OLYMPIC SECURITY

U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future Olympics
Why GAO Did This Study

The 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, were held against the backdrop of growing concerns about international terrorism. Despite widespread fears of a potential terrorist attack on the Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and secure event with no terrorist incidents.

To assist Greece in securing the 2004 Games, U.S. government agencies provided training and other support in the four years leading up to the Games. In addition, the U.S. government provided some security and other assistance to American athletes, spectators, and commercial investors, and expects to continue such support for future Olympics, including the upcoming 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy.

GAO was asked to (1) determine the U.S. approach and coordination efforts for providing security assistance to the 2004 Summer Olympics; (2) examine the roles of U.S. agencies in Athens Olympics security and their financial outlays; and (3) review lessons learned in providing security assistance in support of the Olympics and how they are being incorporated into preparations for future Olympics.

The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice concurred with the report or had no comments.

What GAO Found

In 2001, the United States began planning its security assistance for the 2004 Summer Olympics, responding to the heightened worldwide anxiety following the September 11 attacks and Greece’s request for international advice on its security plan. The United States based much of its security assistance on knowledge gained through Greece’s participation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and through the staging of a major U.S. military exercise in March 2004. Based on these assessments, the United States employed a coordinated approach in providing security assistance to Greece for the Olympics. The U.S. Ambassador in Greece coordinated and led the U.S. interagency efforts in-country, while the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic contributions. Furthermore, the United States participated in a seven-country coordination group that aimed to identify potential areas of cooperation on security and support for Greece.

Almost 20 entities and offices within a number of U.S. agencies provided more than $35 million in security assistance and support to the government of Greece. The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, and Justice provided security training to various elements of the Greek government; the Departments of Energy and Justice provided crisis response assistance during the Olympics; and the State Department also provided special security and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and corporate sponsors. Following the 2004 Summer Games, these U.S. agencies identified a number of lessons learned, such as the importance of assessing host governments’ security capabilities early to assist in planning U.S. support, appointing key personnel to craft unified messages for the U.S. security efforts, and coordinating with multilateral and other organizing entities. These lessons were then communicated by Washington, D.C. and Athens-based personnel to U.S. officials in Italy who are preparing to support the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin.

2004 Summer Olympic Games Facts at a Glance

- First Summer Olympics post-9/11
- Second smallest country to host (approximately 10.6 million in population)
- 10,500 athletes
- 202 countries represented
- 37 events in 28 sports at 35 venues

Sources: GAO (data); MapArt.
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May 31, 2005

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Co-Chairman
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate

The Honorable Gordon H. Smith
Chairman
The Honorable Byron L. Dorgan
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Trade, Tourism, and Economic Development
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
United States Senate

The 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, were held against the backdrop of growing concerns about international terrorism, combined with the post-September 11, 2001, climate of heightened anxiety about terrorism. Greece’s history of domestic terrorism, increased security tension worldwide created by the Iraq war, and two terrorist incidents in Europe months prior to the Olympics created a challenging threat environment for the 2004 Games. Despite widespread fears of a potential terrorist attack on the Olympics, Greece hosted a safe and secure event with no terrorist incidents. Although the host government is responsible for the security of an Olympics, the United States provided years of security assistance to Greece in advance of and throughout the Games. The U.S. government expects to continue working to ensure the security of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors at future Olympics, including the upcoming 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy.

You requested that we (1) determine the U.S. approach for providing security assistance to Greece for the 2004 Summer Olympics and how such security efforts were coordinated, (2) examine the roles of U.S. agencies in Athens Olympics security and their financial outlays, and (3) review lessons learned in providing security assistance in support of the Olympics and how those lessons are being incorporated into preparations for future Olympics, especially the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy.

To accomplish our objectives, we obtained and reviewed all available interagency and agency-specific operations plans for and after-action reports on the Athens Games and operations plans for the Turin Games. We interviewed officials at the Departments of State (State), Justice (DOJ),
Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) and at certain intelligence agencies. In Athens, Greece, and Rome, Milan, and Turin, Italy, we interviewed U.S. Embassy and consulate officials and obtained documentation on the support provided by the United States for the 2004 Summer Olympics and planned U.S. support for the 2006 Winter Olympics. We interviewed Greek and Italian officials to obtain their perspective on the U.S. security support provided. We also created and distributed a data collection instrument that enabled us to collect and analyze cost information provided by key agencies involved in supporting the Athens Games. We conducted our review between October 2004 and May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief

The United States began planning its security assistance for the 2004 Summer Olympics in 2001, responding to Greece’s request for international advice regarding its security plan and the heightened worldwide concern regarding terrorism following the September 11 terrorist attacks. The United States based much of its plan for providing security assistance on knowledge gained through Greece’s long-standing participation in State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program and through the staging of several military exercises, including a major exercise in March 2004 that was specifically tailored to address a theoretical terrorist attack on the Olympics. Based on these assessments, the United States employed a coordinated approach in providing security assistance to Greece for the Olympics. The U.S. Ambassador in Greece coordinated and led the U.S. interagency efforts in-country, while the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic contributions.

Furthermore, the United States participated in a seven-country coordination group that aimed to identify potential areas of cooperation on security and support for Greece.

1The Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) Program provides training and related assistance to law-enforcement and security services of select friendly foreign governments, aiming to enhance their skills to deter and counter the threats of terrorism. The assistance addresses four specific areas—crisis prevention, crisis management, crisis resolution, and investigation—and can take many forms, such as airport security, crime-scene investigations, and chemical and biological attacks.

2The participating countries were Australia, France, Germany, Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Under the guiding principles of certain presidential directives and U.S. agencies’ own authorities, approximately 20 entities and offices within a number of U.S. agencies provided more than $35 million in security assistance and support to the government of Greece in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. State, DHS, DOD, and DOJ provided security training to various elements of the Greek government; DOE and DOJ provided crisis response assistance during the Olympics; and State also provided special security and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and corporate sponsors. Most funds spent on the Olympics came from agencies’ normal operating budgets. U.S. government agencies identified specific costs for the Olympics, including more than $10 million for travel and lodging expenses for U.S. staff temporarily assigned to Athens and more than $9 million in dedicated training to Greek officials in a wide variety of specializations. In addition, the U.S. government incurred other Olympics-related costs for activities that were accelerated or positioned to coincide with the Olympics. For example, DOE programs provided expertise and equipment to enhance Greece’s capability to detect nuclear devices and materials at certain land borders and a major port, and the 2004 DOD European Command March military exercise—which included participation by the U.S. Embassy and Greek officials—focused on a theoretical terrorist attack on the Olympics.

Following the 2004 Summer Games, the U.S. agencies involved with providing security assistance identified a number of lessons learned, such as the importance of assessing a host government’s security capabilities early to assist in planning U.S. support, appointing key personnel to craft unified messages for the U.S. security efforts, and coordinating with multilateral and other organizing entities. These lessons were then communicated by Washington, D.C.- and Athens-based personnel from State, DOJ, DHS, and DOD to their counterparts in Italy who are preparing for the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin. For the most part, the key lessons learned are being applied in preparation for the Turin Games. For example, U.S. officials in Athens noted that the long-standing U.S. relationship with Greece helped in early identification of potential security gaps and areas

3The President manages the operations of the federal government through executive orders and issues decisions on foreign affairs and national security matters through presidential directives.

4GAO surveyed the 17 entities that State had identified as playing a key role in support of the Athens Games (see app. I for more information). We received additional information on other agencies that also provided support for the Olympics.
Background

Since the revival of the Olympic Games in 1896, the event has grown from 241 athletes representing 14 countries to, in the case of the 2004 Athens Games, approximately 10,500 athletes from 202 countries. While the stated goal of the Olympic movement is “to contribute to building a peaceful and better world,” its history includes tragedy and terror as well. At the 1972 Munich Games, Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli Olympic team, resulting in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes. The 1996 Atlanta Olympics were marred by a pipe-bomb explosion that killed one person and injured 110 others.

One of the International Olympic Committee requirements for countries bidding to host the games is to ensure the security of the participating athletes and spectators, an increasingly challenging task in today’s environment of terrorist threats. In February 2002, just five months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States hosted the Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah. Amid tight security coordinated under the auspices of the U.S. Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—with support from the U.S. military—the Olympics concluded without any terrorist incidents. All eyes then turned to Athens, Greece, for the 2004 Summer Olympics.
The challenges Greece faced in hosting an Olympics included a continuing terrorist climate as well as complications arising from its own infrastructure projects. In November 2003, terrorists attacked the British consulate and a bank in Istanbul, Turkey, killing the British Consul-General and 26 others, and in March 2004, a terrorist attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed nearly 200 people. In addition, between the 1970s and early 2000s, the Greek domestic terrorist group “November 17” specifically targeted Americans stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Athens along with other western diplomats. Finally, Greece experienced delays in completing its infrastructure construction program of roads, public transit, and venue sites; the late completion of some venue sites complicated advance security planning as the Olympics opening ceremonies approached.

The second smallest country to host the Games, Greece spent approximately $1.2 billion on security preparations for the Games, along with about $10 billion for infrastructure improvements and other costs. The United States, in partnership with six other countries, worked with Greece over the four years preceding the Games to share knowledge, expertise, and equipment. This assistance helped prepare Greece for the security challenges of hosting this enormous international event in a threat environment underscored by the ongoing conflict in Iraq, recent terrorist attacks in the region, and Greek security and other issues.

The next Olympics will be the Winter Games in Turin, Italy, February 10-26, 2006. The United States is working with Italy to determine what support it may be able to provide.

### U.S. Assistance Based on Security Capabilities Assessment, Supported by Coordinated Effort

The U.S. assistance to Greece for the 2004 Summer Olympics was based on security gaps identified through a needs assessment and Greece’s participation in several U.S. military exercises. Based on these assessments, the U.S. Embassy in Athens led the governmentwide coordination effort, in concert with a Washington, D.C.-based interagency group and U.S. participation in a multilateral coordinating body.

### U.S. Security Assistance to Greece Informed by Needs Assessment and Military Exercises

In 2000, Greece began its security planning for the 2004 Summer Olympics and asked seven countries that had previously hosted Olympics or had significant counterterrorism expertise to provide advice on its security plans. These seven countries—Australia, France, Germany, Israel, Spain,
the United Kingdom, and the United States—formed the Olympic Security Advisory Group, which provided coordinated security advice to Greece on its security planning. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Greece revised its security planning in light of the worldwide heightened concerns over terrorism, and the United States began determining its approach for providing security assistance to Greece and to Americans who would be participating in or attend the Games.

The United States based its security assistance approach on knowledge gained from Greece’s participation in State’s ATA Program since 1986. In addition to this knowledge, the ATA Program led an interagency effort to conduct a thorough needs assessment in December 2001 of the Greek police and the country’s capability to provide security during the 2004 Summer Olympics. This assessment both reviewed progress gained from past ATA Program training and identified several areas of potential U.S. security assistance, including VIP security, port and maritime security, canine explosives detection, and crisis response. Based on the assessment, the United States provided additional training in preparation for the Olympics under the ATA Program. This included providing the Greek government with formal training courses and seminars and training for more than 200 Hellenic Coast Guardsmen in underwater explosive devices, advanced improvised explosive devices, weapons of mass destruction first response, and Marine interdiction procedures.

Along with the ATA Program, Greece also participated in several U.S. military exercises that helped to identify security gaps. In the fall of 2003 and spring of 2004, the U.S. DOD European Command arranged several tabletop exercises that enabled Greek decision makers at tactical and political levels to test their strategies for handling security issues. The exercises involved role playing through various crisis scenarios to determine and practice effective responses. In March 2004, DOD’s European Command coordinated the participation of the U.S. Embassy in Athens, several components of the U.S. military, and members of the newly
elected Greek government in a consequence management exercise specifically tailored to address a theoretical terrorist attack on the Olympics. For about two weeks, staff at the American Embassy, U.S. military personnel, and Greek officials played out roles and practiced their responses in the event of such an attack. Greek officials stated that this consequence management exercise enabled them to better identify areas for improvement in their security plans and capabilities. Due to the March 2004 military exercise, along with the other training, the Greek commanders at the various venues realized that in the event they could not reach their commanding officers, they needed procedures and plans in place for undertaking emergency evacuations on their own authorities. In addition, they needed the ability to communicate directly with counterparts within certain emergency response units, such as the fire department or police department. Figure 1 provides a timeline of U.S. security assistance for the 2004 Summer Olympics.

*A foreign consequence management event is an incident that occurs abroad and involves chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear contamination. It is not limited to a terrorist incident; it also can be caused by a war, natural cause, or accident. In addition, a foreign consequence management event must threaten to overwhelm existing host-nation response capabilities and prompt a host-nation request for immediate international assistance. According to the Department of State, the release of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear contaminants is required by international agreements to be reported, regardless of how the agent was released. Finally, consequence management of an incident is the sole responsibility of the host nation. The United States may be asked to provide assistance only.*
Figure 1: Timeline of U.S. Support for 2004 Athens Olympics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Greece calls the first OSAG meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>OSC position established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December 4-13 - ATA-led interagency review and assessment in Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June - State estimates that 35-150 Diplomatic Security agents will be required for Olympic operations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October - OSC arrives in Athens</td>
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Legend:
ATA - Antiterrorism Assistance Program
EUCOM - DOD European Command
OSAG - Olympic Security Advisory Group
OSC - Olympic Security Coordinator

Source: GAO.
Based on the identified security needs, the U.S. Embassy in Athens led the U.S. interagency coordination efforts in Greece. These efforts were supported by a Washington, D.C.-based interagency coordination group, in concert with the U.S. participation in the multilateral Olympic Security Advisory Group.

Because of State’s leadership role in U.S. foreign policy efforts, the U.S. Ambassador to Greece played a central coordination role for the U.S. interagency effort to support the Athens Olympics. Several agencies have identified the Ambassador’s coordination role as key to managing the complex interagency process within the Embassy, as well as with each of the agencies’ central offices in Washington, D.C., and the DOD European
Command headquarters in Germany. The Ambassador’s single point of contact for all U.S. assistance for the Olympics was the Olympic Security Coordinator, a State Diplomatic Security agent who was assigned to this role in the fall of 2001. As the head of the U.S. Embassy in Athens that houses a number of U.S. agencies, the Ambassador pulled together a central working group that included the Olympic Security Coordinator, the State Senior Regional Security Officer, the Defense Attaché, and the DOJ/FBI Legal Attaché. The Ambassador met with this group regularly prior to the Olympics to determine the roles and responsibilities for the various participating agencies in helping Greece to prepare for hosting the Olympics. In addition, the Ambassador led the planning for the agencies to provide additional security and support services for U.S. athletes, officials, spectators, and corporate sponsors for the Games.

Interagency Group Facilitated Domestic Contributions

The State-chaired International Athletic Events Security Coordination Group (interagency group), an interagency working group in Washington, D.C., facilitated and coordinated agencies’ contributions to security assistance to Greece. Established in December 2001, this group serves to coordinate U.S. government efforts for supporting U.S. embassies and host governments of major international sporting events with a variety of counterterrorism capabilities. The group played a key role in supporting security efforts for the Athens Olympics, in coordination with the Athens Embassy-based efforts. The interagency group determined support roles and responsibilities to be carried out by the various member agencies, and drafted response cables back to the Embassy. This effort aimed to keep all of the agencies informed and prevent duplicative or conflicting efforts by those involved. The interagency group grew to include representatives from the intelligence community, State, DOD, DOE, DOJ, DHS, and the Department of Health and Human Services, among others.

United States Worked with Six Partner Countries to Coordinate Host Country Security Assistance

Along with its internal interagency coordination process, the United States participated in the multilateral Olympic Security Advisory Group. The advisory group reported to the Greek Minister of Public Order on security issues at the strategic level. The group also provided advice on technical support issues at the operational level. The range of issues included intelligence, planning, training and exercises, technology, command and control coordination, and venue security. The United Kingdom chaired the group, which met monthly to coordinate advice and information shared with Greece and assign responsibility for providing Greece with security training and equipment. One senior Greek official estimated that the United States provided about 75 percent of the security assistance, the United Kingdom about 20 percent, and other countries about 5 percent.
Multiple U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for Greece

Operating under general policy guidance and their own agency-specific authorities, U.S. agencies coordinated their efforts to provide security assistance for the 2004 Summer Olympics. The U.S. government spent more than $35 million in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 in support of the Olympics.

Agencies Operated under General Policy Guidance and Agency-Specific Authorities

Although the host government has ultimate responsibility for the security of an Olympics, the United States has a vested interest in ensuring the security of its citizens in all locations. In this regard, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62 states,

The first duty of government is the protection of its citizens. That duty extends to Americans abroad, whether they are traveling in an official or private capacity. The State Department, through its chiefs of mission, will be responsible . . . for programs to preserve the safety of private U.S. citizens abroad. U.S. citizens shall be adequately warned of the danger of terrorist attack, advised regarding precautionary measures and afforded appropriate assistance and protection.

Furthermore, PDD 39 states,

It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace, or on foreign territory.

It also notes that State has the responsibility to reduce the vulnerability affecting the general safety of American citizens abroad. Under this general guidance, the U.S. government worked with the government of Greece over the four years leading up to and through the 2004 Summer Olympic Games to ensure that American citizens attending the Games would be safe and secure.

Under State’s leadership, the other agencies used their individual authorities to provide assistance. For example, according to DOJ officials, FBI has the authority to bring cases to U.S. courts to prosecute terrorist
Therefore, FBI had crisis management experts and agents prepared to help Greece process crime scenes and to gather evidence in the event of an attack. Similarly, the Transportation Security Agency, according to an agency official, has authority to work with foreign governments to address security concerns on passenger flights operated by foreign air carriers in foreign air transportation, and, therefore, provided Greece with security assessments and training at certain airports.

Some officials at State and DOJ stated that they lack specific guidance for U.S. support of a foreign security event such as the Olympics. For domestic-based “National Special Security Events,” PDD 62 lays out specific security roles and responsibilities for certain agencies, and PDD 39 provides guidance for U.S. policy on counterterrorism. Agencies used these PDDs to provide additional guidance to the U.S. efforts in support of the Athens Olympics. For example, PDD 39 created the interagency Foreign Emergency Support Team, which was deployed to the Athens Olympics to provide assistance to Greek agencies if needed. Although some agencies told us that the frameworks of these PDDs helped to guide their security assistance efforts in Greece, they also said that these PDDs outline specific agency roles only for domestic events, not foreign-based events. Some agency officials at DOD, DOJ, and State indicated that further clarification of the agencies’ roles and responsibilities in supporting foreign-based events might be helpful, particularly for planning and budgeting resources.

**Many U.S. Agencies Contributed Security Efforts for the Olympics**

**Department of State**

State, as the lead U.S. agency for foreign affairs, led the interagency effort both at the U.S. Embassy in Athens and by chairing the interagency group in Washington, D.C. This coordination effort ensured collaboration among agencies to prevent duplicative efforts.

- State’s ATA Program coordinated training provided by multiple U.S. agencies over the three years leading up to the Olympics.

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\(^6\)See 18USC2332b(f)\&(g) concerning the Attorney General's primary investigative authority for all federal crimes of terrorism, including those occurring outside the United States.
State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism heads U.S. government efforts to improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments. The office ran several interagency-staffed counterterrorism workshops in Greece prior to the Olympics to train Greek senior policy officials. These workshops provided opportunities for the Greek officials to test their security strategies and receive critiques and suggestions for improvements from U.S. experts.

State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security protects U.S. personnel and missions overseas, advising U.S. ambassadors on all security matters and providing a security program against terrorist, espionage, and criminal threats at U.S. diplomatic facilities. For the Olympics, Diplomatic Security agents provided security to U.S. athletes by traveling with U.S. athletic teams between the Olympic Village and various venues, and providing a security liaison with the Greek police commanders at the Olympic venues.

The Diplomatic Security Bureau also co-chairs the Overseas Security Advisory Council, a joint venture between State and the U.S. private sector to exchange timely information on overseas security issues with U.S. businesses. During the Olympics, the council interacted with corporate sponsors in mutually beneficial information sharing on potential security issues.

State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, which is responsible for assisting American citizens traveling or living abroad, increased its outreach to thousands of American spectators attending the Games, providing services such as replacing lost passports and acting as liaisons with Greek law enforcement.

Department of Justice

The DOJ mission is to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law; to provide federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of justice for all Americans.7

Under its broad authority, DOJ provided support to the Greek government’s efforts in dismantling the “November 17” domestic terrorism network prior to the Games.

7See also DOJ Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2003-2008.
Under its responsibility to provide training and development assistance to foreign criminal justice systems, DOJ provided legal assistance to Greece in preparing it to fulfill its law-enforcement responsibilities.

FBI has a responsibility to conduct professional investigations and authorized intelligence collection to identify and counter the threat posed by domestic and international terrorists and their supporters within the United States, and to pursue extraterritorial criminal investigations to bring the perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice. During the Olympics, FBI agents were prestaged in Greece to provide crisis management assistance in the event of a terrorist attack.

As part of its mission to assist other law-enforcement agencies in order to suppress and reduce violent crime as well as protect the public, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives supplied agents to work with State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security as security liaisons for the U.S. athletic teams.

DOD’s purpose is to protect and advance U.S. national interests, such the safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad and the security and well-being of allies and friends.

The DOD European Command’s large military exercise in March 2004 provided a unique opportunity for U.S. experts to interact with Greek political and tactical officials as they practiced antiterrorism responses to a theoretical Olympics-related terrorist attack.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is responsible for reducing the threat to the United States from nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. For the Olympics, it created some of the tabletop scenarios involving weapons of mass destruction that were used in other military exercises.

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency provides imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial data and information for planning, decision making and action in support of national security. It worked with Greece to collect imaging data to provide detailed maps of the rapidly changing Athens infrastructure prior to the Olympics. The imaging and maps also provided the U.S. government with detailed information on venues and surrounding areas in case there was a need for emergency evacuations.
U.S. Naval Forces Europe, which operates under the DOD European Command, provided the temporary installation of a Dunlop barrier in the Port of Pireaus during the Olympics. This large, floating barrier helped to protect U.S. athletes, security officials, and VIPs who were housed aboard ships in the port from potential terrorist attacks via small boats.

**Department of Homeland Security**

DHS is responsible for preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation, including safeguarding the American people and their freedoms, critical infrastructure, property, and the economy.

- The department’s Federal Air Marshal Service protects U.S. air carriers and passengers against hostile acts, and, for the Olympics, provided additional air marshals to accompany U.S.-based carriers traveling to and from Greece for the Olympics.

- Transportation Security Administration experts provided assessments of airport and mass transit security and helped to train Greek government workers.

- Immigration and Customs Enforcement provided specialized training on fraudulent document recognition.

- The U.S. Coast Guard provided training to the Greek Hellenic Coast Guard under State’s ATA Program.

- Secret Service agents provided expertise in VIP protection for State’s counterterrorism workshops in addition to providing their normal protection services for certain VIPs.

**Department of Energy**

DOE’s overarching mission is to advance the national economic and energy security of the United States.

- The DOE Office of the Second Line of Defense aims to strengthen the overall capability to detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders. Under this responsibility, it provided expertise and radiation detection equipment to the Greek Atomic Energy Commission for installation at certain border crossings, Athens International Airport, and the Port of Piraeus.
Other DOE programs provided related support, such as upgrading the physical security around a Greek nuclear research reactor and securing radiological sources at locations throughout Greece.\textsuperscript{8}

- DOE's National Nuclear Security Agency has a responsibility to promote international nuclear safety and nonproliferation and to reduce global danger from weapons of mass destruction. For the Olympics, it provided personnel in support of the Foreign Emergency Support Team, a State-led interagency rapid-response team that was deployed prior to the Olympics.

Other Agencies

U.S. Postal Inspectors, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, among others, provided additional security support for the Olympics.

Agencies Identified Additional Expenditures for Providing Security Assistance

We surveyed the U.S. agencies identified as contributing security support in advance of and at the Athens Olympic Games, and the agencies identified more than $35 million in additional expenditures in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to arrange and provide this U.S. assistance. The majority of costs identified by the agencies were travel costs for U.S. personnel supporting the Games and for training programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel. Agencies reported to us they spent more than $10 million in travel costs, including airfare, lodging, and per diem costs for hundreds of staff who traveled overseas in 2003 and 2004 to provide security assistance, with most travel occurring during the Olympics. Agencies further reported to us more than $9 million in training costs, including the costs for building and executing the consequence management military exercises and FBI forensics trainings, as well as for translation of training materials and providing translators at the training sessions. Greece had received about $1.6 million in previous ATA Program assistance between 1986 and 2001, and, in preparation for the Olympics, received over $15 million in antiterrorism assistance between 2001 and 2004. While, State was appropriated $2.763 million in fiscal year 2004 for

costs related to providing security assistance to the Olympics, all other security assistance funding came from individual agencies’ budgets and was reprogrammed from other planned uses, which in some instances caused other programs to be delayed to accommodate Olympics security needs. For example, the public affairs section at the U.S. Embassy in Athens canceled some cultural programs in order to focus on events that promoted the Olympics.

The reported costs in fiscal years 2003 and 2004 do not capture the entirety of costs for supporting the Olympics, particularly the significant salary costs for the hundreds of personnel who supported the U.S. security assistance effort. State identified about $660,000 in fiscal years 2002 to 2004 in estimated salary, benefits, and related costs for four staff who were hired to fill Olympics-related coordination roles. However, the costs of salaries and benefits of other U.S. officials who were deployed to Athens, or Embassy and other personnel who worked for months or even years to support the U.S. effort to the Games, are not included.

While the travel and training costs above were incurred directly in support of the Olympics, some U.S. agencies accelerated or repositioned other activities to coincide with Olympics preparations. For example, Department of Energy programs to provide radiation detection equipment to Greece were expedited so that the equipment could be installed at Greece’s ports of entry and at other locations in Greece in time for the Olympics. In addition, the March 2004 DOD European Command military exercise—a major exercise for training U.S. forces—was focused on Olympics-related terrorist scenarios.

Security Planning Lessons Learned from Athens Are Being Applied to Turin

Following the Athens Games, U.S. agencies collected and distributed lessons learned to agencies involved in security planning for the Turin Games. These lessons included establishing bilateral relationships to identify areas of potential assistance; designating key U.S. officials to craft and deliver unified messages; and working with the local organizing committee and multilateral contacts. These and other key lessons learned from Athens are being applied in the planning efforts for Turin. However, U.S. efforts to support the Turin Games face significant infrastructure, funding, and coordination challenges.
At the conclusion of the Athens Olympic Games, U.S. agencies involved in the security assistance effort moved quickly to collect and disseminate lessons learned to their Turin Games counterparts. Officials at State, DOD, FBI, and other key agencies completed detailed after-action reports on the aspects of security support that went well and should be replicated in the future, where feasible, and what aspects might be improved upon. In addition, in September 2004, less than 2 weeks after the closing ceremony of the Athens Games, Athens-based U.S. staff traveled to the U.S. Consulate in Milan, Italy, to meet with their Italy-based colleagues for a 2-day workshop on lessons learned in overall coordination. The U.S. Milan consulate also organized and hosted a three-day interagency conference in October 2004 for Athens- and Washington, D.C.-based officials who will be working on the Turin Winter Games.

Agencies and entities involved in the U.S. effort have also looked to continually improve. For example, at the suggestion of agencies involved in the Athens effort, the Washington, D.C.-based interagency group has formed smaller subcommittees to focus on specific areas such as logistics, transportation security, and intelligence support. The subcommittees were named in late 2004, after the Athens lessons learned were disseminated. Additionally, the United States is leading a Group of Eight initiative to capture security best practices and lessons learned in hosting major events like the Olympics. According to DOJ officials, since the advent of the modern Olympics in 1896, Group of Eight nations have hosted approximately 60 percent of all Olympics. Final Group of Eight approval for the resulting handbook is expected later this year.

While the government of Italy had yet to request U.S. security assistance as of April 2005, the U.S. government, led by State, is actively working to coordinate a U.S. security presence to support the interests of its athletes, spectators, and commercial industries during the Games. The U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator relocated to Turin from Milan in January 2005 and set up a support office in April 2005 to provide the U.S. government with a forward-based infrastructure for coordinating security support. The United States is also

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9The heads of state of the Group of Eight nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) meet at an annual summit to discuss international economic and political issues.
States is also contracting for additional office space in Turin to house the interagency joint operations and intelligence center.

The U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator in Turin has already polled participating U.S. agencies to determine their planned baseline, or initial, presence. In April 2005, the American Embassy in Rome projected that $4.4 million will be expended to support the ongoing planning efforts and an interagency presence of about 150 to 200 additional personnel during the Games. The bulk of the planned U.S. footprint comprises State Diplomatic Security agents, with supporting roles from FBI, DOD European Command, and other agencies. Figure 2 presents a timeline of planned U.S. security assistance to the 2006 Winter Olympics.

Figure 2: Timeline of Planned U.S. Support for Turin Olympics

Key Lessons Learned from Athens Being Applied to Turin

Key lessons learned from Athens that were highlighted in numerous agency after-action reports are being applied to the Turin Games security planning. These lessons include the importance of planning early by using existing bilateral relationships to assess the host country’s security capabilities; designating key U.S. officials to lead logistics and messaging efforts; and working with multilateral, bilateral, and specialized groups to improve coordination and ensure smooth access for U.S. support. The lessons
Importance of Early Planning, Informed by Existing Bilateral Relationships

Many agency after-action reports from Athens and U.S. officials' comments indicate the importance of early planning, informed by existing bilateral relationships that reveal host country security capabilities. Such early insight enables advance planning of baseline support, including logistics as well as training and military exercises to enhance the host country's capabilities. For Athens, Greece's participation in State's ATA Program and an interagency assessment in 2001 revealed Greece's capabilities, which allowed U.S. agencies to develop a succession of training activities that began in 2002. In addition, DOD's European Command began formally planning in 2003 for its March 2004 exercise. Such specially tailored, elaborate exercises take at least 6 months to plan, experts told us.

Furthermore, early planning of U.S. baseline support for an Olympics enables agencies to coordinate their efforts and plan more efficiently and effectively, including arranging accommodations, vehicle rentals, and communications infrastructure. For example, advance notification of the expected U.S. agency presence would allow for planning of support infrastructure, including operations and intelligence centers. Due to the short supply of large office space in Athens, the United States divided its operations centers there into discrete areas. U.S. officials who worked the Athens Olympics recommend that operations and intelligence centers for future Olympics be collocated, to ensure the efficient delivery and dissemination of information among U.S. agencies; however, acquiring and outfitting suitable space for a joint operations center requires advance planning. Additionally, Greece- and Italy-based U.S. officials told us that hotel accommodations within the host country can sell out up to 3 years in advance of the Olympics, and prices on accommodations, vehicle rentals, and communications wiring and infrastructure dramatically increase as the Games draw near. Planning for and securing the U.S. presence early would prevent some of the last-minute, high-cost expenditures incurred at the Athens Olympics, such as for installation of communications lines in temporary office space.

This lesson is being applied to Turin as the United States has used its long-standing counterterrorism and military partnership with Italy to better understand Italy's advanced security capabilities. Based on this assessment, the interagency working group in Washington, D.C., is determining the scope of each agency's baseline support operations to prevent duplication of effort and identify the best sources and capabilities.
The U.S. support for the Athens Games also demonstrated the importance of designating key individuals to serve as point persons for logistics and message development. As part of its coordinated approach in Athens, the U.S. Embassy designated individuals to be responsible for political, security, and logistics arrangements. Athens- and Washington, D.C.-based officials told us this strategy worked well, and recommended its future use. The clear establishment of U.S. roles and responsibilities—including a single U.S. contact to Greece—helped Greece avoid a barrage of separate requests for assistance from U.S. agencies, while also minimizing overlap among and overreach by participating U.S. agencies. As the U.S. focal points for the host government and the public, these individuals may be further tasked, as was the case in Athens, with crafting and ensuring a consistent message and setting consistent expectations for the host country and multilateral community regarding planned U.S. participation efforts. This also proved useful in Athens, U.S. officials told us.

This lesson is being applied to Turin through State’s appointment of an Olympic Security Coordinator in November 2004. This coordinator in Turin is acting as a focal point for contacts with the host government and will work with the Consul General in Milan to develop and communicate coordinated messages. Maintaining a U.S. government message for Turin that is consistent, clear, and targeted—as was done in Athens—is designed to avert possible confusion by the government of Italy on which U.S. agency to speak with to obtain certain capabilities. The strategy will also help ensure that U.S. citizens and interests receive a consistent message on security or other critical issues.
weapons of mass destruction response capabilities. Where possible, such multilateral efforts should be employed in the future to vet host country requests, provide multilateral assistance in a coordinated manner, and avoid duplication of effort among contributing countries, U.S. officials told us.

Officials who worked on the Athens Olympics also suggested working closely with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC), and local organizing committees early to ensure adequate numbers of credentials with proper access rights are granted to U.S. officials. The host country typically provides just four credentials for officials from each participating country. Given the hundreds of U.S. personnel on the ground to support the Athens Games, U.S. officials worked with the local organizing committee over many months to secure the necessary credentials for access to the Olympic Village and venues. U.S. officials stated that the IOC needs to adjust the security framework for post-September 11 Olympics, including reassessing the issuance of credentials for security support personnel. The multilateral Olympic Security Advisory Group provided feedback on this issue to the IOC at the conclusion of the Athens Games, and USOC officials stated that further discussion is planned with the IOC at future meetings.

This lesson is being applied to Turin through U.S. officials’ extensive cooperation with local organizing committees and government of Italy security officials, extending back to a formal security coordination conference in Milan in October 2004, which included personnel from State, DOJ, DHS, and DOD. The U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator has forged a close relationship with the Turin-based government of Italy Olympics security strategy official, and continues to work with him on a regular basis to ensure that detailed plans are executed appropriately. Further, key U.S. officials have also begun communicating early with the local organizing committee to ensure adequate numbers of credentials are provided with appropriate access for U.S. personnel at Olympic venues.

Application of Lessons Learned also includes Specific Projects and Strategies

The Athens lessons learned applied for the Turin Games also include more-detailed strategies and projects, highlights of which include the following:

- In Athens, U.S. support was somewhat decentralized, utilizing multiple operations centers for various functions, such as intelligence and athlete support, which officials said was challenging. Therefore, in Turin, U.S. agencies plan to better centralize resources by collocating intelligence and interagency operations centers, as well as by developing a dedicated
In Athens, some agencies struggled to identify funding sources to make advance payments on housing and logistics needs. For Turin, State is leveraging funds internally to make deposits on hotels, and agencies will be responsible for identifying and securing funding for logistics, such as lodging, communications, and transportation.

- Italy did not participate in the Olympic Security Advisory Group for the Athens Olympics, which U.S. and Greek officials credited with enhancing coordination and collaboration multilaterally. However, Italy may be creating its own multilateral advisory group.

- In Athens, State’s Diplomatic Security agents encountered problems obtaining unlimited access to all venues. In Turin, the Olympic Coordinator is working with the USOC on a plan to better deploy U.S. agents.

U.S. Support for Turin Games Faces Additional Challenges

In planning for the 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy, winter conditions and weather present a host of new and different challenges for U.S. security assistance. Winter Olympics are typically one-third the scale of the Summer Olympics, but venues are spread out over more land. Whereas the 2004 Summer Olympics were mostly centered in and around the Greek capital city, where the United States had a large embassy presence and infrastructure in place to provide administrative and logistical support for the U.S. security efforts, the 2006 Winter Games are located in the remote northwest corner of Italy. The nearest U.S. presence is the consulate in Milan, about a 90-minute drive from Turin. One Olympic Village will be in Turin, and two will be located in mountain towns up to 60 miles away, where certain sports—such as bobsled, luge, skiing, and snowboarding—will be located. Locating suitable lodging for U.S. security and support personnel near key venues is proving challenging. On-the-ground security details could prove problematic, as spectators wearing bulky winter apparel will hope to enter the venues with minimum wait outside in the cold, and traffic may clog roads leading to mountain venues. Figure 3 presents images of some of the roads leading to mountain venues, one of the venues to be used for the Olympics, and one of the three Olympic Villages that will house athletes.
Figure 3: Turin Olympics Mountain Venues

Source: GAO.

Top row: Mountain roads to Sestriere, Italy. Bottom row: Snowboarding venue in Bardonecchia, Italy; Olympic Village under construction in Sestriere (February 2004).
The threat framework surrounding the 2006 Winter Olympics remains largely the same. Italy has partnered with the United States in the war on terror, including the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and al Qaeda has named Italy as a target. In addition, Italy faced difficult security challenges at other major events, such as the meeting of the Group of Eight in Genoa in 2001, at which activists clashed violently with Italian police forces, and for the funeral of Pope John Paul II in April 2005.

Since Turin is located approximately 90 minutes from the nearest U.S. Consulate in Milan, a temporary U.S. post is being created in Turin. Opened in April 2005, this office will house the Olympic Security Coordinator, the Olympic Coordinator for logistics, the FBI liaison, and locally hired support staff. The consulate had to obtain special permission to hire local staff in Turin and secure more than $235,000 for the office space lease and security upgrades. In addition, the office had to be fully furnished and outfitted to support the needs of the staff, including furniture, supplies, computers, and telephone and fax lines. At the time of our visit in February 2005, the Milan Consul General stated that the Embassy in Rome had worked to make funding for the staff and infrastructure available from its own funds, but that those funds would need to be reimbursed by State and other agencies. At the interagency group meetings, State reminds other agencies to identify funding for their support and release it to State for immediate use to secure logistics support, such as contracting for lodging and transportation. State does not have a “major events” fund, so no monies have been budgeted for Olympics-related support. Other agencies indicated similar constraints and lack of advance budgeting for Olympics security assistance.

U.S. Role for Beijing Games Still Unclear

While U.S. agencies are focusing on the 2006 Winter Olympics, they are beginning to assess potential roles for U.S. security assistance for the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, China. These plans are still in the early stages, although State expects that the U.S. mission in Beijing will appoint both an Olympic Coordinator and an Olympic Security Coordinator by the fall of 2005 to allow them to participate in the U.S. assistance for the Turin Games. State officials have received tentative inquiries from Chinese officials regarding Olympics security issues. However, the United States has not assessed China’s security plans for the 2008 Olympics, and officials at key agencies stated they are uncertain about the extent of assistance China may request or permit from outside sources.
Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. The departments orally concurred with the content of the report or had no comments. Technical comments provided by the departments were incorporated, as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested Members of Congress. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Attorney General. We will also make copies available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. A GAO contact and key contributing staff are listed in appendix II.

Jess T. Ford
Director, International Affairs and Trade
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

To fulfill our objectives in identifying U.S. security strategies in supporting the 2004 Summer Olympics, the various roles of the U.S. agencies involved, and the lessons they learned in supporting the Olympics, we interviewed officials at the Departments of State (State), Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE) and at certain intelligence agencies, and conducted fieldwork in Athens, Greece. At all of the agencies, we obtained and reviewed all available operations plans and after-action reports. At State, we interviewed officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Counterterrorism office, Overseas Security Advisory Council, and Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, as well as the Olympic Security Coordinator. At DOJ, we interviewed officials in the Criminal Division; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), including an agent who was temporarily assigned to Greece during the Games. At DHS, we met with officials in the Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, Coast Guard, and Federal Air Marshal Service. At DOD, we spoke with officials in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, European Command, and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, as well as the former Defense Attaché for the Athens Embassy. At DOE, we interviewed an official who was deployed to Greece with the State-led Foreign Emergency Support Team. During our fieldwork in Athens in November 2004, we interviewed key U.S. officials such as the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Senior Regional Security Officer, Legal Attaché, Public Affairs Officer, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attaché, the head of the Political section, officials in the Defense Attaché Office and Consular section, and an intelligence officer. In addition, we obtained and reviewed key documents, including operational plans, after-action reports, planning manuals and timelines, and assessments. We interviewed four Greek officials identified by the Embassy as key to the Olympics process in order to assess the Greek receptivity to U.S. assistance provided and any lessons that can be applied to providing support to host governments of future Olympics. These individuals were the former head of the Greek police force, who had overall responsibility for the Greek Olympics security strategy; the official who was in charge of the Greek tactical operations center and who is now the head of the Greek police force; and the individual who was in charge of the crisis management systems during the Olympics. Finally, we interviewed one Greek-American who was the Deputy General Manager for Security for the local Athens Olympic Organizing Committee.

To determine cost estimates of U.S. security support to the Athens Olympic Games, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI) to survey...
agencies identified as contributing to the U.S. effort. A draft DCI was pretested on two federal agencies. In October 2004, GAO sent the revised DCI to the agencies identified by State in June 2004 as supporting the U.S. security assistance effort, and obtained 17 responses. Our DCI asked agencies to tell us how they collected and tracked the data on costs. We conducted follow-ups with agencies to clarify data collection issues based on the responses we received. GAO notes that not all agency components collect and track data in a consistent manner. Furthermore, the DCI did not attempt to gather information on the costs of personnel salaries, which are presumed to be a significant outlay for the agency components involved. We determined that the data are sufficiently reliable to be reported in aggregated form, rounded to millions, as estimated cost outlays and by category of expenditure, but not in precise, detailed form.

To assess how lessons learned in supporting Greece are being applied to future Games, particularly the 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, we gathered information from the various agencies identified above, reviewed operations plans and budget requests, attended meetings of the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, Turin, and mountain areas of Italy. During our fieldwork, we interviewed key U.S. officials in Rome, including the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Senior Regional Security Officer, Financial Management Officer, Information Management Officer, Consul General, intelligence officers, officials in the Office of Defense Cooperation, Political section, and Legal Attaché office. In addition, we interviewed the Italian Minister of Public Order in the Ministry of the Interior to assess the way in which the United States has presented offers of assistance for the Turin Games to the government of Italy. In Milan, we interviewed the Consul General, Acting Olympic Coordinator (for logistics), Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Secret Service Attaché, and others involved in providing logistical support, including contracting for cellular phones and transportation services for the U.S. personnel working on the Olympics. In Turin, we interviewed the Olympic Security Coordinator and the FBI liaison, visited the then-proposed site for the logistical support

1We did not survey a few agencies that State did not identify; these agencies were reported to have incurred some small costs.

2GAO identified four State personnel positions that were created specifically for Olympics and requested cost data from State for those positions only, which is included in this report.

3The official Olympic Coordinator began working in Turin, Italy, in April 2005.
office established in April 2005, and the site of the planned interagency joint operations and intelligence center. We also visited a number of the Olympics venues in the city of Turin, including the ice skating pavilion, hockey venues, the stadium for the opening and closing ceremonies, the location of the medals ceremonies, and the site of the Olympic Village. Finally, in order to understand the challenges associated with providing security support to far-flung Olympics venues, we traveled to the two mountain locations of the other Olympics Villages and the locations of the alpine skiing venue and the snowboarding venue. U.S. officials also provided us with information on their early plans to support the Beijing Olympics in 2008. We also interviewed two officials at the U.S. Olympic Committee for their perspective on U.S. government security assistance to foreign-based Olympics.

We conducted our work from October 2004 to May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
## GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

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<th>GAO Contact</th>
<th>Diana Glod, (202) 512-8945</th>
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<td><strong>Staff Acknowledgments</strong></td>
<td>In addition to the individual named above, Sharron Candon, Michelle Munn, Andrea Miller, Melissa Pickworth, Joe Carney, and Martin de Alteriis made key contributions to this report.</td>
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