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Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10 a.m. EST Thursday, February 17, 


Statement of David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States:


GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-350T, a testimony to the Subcommittee on Oversight 
of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of 
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. 

Why GAO Did This Study:

GAOís audits and evaluations identify federal programs and operations 
that, in some cases, are high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities 
to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Increasingly, GAO also is 
identifying high-risk areas to focus on the need for broad-based 
transformations to address major economy, efficiency, or effectiveness 
challenges. Since 1990, GAO has periodically reported on government 
operations that it has designated as high risk. In this 2005 update for 
the 109th Congress, GAO presents the status of high-risk areas 
identified in 2003 and new high-risk areas warranting attention by the 
Congress and the administration. Lasting solutions to high-risk 
problems offer the potential to save billions of dollars, dramatically 
improve service to the American public, strengthen public confidence 
and trust in the performance and accountability of the federal 
government, and ensure the ability of government to deliver on its 

What GAO Found:

In January 2003, GAO identified 25 high-risk areas; in July 2003, a 
26th high-risk area was added to the list. Since then, progress has 
been made in all areas, although the nature and significance of 
progress varies by area. Federal departments and agencies, as well as 
the Congress, have shown a continuing commitment to addressing high-
risk challenges and have taken various steps to help correct several of 
the problemsí root causes. GAO has determined that sufficient progress 
has been made to remove the high-risk designation from three areas: 
student financial aid programs, FAA financial management, and Forest 
Service financial management. Also, four areas related to IRS have been 
consolidated into two areas. 

This year, GAO is designating four new high-risk areas. The first new 
area is establishing appropriate and effective information-sharing 
mechanisms to improve homeland security. Federal policy creates 
specific requirements for information-sharing efforts, including the 
development of processes and procedures for collaboration between 
federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. This area 
has received increased attention but the federal government still faces 
formidable challenges sharing information among stakeholders in an 
appropriate and timely manner to reduce risk. 

The second and third new areas are, respectively, DODís approach to 
business transformation and its personnel security clearance program. 
GAO has reported on inefficiencies and inadequate transparency and 
accountability across DODís major business areas, resulting in billions 
of dollars of wasted resources. Senior leaders have shown commitment to 
business transformation through individual initiatives in acquisition 
reform, business modernization, and financial management, among others, 
but little tangible evidence of actual improvement has been seen in 
DODís business operations to date. DOD needs to take stronger steps to 
achieve and sustain business reform on a departmentwide basis. Further, 
delays by DOD in completing background investigations and adjudications 
can affect the entire government because DOD performs this function for 
hundreds of thousands of industry personnel from 22 federal agencies, 
as well as its own service members, federal civilian employees, and 
industry personnel. OPM is to assume DODís personnel security 
investigative function, but this change alone will not reduce the 
shortages of investigative personnel. 

The fourth area is management of interagency contracting. Interagency 
contracts can leverage the governmentís buying power and provide a 
simplified and expedited method of procurement. But several factors can 
pose risks, including the rapid growth of dollars involved combined 
with the limited expertise of some of agencies in using these contracts 
and recent problems related to their management. Various improvement 
efforts have been initiated to address this area, but improved policies 
and processes, and their effective implementation, are needed to ensure 
that interagency contracting achieves its full potential in the most 
effective and efficient manner.

What GAO Recommends:

This testimony contains GAOís views on what remains to be done for each 
high-risk area to bring about lasting solutions. Persistence and 
perseverance by the administration in implementing GAOís recommended 
solutions and continued oversight and action by the Congress are both 

To view the full product, click on the link above. For more 
information, contact George Stalcup at (202) 512-9490 or

[End of section]

GAO's 2005 High-Risk List:

2005 High-Risk Areas: Addressing Challenges In Broad-based 

* Strategic Human Capital Management[A].
* U.S. Postal Service Transformation Efforts and Long-Term Outlook[A].
* Managing Federal Real Property[A].
* Protecting the Federal Government's Information Systems and the 
Nation's Critical Infrastructures.
* Implementing and Transforming the Department of Homeland Security.
* Establishing Appropriate And Effective Information-Sharing Mechanisms 
to Improve Homeland Security.
* DOD Approach to Business Transformation[A].
* DOD Business Systems Modernization.
* DOD Personnel Security Clearance Program.
* DOD Support Infrastructure Management.
* DOD Financial Management.
* DOD Supply Chain Management (formerly Inventory Management).
* DOD Weapon Systems Acquisition.

2005 High-Risk Areas: Managing Federal Contracting More Effectively: 

* DOD Contract Management.
* DOE Contract Management.
* NASA Contract Management.
* Management of Interagency Contracting.

2005 High-Risk Areas: Assessing the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Tax 
Law Administration: 

* Enforcement of Tax Laws[A, B].
* IRS Business Systems Modernization[C].

2005 High-Risk Areas: Modernizing and Safeguarding Insurance and 
Benefit Programs: 
* Modernizing Federal Disability Programs[ A].
* Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation Single- Employer Insurance 
* Medicare Program[A].
* Medicaid Program[A].
* HUD Single-Family Mortgage Insurance and Rental Housing Assistance 

2005 High-Risk Areas: Other: 

* FAA Air Traffic Control Modernization.

Source: GAO.

[A] Legislation is likely to be necessary, as a supplement to actions 
by the executive branch, in order to effectively address this high-risk 

[B] Two high-risk areas--Collection of Unpaid Taxes and Earned Income 
Credit Noncompliance--have been consolidated to make this area.

[C] The IRS Financial Management high-risk area has been incorporated 
into this high-risk area.

[End of table]

Mr. Chairman, Senator Akaka, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss GAO's 2005 high-risk update 
report. As you know, we periodically assemble our work for the Congress 
in ways we hope will help in its budget and programmatic deliberations, 
as well as oversight and legislative activities. The "high-risk" 
program was begun in 1990 under the direction of my immediate 
predecessor, the Honorable Charles A. Bowsher. Beginning in 1993, we 
have been updating this report at the onset of each new Congress. This 
effort, which is actively supported by your Subcommittee, as well as 
the full Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
and the House Committee on Government Reform, has brought a much needed 
focus to problems that are impeding effective government and costing 
the government billions of dollars each year. In fact, Chairman 
Voinovich and Senator Akaka, our 2005 high-risk update was issued on 
January 25, 2005, at a press briefing that the chairs and ranking 
members of our Senate and House oversight committees, as well as both 
of you, attended.

As this Subcommittee knows, we have made hundreds of recommendations to 
improve these high-risk operations. Moreover, our focus on high-risk 
problems contributed to the Congress's enacting a series of 
governmentwide reforms to address critical human capital challenges, 
strengthen financial management, improve information technology 
practices, and instill a more results-oriented government. Our high- 
risk status reports are provided at the start of each new Congress. 
This update should help you and other Members of Congress carry out 
your responsibilities while improving the federal government's 
performance and enhancing its accountability for the benefit of the 
American people.

During my tenure as Comptroller General, our high-risk program has 
increasingly focused on those major programs and operations that need 
urgent attention and transformation in order to ensure that our 
national government functions in the most economical, efficient, and 
effective manner possible. As in prior updates, federal programs and 
operations are also emphasized when they are at high risk because of 
their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

Our report summarizes (1) progress made in correcting high-risk 
problems, (2) actions under way, and (3) further actions that we 
believe are needed. In this update, we determined that sufficient 
progress had been made to remove the high-risk designation from three 
areas, and we designated four new areas as high risk. In addition, 
several prior high-risk areas have been consolidated or modified.

Our objective for the high-risk list is to bring "light" to these areas 
as well as "heat" to prompt needed "actions." The Bush Administration 
has looked to our high-risk program to help shape various 
governmentwide initiatives such as the President's Management Agenda, 
which has at its base many of the areas we had previously designated as 
high risk. To its credit, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has 
worked closely with a number of agencies that have high-risk issues, in 
many cases establishing action plans and milestones for agencies to 
complete needed actions to address areas that we have designated as 
high risk. In this regard, Clay Johnson, OMB's Deputy Director for 
Management, recently reaffirmed the Bush Administration's desire to 
refocus on GAO's high-risk list in order to make as much progress as 
possible in the President's second term. This is very encouraging. 
However, continued oversight by the Congress will also be key, and in 
the case of some areas, legislative actions will be needed.

Just yesterday, we issued another report entitled 21st Century 
Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal Government [Hyperlink,], which presented a 
number of illustrative questions for the Congress and other policy 
makers to consider as they carry out their various constitutional 
responsibilities. These questions span a broad range of budget 
categories and federal operations, including discretionary and 
mandatory spending, and tax policies and programs. We hope that this 
new report, along with the high-risk report, will be used by various 
congressional committees as they consider which areas of government 
need particular attention and reconsideration. In the final analysis, 
only elected officials can decide whether, when, and how best to 
proceed to address these important issues.

High-Risk Designations Removed:

For this 2005 high-risk update, we determined that three high-risk 
areas warranted removal from the list because of progress made. They 
are the Department of Education's (Education) Student Financial Aid 
Programs, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Financial Management, 
and the Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Forest Service Financial 
Management. We will, however, continue to monitor these programs, as 
appropriate, to ensure that the improvements we have noted are 

Student Financial Aid Programs:

In 1990, we designated student financial aid programs as high risk. 
Since then, in intervening high-risk updates, we reported various 
problems, including poor financial management and weak internal 
controls, fragmented and inefficient information systems, and 
inadequate attention to program integrity as evidenced by high default 
rates and the numbers of ineligible students participating in the 
programs. In 1998, the Congress established Education's Office of 
Federal Student Aid (FSA) as the government's first performance-based 
organization, thus giving it greater flexibility to better address long-
standing management weaknesses within student aid programs. In 2001, 
Education created a team of senior managers dedicated to addressing key 
financial and management problems throughout the agency, and in 2002, 
the Secretary of Education made removal from GAO's high- risk list a 
specific goal and listed it as a performance measure in Education's 
strategic plan. We reported in 2003 that Education had made important 
progress, but that it was too early to determine whether improvements 
would be sustained and that additional steps needed to be taken in 
several areas.

Since 2003, Education has sustained improvements in the financial 
management of student financial aid programs and taken additional steps 
to address our concerns about systems integration, reporting on 
defaulted loans, and human capital management. Furthermore, the agency 
has met many of our criteria for removing the high-risk designation. 
Education has demonstrated a strong commitment to addressing risks; 
developed and implemented corrective action plans; and, through its 
annual planning and reporting processes, monitored the effectiveness 
and sustainability of its corrective measures. Thus, while FSA needs to 
continue its progress and take additional steps to fully address some 
of our recommendations, we are removing the high-risk designation from 
student financial aid programs.

FSA has sustained improvements to address its financial management and 
internal control weaknesses. FSA received an unqualified, or "clean," 
opinion on its financial statements for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 
2004. In addition, the auditors indicated progress in addressing 
previously identified internal control weaknesses, with no material 
weaknesses[Footnote 1] reported in FSA's fiscal year 2003 and 2004 
audits. However, the auditors reported that FSA should continue to 
further strengthen these internal controls, which are related to the 
calculation and reporting of the loan liability activity and subsidy 
estimates, as well as its information systems controls. FSA has also 
established processes to address several previously reported internal 
control weaknesses that made FSA vulnerable to improper payments in its 
grant and loan programs. For example, FSA has taken steps to better 
ensure that grants are not awarded to ineligible students and has 
implemented a process to identify and investigate schools for possible 
fraudulent activities or eligibility-related violations. Further, FSA 
addressed concerns we raised about students who were underreporting 
family income, by working with OMB and the Department of the Treasury 
to draft legislation that would permit use of tax information to verify 
income reported on student aid applications.

FSA has taken further actions toward integrating its many disparate 
information systems. FSA has developed an integration strategy that 
focuses on achieving a seamless information exchange environment 
whereby users--students, educational institutions, and lenders--would 
benefit from simplified access to the agency's financial aid processes 
and more consistent and accurate data across its programs. FSA also has 
made progress toward establishing an enterprise architecture for 
guiding its systems integration efforts and has begun three efforts for 
reengineering its information-processing environment, which would 
consolidate and integrate most of its systems and move it closer to a 
seamless information exchange environment.

FSA also included action steps for achieving student loan default 
management goals in its annual plan and has taken steps to help reduce 
the default rate. In 2003, FSA created a work group that identified 
over 60 default prevention and management initiatives and established a 
new organizational unit to focus on mitigating and reducing the risk of 
loss to the taxpayer from student obligations. FSA added information to 
its exit counseling guide to help increase borrowers' awareness of the 
benefits of repaying their loans through electronic debiting accounts 
and prepayment options. In 2003, FSA reported a cohort default rate of 
5.4 percent for 2001, and defaulted loans as a percentage of total 
outstanding loans declined from 9.4 percent in 2001 to 7.6 percent in 

FSA is taking steps to address its human capital challenges. It 
developed a comprehensive human capital strategy that includes many of 
the practices of leading organizations and has addressed many of the 
issues we previously raised. For example, FSA identified challenges 
that it will likely face in coming years, such as likely retirements, 
and discussed recognized weaknesses, such as the need to develop the 
skills of staff and maintain the focus of the agency's leadership on 
human capital issues. FSA has also prepared a succession plan that 
addresses some of our concerns about the pending retirement of senior 
employees in key positions across the agency. Additionally, FSA has 
established several approaches to support staff development by revising 
its Skills Catalog, which should enable staff to independently plan 
their professional development; introducing online learning tools; 
offering a wide variety of internal courses; and providing funds for 
external courses.

FAA Financial Management:

We first designated FAA financial management as high risk in 1999 
because the agency lacked accountability for billions of dollars in 
assets and expenditures due to serious weaknesses in its financial 
reporting, property, and cost accounting systems. These problems 
continued through fiscal year 2001, when FAA's financial management 
system required 850 adjustments totaling $41 billion in order to 
prepare FAA's annual financial statements. In addition, at that time, 
FAA could not accurately and routinely account for property totaling a 
reported $11.7 billion, and lacked the cost information necessary for 
decision making as well as to adequately account for its activities and 
major projects, such as the air traffic control modernization program. 
Also, while FAA received an unqualified audit opinion on its fiscal 
year 2001 financial statements, the auditor's report cited a material 
internal control weakness related to FAA's lack of accountability for 
its property and several other internal control weaknesses related to 
financial management issues.

At the time of our January 2003 high-risk report, FAA had made 
significant progress in addressing its financial management weaknesses, 
most importantly through ongoing efforts to develop a new financial 
management system called Delphi, including an integrated property 
accounting system, as well as initiatives to develop a new cost 
accounting system. However, these new systems were still under 
development and not yet operational. Therefore, it had yet to be seen 
whether the new systems would resolve the long-standing financial 
management issues that had resulted in our designation of FAA financial 
management as high risk. As a result, we retained FAA financial 
management as a high-risk area, while noting that significant progress 
was being made.

FAA management has continued to make progress since our January 2003 
high-risk report. Subsequent auditors' reports on FAA's financial 
statements for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 were unqualified, but 
continued to cite internal control weaknesses, although less severe 
than in prior years, related to FAA's then existing financial 
management systems. In fiscal year 2004, FAA implemented its new Delphi 
general ledger system, including an integrated property accounting 
system. FAA management was able to prepare financial statements for the 
fiscal year ended September 30, 2004, using these new systems, and 
FAA's auditors gave FAA an unqualified opinion on these financial 
statements. While the auditors reported several internal control 
weaknesses related to the implementation of the new financial 
management systems, none of these were considered to be material 
weaknesses, and FAA management, in responding to the auditor's report, 
indicated their full commitment to addressing these issues.

While the cost accounting system is still under development, progress 
has been made. The cost accounting interface with Delphi was completed 
in fiscal year 2004, and the labor distribution interface is expected 
to be completed in fiscal year 2005. For the first time, some cost 
accounting data, while not available on a monthly basis, were available 
shortly after fiscal-year end for the 12 months ended September 30, 
2004. FAA management has demonstrated its commitment to the full 
implementation of this system, devoting significant planning and 
resources to its completion and the monitoring of its implementation 

While it is important that FAA management continue to place a high 
priority on the cost system and, more importantly, ultimately use cost 
information routinely in FAA decision making, FAA's progress in 
improving financial management overall since our January 2003 high-risk 
update has been sufficient for us to remove the high-risk designation 
for FAA financial management.

Forest Service Financial Management:

We first designated USDA's Forest Service financial management as high 
risk in 1999 because the agency lacked accountability over billions of 
dollars in its two major assets--fund balance with the Department of 
the Treasury (Treasury) and property, plant, and equipment. Since the 
Forest Service is a major component of USDA, the lack of accountability 
over these two major assets contributed to disclaimers of opinions on 
USDA's consolidated financial statements. In addition, the Forest 
Service continued to have material weaknesses in its accounting and 
reporting of accounts receivable and accounts payable. This precluded 
the agency from knowing costs it had incurred and amounts owed to 
others throughout the year. These problems were further exacerbated by 
problems with the Forest Service's partial implementation of its new 
financial accounting system. This system was unable to produce certain 
critical budgetary and accounting reports that track obligations, 
assets, liabilities, revenues, and costs. Thus, these financial 
reporting weaknesses hampered management's ability to effectively 
manage operations, monitor revenue and spending levels, and make 
informed decisions about future funding needs.

The Forest Service's long-standing financial management deficiencies 
were also evident in the repeated negative opinions on its financial 
statements, including adverse opinions in fiscal years 1991, 1992, and 
1995. Due to the severity of its accounting and reporting deficiencies, 
the Forest Service did not prepare financial statements for fiscal year 
1996, but chose instead to focus on trying to resolve these problems. 
However, the Forest Service's pervasive material internal control 
weaknesses continued to plague the agency. In our 2001 high-risk 
update, we reported that the USDA Office of Inspector General was 
unable to determine the accuracy of the Forest Service's reported $3.1 
billion in net property, plant, and equipment, which represented 51 
percent of the agency's assets. We also reported that the inspector 
general was unable to verify fund balances with Treasury totaling $2.6 
billion because the reconciliation of agency records with Treasury 
records had not been completed. Because of the severity of these and 
other deficiencies, the inspector general disclaimed from issuing 
opinions on the Forest Service's financial statements for fiscal years 
1997 through 2001. In addition, we noted that the Forest Service's 
autonomous field structure hampered efforts to correct these accounting 
and financial reporting deficiencies. We also reported that the Forest 
Service had implemented its new accounting system agencywide. However, 
the system depended on and received data from feeder systems that were 
poorly documented, operationally complex, deficient in appropriate 
control processes, and costly to maintain.

In our 2003 high-risk report, while we highlighted that the Forest 
Service continued to have long-standing material control weaknesses, 
including weaknesses in its fund balance with Treasury and in property, 
plant, and equipment, we reported that the Forest Service had made 
progress toward achieving accountability by receiving its first 
unqualified opinion on its fiscal year 2002 financial statements. 
Although the Forest Service had reached an important milestone, it had 
not yet proved it could sustain this outcome, and had not reached the 
end goal of routinely producing timely, accurate, and useful financial 
information. As a result, we retained Forest Service financial 
management as a high-risk area.

In the past 2 years, the Forest Service has made additional progress, 
especially with respect to addressing several long-standing material 
internal control deficiencies. Based on our criteria for removing a 
high-risk designation, which includes a demonstrated strong commitment, 
corrective action plan, and progress in addressing deficiencies, we 
believe the Forest Service's overall improvement in financial 
management since our January 2003 high-risk update has been sufficient 
for us to remove Forest Service financial management from the high-risk 
list at this time. The Forest Service has resolved material 
deficiencies related to its fund balance with Treasury and in property, 
plant, and equipment, thus increasing accountability over its billions 
of dollars in assets, and USDA and the Forest Service received 
unqualified opinions on their fiscal year 2004 financial statements.

This does not mean that the Forest Service has no remaining challenges. 
For example, while we recognized its clean opinion for fiscal year 2002 
in our last update, subsequently, in fiscal year 2003, these financial 
statements had to be restated to correct material errors. The Forest 
Service also received a clean opinion for fiscal year 2003, but these 
financial statements had to be restated in fiscal year 2004 to again 
correct material misstatements. Frequent restatements to correct errors 
can undermine public trust and confidence in both the entity and all 
responsible parties. Further, the Forest Service continues to have 
material internal control weaknesses related to financial reporting and 
information technology security, and its financial management systems 
do not yet substantially comply with the Federal Financial Management 
Improvement Act of 1996.

However, the Forest Service has demonstrated a strong commitment to 
efforts under way or planned, that, if effectively implemented, should 
help to resolve many of its remaining financial management problems and 
move it toward sustainable financial management business processes. 
These efforts are designed to address internal control and 
noncompliance issues identified in audit reports, as well as 
organizational issues. For example, during fiscal year 2004, the Forest 
Service began reengineering and consolidating its finance, accounting, 
and budget processes. We believe these efforts, if implemented 
effectively, will provide stronger financial management, sustain 
positive audit results, and ensure compliance with federal financial 
reporting standards. Yet, it is important that USDA and Forest Service 
officials continue to place a high priority on addressing the Forest 
Service's remaining financial management problems, and we will continue 
to monitor its progress.

New High-Risk Areas:

Our use of the high-risk designation to draw attention to the 
challenges associated with the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 
of government programs and operations in need of broad-based 
transformation has led to important progress. We will also continue to 
identify high-risk areas based on the more traditional focus on fraud, 
waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Overall, our focus will continue to be 
on identifying the root causes behind vulnerabilities, as well as 
actions needed on the part of the agencies involved and, if 
appropriate, the Congress. For 2005, we have designated the following 
four new areas as high risk: Establishing Appropriate and Effective 
Information-Sharing Mechanisms to Improve Homeland Security, Department 
of Defense (DOD) Approach to Business Transformation, DOD Personnel 
Security Clearance Program, and Management of Interagency Contracting.

Establishing Appropriate and Effective Information-Sharing Mechanisms 
to Improve Homeland Security:

Information is a crucial tool in fighting terrorism, and the timely 
dissemination of that information to the appropriate government agency 
is absolutely critical to maintaining the security of our nation. The 
ability to share security-related information can unify the efforts of 
federal, state, and local government agencies, as well as the private 
sector as appropriate, in preventing or minimizing terrorist attacks.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks heightened the need for comprehensive 
information sharing. Prior to that time, the overall management of 
information-sharing activities among government agencies and between 
the public and private sectors lacked priority, proper organization, 
coordination, and facilitation. As a result, the existing national 
mechanisms for collecting threat information, conducting risk analyses, 
and disseminating warnings were at an inadequate state of development 
for protecting the United States from coordinated terrorist attacks.

Information sharing for securing the homeland is a governmentwide 
effort involving multiple federal agencies, including but not limited 
to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB); the Departments of 
Homeland Security (DHS), Justice, State, and Defense; and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. Over the past several years, GAO has identified 
potential information-sharing barriers, critical success factors, and 
other key management issues that should be considered, including the 
processes, procedures, and systems to facilitate information sharing 
among and between government entities and the private sector.

Establishing an effective two-way exchange of information to detect, 
prevent, and mitigate potential terrorist attacks requires an 
extraordinary level of cooperation and perseverance among federal, 
state, and local governments and the private sector to establish 
timely, effective, and useful communications. Since 1998, GAO has 
recommended the development of a comprehensive plan for information 
sharing to support critical infrastructure protection efforts. The key 
components of this recommendation can be applied to broader homeland 
security and intelligence-sharing efforts, including clearly 
delineating the roles and responsibilities of federal and nonfederal 
entities, defining interim objectives and milestones, setting time 
frames for achieving objectives, and establishing performance measures.

We have made numerous recommendations related to information sharing, 
particularly as they relate to fulfilling federal critical 
infrastructure protection responsibilities.[Footnote 2] For example, we 
have reported on the practices of organizations that successfully share 
sensitive or time-critical information, including establishing trust 
relationships, developing information-sharing standards and protocols, 
establishing secure communications mechanisms, and disseminating 
sensitive information appropriately. Federal agencies have concurred 
with our recommendations that they develop appropriate strategies to 
address the many potential barriers to information sharing. However, 
many federal efforts remain in the planning or early implementation 

In the absence of comprehensive information-sharing plans, many aspects 
of homeland security information sharing remain ineffective and 
fragmented. Accordingly, we are designating information sharing for 
homeland security as a governmentwide high-risk area because this area, 
while receiving increased attention, still faces significant 
challenges. Since 2002, legislation,[Footnote 3] various national 
strategies, and executive orders have specified actions to improve 
information sharing for homeland security.

Earlier this month, DHS released an Interim National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP),[Footnote 4] which addresses some of the key 
issues that GAO has previously identified. The DHS plan is intended to 
provide a consistent, unifying structure for integrating critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) efforts into a national program. The 
interim NIPP identifies key stakeholders and participants in 
information sharing efforts related to public-private efforts to 
protect critical infrastructure. In addition, the plan recognizes that 
information sharing systems can be broadly defined as interactions of 
people, physical structures, information, and technologies that are 
designed to ensure that critical, high-quality, and productive 
knowledge is available to decision makers whenever and wherever it is 
needed. Further, the plan identifies key responsibilities for DHS, 
including the development, implementation, and expansion of information-
sharing strategies to support infrastructure protection efforts.

The interim plan released by DHS is an important step toward improving 
information sharing for infrastructure protection efforts; however, 
extraordinary challenges remain. As the 9/11 Commission recognized, 
information sharing must be "guided by a set of practical policy 
guidelines that simultaneously empower and constrain officials, telling 
them clearly what is and is not permitted."[Footnote 5] While the wide 
range of executive and legislative branch actions is encouraging, 
significant challenges remain in developing the required detailed 
policies, procedures, and plans for sharing homeland security-related 
information. For example, the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act 
required procedures for facilitating homeland security information 
sharing and established authorities to share different types of 
information, such as grand jury information; electronic, wire, and oral 
interception information; and foreign intelligence information. In July 
2003, the President assigned these functions to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security,[Footnote 6] but no deadline was established for 
developing information-sharing procedures. Without clear processes and 
procedures for rapidly sharing appropriate information, the ability of 
private sector entities to effectively design facility security systems 
and protocols can be impeded. In addition, the lack of sharing 
procedures can also limit the federal government's accurate assessment 
of nonfederal facilities' vulnerability to terrorist attacks.

In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) required the establishment of (1) an information-
sharing environment (ISE) as a means of facilitating the exchange of 
terrorism information among appropriate federal, state, local, and 
tribal entities, and the private sector; and (2) an information-sharing 
council to support the President and the ISE program manager with 
advice on developing policies, procedures, guidelines, roles, and 
standards necessary to implement and maintain the ISE. It will be 
important to ensure that the DHS information- sharing systems are 
coordinated with those required under the intelligence reform 

Improving the standardization and consolidation of data can also 
promote better sharing. For example, in 2003 we found that goals, 
objectives, roles, responsibilities, and mechanisms for information 
sharing had not been consistently defined by the 9 federal agencies 
that maintain 12 key terrorist and criminal watch list systems. As a 
result, efforts to standardize and consolidate appropriate watch list 
data would be impeded by the existence of overlapping sets of data, 
inconsistent agency policies and procedures for the sharing of those 
data, and technical incompatibilities among the various watch list 
information systems. In addition, 2004 reports from the inspectors 
general at DHS and the Department of Justice highlight the challenges 
and slow pace of integrating and sharing information between 
fingerprint databases.[Footnote 7]

A great deal of work remains to effectively implement the many actions 
called for to improve homeland security information sharing, including 
establishing clear goals, objectives, and expectations for the many 
participants in information-sharing efforts; and consolidating, 
standardizing, and enhancing federal structures, policies, and 
capabilities for the analysis and dissemination of information.

DOD Approach to Business Transformation:

DOD spends billions of dollars each year to sustain key business 
operations that support our forces, including, for example, systems and 
processes related to human capital policies and practices, acquisition 
and contract management, financial management, supply chain management, 
business systems modernization, and support infrastructure management-
-all of which appear on GAO's high-risk list. Recent and ongoing 
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and new homeland defense 
missions have led to newer and higher demands on our forces in a time 
of growing fiscal challenges for our nation. In an effort to better 
manage DOD's resources, the Secretary of Defense has appropriately 
placed a high priority on transforming force capabilities and key 
business processes.

For years, we have reported on inefficiencies and the lack of adequate 
transparency and appropriate accountability across DOD's major business 
areas, resulting in billions of dollars of wasted resources annually. 
Although the Secretary of Defense and senior leaders have shown 
commitment to business transformation, as evidenced by individual key 
initiatives related to acquisition reform, business modernization, and 
financial management, among others, little tangible evidence of actual 
improvement has been seen in DOD's business operations to date. 
Improvements have generally been limited to specific business process 
areas, such as DOD's purchase card program, and have resulted in the 
incorporation of many key elements of reform, such as increased 
management oversight and monitoring and results-oriented performance 
measures. However, DOD has not taken the steps it needs to take to 
achieve and sustain business reform on a broad, strategic, 
departmentwide, and integrated basis. Among other things, it has not 
established clear and specific management responsibility, 
accountability, and control over overall business transformation- 
related activities and applicable resources. In addition, DOD has not 
developed a clear strategic and integrated plan for business 
transformation with specific goals, measures, and accountability 
mechanisms to monitor progress, or a well-defined blueprint, commonly 
called an enterprise architecture, to guide and constrain 
implementation of such a plan. For these reasons, we, for the first 
time, are designating DOD's lack of an integrated strategic planning 
approach to business transformation as high risk.

DOD's current and historical approach to business transformation has 
not proven effective in achieving meaningful and sustainable progress 
in a timely manner. As a result, change is necessary in order to 
expedite the effort and increase the likelihood of success. For DOD to 
successfully transform its business operations, it will need a 
comprehensive and integrated business transformation plan; people with 
needed skills, knowledge, experience, responsibility, and authority to 
implement the plan; an effective process and related tools; and results-
oriented performance measures that link institutional, unit, and 
individual performance goals and expectations to promote accountability 
for results. Over the last 3 years, we have made several 
recommendations that, if implemented effectively, could help DOD move 
forward in establishing the means to successfully address the 
challenges it faces in transforming its business operations. For 
example, we believe that DOD needs a full-time chief management officer 
(CMO) position, created through legislation, with responsibility, 
authority, and accountability for DOD's overall business transformation 
efforts. This is a "good government" matter that should be addressed in 
a professional and nonpartisan manner. The CMO must be a person with 
significant authority and experience who would report directly to the 
Secretary of Defense. Given the nature and complexity of the overall 
business transformation effort, and the need for sustained attention 
over a significant period of time, this position should be a term 
appointment (e.g., 7 years), and the incumbent should be subject to a 
performance contract. DOD has agreed with many of our recommendations 
and launched efforts intended to implement many of them, but progress 
to date has been slow. In my view, it will take the sustained efforts 
of a CMO, as we have proposed, to make the needed progress in 
transforming DOD's business operations.

DOD Personnel Security Clearance Program:

Delays in completing hundreds of thousands of background investigations 
and adjudications (a review of investigative information to determine 
eligibility for a security clearance) have led us to add the DOD 
personnel security clearance program to our 2005 high-risk list. 
Personnel security clearances allow individuals to gain access to 
classified information that, in some cases, could reasonably be 
expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national defense or 
foreign relations through unauthorized disclosure. Worldwide 
deployments, contact with sensitive equipment, and other security 
requirements have resulted in DOD's having approximately 2 million 
active clearances. Problems with DOD's personnel security clearance 
process can have repercussions throughout the government because DOD 
conducts personnel security investigations and adjudications for 
industry personnel from 22 other federal agencies, in addition to 
performing such functions for its own service members, federal civilian 
employees, and industry personnel. While our work on the clearance 
process has focused on DOD, clearance delays in other federal agencies 
suggest that similar impediments and their effects may extend beyond 

Since at least the 1990s, we have documented problems with DOD's 
personnel security clearance process, particularly problems related to 
backlogs and the resulting delays in determining clearance eligibility. 
Since fiscal year 2000, DOD has declared its personnel security 
clearance investigations program to be a systemic weakness--a weakness 
that affects more than one DOD component and may jeopardize the 
department's operations--under the Federal Managers' Financial 
Integrity Act of 1982. An October 2002 House Committee on Government 
Reform report also recommended including DOD's adjudicative process as 
a material weakness. As of September 30, 2003 (the most recent data 
available), DOD could not estimate the full size of its backlog, but we 
identified over 350,000 cases exceeding established time frames for 
determining eligibility.

The negative effects of delays in determining security clearance 
eligibility are serious and vary depending on whether the clearance is 
being renewed or granted to an individual for the first time. Delays in 
renewing previously issued clearances can lead to heightened risk of 
national security breaches because the longer individuals hold a 
clearance, the more likely they are to be working with critical 
information and systems. Delays in issuing initial clearances can 
result in millions of dollars of additional costs to the federal 
government, longer periods of time needed to complete national security-
related contracts, lost-opportunity costs if prospective employees 
decide to work elsewhere rather than wait to get a clearance, and 
diminished quality of the work because industrial contractors may be 
performing government contracts with personnel who have the necessary 
security clearances but are not the most experienced and best-qualified 
personnel for the positions involved.

DOD has taken steps--such as hiring more adjudicators and authorizing 
overtime for adjudicative staff--to address the backlog, but a 
significant shortage of trained federal and private-sector 
investigative personnel presents a major obstacle to timely completion 
of cases. Other impediments to eliminating the backlog include the 
absence of an integrated, comprehensive management plan for addressing 
a wide variety of problems identified by us and others. In addition to 
matching adjudicative staff to workloads and working with the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) to develop an overall management plan, DOD 
needs to develop and use new methods for forecasting clearance needs 
and monitoring backlogs, eliminate unnecessary limitations on 
reciprocity (the acceptance of a clearance and access granted by 
another department, agency, or military service), determine the 
feasibility of implementing initiatives that could decrease the backlog 
and delays, and provide better oversight for all aspects of its 
personnel security clearance process.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 authorized 
the transfer of DOD's personnel security investigative function and 
over 1,800 investigative employees to OPM. The transfer is scheduled to 
take place this month. While the transfer would eliminate DOD's 
responsibility for conducting the investigations, it would not 
eliminate the shortage of trained investigative personnel needed to 
address the backlog. Although DOD would retain the responsibility for 
adjudicating clearances, OPM would be accountable for ensuring that 
investigations are completed in a timely manner.

Management of Interagency Contracting:

In recent years, federal agencies have been making a major shift in the 
way they procure many goods and services. Rather than spending a great 
deal of time and resources contracting for goods and services 
themselves, they are making greater use of existing contracts already 
awarded by other agencies. These contracts are designed to leverage the 
government's aggregate buying power and provide a much-needed 
simplified method for procuring commonly used goods and services. Thus, 
their popularity is gaining quickly. The General Services 
Administration (GSA) alone, for example, has seen a nearly tenfold 
increase in interagency contract sales since 1992, pushing the total 
sales mark up to $32 billion (see fig. 1). Other agencies, such as the 
Department of the Treasury and the National Institutes of Health, also 
sponsor interagency contracts.

Figure 1: Multiple Award Schedule Sales, Fiscal Years 1992 through 

[See PDF for image]

Note: Dollar amounts are then-year dollars.

[End of figure]

These contract vehicles offer the benefits of improved efficiency and 
timeliness; however, they need to be effectively managed. If they are 
not properly managed, a number of factors can make these interagency 
contract vehicles high risk in certain circumstances: (1) they are 
attracting rapid growth of taxpayer dollars; (2) they are being 
administered and used by some agencies that have limited expertise with 
this contracting method; and (3) they contribute to a much more complex 
environment in which accountability has not always been clearly 
established. Use of these contracts, therefore, demands a higher degree 
of business acumen and flexibility on the part of the federal 
acquisition workforce than in the past. This risk is widely recognized, 
and the Congress and executive branch agencies have taken several steps 
to address it. However, the challenges associated with these contracts, 
recent problems related to their management, and the need to ensure 
that the government effectively implements measures to bolster 
oversight and control so that it is well positioned to realize the 
value of these contracts, warrants designation of interagency 
contracting as a new high-risk area.

Interagency contracts are awarded under various authorities and can 
take many forms. Typically, they are used to provide agencies with 
commonly used goods and services, such as office supplies or 
information technology services. Agencies that award and administer 
interagency contracts usually charge a fee to support their operations. 
These types of contracts have allowed customer agencies to meet the 
demands for goods and services at a time when they face growing 
workloads, declines in the acquisition workforce, and the need for new 
skill sets.

Our work, together with that of some agency inspectors general, has 
revealed instances of improper use of interagency contracts. For 
example, we recently reviewed contracts and task orders awarded by DOD 
and found some task orders under the GSA schedules that did not satisfy 
legal requirements for competition because the work was not within the 
scope of the underlying contracts.[Footnote 8] Similarly, the inspector 
general for the Department of the Interior found that task orders for 
interrogators and other intelligence services in Iraq were improperly 
awarded under a GSA schedule contract for information technology 
services.[Footnote 9] More broadly, the GSA inspector general conducted 
a comprehensive review of the contracting activities of GSA's Federal 
Technology Service (FTS), an entity that provides contracting services 
for agencies across the government, and reported that millions of 
dollars in fiscal year 2003 awards did not comply with laws and 
regulations.[Footnote 10] Administration officials have acknowledged 
that the management of interagency contracting needs to be improved.

Interagency contracting is being used more in conjunction with 
purchases of services, which have increased significantly over the past 
several years and now represent over half of federal contract spending. 
Agencies also are buying more sophisticated or complex services, 
particularly in the areas of information technology and professional 
and management support. In many cases, interagency contracts provide 
agencies with easy access to these services, but purchases of services 
require different approaches in describing requirements, obtaining 
competition, and overseeing contractor performance than purchases of 
goods. In this regard, we and others have reported on the failure to 
follow prescribed procedures designed to ensure fair prices when using 
schedule contracts to acquire services. At DOD, the largest customer 
for interagency contracts, we found that competition requirements were 
waived for a significant percentage of supply schedule orders we 
reviewed, frequently based on an expressed preference to retain the 
services of incumbent contractors. DOD concurred with our 
recommendations to develop guidance for the conditions under which 
waivers of competition may be used, require documentation to support 
waivers, and establish approval authority based on the value of the 
orders.[Footnote 11]

There are several causes of the deficiencies we and others have found 
in the use of interagency contracts, including the increasing demands 
on the acquisition workforce, insufficient training, and in some cases 
inadequate guidance. Two additional factors are worth noting. First, 
the fee-for-service arrangement creates an incentive to increase sales 
volume in order to support other programs of the agency that awards and 
administers an interagency contract. This may lead to an inordinate 
focus on meeting customer demands at the expense of complying with 
required ordering procedures. Second, it is not always clear where the 
responsibility lies for such critical functions as describing 
requirements, negotiating terms, and conducting oversight. Several 
parties--the requiring agency, the ordering agency, and in some cases 
the contractor--are involved with these functions. But, as the number 
of parties grows, so too does the need to ensure accountability.

The Congress and the administration have taken several steps to address 
the challenges of interagency contracting. In 2003, the Congress sought 
to improve contract oversight and execution by enacting the Services 
Acquisition Reform Act. The act created a new chief acquisition officer 
position in many agencies and enhanced workforce training and 
recruitment. More recently, the Congress responded to the misuse of 
interagency contracting by requiring more intensive oversight of 
purchases under these contracts. In July 2004, GSA launched "Get It 
Right," an oversight and education program, to ensure that its largest 
customer, DOD, and other federal agencies properly use GSA's 
interagency contracts and its acquisition assistance services. Through 
this effort, GSA seeks to demonstrate a strong commitment to customer 
agencies' compliance with federal contracting regulations and, among 
other things, improve processes to ensure competition, integrity, and 
transparency. Additionally, to address workforce issues, OMB, GSA, and 
DOD officials have said they are developing new skills assessments, 
setting standards for the acquisition workforce, and coordinating 
training programs aimed at improving the capacity of the federal 
acquisition workforce to properly handle the growing and increasingly 
complex workload of service acquisitions.

These recent actions are positive steps toward improving management of 
interagency contracting, but, as with other areas, some of these 
actions are in their early stages and others are still under 
development. In addition, it is too early to tell whether all of the 
corrective actions will be effectively implemented, although a recent 
limited review by the GSA inspector general found some improvement at 
FTS from enhanced management controls. Our work on major management 
challenges indicates that specific and targeted approaches are also 
needed to address interagency contracting risks across the government. 
Ensuring the proper use of interagency contracts must be viewed as a 
shared responsibility of all parties involved. But this requires that 
specific responsibilities be more clearly defined. In particular, to 
facilitate effective purchasing through interagency contracts, and to 
help ensure the best value of goods and services, agencies must clarify 
roles and responsibilities and adopt clear, consistent, and enforceable 
policies and processes that balance the need for customer service 
against the requirements of contract regulations. Internal controls and 
appropriate performance measures help ensure that policies and 
processes are implemented and have the desired outcomes.

In addition, to be successful, efforts to improve the contracting 
function must be linked to agency strategic plans. As with other 
governmentwide high-risk areas, such as human capital and information 
security, effectively addressing interagency contract management 
challenges will require agency management to commit the necessary time, 
attention, and resources, as well as the executive branch and the 
Congress to enhance their oversight. Making these investments has the 
potential to improve the government's ability to acquire high-quality 
goods and services in an efficient and effective manner, resulting in 
reduced costs, improved service delivery, and strengthened public trust.

Emerging Areas:

In addition to specific areas that we have designated as high risk, 
there are other important broad-based challenges facing our government 
that are serious and merit continuing close attention. One area of 
increasing concern involves the need for the completion of 
comprehensive national threat and risk assessments in a variety of 
areas. For example, emerging requirements from the changing security 
environment, coupled with increasingly limited fiscal resources across 
the federal government, emphasize the need for agencies to adopt a 
sound approach to establishing realistic goals, evaluating and setting 
priorities, and making difficult resource decisions. We have advocated 
a comprehensive threat and/or risk management approach as a framework 
for decision making that fully links strategic goals to plans and 
budgets, assesses values and risks of various courses of action as a 
tool for setting priorities and allocating resources, and provides for 
the use of performance measures to assess outcomes. Most prominently, 
two federal agencies with significant national security 
responsibilities--DHS and DOD--are still in the beginning stages of 
adopting a risk-based strategic framework for making important resource 
decisions involving billions of dollars annually. This lack of a 
strategic framework for investment decisions is one of the reasons that 
implementing and transforming DHS, and DOD's approach to business 
transformation, have been designated as high-risk areas. At the same 
time, this threat/risk assessment concept can be applied to a broad 
range of existing federal government programs, functions, and 

The relatively new DHS, with an annual budget of over $40 billion, has 
not completed risk assessments mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 to set priorities to help focus its resources where most needed. 
In performing its duties to protect the nation's critical 
infrastructure, DHS has not made clear the link between risk assessment 
and resource allocation, for example, what criteria it initially used 
to select assets of national importance and the basic strategy it uses 
to determine which assets warrant additional protective measures, and 
by how much these measures could reduce the risk to the nation. We have 
reviewed the work of several of DHS's component agencies that have 
taken some initial steps towards risk management, but much remains to 
be done. DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), as a first 
step toward developing budget requests and workforce plans for fiscal 
year 2007 and beyond, has had its Office of Investigations field 
offices conduct baseline threat assessments to help identify risks. 
However, performance measures to assess how well a particular threat 
has been addressed were not used for workforce planning in ICE's fiscal 
year 2006 budget request. DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has 
taken steps to address the terrorism risks posed by oceangoing cargo 
containers. However, CBP has not performed a comprehensive set of 
assessments vital for determining the level of risk for oceangoing 
cargo containers and the types of responses necessary to mitigate that 
risk. The need to use a risk management approach has been a recurring 
theme in our previous work in transportation security. We reported in 
2003 that DHS's Transportation Security Administration (TSA) planned to 
adopt a risk management approach. To date, including in our most recent 
work on general aviation security, we have found that TSA has not fully 
integrated this approach, which includes assessments of threat, 
vulnerability, and criticality, to help it prioritize its efforts. As a 
result, we have recommended that TSA continue its efforts to integrate 
a risk management approach into its processes.

DOD, with an annual budget of over $400 billion, exclusive of 
supplemental funding, is in the process of transforming its force 
capabilities and business processes. We have reported on limitations in 
DOD's strategic planning and budgeting, including the use of overly 
optimistic assumptions in estimating funding needs, often resulting in 
a mismatch between programs and budgets. In its strategic plan--the 
September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review--DOD outlined a new risk 
management framework consisting of four dimensions of risk--force 
management, operational, future challenges, and institutional--to use 
in considering trade-offs among defense objectives and resource 
constraints. According to DOD, these risk areas are to form the basis 
for DOD's annual performance goals. They will be used to track 
performance results and will be linked to planning and resource 
decisions. As of December 2004, DOD was still in the process of 
implementing this approach departmentwide. It also remains unclear how 
DOD will use this approach to measure progress in achieving business 
and force transformation.

We believe that instilling a disciplined approach to identifying and 
managing risk has broad applicability across a wide range of federal 
programs, operations, and functions throughout the federal government. 
This will be a continuing focus of our work in the future. More 
generally, we will also continue to monitor other management challenges 
identified through our work, including those discussed in our January 
2003 Performance and Accountability Series: Major Management Challenges 
and Program Risks [Hyperlink,
95] through [Hyperlink,]. 
While not high risk at this time, these challenges warrant continued 
attention. For example, at the U.S. Census Bureau, a number of 
operational and managerial challenges loom large as the agency 
approaches its biggest enumeration challenge yet, the 2010 Census. The 
Census Bureau will undertake an important census test and make critical 
2010 Census operational and design decisions in the coming months--and 
we will continue to closely monitor these challenges to assist the 
Congress in its oversight and the Census Bureau in its decision making.

Progress Being Made in Other High-Risk Areas:

For other areas that remain on our 2005 high-risk list, there have been 
important but varying levels of progress, although not yet enough 
progress to remove these areas from the list. Top administration 
officials have expressed their commitment to maintaining momentum in 
seeing that high-risk areas receive adequate attention and oversight. 
Since our 2003 high-risk report, OMB has worked closely with a number 
of agencies that have high-risk issues, in many cases establishing 
action plans and milestones for agencies to complete needed actions to 
address areas that we have designated as high risk. Such a concerted 
effort by agencies and ongoing attention by OMB are critical; our 
experience over the past 15 years has shown that perseverance is 
required to fully resolve high-risk areas. The Congress, too, will 
continue to play an important role through its oversight and, where 
appropriate, through legislative action targeted at the problems and 
designed to address high-risk areas. Examples of areas where noticeable 
progress has been made include the following:

* Strategic Human Capital Management. Recognizing that federal agencies 
must transform their organizations to meet the new challenges of the 
21st century and that their most important asset in this transformation 
is their people, we first added human capital management as a 
governmentwide high-risk issue in January 2001 to help focus attention 
and resources on the need for fundamental human capital reform 
requiring both administrative and legislative action. Since then, the 
Congress and the agencies have made more progress in revising and 
redesigning human capital policies, processes, and systems than in the 
previous quarter century. The Congress has called on agencies to do a 
better and faster job of hiring the right people with the right skills 
to meet their critical missions, such as protecting the homeland, and 
gave the agencies new flexibilities to meet this challenge. The 
Congress has also granted agencies, such as DOD and DHS, unprecedented 
flexibility to redesign their human capital systems, including 
designing new classification and compensation systems, which could 
serve as models for governmentwide change. Therefore, effectively 
designing and implementing any resulting human capital systems will be 
of critical importance not just for these agencies, but for overall 
civil service reform. As part of the President's Management Agenda, the 
administration has also made strategic human capital management one of 
its top five priorities and established a system for holding agencies 
accountable for achieving this change. Some agencies have begun to 
assess their future workforce needs and implement available 
flexibilities to meet those needs. As a result of the ongoing 
significant changes in how the federal workforce is managed, there is 
general recognition that there should be a framework to guide human 
capital reform built on a set of beliefs that entail fundamental 
principles and boundaries that include criteria and processes that 
establish checks and limitations when agencies seek and implement their 

* Federal Real Property. Since January 2003, the administration has 
taken several key steps to address long-standing problems in managing 
federal real property. First, in an effort to provide a governmentwide 
focus on federal real property issues, the President added the Federal 
Asset Management Initiative to the President's Management Agenda and 
signed Executive Order 13327 in February 2004. Under the order, 
agencies are to designate a senior real property officer to, among 
other things, identify and categorize owned and leased real property 
managed by the agency and develop agency asset management plans. 
Agencies such as DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have 
taken other actions--DOD is preparing for a round of base realignments 
and closures in 2005, and in May 2004, VA announced a wide range of 
asset realignment decisions. These and other efforts are positive 
steps, but it is too early to judge whether the administration's focus 
on this area will have a lasting impact. The underlying conditions and 
related obstacles that led to our high-risk designation continue to 
exist. Remaining obstacles include competing stakeholder interests in 
real property decisions; various legal and budget-related disincentives 
to optimal, businesslike, real property decisions; and the need for 
better capital planning among agencies.

Other areas in which improvements have been shown include the Postal 
Service's transformation efforts and long-term outlook, modernizing 
federal disability programs, the Medicaid program, HUD's Single-Family 
Mortgage Insurance and Rental Housing Assistance programs, and the 
implementation and transformation of DHS.

Consolidation of High-Risk Areas:

Collection of Unpaid Taxes and Earned Income Credit Noncompliance:

We have combined our previous Collection of Unpaid Taxes and Earned 
Income Credit Noncompliance high-risk areas into an area titled 
Enforcement of Tax Laws. Collection of unpaid taxes was included in the 
first high-risk series report in 1990, with a focus on the backlog of 
uncollected debts owed by taxpayers. In 1995, we added Filing Fraud as 
a separate high-risk area, narrowing the focus of that high-risk area 
in 2001 to Earned Income Credit Noncompliance because of the 
particularly high incidence of fraud and other forms of noncompliance 
in that program. We expanded our concern about the Collection of Unpaid 
Taxes in our 2001 high-risk report to include not only unpaid taxes 
(including tax evasion and unintentional noncompliance) known to the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but also the broader enforcement issue 
of unpaid taxes that IRS has not detected. We made this change because 
of declines in some key IRS collection actions as well as IRS's lack of 
information about whether those declines had affected voluntary 
compliance. Although the Congress dedicated a specific appropriation 
for Earned Income Credit compliance initiatives (both to curb 
noncompliance and encourage participation) in fiscal years 1998 through 
2003, with the 2004 budget the Congress returned to appropriating a 
single amount for IRS to allocate among its various tax law enforcement 

In recent years, the resources IRS has been able to dedicate to 
enforcing the tax laws have declined, while IRS's enforcement workload-
-measured by the number of taxpayer returns filed--has continually 
increased. As a result, nearly every indicator of IRS's coverage of its 
enforcement workload has declined in recent years. Although in some 
cases workload coverage has increased, overall IRS's coverage of known 
workload is considerably lower than it was just a few years ago. 
Although many suspect that these trends have eroded taxpayers' 
willingness to voluntarily comply--and survey evidence suggests this 
may be true--the cumulative effect of these trends is unknown because 
new research into the level of individual taxpayer compliance is only 
now being completed by IRS after a long hiatus. Based on this new 
research, in 2005, IRS intends to release a new estimate of 
noncompliance and begin to use this research to improve targeting of 
enforcement and other compliance resources.

Further, IRS's workload has grown ever more complex as the tax code has 
grown more complex. Complexity creates a fertile ground for those 
intentionally seeking to evade taxes and often trips others into 
inadvertent noncompliance. IRS is challenged to administer and explain 
each new provision, thus absorbing resources that otherwise might be 
used to enforce the tax laws.

At the same time, other areas of particularly serious noncompliance 
have gained the attention of IRS and the Congress--such as abusive tax 
shelters and schemes employed by businesses and wealthy individuals 
that often involve complex transactions that may span national 
boundaries. Given the broad decline in IRS's enforcement workforce, the 
resulting decreased ability to follow up on suspected noncompliance, 
the emergence of sophisticated evasion concerns, and the unknown effect 
of these trends on voluntary compliance, IRS is challenged on virtually 
all fronts in attempting to ensure that taxpayers fulfill their 
obligations. IRS's success in overcoming these challenges becomes ever 
more important in light of the nation's large and growing fiscal 
pressures. Accordingly, we believe the focus of concern on the 
enforcement of tax laws is not confined to any one segment of the 
taxpaying population or any single tax provision. Our designation of 
the enforcement of tax laws as a high-risk area embodies this broad 

IRS Business Systems Modernization and IRS Financial Management:

IRS has long relied on obsolete automated systems for key operational 
and financial management functions, and its attempts to modernize these 
aging computer systems span several decades. This long history of 
continuing delays and design difficulties and their significant impact 
on IRS's operations led us to designate IRS's systems modernization 
activities and its financial management as high-risk areas in 1995. 
Since that time, IRS has made progress in improving its financial 
management, such as enhancing controls over hard copy tax receipts and 
data and budgetary activity, and improving the accuracy of property 
records. Additionally, for the past 5 years, IRS has received clean 
audit opinions on its annual financial statements and, for the past 3 
years, has been able to achieve these opinions within 45 days of the 
end of the fiscal year. However, IRS still needs to replace its 
outdated financial management systems as part of its business systems 
modernization program. Accordingly, since the resolution of IRS's 
remaining most serious and intractable financial management problems 
largely depends upon the success of IRS's business systems 
modernization efforts, and since we have continuing concerns related to 
this program, we are combining our two previous high-risk areas into 
one IRS Business Systems Modernization high-risk area.

Major Management Challenges at Federal Agencies:

We recently compiled lists of products issued since January 2003 
related to the major management challenges identified in the 2003 
Performance and Accountability Series. These lists, accompanied by 
narratives describing the related major management challenges, are 
available on our Web site at [Hyperlink,]. 
As always, GAO stands ready to assist the Congress as it develops its 
agenda and pursues these important high- risk issues.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Akaka, and Members of the Subcommittee, this 
concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions you 
may have.



[1] A material weakness is a condition in which the design or operation 
of one or more of the internal control components does not reduce to a 
relatively low level the risk that errors, fraud, or noncompliance in 
amounts that would be material to the financial statements may occur 
and not be detected promptly by employees in the normal course of 
performing their duties.

[2] GAO, Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, 
Challenges, and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-1165T (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 17, 2003); and Homeland Security: Information-Sharing 
Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-715T 
(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2003).

[3] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296); the Intelligence 
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).

[4] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (Washington D.C.: February 2005).

[5] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission 
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
upon the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
July 22, 2004).

[6] Executive Order 13311: Homeland Security Information Sharing 
(Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2003).

[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, 
Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, 
OIG-05-06 (Washington D.C.: December 2004); and U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Inspector General, Semiannual Report to the 
Congress: Top Management Challenges (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2003).

[8] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures 
and Management Challenges, GAO-04-605 (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2004).

[9] U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General, 
Review of 12 Procurements Placed Under General Services Administration 
Federal Supply Schedules 70 and 871 by the National Business Center 
(Washington, D.C.: 2004). 

[10] U.S. General Services Administration, Office of the Inspector 
General, Compendium of Audits of the Federal Technology Service's 
Regional Client Support Centers (Washington, D.C.: 2004). 

[11] GAO, Contract Management: Guidance Needed to Promote Competition 
for Defense Task Orders, GAO-04-874 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004).