maintain, as well as recent statutory and administrative efforts in those states to place limits on bulk transfers or the availability of SSNs in public documents. In addition, we interviewed interest groups we identified while planning our work that represent record keepers and businesses that utilize public records. We also reviewed relevant federal privacy and records laws and recently proposed legislation related to information privacy, reviewed state laws we identified from outside sources, and reviewed available information on select foreign data protection laws. We performed our work from September 2007 through September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

On September 4, 2008, we briefed your staff on the results of our work. This letter formally conveys the information provided during that briefing

¹Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample's results as a 95 percent confidence interval (i.e., plus or minus 15 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals in this report will include the true values in the study population. In addition, for reporting purposes, each sample element selected was subsequently weighted in the analysis to account statistically for all the members of the population.

	(see enc. I). Concurrently with this letter, we are issuing an electronic supplement that shows the responses to all survey items. ^{2}
Results in Brief	Many counties make public records that may contain Social Security numbers (SSNs) available in bulk to businesses and individuals in response to state open records laws, and also because private companies often request access to these records to support their business operations. Our sample allows us to estimate that 85 percent of the largest counties make records with full or partial SSNs available in bulk or online, ³ while smaller counties are less likely to do so (41 percent). According to county officials and businesses we interviewed, SSNs are generally found in certain types of records such as property liens and appear relatively infrequently. However, because millions of records are available, many SSNs may be displayed. Counties in our survey cited state laws as the primary reason for making records available, and requests from companies may also drive availability, as several told us they need bulk records to support their businesses models. Counties generally do not control how records are used. Of counties that make records available in bulk or online, only about 16 percent place any restrictions on the types of entities that can obtain these records. We found that title companies are the most frequent recipients of these records, but others such as mortgage companies and data resellers that collect and aggregate personal information often obtain records as well. Private companies we interviewed told us they obtain records help them conduct their business, including using SSNs as a unique identifier. For example, a title company or data reseller may use the SSN to ensure that a lien is associated with the correct individual, given that many people have the same name. Information from these records may also be used by companies to build and maintain databases or resold to other businesses. Businesses we contacted told us they have various safeguards in place to secure information they obtain from public records. In some cases, information from these public records is sent overseas for processing, a

²GAO, Social Security Numbers: Transfers and Sales of Public Records That May Contain Social Security Numbers, an E-supplement to GAO-08-1009R, GAO-08-1004SP (Washington, D.C.: Sept 19, 2008).

 $^{^{3}}$ Unless otherwise noted, all estimates have a margin of error of 15 percent or less.

State and local governments, as well as the federal government, are taking various actions to safeguard SSNs in public records, but these actions are a recent phenomenon. Based on our survey, we estimate that about 12 percent of counties have completed redacting or truncating SSNs that are in public records—that is, removing the full SSN from display or showing only part of it and another 26 percent are in the process of doing so. Some are responding to state laws requiring redaction or truncation, but others have acted on their own based on concerns about the potential for identity theft. For example, California and Florida recently passed laws that require record keepers to truncate or redact SSNs in their publicly available documents, while one clerk in Texas told us that in response to public concern about the vulnerability of SSNs to misuse, the county is redacting SSNs from records on its own initiative. In recent years, 25 states have enacted some form of statutory restriction on displaying SSNs in public records. Some states have also enacted laws allowing individuals to request that their SSNs be removed from certain records such as military discharge papers. For example, in one of the states we visited, we saw notices posted by county recorders describing the right to make this request. At the federal level, our prior work found that some federal agencies have taken action by truncating SSNs they place in the public record at the local level. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) recently started truncating SSNs in tax liens it files with local clerks and recorders, and the Department of Justice (Justice) initiated a similar practice for some liens and other records in response to our prior recommendations. However, we did not identify any federal laws restricting state or local governments from making public records available in bulk or governing how private entities may use SSNs obtained from public records, including the offshoring of records with SSNs. Although their governments have enacted measures that may address data security in the two countries where we were told public records data are sent, the extent to which those measures protect SSNs from inappropriate use is unclear. There are several bills pending in the current Congress that would limit both private and government entities' ability to sell or display SSNs to other parties. For example, one of the bills has a provision that would limit posting SSNs that are contained in public records on the Internet. The bills do not address how SSNs or personal information from public records that has been sent offshore should be handled.

Concluding Observations Recent actions by states and counties to limit the display of SSNs in records made available to the public through redaction or truncation are positive steps, but these actions will only protect SSNs in future transactions, as millions of records with SSNs have already been obtained in bulk or online. Additional concerns remain about the security of SSNs in these records. In particular, because many record keepers cannot or do not restrict what entities can obtain public records with SSNs or control


how they are used, and some businesses are sending records with SSNs offshore where little is known about how they are used or protected, ensuring the security of SSNs is an ongoing challenge. In weighing how best to address some of these open issues over the availability of SSNs in public records, Congress will need to balance the need to keep SSNs confidential with the long standing tradition of open access to public records, the rights of states and localities to regulate the availability of records they maintain, and the use of SSNs in the private sector. Recent actions taken by the IRS, Justice, and states to truncate SSNs represent one effort that may strike an appropriate balance between protecting SSNs from misuse and making a portion available for appropriate parties to firmly establish the identity of specific individuals. We provided a draft of this report to the Social Security Administration (SSA) Agency Comments and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for review and comment. SSA and FTC provided only technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to relevant congressional committees, the Commissioner of SSA, the Chairman of FTC, and other interested parties and will make copies available to others on request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 202-512-7215 or bertonid@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this study include Jeremy Cox (Assistant Director), Joel Marus (Analyst-in-Charge), Daniel Concepcion, and Jill Yost. In addition, Carolyn Boyce, Justin Fisher, Sheila McCoy, George Quinn, Walter Vance, and Charles Willson provided significant assistance.


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
Daniel Bertoni Director, Education, Workforce, and Income Security Issues


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
Enclosure I





























































Some Businesses Others	Rely on SSNs in R	ecords More th
Some businesses told us…	Because	Examples include
Having the complete SSN is critical for them.	They must ensure that they match information to the correct individual. There are many people in the nation with the same name.	Consumer reporting agencie people finders
A partial SSN (e.g., the last four digits) is sufficient.	They still need to match to an individual, but pertinent records are at the county level where the universe of individuals is smaller.	
Having an SSN is inconsequential.	They are not interested in matching data to individuals, but are instead interested in specific information such as recent home purchases.	Marketing firms

















Finding 2: Actions to protect SSNs in records




Existing Federal Laws Do Not Address the Transfer of State and Local Public Records or the Display of SSNs in Them

- Major federal privacy and records laws we reviewed, including the Privacy Act and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), do not appear to restrict the bulk transfer of state or local public records or the display of SSNs in those records.
- A 1990 amendment to the Social Security Act requires that SSNs obtained or maintained pursuant to any provision of law enacted on or after October 1, 1990, be kept confidential.⁴
 - Officials at SSA and FTC staff were not aware of any actions taken to enforce this provision, and no regulations have been promulgated implementing the provision.⁵
 - We were unable to identify any federal or state cases addressing this provision, nor could we find anything relevant in the legislative history.
 - As a result, it is not clear whether or how this provision applies to state and local government sales of public records that may contain SSNs.

29


⁴ 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(viii).
⁵ In their technical comments on a draft of this report, SSA officials noted that while SSA has general rulemaking authority with respect to this provision, it has not explored the extent of this authority. In addition, SSA officials stated that even if SSA were to promulgate regulations under this provision, it does not have the authority to enforce them. FTC does not have rulemaking authority under the amendment, according to FTC staff.





Selected Pending Federal L Display or Sale of SSNs	egislation Would Limit the
S. 238	H.R. 948
Generally prohibits the display or purchase of SSNs without the express consent of the SSN holder; contains an exception for certain public records	Makes it unlawful for any person to sell o purchase SSNs in a manner violating regulations to be promulgated by SSA; d not have explicit provisions applicable to exempting state and local governments
S. 2915	H.R. 3046
Prohibits display of SSNs to the general public on the Internet by state and local governments unless truncation standards to be set by SSA in accordance with certain guidelines are met; considers certain unencrypted transmittals of SSNs through the Internet to be a public display	With certain exceptions, restricts the sale and display of SSNs to the general public government entities; Does not specifically address SSNs in public records; Require SSA to develop uniform truncation standards

Source: GAO.

31







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